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ABSTRACT 
This thesis comprises of two parts. Part One of the thesis denotes an archival modelling study 
that evaluates the relationships between effective audit committee characteristics (size, inde-
pendence, financial expertise, meeting frequency, directorship, tenure and age of audit commit-
tees) and perceived audit quality in Hong Kong. Part Two is a questionnaire survey study explor-
ing the effects of external auditors’ trust in audit committee members on both their interactions 
and perceived audit quality in Hong Kong.  
In the archival modelling study, discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones model 
were employed in order to measure perceived audit quality. Fixed effect panel data regression 
with robust standard errors was used as primary analysis. On the basis of data obtained from the 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Composite Index between 2010 and 2015, the findings suggest that their 
financial expertise, size, tenure and age are important determinants of perceived audit quality. 
This result indicates that their expertise enables them to fulfil their oversight role competently, 
whereas their size provides them with sufficient resources to be able to perform their roles. Simi-
larly, their length of tenure enables them to obtain more experience and knowledge of the opera-
tions of companies, while their age indicates that they may have less energy to perform their 
oversight role and have difficulties in keeping abreast of changing environment of companies. 
Thus, an audit committee with old members may reduce audit quality. Audit fees and choice of 
auditor are used as the measures of audit quality for the robustness checks.  The results of ro-
bustness checks demonstrate that a large audit committee with financial expertise demands 
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greater efforts from external auditors, as indicated in higher audit fees. However, audit commit-
tee members’ directorships are found to be negatively associated with audit fees but positively 
related to the appointment of Big 4 auditors.   
In the questionnaire survey study, perceived audit quality is measured based on external auditors’ 
interactions with audit committee members. Semi-structured questionnaires were used in order to 
assess the levels of their trust in audit committee members and their interactions. Ordinary least 
square with robust standard errors, independent t-tests and thematic analysis were used in this 
study. According to the findings, the external auditors trust them because they have and display 
integrity, competence and goodwill. These findings also suggest that their trust in audit commit-
tee members improve their interactions in terms of sharing information, devoting their time and 
efforts to an external audit and providing their comments on managers.  
Overall, both findings are congruent with agency theory and social interdependence theory. On 
the one hand, agency theory states that higher quality audit committees are associated with effec-
tive monitoring, which, in turn, helps to improve audit quality so that earnings management is 
constrained. On the other hand, social interdependence theory states that when two parties (ex-
ternal auditors and audit committee members, in this case) depend on one another, they will try 
to improve their interactions so that their common goals (high audit quality) can be achieved on 
the basis of trust. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, professionals, boards of 
directors and audit firms, particularly on issues relating to audit quality and the mandating of 
corporate governance practices.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight role has received great attention from regu-
lators, audit firms, as well as financial statement users since the reliability of financial statements 
and audit quality has been questioned after financial scandals (Basiuddin, 2011; DeFond and 
Francis, 2005). 
 
Agency theory explains why external audits and corporate governance are required to protect the 
interest of shareholders. Since they do not participate in day-to-day operation of a company, they 
tend to depend upon managers to manage a company’s operations. However, managers may not 
always act in the best interest of shareholders, which is why external audits and corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms are required to protect their interest (Chen et al., 2006; Beasley, 2000; Cad-
bury, 1992; Denis et al., 1997; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wallance, 
1980). The agency theory will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2.1.  
 
One of the corporate governance mechanisms is the oversight of audit committees (abbreviated 
to AC in the entire thesis) on the integrity of financial statements and quality of external audit 
that provides independent checks on the integrity of financial statements (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; 
UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) so that agent-principal conflict is reduced. Therefore, it 
should reduce the probability that accounting frauds and aggressive earnings management occur; 
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for this reason, financial statement users may use these statements to make appropriate decisions 
(Liao and Hsu, 2013; Carcello et al., 2011; Duchin et al., 2010). Regulators are of the view that 
effective corporate governance improves the ability of the board and ACs to oversee managers, 
external audits and financial statements for the shareholders’ interest (Sarbanes-Oxley 2002; UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2010). Therefore, it is argued that effective AC characteristics 
should improve the effectiveness of their oversight effort in mitigating agent-principal conflict 
by monitoring audit quality.  
 
Furthermore, in the context of external audit, ACMs are required to interact with external audi-
tors (EA) to ensure high quality audit. For example, the interactions include their engagement in 
discussions with ACMs on clients’ operations, significant risk areas, managers’ integrity and be-
haviour, indicators of frauds and progress and scope of an external audit (HKICPA, 2015; Char-
tered Professional Accountants of Canada, 2014). EAs are expected to discuss significant and 
critical accounting policies and estimates with ACMs, so they better understand specific account-
ing policies relevant to the firm and industry and whether the estimates are appropriate (PCAOB, 
2012). Another example is discussion on the significant usual transactions (PCAOB, 2012). The 
discussions enable EAs to assess the risk and nature of the transactions so that they understand 
how to perform appropriate audit approaches on the transactions. They also communicate with 
ACMs for difficulties encountered in performing the audit (PCAOB, 2012). One of the difficul-
ties is managers’ incooperation. This allows ACMs to understand how to require managers to 
cooperate with EAs.  
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These interactions are expected to positively impact the quality of an external audit. Extant stud-
ies suggest that trust is an important factor that improves interactions between actors (Minnar et 
al., 2017; Bogt and Tillema, 2016; Bien, Ben and Wang, 2014; Oortmerssen, Woerkum and 
Aarts 2014; Cullen, Edelenbos and Eshuis, 2012; Silva et al. 2012; Robson, Katsikeas and Bello, 
2008; Berends et al., 2006; Johnson and Sakano, 2000). Hence, it can be expected that EAs’ trust 
should encourage them to interact with ACMs with effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
an external audit leading to enhanced audit quality.   
 
However, prior studies suggest that the impacts of AC characteristics on audit quality in Hong 
Kong were conducted on data in the years preceding the global financial crisis in 2008 (Cheng, 
Lui and Shum, 2015; Lin, Hutchinson, and Percy 2015; Chan et al., 2011; Cheung et al., 2011; 
Chau and Leung 2006; Ching, Firth, and Rui, 2006; Jaggi and Leung, 2007). In addition, the 
scope of the prior studies on the impacts of AC characteristics on audit quality in Hong Kong has 
remained very limited. The details of prior studies pertaining to corporate governance and audit 
quality in Hong Kong have been discussed in Section 1.2. Furthermore, no extant studies have 
explored the factors that influence EAs’ trust in ACMs and the ramifications of this trust on their 
interactions and audit quality. Against this backdrop, the current study seeks to fill the 
knowledge gaps in these identified areas.  
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This study examines the role of ACMs on audit quality rather than financial reporting quality. 
Biddle et al. (2009, p.113) defined financial reporting quality as “the precision with which finan-
cial reporting conveys information about the firm’s operations, in particular its expected cash 
flows, that inform equity investors”. The quality is the accuracy of information contained in fi-
nancial reports before the external audits. However, audit quality is defined as “meeting inves-
tors’ needs for independent and reliable audits and robust audit committee communications on 
financial statements, disclosures, internal control, and going concern warnings” (PCAOB, 2013, 
p.1). Audit quality is concerned more about the appropriateness of an external audit to improve 
the quality of financial information.  
 
Gaynor et al. (2016) stated that financial reporting quality captures the extent to which the finan-
cial statements reflect the firm’s underlying economic condition but audit quality measures the 
quality of assurance that the external auditors (EAs) obtained sufficient appropriate evidence that 
the financial statements faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics. Thereby, financial 
reporting quality is the quality of the financial information which is independent of the quality of 
external audits such as the quality of EAs’ input, audit process and EAs’ interactions with audit 
committee members (ACMs) and their oversight effort on the quality of audit work. However, 
this study aims to examine the oversight role of ACMs in improving the quality of external work, 
so audit quality rather than financial reporting quality should be used. The definitions of audit 
quality are further explored in Section 2.4.1.   
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1.1 Justifications for the Study 
 
The failures of the companies such as Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Arthur Andersen, 
WorldCom, China Metal Recycling, Hontex, Shanghai Pharmaceuticals Holdings Co Ltd and 
Olympus Corporation resulted in losses worth hundred billions of dollars by shareholders, banks, 
audit firms, suppliers, customers, employees and other stakeholders due to weak monitoring 
mechanisms (HK Company Law, 2013; Basiruddin, 2012; New York Times, 2002). Effective 
monitoring mechanisms such as an effective AC may have prevented these financial scandals 
from occurrence or at least reduce their severity (OECD, 2004; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). 
Whilst the occurrence of these financial scandals could be attributed to several reasons, it may 
also indicate the ineffectiveness of ACMs in the discharge of their oversight role (Krishnan and 
Visvanthan, 2007; Scott, 2012; Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard, 
2007).  
 
One way in which the AC could mitigate financial scandal or poor financial reporting is by en-
suring the quality of an external audit. For instance, ACMs should effectively assess the sound-
ness of audit strategy and implementation arrangements along with any deviation from the audit 
plan as agreed with EAs, monitor the judgment and expertise of audit team whilst also evaluating 
EAs’ effectiveness in assessing the quality and transparency of financial reporting by managers 
(PwC, 2013; HKSA, 2002). More specifically, they would do well to ensure that EAs understand 
the risks and issues that assume significance to the audit (PwC, 2013; HKSA, 2002) and oversee 
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changes within scope of an external audit, EAs’ relationships with managers and any breaches of 
independence and subsequent mitigating actions (PwC, 2013). Moreover, they should examine 
the comprehensiveness and clarity of the audit findings, including the views on the robustness of 
the company’s going concern assessment, outcome and disclosure (HKSA, 2002). They should 
also monitor robustness and appropriateness of the audit firm’s internal quality control proce-
dures and examine the efficacy of communications between EAs and managers (PwC, 2013), 
whilst also responding to EAs about significant issues affecting the financial statements (PwC, 
2013).  
 
The failure to perform these oversight roles may lead to low quality audit, thus allowing manag-
ers to manipulate financial statements with a view to mislead financial statement users. Therefore, 
financial scandals may occur (Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2011; Beasley, 1996, Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney, 1996).  
 
This study aims to enhance our understanding of issues about the oversight role of the AC in au-
dit quality. Numerous studies in the past have focused on the effectiveness of the regulations on 
the AC characteristics in the US (Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 2018; Cohen, Hoitash and 
Krishnamoorthy, 2014; Munsif, Raghunandan and Dasaratha, 2013; Owens-Jackson, Robinson 
and Waller Shelton, 2009; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001) and the UK (Chaudhry and Noel, 2017; 
Alzeban and Sawan, 2015; Basil, 2011; Basiruddin, 2011; Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; 
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Zaman and Sarens, 2013). However, the characteristics of Hong Kong markets are very different 
from those of the UK and US. These unique characteristics have been discussed in Sections 1.1.1 
to 1.1.4. Therefore, the roles of the AC should be investigated in such a unique market especially 
after the financial crisis in 2008 because managers are under pressure to manipulate earnings in 
order to show strong financial performance. Moreover, previous studies have focused on the reg-
ulations as governance mechanisms, but continued to ignore the interactions taking place be-
tween ACMs and EAs on audit quality. EAs’ trust in ACMs may enhance the quality of audit 
because their trust may enhance their performance by encouraging them to interact with ACMs 
and limit their opportunistic behaviour in external audits. The next section discusses the unique 
characteristics of Hong Kong.  
 
1.1.1 Hong Kong Regulatory Framework  
 
The first unique characteristic of Hong Kong is its regulatory framework. According to Lam 
(2013), the framework of corporate governance can be categorised as both statutory and non-
statutory requirements. Statutory requirements include Securities and Futures Commission, 
Companies Ordinance, Securities Ordinance and Takeover Codes. Non-statutory requirements, 
on the other hand, are the rules specified in the Listing Rules. The requirements of AC character-
istics are specified in the Listing Rules. Hence, AC characteristics are not regulated under statu-
tory requirements. Since the Listing Rules have no legal effects on the listed firms, the most se-
vere form of punishment is from public censure or cold-shouldering (Zhou, 2006).  
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Hong Kong listed companies do have the freedom to determine as to whether AC characteristics 
deviate from the requirements under the Listing Rules. This is not the same as the requirements 
in the US, which legally requires a listed company to have an AC and meet the required AC 
characteristics (Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002). Since the legal requirements of AC characteristics 
are viscerally different, the findings of the US studies cannot be generalised to Hong Kong.  
 
1.1.2 Family Ownership Concentration  
 
The second unique characteristic is concerned with family members’ involvement in a company. 
In Hong Kong, corporate ownership is very concentrated within the hands of a few family mem-
bers, unlike the US and other Western countries where the ownership is widely spread 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002). Mok, Lam and Cheung (1992) opined that 
family-controlled firms were not uncommon in Hong Kong. Tsui and Stott (2004) reported that 
the ten most prominent families in Hong Kong controlled approximately 32.1 percent of assets of 
listed companies in Hong Kong. Correspondingly, Credit Suisse (2011) showed that 62% of the 
country’s firms were family firms. Analogously, Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009) stated that approx-
imately 50 percent of the listed companies in Hong Kong were controlled by family members 
through the appointment of family members on the board. Family members in Hong Kong ap-
pointed chairpersons or executive directors on the board in order to safeguard their personal in-
terests in the listed companies. If family board members are executive members in a firm, control 
will be dominated, thereby weakening the ability of companies to make independent decisions 
(Jaggi and Leung, 2007). Jaggi and Leung (2007) examined whether voluntary establishment of 
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an AC in Hong Kong from 1999 to 2000 can effectively reduce earnings management. They 
found that the presence of family members on boards did reduce the effectiveness of ACs. In ad-
dition, they observed that the effectiveness of independent non-executive directors on an AC in 
lowering discretionary accruals was reduced for family firms in Hong Kong.  
 
As mentioned before, since the ownership structure in Hong Kong is very different from those in 
the US and Europe, the findings in these countries may not be generalised to Hong Kong. If 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few family members, they may misuse their power to 
appoint executive directors on the boards. The independence of an AC may be impaired because 
the reappointment of ACMs is predicated on the personal relationships with family members 
who appoint them on the board. For this reason, they are less likely to oppose the family mem-
bers (Jaggi and Leung, 2007).   
1.1.3 Chinese Culture and Philosophy 
The third unique characteristic of Hong Kong relates to directors and EAs. Chinese, American 
and European culture are very different, so it is only natural that their thoughts and actions may 
differ from those of American and European. For instance, many Chinese and Hong Kong people 
are Confucians who negate the value of individual independence. Instead, they emphasise group 
recognition, mutual interdependence and shared collective interests (Liu and Li N.D.).  Confu-
cianism encourages ACMs to focus on the group interests of the members inside companies such 
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as managers as opposed to the interests of members outside companies like shareholders and 
government.  
Many Chinese and Hong Kong people are also Taoismists. The philosophy of Taoism is contra-
dictory to that of corporate governance. Taoism suggested that humans should not use rules and 
regulations to control behaviour of others because this is temporal and interferes with the nature 
(Lao, 1998). Nevertheless, corporate governance focuses on strict controls over the behaviour of 
managers by the oversight of ACMs and EAs. Since the Chinese culture and philosophy focuses 
on protecting the interests of people inside the company and opposing the actions to oversee 
managers and EAs, ACMs in Hong Kong may become more passive in monitoring them. There-
fore, Hong Kong is a unique place for this study. 
1.1.4 Duality of CEO 
 
The fourth unique characteristic influences the independence of a chairperson to monitor a com-
pany in Hong Kong. Duality refers to the concept that a person serves as chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chairperson of a company (Boyd, 1995). In this regard, Malette and Fowler (1992) 
suggested that the roles of CEO and chairperson must be separated. CEO is responsible for the 
operations of a company, but chairperson is responsible for monitoring the performance of man-
agers, including the CEO. Therefore, if the roles of CEO and chairperson are combined, the 
chairperson may be able to monitor his or her own work as a CEO, thereby rendering the moni-
toring ineffective (Malette and Fowler, 1992).  
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As compared to Europe, Hong Kong has more listed companies which combine the roles of CEO 
and chairperson. This dual role is also popular in the US. Only 40 percent of large listed compa-
nies in the US had separate roles of CEO and chairperson in 2014 (Deloitte, 2014).  In the UK, 
approximately 10 percent of the listed companies served the dual roles of CEO and chairperson 
(Deloitte, 2011; Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005; Higgs, 2003; Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001).  
 
It may be noted that the levels of dual roles of CEO and chairperson in Hong Kong listed com-
panies were between those of the US and UK.  According to Gui and Leung (2004), the propor-
tion of dual roles of CEO and chairperson in Hong Kong was 54 percent in 1996. According to 
Chen, Stouraitis and Wong (2005), it was approximately 52 percent from 1995 to 1998.  
 
In the wake of these differences, the oversight effects of AC on audit quality may differ because 
the chairperson, who is the CEO, of a company may appoint a related person to be ACMs to 
oversee the financial statements that are prepared by the subordinates of the CEO. In this case, 
since the ACMs may not be truly independent, the efficacy of their oversight may be reduced, 
leading to impaired audit quality.  
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1.2 Motivations for the Study 
The distinctiveness of the context explained above provides three main motivations for this study:  
 
Firstly, a review of audit quality literature reveals a paucity of research relating audit quality on 
various attributes of corporate governance such as AC and board characteristics in such a unique 
market in Hong Kong. To that end, this is the most comprehensive study that investigates the im-
pacts of AC and board characteristics on audit quality in Hong Kong.  
 
Secondly, this review also reveals a scarcity of research relating to AC characteristics and audit 
quality estimated as discretionary accruals in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 in 
Hong Kong. For instance, one stream of the research examines the relationships between corpo-
rate governance and firm performance in Hong Kong. Cheng, Lui and Shum (2015) investigated 
the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the share performance of 976 companies 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange during the financial crisis from 2008 to 2009. Market 
returns were regressed on duality of CEO and chairman board size, independence of chairman, 
board independence, AC independence as well as proportion of shares held by independent di-
rectors on the AC. Using ordinary least square regression (OLS), the authors observed that firms 
which had a higher proportion of independent directors and greater concentration of ownership 
had a lower share performance and reduced price volatility during the financial crisis. Similarly, 
Chan et al. (2011) provided a more comprehensive study on AC characteristics. They examined 
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the effects of AC characteristics on firm performance in 2006. AC characteristics were measured 
as ACMs’ financial expertise, number of meetings, independence, tenure, directorships and re-
muneration. Using OLS, they found that average AC remuneration and number of AC meetings 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q.  
 
In a study that examined the relationships between changes in the quality of corporate govern-
ance practices and subsequent market valuation among large listed companies in Hong Kong 
from 2002 to 2005, Cheung, Connelly and Limpaphayom (2011) regressed market valuation 
measured as change in Tobin’s Q and change in market-to-book ratio on corporate governance 
index which captured rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stake-
holders, disclosure and transparency and board responsibilities. Using fixed effect panel data re-
gression with firm clustering, they noted that firms which exhibited improvements in the quality 
of corporate governance displayed a subsequent increase in market valuation. In a study that in-
vestigated the effects of the corporate governance on firm performance between founding family 
firms and non-founding family firms in Hong Kong, and the performance inside founding family 
firms from 2008 to 2012, Lee and Barnes (2017) regressed firm performance measured as To-
bin’s Q, return on assets and return on equity on board size, board independence and number of 
family members on the board. Using two stage regression, they noted that board size and inde-
pendence were positively associated with return on assets.  
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Another stream of research examined the effects of corporate governance on earnings manage-
ment in Hong Kong. For example, Jaggi and Leung (2007) examined whether the establishment 
of ACs by Hong Kong firms would constrain earnings management, especially in firms with 
family-dominated corporate boards from 1999 to 2000. Earnings management was measured as 
discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones Model and performance-adjusted current dis-
cretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals were regressed on board size, board independence, 
shareholdings of CEO, non-executive directors and presence of the AC.  Using simultaneous re-
gression models and three-stage regression, they observed that overall ACs played a significant 
role in constraining earnings management even in the business environment of high ownership 
concentration. The effectiveness of ACs was, however, reduced when family members were pre-
sent on corporate boards, especially when family members dominated the corporate board.  
 
In a study that investigated the relationships between earnings management in Chinese firms 
listed in Hong Kong and the presence of government officials on the AC from 2004 to 2008, Lin, 
Hutchinson and Percy (2015) regressed earnings management measured as the discretionary ac-
cruals estimated by modified Jones model and Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004) on AC char-
acteristics which evaluated the effects of government officials on the AC, AC independence, AC 
accounting, financial and industry experience. Using random effects generalised least square, 
they observed a positive association between AC independence, experience and earnings man-
agement during the presence of government officials on the AC. In a study that investigated the 
use of discretionary current accruals by firms that make seasoned equity offers from 1993 to 
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2000, Ching, Firth and Rui (2006) regressed discretionary accruals on board independence, 
board size, family control and indicator for seasoned equity offering (SEO). They found that 
family-owned firms are more likely to use positive discretionary accruals before making an SEO. 
Independent directors and outside block shareholders constrain earnings management in family-
controlled firms. SEO firms with a larger board size were found to have a higher degree of earn-
ings management around SEOs.  
 
Prior studies in Hong Kong, as stated above, reveal that the effects of AC characteristics on audit 
quality measured as the level of earnings management have been under-researched after the fi-
nancial crisis in 2008 and the scope of AC characteristics is very limited, which is why there is a 
strong incentive to investigate the effects of these characteristics on audit quality. Hence, this 
study used recent data available from 2010 to 2015. The summary of the studies above can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
 
Thirdly, review of auditing and trust literature does not show any research relating EAs’ trust in 
ACMs to the efficacy of their interactions and audit quality. There is also no research investigat-
ing what factors influence EAs’ trust in ACMs. It is important to explore these issues because 
their trust in ACMs may affect their interactions with ACMs, which may impact the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the audit processes. Therefore, there is strong incentive to explore their trust, 
interactions and audit quality. This research is also unique in that it brings in the results from 
other fields such as psychology and sociology to auditing.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
 
This study seeks to investigate the role of AC characteristics and EAs’ trust in ACMs on audit 
quality. Notably, this study asked four research questions to address this issue.  
 
1) What are the impacts of AC characteristics on audit quality in Hong Kong?  
2) What factors influence EAs’ trust in ACMs in Hong Kong? 
3) Does EAs’ trust have positive effects on their interactions with ACMs in Hong Kong? 
4) How does EAs’ trust in ACMs impact their interactions and audit quality in Hong Kong?  
 
1.4 Contributions to Existing Knowledge 
This research provides some novel contributions to the literature on AC and audit quality. The 
contributions to extant literature are summarised as follows: 
 
There is no published research that investigates the effects of EAs’ trust in ACMs on their inter-
actions and audit quality. In this regard, this study makes a significant contribution towards un-
derstanding their interactions with ACMs. This is the first research investigating the factors that 
influence their trust in ACMs using thematic analysis. Although a few previous studies (Rennie, 
Kopp and Lemon, 2010; Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996) have investigated what fac-
tors influenced EAs’ trust in managers or clients’ firms, these factors are likely to be different 
when they are explored in the AC level.  
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This is also the first research that examines the impacts of effective AC characteristics on audit 
quality measured as discretionary accruals using recent data from 2010 to 2015. In the context of 
Hong Kong, discretionary accruals are more appropriate to be used as a proxy for audit quality 
because only a small proportion of sample firms contained in the Hang Seng Composite Index 
have restatements of financial restatements, modified or adverse audit opinion, so they are not 
appropriate to proxy for audit quality. The appointment of Big 4 auditors is used as robustness 
checks rather than the dependent variables in the main archival modelling study because a small 
proportion of sample firms appoint non-Big 4 auditors. Audit fees are also used as robustness 
checks only because audit fees contain risk premium and brand name premium, so high audit 
fees do not truly reflect the quality of external audit work. Thereby, discretionary accruals should 
be used to reflect the audit quality in the archival modelling studies.  
 
The scope of this study (1,714 firm-year observations from six years) makes a valuable addition 
to the current body of literature by providing some recent evidence on the effects of ACMs on 
monitoring audit quality where prior research findings were either inconclusive or very limited in 
Hong Kong. This study is very comprehensive in its scope not only in the selection of AC char-
acteristics, but also in controlling for the effects of board characteristics. The selection of com-
prehensive governance variables facilitates investigation into the relationships between corporate 
governance and audit quality.  
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Meanwhile the current study is also the first one to examine the effects of AC age and board age 
on audit quality in Hong Kong and leverage board members’ cumulative equity position as board 
members’ ownerships. Prior studies only considered the proportion of the ordinary shares held 
by board members. However, having the underlying shares covered by share opinions or con-
vertible bond may intervene with board members’ independent judgment of monitoring earnings 
management in Hong Kong.  
 
Finally, this is also the first study to utilise probit panel data regression with robust standard er-
rors to gauge whether the discretionary accruals are higher than the sample median in Hong 
Kong. The discretionary accruals that are higher than the median of the sample firms may be 
more effective in indicating low audit quality or the presence of earnings management.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
In order to address the research questions stated in Section 1.3, the researcher used agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and social interdependence theory in order to provide the main theoretical un-
derpinnings for this study. This research has been divided into two segments: archival modelling 
study and questionnaire survey study. The quantitative method is used in archival modelling 
study as discussed in Chapter 4. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used in the ques-
tionnaire survey study as discussed in Chapter 8. This section discusses the distinctions between 
them and why they are appropriate in this study. 
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“Quantitative methods are described as entailing the collection of numerical data and as exhibit-
ing a view of the relationship between theory and research as deductive, a predilection for a natu-
ral science approach and as having an objectivist conception of social reality” (Bryman and Bell, 
2007, p.154). Quantitative methods are used by positivists using deductive approach (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). Smith et al. (2012) stated that positivists believe that only phenomena that can 
be observed or measured can be regarded as knowledge. They suggested that the social world 
exists independently and its properties should be examined by objective methods. It assumes that 
the reality exists independent of the research and there is only single truth. Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2012) suggested that the single truth can be found out by objective or scientific methods.  
 
Creswell (2009) suggested that positivists are concerned with the facts and identifying causes 
that affect outcomes rather than impressions of human subjects. The purpose of positivistic re-
search is to use a highly structured methodology to make a generalisation. Saunders et al. (2009) 
stated that the focus of positivistic research is on quantifiable observations that allow researchers 
to use statistical analysis. Scotland (2012) stated that deductive approach is used by positivists. 
Correlation and experimentation are utilised to reduce complex interactions of variables. Positiv-
istic research often uses empirical testing, controlled variables and random sampling. It primarily 
uses mathematical and quantitative methods.  
 
Scotland (2012) suggests that the result of positivistic research is considered good if the results 
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that occur due to the independent variable can be generalised to the population and different re-
search can arrive at the same result with the same data in the same way. In addition, research 
should be objective and robust to the refutation of empirical study. 
 
However, the quantitative method fails to distinguish people and social instituions from ‘the 
world of nature’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007). It is assumed that the principles of the scientific 
method can and should be applied to all phenomena. This ignores the differences between the 
social and natural world. For example, it ignores that the fact that people interpret the world 
around them, whereas this capactity for self-reflection cannot be found among the objects of the 
natural sciences (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of relationships between variables creates a static view of social life 
that is independent of people’s lives. Studies that aim to bring out the relationships between vari-
ables omit the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in human groups. This implies 
that researchers do not know how what appears to be a relationship between two or more varia-
bles has been produced by the people to whom it applies (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
In this study, the researcher uses the quantitative research in the archival modelling study to in-
vestigate the relationships between the AC characteristics and audit quality. The questionnaire 
survey study is divided into two parts. Part One of the questionnsire survey also uses the quanti-
tative method to analyse the responses of the closed-ended questions in order to examine the re-
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lationships between the levels of EAs’ trust in ACMs and the perception of the quality of their 
interactions. This is discussed in Section 8.7. The quantitaitve research is appropriate for the ar-
chival modelling study, because it is positivistic and deductive research that uses statistical anal-
ysis to identify the correlations and patterns between variables for generalisation rather than the 
participants’ interpretations about their interactions with the world. However, it does not answer 
the questions why and how their trust influences the perception of the quality of their interactions. 
Therefore, Part Two of the questionnaire survey uses the qualitative research method to analyse 
the responses of the open-ended questions as discussed in Section 8.8.  
 
Qualitative research is a research method that usually emphasises words rather than quantifica-
tion in collection and analysis of data.  This research method can be used by interpretive research 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). It rejects the notion that humans can be analysed in a laboratory as if 
objects were analysed with the laws of natural science. They argue that a social world is too 
complex to make a generalisation. Since interpretivists do not reduce complexity of social phe-
nomena, data collection is less artificial (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Crewell (2009) states that 
individuals are social actors and researchers should understand phenomena from the perspective 
of individuals, so it is not possible to separate people from the social contexts they belong to 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
 
Edge and Richards (1998) suggest that interpretivists use their beliefs when they decide how to 
research and how to interpret their collected data. They bring their own interests and values to 
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the research and have to understand the differences between humans in the role as social actors 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
 
However, qualitative research is criticised to be too subjective because qualitative findings rely 
too much on the researcher’s unsystematic views about what is significant (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). It is also difficult to generalise the findings of qualitative research because researach is 
usually conducted with a small number of individuals, so it is impossible to know how the find-
ings can be generalised to other settings (Bryman and Bell, 2007). It is also difficult to replicate 
the results because it is usually unstructured and relies on the qualitative researcher’s ingenuity 
and there are hardly any standard procedures to be followed (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
Qualitative research is used to analyse the responses of open-ended questions contained in the 
the questionnaire survey study. This part of the questionnaire survey study is interpretive and 
inductive research. The researcher wants to understand the phenomena from EAs’ perspectives, 
so it is not possible to separate the EAs from the social contexts they belong to. This method is 
appropriate because it enables the researcher to explore the effects of trust in the audit processes 
and EAs’ views on specific issues rather than use statistical method to identify the correlation 
and patterns between variables for generalisation.   
 
In the archival modelling study, a sample of companies contained in Hong Kong Hang Seng 
Composite Index was selected and their annual reports were used as the source for data collec-
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tion. Notably, these annual reports were obtained from the companies’ websites. The AC, finan-
cial and board data were collected by hand from financial statements. Fixed effect panel data re-
gression with robust standard errors was primarily used so as to examine these relationships. As 
mentioned before, data were collected from 2010 to 2015. The archival modelling study answers 
Research Question 1.  
 
In the questionnaire survey study, primary data were collected using semi-structured question-
naire survey. OLS with robust standard errors and independent t-tests were used to analyse the 
responses to closed-ended questions in order to better understand the relationships between the 
levels of trust and perception of the quality of their interactions with ACMs. Further, thematic 
analysis was used to evaluate the responses to open-ended questions so as to understand the fac-
tors that influence their trust in ACMs and how their trust improves the effectiveness of their in-
teractions and in effect, audit quality. The questionnaire survey study answers Research Ques-
tions 2 to 4. Figure 1 summarises the research methodologies of this thesis.  
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The Thesis 
Archival Modelling Study 
EAs’ Trust in ACMs  
and Audit Quality  
Questionnaire Survey Study 
Research Question 1 
Research Questions 2-4 
AC Characteristics  
and Audit Quality  
Figure 1: Research Methodologies 
 
Quantitative 
Research Method 
Quantitative  
Research Method 
(Closed-ended Questions) 
Qualitative  
Research Method 
(Open-ended Questions) 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter discussed the background and rationale for this study, elucidated the motivation for 
the study and specified the research questions. The contributions made by this study have also 
been highlighted.  
 
The remainder of this study has been organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background 
and theoretical framework to support the arguments that have been made in this study. The most 
common theoretical frameworks, such as agency theory and stakeholder theory, have been used 
to explain the linkage between AC characteristics and audit quality. Social interdependence theo-
ry has been used to provide a basis for the argument made in the study. This is because since 
ACMs and EAs have common goals to ensure high audit quality, they may have positive interac-
tions, which may then facilitate an improvement in the performance of their monitoring audit 
quality.  Once this is established, it provides a general understanding of the nature of earnings 
management and managers’ motivations to engage in it. This chapter then discusses various as-
pects of audit quality. High audit quality is one of the approaches that is undertaken to reduce 
earnings management. This chapter also reviews the developments of corporate governance and 
AC in Hong Kong in order to understand the rights and responsibilities of the board of directors 
and ACMs to monitor audit quality.  
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Meanwhile Chapters 3 to 6 relate to the archival modelling study. Chapter 3 reviews prior studies 
on the association between AC characteristics and audit quality, thereby providing a critical and 
comprehensive review of the various attributes of ACs along with their expected effects on audit 
quality.  The review concludes with seven hypotheses. Chapter 4 outlines the methodological 
methods of the archival modelling study, identifies the data sources and describes the sample se-
lection process as well as data collection procedures. It also presents analytical procedures and 
definition and measurement of variables, whilst justifying the choices of analytical methods.  
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the research results of the archival modelling study. Descriptive 
statistics are presented, followed by the presentation of the findings of various tests that examine 
the violation of assumptions and the tested model. The inferences are drawn from tests of the hy-
potheses. Chapter 6 compares the findings obtained in Chapter 5 to previous research findings so 
that the researcher could infer the meanings of the findings and then discuss their implications on 
audit quality in Hong Kong.  
 
Chapters 7 to 10 relate to the questionnaire survey study. Chapter 7 reviews the prior studies on 
the factors that may influence the levels of trust and the impacts of actors’ trust on their interac-
tions and performance. This provides a critical and comprehensive review of trust and its poten-
tial impacts on interactions and audit quality. The review concludes with as many as four propo-
sitions. In addition to outlining the methodological methods of the questionnaire survey study, 
Chapter 8 discusses the data collection procedure of questionnaire, its administration, selection 
of participants and research instrument. Chapter 9 presents and discusses the findings of the ar-
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chival modelling study. Descriptive statistics are presented, followed by the presentation of the 
results of OLS with robust standard errors, independent-t test and thematic analysis. Chapter 10 
compares the findings obtained in Chapter 9 to prior research findings that allow the researcher 
to infer the meanings of his findings and then discuss their implications of EAs’ trust on ACMs 
on audit quality in Hong Kong.  
 
Chapter 11 synthesises the results of the archvial modelling and questionnaire survey studies so 
as to facilitate an understanding of how the archival modelling and questionnaire survey studies 
are connected as well as the implications of this research to various audiences. 
 
Chapter 12 presents a summary of this study and draws conclusions. This chapter also highlights 
the study’s potential limitations and avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 provided the introduction and justifications for the study. Chapter 2 presents relevant 
background and theoretical framework for the archival modelling and questionnaire survey stud-
ies. Firstly, this chapter discusses the agency and stakeholder theories to support the viewpoint 
that the presence of an effective AC is imperative to protect the stakeholders’ interest. Social in-
terdependence theory is reviewed to explore the factors that may influence EAs’ trust in ACMs 
and how this trust affects their interactions. The developments of Hong Kong corporate govern-
ment and AC are presented so that the researcher can understand the rights and responsibilities of 
ACMs in performing their oversight role. Thereafter, this chapter discusses various aspects of 
earnings management and audit quality in order to contend that audit quality is indeed important 
to constrain earnings management.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
 
This section discusses three theories relating to the current study. The first two theories, namely, 
agency theory and stakeholder theory, underpinned the discourse on corporate governance in this 
thesis, and elucidated the important role of an AC in overseeing audit quality to protect stake-
holders’ interest. It is these two theories that provide the requisite support for the archvial model-
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ling study. The last theory, social interdependence theory, can be used to explain the factors that 
may influence EAs’ trust in ACMs and how this trust influences their interactions in external au-
dits. This theory provides support for the questionnaire survey study.  
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory is used extensively in the context of finance and corporate governance literature 
(Li, Li and Minor, 2016; Krakel and Muller, 2015; Ghosh and Sun, 2014; Jiraporn and Chin-
trakarn, 2013; Liao and Hsu, 2013; Fung, Jo and Tsai, 2009; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In par-
ticular, this theory helps explain the underlying problem between shareholders and managers as 
well as the reason why shareholders cannot oversee audit quality on their own but tend to rely on 
the AC.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that in a contract, one person (the principal) engages another 
person (the agent) to provide services by delegating the authorities to the agent. Similarly, 
Friedman (1970) explained that under agency relationship, shareholders are actually the owners 
(the principals) of the company, so fiduciary duty requires agents (managers) to act for the bene-
fits of beneficiaries (principals) so as to safeguard their property (capitals provided). Managers 
should only maximise the wealth of their shareholders. However, the managers may not act in 
the best interest of the shareholders if they want to maximise their own benefits (Buchholtz and 
Ribbens, 1994; Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Pratt and 
Zeckhauser, 1985).  
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Agency problem occurs between managers and shareholders due to the separation of manage-
ment from ownership (Jensen, 1986; Berle and Means, 1932). As principles, shareholders do not 
participate in day-to-day operation of a company since shareholders are not expected to assume 
the responsibility of managing a firm. As a result, the responsibility for operation is placed in the 
hands of managers (OECD, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Berle and Means, 1932). Howev-
er, the objectives of the managers and shareholders are incompatible. Managers want to maxim-
ise their own wealth such as bonus and performance, but shareholders want to maximise their 
own benefits such as high share prices and accurate information of financial statements (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  
 
Shapiro (2005) suggested that asymmetric information exacerbates the problem in the relation-
ship between the principal and agent. Managers act as agents for shareholders to manage a firm 
and possess more information than shareholders due to their involvement (unlike shareholders) 
in the day-to-day operations of companies. This information asymmetry leads to two problems: 
moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Moral hazard refers to a situation wherein agents conceal their actions which may be detrimental 
to their principals when the agents are motivated to pursue their own interests (Holmstrom, 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Jensen, 1986). Although these agents should presumably act in the best inter-
ests of their principals, in reality, they often act for their own benefits at the expense of their 
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principals. Scott (2012) opined that moral hazard occurs when the one can observe his or her 
own actions in fulfilment of a transaction, but another cannot. He stated that shareholders do not 
possess information about managers’ efforts that are devoted to managing a firm because efforts 
are unobservable; as a result, managers may reduce their efforts. As an indicator of managers’ 
performance, earnings may be used indirectly to measure the managers’ efforts. Therefore, with-
out monitoring, managers may engage in earnings management to maximise their private gains 
by inflating earnings in order to avail more bonuses and enhancing their performance at expenses 
of shareholders.  
 
On the other hand, adverse selection is more concerned with the hidden information provided to 
the principals. In this regard, Scott (2012) suggested that adverse selection occurs when one pos-
sesses more information than another. For example, managers may camouflage poor earnings by 
manipulating financial statements, but shareholders do not have information about it. The ab-
sence of monitoring makes it difficult to find that financial statements are materially misstated by 
managers.  
 
Consistent with agency theory, prior research agrees that managers pursue their own benefits ra-
ther than shareholders’ benefits because their goals are incompatible. For example, in a merger 
and acquisition, agency problem may arise, because the acquirer has less information about the 
target company as compared to its managers (Krakel and Muller 2015; Datar, Frankel and 
Wolfson, 2001; Verrecchia, 1983; Brealey, Leland and Pyle, 1977). For instance, in a study in-
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vestigating agency problem and merger and diversification, Amihud and Lev (1981) concluded 
that managers engage in unrelated mergers and diversification in order to reduce employment 
risk unless they are monitored by large block shareholders. Correspondingly, Datar, Frankel and 
Wolfson (2001) found that the acquirer designed the consideration to be based on future perfor-
mance of the targets if they are ridden with high uncertainties due to agency problem, because it 
cannot observe the manger’s efforts in improving firm performance (Datar, Frankel and Wolfson, 
2001) both before and after the merger of acquisition. This indicates that the acquirer is sensitive 
to information asymmetries caused by agency problem. Analogously, Fung, Jo and Tsai (2009) 
noted that firms with less managerial equity ownership and no long-term incentive plans are 
more likely to pursue value-destroying market-driven acquisition because managers tend to pur-
sue short-term self-interest. In a study that aimed to examine the synergies of merger target and 
agency cost, Krakel and Muller (2015) observed that the CEO systematically recommended tar-
gets with low synergies even when targets with high synergies are available in order to obtain 
high-powered incentives and therefore, a high personal income during the merger-management 
stage. Cheng et al. (2016) made a poignant observation that firms that have the outside block 
shareholders with a greater tendency to monitor managers such as hedging fund elicit higher 
takeover gains.  
 
Moreover, managers may over-invest in projects when they have excess cash, but shareholders 
do not have information about it. In a study that investigated the relationships between the levels 
of free cash flow and investment, Chen, Sun and Xu (2016) observed that managers engaged in 
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over-investment if they had high levels of free cash flow. Stulz (1990) noted that firms with free 
cash flows had a strong incentive to invest in negative NPV project for their own benefits as op-
posed to shareholders’ interests. Similarly, Richardson (2006) examined the effects of free cash 
flow on over-investment and noted that over-investment was concentrated in firms that had the 
highest levels of free cash flow. Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) noted that if managers have ac-
cess to excessive power, they may under-invest in areas that may actually enhance firm value. Li, 
Li and Minor (2016) meanwhile demonstrated that CEO power is negatively correlated with a 
firm’s choice to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in the firm, but CSR 
activities enhance firm value, as mentioned by their study.   
 
Dividend payout may serve as a mechanism to reduce cash flow that exists under the control of 
managers, thereby alleviating the agency problem (Chang, Kang and Li, 2016; Ghosh and Sun, 
2014). Chang, Kang and Li (2016) observed that firms with large institutional ownership are 
more likely to use dividend payouts to reduce high agency conflicts. Ghosh and Sun (2014) con-
curred that lower information asymmetry leads to lower agency conflicts, thus reducing the cost 
of capital and increasing the rate of growth. They also observed that the distribution of excess 
dividend to shareholders was positively associated with externally financed growth. Lang (1995) 
noted that managers tend to retain the proceeds from sales of assets in companies rather than dis-
tributing them to shareholders or debt-holders as dividends or payments to debt-holders. Manag-
ers were found to retain the proceeds to reduce their employment risk, but did not safeguard the 
interest of shareholders or debt-holders.  
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Firms may incur agency costs to reduce the agency problem. They are recognised as the cost of 
bonding, cost of monitoring and cost of residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The cost of 
residual loss is denoted by the total agency cost when bonding and monitoring activities are both 
prohibited and ineffective. The cost of bonding is the cost to align agents’ interest with princi-
pals’ interest and relates to the compensation for the agent. One of the methods to align their in-
terests is to allow managers to have shareholdings in a company. By doing so, both managers 
and shareholders become company owners, as a result of which their interests are aligned. Prior 
studies agree that cost of bonding may reduce the agency problem if managers’ interests are 
aligned with shareholders’ rights. In a study relating to takeover bids, Buchholtz and Ribbens 
(1994) noted that CEO who had shareholdings may be less likely to resist takeover bids which 
were beneficial to shareholders. Agrawal and Mandelker (1985) demonstrated that managers’ 
shareholdings encouraged them to make investment decisions aligned with the interest of share-
holders. Other studies (Liu, Hsueh and Wu, 2017; Gaur, Bathula and Singh, 2015) found that 
managers’ shareholdings in a company may improve its performance. As an implication, since 
their interests are aligned, managers may act for the benefits of shareholders.  
 
The cost of monitoring refers to the cost of hiring other agents such as EAs and ACMs to moni-
tor the agents (managers) to act in the best interest of the principals (shareholders). Prior studies 
also concur that the cost of monitoring assumes importance in reducing the agency problem. For 
instance, Kosnik (1987) supported the view by showing that if board is ineffective in monitoring 
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managers’ performance, managers may repurchase shares at the price above market price. The 
expensive repurchase of shares is detrimental for the shareholders because it will consolidate 
managers’ power of control at the expense of shareholders. Other studies supported the view that 
if ACs are effective in monitoring managers, managers are less likely to manage earnings for 
their own personal gain (Liao and Hsu, 2013; Carcello, Hermanson and Ye, 2011; Sharma and 
Sharma, 2011; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Duchin Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010; Owens-
Jackson, Robinson and Shelton 2009).  
 
The agency theory relates to the main themes of this thesis. Since shareholders neither participate 
in the day-to-day operation of a company nor have the rights to monitor managers, they may not 
possess adequate information about managers’ performance and their actions, thereby resulting 
in the problem of information asymmetries. Consequentially, managers may take advantage of 
this lacuna to manipulate financial statements for their own benefits. In turn, EAs may dilute 
their efforts in external audit, because they may want to minimise the resources used to earn the 
audit fees that have already been agreed upon. Therefore, the agency theory supports the views 
that the AC should exist to monitor managers as well as EAs to ensure high quality financial 
statements and audits.  
 
Nevertheless, agency theory is not impervious to criticisms. For example, it argues that managers 
should only maximise the wealth of shareholders. To that end, Quinn and Jones (1995) posited 
that an efficient market has been considered to be the best way for allocating social resources. 
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The benefits of all stakeholders will be enhanced if the market is efficient and managers only 
maximise the wealth of shareholders. However, Cooper (1970) stated that the assumption of effi-
cient market is not realistic. If the assumption is relaxed, the conclusion that the benefits of all 
stakeholders and society will be enhanced is invalid.  
 
Agency theory has also been criticised due to the problem of ownership. It assumes that share-
holders own a firm, so managers should maximise their wealth. However, a firm is nexus of con-
tract, which implies that one can own a mere nexus including shareholders (Bosse and Phillips 
2016). Fama (1980) stated that owners of capital are the owners of production factors but not a 
firm. Correspondingly, D’Ors (1979) argued that shareholders cannot be company owners be-
cause they are uncommitted and can always leave the firm by selling their shares. The applica-
tion of fiduciary duty under agency theory is flawed. Marens and Wicks (1999) suggested that 
fiduciary duty is not applied to a person; instead, it aims to protect property provided by a princi-
pal. Therefore, as a fiduciary, directors’ relationship is not with shareholders personally but with 
their investment, including stakeholder’s investment such as labour and effort.  
 
Freeman and Evan (1990) argued that the money used to protect shareholders is earned from the 
profit generated using stakeholders’ capital, including money, labour, expertise and time. There-
fore, if only the interests of shareholders are protected, the cost of protection could potentially be 
exported to other stakeholders in the society. As a result, they may bear the cost of companies’ 
actions. Danielson and Press (2006) and Jensen (2005) opined that agency theory ignores the 
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long-term survival of a firm. If firms were not unable to gain the supports of their employees and 
customers by serving their interest, the firms would not be able to survive.  
 
In summary, agency theory supports the view that an effective AC should be established to over-
see financial reporting and audit quality. The AC should have certain characteristics that enable 
ACMs to function effectively and allow for the monitoring of the audit quality. For instance, a 
large AC may have more expertise or manpower to monitor audit processes and financial report-
ing quality (Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Rickling, 2014; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Baxter and 
Cotter, 2009; Lin, Li and Yang, 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001). An independent AC may oversee 
managers and EAs without being influenced by them (Liao and Hsu, 2013; Carcello, Hermanson 
and Ye, 2011; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010; Sharma 
and Sharma, 2011). ACMs with great expertise may understand high quality audit processes and 
earnings management strategy, so that EAs cannot provide low quality audit and managers may 
find it more difficult to engage in earnings management (Rickling, 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; 
Naiker and Sharma, 2009).  
 
ACMs with long tenure may gain knowledge of operations in a specific company, so they may 
understand the high risk areas in a company and be familiar with the integrity of managers (Chan, 
Liu and Sun, 2013; Aldamen et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2010; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). A dili-
gent AC may spend more time discussing important issues to enhance the quality of an audit 
such as the appropriate relationships between EAs and managers (Rickling, 2014; Suarez et al., 
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2013; Hong Kong Society of Accountants, 2002; The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012; 
Sharma and Iselin, 2012). ACMs with many outside directorships may enable them to derive 
greater oversight experience in other companies so that they will know how to improve a com-
pany’s operations (Rickling, 2014; Alkdai and Hanefah, 2012; Kang and Kim, 2011; Ahn, Pi-
raporn and Kim, 2010; Frye and Wang, 2010; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009). Older ACMs may work 
more diligently because they have fewer career options and high reputation risk (Dao, Huang and 
Zhu, 2013; Huang, Green and Lee, 2012; Van der Zahn, Harjinder and Inderpa, 2008). These 
factors support the viewpoint that effective AC characteristics may improve their oversight quali-
ty on audit quality.  
 
 
2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Agency theory suggested that an AC is required to protect shareholders’ interests. Freeman (1984) 
extended the protection to stakeholders as well. He proposed a stakeholder theory by stating that 
a corporation should be regarded as the grouping of stakeholders and the purpose of the exist-
ence of a corporation is to manage their interests, needs and viewpoints (HKICPA, 2013a; Ven-
kataraman 2002; Donaldson and Preston 1995). Stakeholder theory can bring in realistic perfor-
mance indicators and a higher moral standard for a firm (Hill and Jones, 1992), thus making cap-
italism more equitable (Kaler, 2006). It highlights CSR (Kaler, 2006). Kaler (2006) suggested 
that managers are required to solve the problem of CSR.  
 
Fontrodona and Sison (2006) claimed that shareholders just have particular rights such as the 
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rights to receive distribution of profit and asset. Although there are no formal or legal rights of 
other stakeholders, they should be able to claim the services of a company due to fundamental 
constituents of distributive justice such as need, ability, effort and mutual agreement that are also 
applicable to their relationships. Resource-based theorists concurred that firms need stakeholder 
relationships to obtain most of the resources (Barney and Arikan, 2001; Harrison and St John, 
1996) so that it can survive. “Mutually beneficial stakeholder relationships can increase the 
wealth-creating capacity of a firm” (Post, Preson and Sachs, 2002, p.36) and reduce value-
destroying outcomes (Harrison and St. John, 1996; Cornell and Shaprio, 1987; Shane and Spicer, 
1983). Meanwhile Drucker (2001) suggested that human capital is one of the most important 
types of capital in a firm, which is why stakeholders’ rights such as those of employees should be 
protected (Fontrodona and Sison, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, stakeholder theory fails to answer the questions of “who” these stakeholders are 
and “how” their interests are managed (Mainardes, Alves and Raposo, 2011; Danielson, Heck 
and Shaffer, 2008). According to Post et al. (2002) and Philips (2002), stakeholder theory does 
not provide a practical solution to identify ways of benefiting all parties equally. Freeman (2002) 
stated that firms should benefit and exact costs from stakeholders, but the theory does not pro-
vide a way to assess which stakeholders make greater contribution than others. 
 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) and Danielson, Heck and Shaffer (2008) suggested that alt-
hough firms should be made more accountable for stakeholders’ long-term benefits in theory, it 
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may lead to maximisation of short-term at expenses of other stakeholders’ long-term benefits. 
Managers always focus on maximising current stakeholders’ short-term benefits; consequently, 
future stakeholders’ long-term interest is ignored because current stakeholders’ needs are more 
urgent. 
 
Since this study examines the role of AC characteristics and EAs’ trust in ACMs in enhancing 
audit quality so as to protect stakeholders’ interest in a society, the researcher adopts the view of 
stakeholder theory that corporate governance should be used to protect stakeholders’ interests. 
 
2.2.3 Social Interdependence Theory 
 
Agency theory and stakeholder theory suggested that stakeholders cannot directly oversee man-
agers to manage a company on their own, which is why there should be an AC to perform the 
oversight role. However, the theories remain salient on what factors influence EAs’ trust in 
ACMs and how their trust may improve their interactions. Social interdependence theory pro-
vides insights into these issues and states that people have interactions because the cost and re-
ward of an actor is dependent on another actor’s actions in a relationship.   
Deutsch (1949) suggested that social independence exists when individuals’ achievement of out-
comes is influenced by the actions of other people. There are two types of social interdependence. 
The first type is positive interdependence if the actions of one individual positively influence the 
achievement of another individual’s goal. The second type is negative interdependence if the ac-
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tions of one individual negatively influence the achievement of another individual’s goal. Since 
trust relates to positive interdependence, only positive interdependence is discussed in this study. 
If there is positive interdependence, individuals may cooperate because their actions may enable 
them to achieve own goals. Therefore, their actions become effective. As an implication, their 
actions increase the probability of attaining a goal. If so, the individuals may demonstrate coop-
erative behaviour (Bertucci et al., 2016; Choi and Johnson, 2011; Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 
2009, 2005; Johnson et al., 1991; Ortiz, Johnson and Johnson, 1996; Lew et al., 1986a, 1986b; 
Mesch, Johnson and Johnson, 1988; Mesch et al., 1986; Deutsch 1949). 
 
This theory proposes three psychological processes (Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2009, 2005, 
2009, 1981; Johnson 2003; Kramer and Brewer 1984; Deutsch 1949). The first process is substi-
tutability. If there is positive interdependence, one individual may substitute their actions for 
others’ actions (Johnson and Johnson 2015, 1981; Johnson et al., 2010; Johnson 2003; Kramer 
and Brewer 1984; Deutsch 1949). For instance, Lewis and Franklin (1944) observed that if an 
actor completes required tasks, that person’s action substitutes for one’s actions, thereby reduc-
ing the tension stemming from interruption. This may then reduce their anxiety so that they can 
exchange information (Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2009, 2005; Ryan, 1982; Pittman, 1980) and 
resources (Bertucci et al., 2016; Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2009, 1992; Johnson, 1974; Craw-
ford and Haaland, 1972; Laughlin and McGlynn, 1967). They may also render help and assis-
tance to others (Bertucci et al., 2016; Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2009, 2003). Actors may be 
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encouraged to challenge each other’s conclusions and reasoning to promote higher quality deci-
sion making and greater insight into problems (Johnson and Johnson 2015, 1979, 1995, 1992, 
1979).  
 
The second process is formation of positive cathexis, which is concerned with the investment of 
psychological energy in others as opposed to oneself (Bertucci et al., 2016; Johnson and Johnson, 
2015, 2009, 2005, 1981; Johnson 2003; Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Deutsch 1949). The cathexis 
attached to one’s actions may also be extended to another individual. This may be used to ex-
plain why one individual trusts another. It presumes that if an organism is to survive, it has to 
respond positively to events that enhance its well-being and respond negatively to events that 
reduce its well-being. Therefore, if effective actions are cathected positively, one may like the 
person who performs the effective actions (Bertucci et al., 2016; Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 
2009, 2006). Thus, positive cathexis encourages actors to act in trustworthy ways (Bertucci et al., 
2016; Johnson and Johnson 2015, 2009; Johnson 1974; Deutsch, 1962, 1960, 1958; Johnson and 
Noonan, 1972).  Koestner et al. (2002) conducted two experiments and observed a positive rela-
tionship between the progress toward achieving goals and positive affect over time. Negative 
progress towards goal attainment was negatively associated with negative affect. 
 
The last process is inducibility, which refers to the openness to being influenced and to influenc-
ing others (Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2003, 1981; Kramer and Brewer 1984; Deutsch 1949). If 
positive interdependence exists and they may have cooperative behaviour, one can easily induce 
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another individual to engage in actions that obtain the goals, or not engage in actions that inter-
fere with the achievement of goals (Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2006, 1981; Johnson, 2003; 
Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Deutsch, 1949).  Inducibility may encourage actors to contribute their 
effort (Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2009; Choi and Johnson, 2011; Stanne, Johnson and Johnson, 
1999; Pallak, Cook and Sullivan, 1980; Wicklund and Brehm, 1976) and influence another’s ef-
forts to attain common goals (Bertucci et al., 2016; Johnson and Johnson, 2009; Johnson et al., 
1985; Crombag, 1966; Raven and Eachus, 1963; Deutsch, 1949b). 
 
When viewed collectively, if actors interdepend on one another to achieve common goal and 
have positive independence, actors may be motivated to strive for mutual benefit (Bertucci et al., 
2016; Johnson and Johnson, 2015, 2009, 1989; Deutsch, 1949b), so they may have more effec-
tive interactions, and ultimately improve their operations.  
 
Prior studies support the views that if actors have common goals, they may have positive interac-
tions in accordance with social interdependence theory. In a study that aimed to examine social 
independence theory in information system development, Pee, Kankanhalli, and Kim (2012) 
suggested that perceived interdependence in terms of goal, task and reward enhance knowledge 
sharing between business professionals and external IT consultants during the development of 
information system. They found that their interdependence facilitates knowledge sharing, thereby 
leading to better performance. In a study that investigated the effects of trust and dependence on 
knowledge sharing in the context of information system development, Lee et al. (2015) con-
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firmed that dependence and trust facilitate knowledge sharing. Ghobadi and D’Ambra (2013) 
used the social interdependence theory to explain high quality knowledge sharing in cross-
functional software development teams. They suggested that the interdependence of partners 
promotes cooperative behaviour, which may facilitate high quality knowledge sharing. They ob-
served that outcome interdependence means interdependence and boundary interdependence - all 
positively related to cooperation and high quality knowledge sharing. 
 
These findings may be applicably on the relationships between EAs and ACMs in external audits. 
Since they interdepend on one another to perform high quality audit to reduce the information 
asymmetries between managers and stakeholders, there is a possibility of positive interdepend-
ence since they have common goals. They interdepend on one another, so any factor that helps 
them achieve their common goals may influence their levels of trust, such as the ACMs’ compe-
tence, integrity and goodwill. With high levels of trust, they believe that their interactions facili-
tate the attainment of common goals (high audit quality). They may be willing to spend their 
time exploring recommendations to improve internal control systems. They may share their ex-
perience so that they understand how to improve the financial reporting processes and internal 
control systems. If EAs expect the ACMs to help them provide high audit quality, they may react 
positively to ACMs. Since they react positively, they may not engage in actions interfering with 
high audits quality and become willing to interact with one another. For example, they may will-
ingly contribute their resources such as efforts and expertise in the audit process and share in-
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formation so as to obtain a better understanding of client’ operation and managers’ integrity. 
These measures, in turn, improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit processes. 
 
2.3 Earnings management 
This section discusses the definitions of earnings management and the rationales for managers to 
do so. It lends credence for the view that if managers remain unmonitored, they may have a 
strong motivation to engage in earnings management for their personal benefits at the expense of 
other stakeholders. They may also manage their earnings by reducing the expenditure or invest-
ment of a company; real earnings management or manipulate the discretionary accruals; accrual-
based earnings management. Section 2.3.1 discusses the definitions of earnings management, 
whereas 2.3.2 discusses the motivation for managers to engage in earnings management.  
 
2.3.1 Definitions of Earnings Management  
 
This study now turns to the problems of earnings management. Managers can manage reported 
earnings by using the flexibility of accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). In wake 
of this flexibility, managers may use different estimations and assumptions to manage reported 
earnings (Watt and Zimmerman, 1990).  
 
Watt and Zimmerman (1990) did not mention why managers are engaged in earnings manage-
ment, but Schipper (1989) stated that managers do so for their private gains. Notably, Schipper 
  
 65 
(1989, pp.92) defined earnings management as “the actions in the sense of purposeful interven-
tion in the external financial reporting processes with the intent for private gain”. 
  
The definition of earnings management by Healy and Wahlen (1999) seems more comprehensive. 
They underscored the fact that managers engage in earnings management for their personal gain 
and use their discretion to achieve their goals. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) defined earnings 
management as the process where “managers use judgments in financial reporting and in struc-
turing transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the under-
lying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers”. They underlined that the purpose of earnings management is to 
mislead stakeholders about the economic performance of the company.  
 
Earnings can be managed in two ways: real earnings management and accrual-based earnings 
management. Roychowdhury (2006) suggested that managers change their decisions using real 
earnings management to influence the economic reality of their firms, but this method is more 
costly and may reduce the companies’ competitiveness, which is why managers usually do not 
use this method. On the other hand, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) stated that accrual-
based earning management entails the use of accruals of earnings without affecting real econom-
ic consequences. Therefore, managers more often engage in accrual-based earnings management. 
High levels of earnings management indicate low levels of audit quality since the external audit 
is often not effective in detecting the manipulation of earnings. Consequently, earnings are not 
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transparent and cannot reflect useful and reliable financial information for users to be able to 
make their economic decisions. Put differently, high levels of earnings management can be con-
sidered low audit quality (Gore et al. 2001; Francis, Maydrew and Sparks, 1999; Becker et al. 
1998). 
 
2.3.2 Motivations for Earnings Management 
 
Based on the previous section, the research shows that managers engage in earnings management 
because of their private gains. This section discusses more incentives for earnings management.  
 
The first motivation is their compensation. Managers may manage earnings upward because their 
bonus is based on the amount of earnings and they want to avoid the violation of debt covenant. 
They may also manage earnings downward so that they can obtain favourable terms during debt-
renegotiation and avoid regulation of government.  
 
Managers’ bonus is often based on the amount of earnings, so managers have the incentive to 
increase bonus by managing earnings. Alternatively, if managers believe that earnings cannot 
increase significantly in a year, they may plan to smooth the earnings to next year, so that they 
can earn a bonus and their earnings can significantly increase in the following year. In this regard, 
Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) and Healy (1985) observed that firms in a lower bound of earn-
ings have higher income-increasing discretionary accruals, thereby indicating that managers en-
gaged in income-increasing earnings management. Healy (1985) noted that managers mange 
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earnings downward when they are unable to meet the earnings target so that their earnings can be 
reserved to calculate bonus in the next year. 
 
Firms may engage in earnings management to avoid violating debt-covenant. Sweeney (1994) 
compared earnings accruals of defaulting firms with those of non-defaulting firms. She reported 
that if the levels of financial indicators of the defaulting firms approached those of covenant re-
strictions, firms had more income-increasing accruals because managers wanted to avoid the vio-
lation of debt-covenant. Similarly, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) suggested that abnormal accru-
als and working capital accruals increased in the year prior to the violation of covenant. Saleh 
and Ahmed (2005) examined the levels of discretionary accruals in distressed firms that were 
under debt contract renegotiation after the violation of debt convent. They documented that the 
firms which underwent debt-renegotiation had a higher income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
 
Political process and legislation is also known to influence the content of financial statements 
(Watts, 1977). In order to avoid the cost of ruling, managers may manipulate earnings to show 
reduced levels of earnings so that they are not prosecuted nor regulated by the government. Pre-
senting evidence to lend credence to this notion, Cahan (1992) found a sample of firms that were 
under investigation for antitrust from 1970 to 1983. He observed that discretionary accruals of 
the firms under investigation decreased in the year of investigation, while the discretionary ac-
cruals of control firms remained constant. Meanwhile Navissi (1999) consistently demonstrated 
that firms would use income-decreasing discretionary accruals to avoid regulations, so that firms 
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may apply for price increases owing to financial hardship.  
 
In summation managers are motivated to engage in earnings management because of manage-
ment compensation, debt-renegotiation, debt-covenant and political cost. Therefore, if financial 
statements prepared by managers are not monitored by high quality audit, it is probable that 
managers may engage in earnings management for their own benefits at the expense of stake-
holders. Figure 2 summarises the motivations for earnings management.  
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Figure 2: Motivations for Earnings Management 
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2.4 Audit Quality 
 
The other important concept underlined in this thesis is audit quality, which is important to deter 
earnings management as stated in Sections 2.3. If EAs do not perform high quality audit, or if 
ACMs fail to effectively monitor the quality of external audit work, EAs may neither perform 
appropriate audit procedures nor gather sufficient evidence to detect manipulated earnings. 
Therefore, if audit quality is low, manipulated earnings may not be detected. Consequently, fi-
nancial statement users may make erroneous economic decisions using the manipulated financial 
statements. Thus, resources may be misallocated in a society, which results in sub-optimal use of 
resources. Most importantly, financial statement users may lose their entire capital invested in a 
company if it goes bankrupt. As a case in point, the collapse of Enron brought significant hard-
ship to many of its stakeholders in the wake of low audit quality. Therefore, audit quality is re-
quired to ensure that earnings fairly reflect the financial performance and position of a company 
(Lee and Barnes 2017; Cheung et al. 2011). 
 
2.4.1 Definitions of Audit Quality 
 
The most common definition of audit quality was provided by DeAngelo (1981), who opined 
that audit quality is “the joint probability that an external auditor will both discover any breach in 
a client’s accounting system and report the breach” (DeAngelo 1981, p.186). This definition fo-
cuses on the willingness and competence of EAs to discover the breach in clients’ accounting 
system. While DeAngelo’s (1981) definition did emphasise the technical quality of EAs, it ig-
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nored the interactions taking place between ACMs and EAs.  
 
According to Sharma et al. (2011), ACMs interact with EAs to discuss issues relating to an ex-
ternal audit, as opposed to operating on their own. International Standards on Auditing recog-
nised the importance of interactions between ACMs and EAs by stating that many of the activi-
ties such as those concerning communications (ISA 260 and ISA 265), audit planning, risk and 
materiality (ISA 300, ISA 315 and ISA 320), reliance on internal audit (ISA 610) and the word-
ing of the audit report (ISA 705 and ISA 706) involve the interactions between ACMs and EAs. 
 
IAASB (2011) concurred that the interactions between EAs and ACMs assume significance for 
the enhancement of audit quality. IAASB (2011, p.2) defined audit quality as “the assessment of 
quality of the external auditor, quality of audit process, and communications and interactions be-
tween external auditors and audit committee members.” The FRC (2008) and the HKICPA 
(2010a) are congruent with the viewpoint of the IAASB (2011) that interactions between ACMs 
and EAs are important determinants of audit quality. According to them, one of the elements de-
termining audit quality is the reliability of audit reporting. They suggested that the reliability of 
audit reporting is predicated on the interactions and communications between ACMs and EAs to 
discuss issues such as the scope of external audits, the threats to auditor objectivity, the key risks 
identified (Dongen 2014), judgments made in forming an audit-related opinion (Dongen 2014), 
the qualitative aspects of a company’s accounting and reporting (Dongen 2014) and potential 
ways of improving the quality of financial reporting (AICPA 2000; BRC 1999). If these issues 
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were not effectively discussed between ACMs and EAs, they may not have sufficient evidence to 
form reliable opinions within the audit report. Therefore, the financial statement users cannot re-
ly on the conclusion of the audit report. 
 
Since this study focuses on the effects of effective AC characteristics and EAs’ trust in ACMs in 
audit quality, the researcher would adopt the definition of the IAASB for audit quality.  
 
2.4.2 Antecedents of Audit Quality 
 
This section discusses the factors affecting audit quality. The FRC (2008) and the HKICPA (2010) 
suggested five important antecedents of audit quality: culture of the audit firm, skills and person-
al qualities of audit partners and staff, the effectiveness of the audit process, reliability and use-
fulness of the audit reporting and factors beyond the control of EAs.  
 
The FRC (2008) and the HKICPA (2010) stated that the culture within an audit firm improves 
audit quality because its leadership is appropriate (Francis 2011; Douglas et al., 2001; Otley and 
Pierce, 1996; Willett and Page, 1996; Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995; Ponemon, 1992). The top 
management of an audit firm should create an environment where it is important to achieve high 
quality and emphasise that serving the public interest assumes significance. Since the top man-
agement is concerned with audit quality, the audit staff may endeavour to enhance the quality of 
their audit work (Svanberg and Ohman, 2013; PCAOB, 2012; HKICPA, 2010; Sweeney et al., 
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2010; FRC, 2008). Therefore, audit quality may be improved. 
 
The second factor is the skills and personal qualities of audit partners as well as staff. If the audit 
partners and staff have the appropriate skills and experience, they may develop a better under-
standing of clients’ business operation and accounting and auditing standards (Knechel et al., 
2012; Francis, 2011; HKICPA, 2010; FRC, 2008; Anderson et al., 1994). Audit firms should as-
sign the audit partners and staff who have appropriate skills and experience to a specific audit 
engagement. In particular, they should recruit staff with appropriate skills and experience. Doing 
so may render audit procedures more appropriate for the clients and better identify significant 
risk areas (Yuan, Cheng and Ye, 2016; Knechel, 2012; Francis, 2011; Erickson, 2000; Solomon, 
Shields and Whittington, 1999; Biggs, Selfridge and Krupka, 1993; Bonner and Lewis, 1990), 
leading to high audit quality.  
 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the audit process is concerned with the appropriateness of the au-
dit methodology and tools that are applied to an external audit (Knechel, 2013; Francis, 2011; 
HKICPA, 2010; FRC, 2008). The involvement of partners and managers in an external audit, 
provision of framework, procedures to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence, effective 
review of audit work and efficacious audit quality control procedures are all the instances of au-
dit processes (Laitinen and Laitinen, 2015; Knechel, 2013; Francis, 2011; HKICPA, 2010; De-
Fond, 2010; FRC, 2008; Anantheraman, 2007; Glover, 2005; Earley, 2002; Anderson, Koonce 
and Marchant, 1994; Bernardi, 1994). If audit methodology and tools are appropriate and reliable 
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and relevant audit evidence can be gathered, the quality of audit may be high (Laitinen and 
Laitinen, 2015).  
 
The reliability and usefulness of audit reporting are concerned with the clarity of the audit report 
as well as the communications between ACMs and EAs (Fakhfakh, 2016; Knechel, 2013; Fran-
cis, 2011; HKICPA, 2010; FRC, 2008). If audit reports are written with high clarity, the audit re-
ports will be useful to the users of financial statements (Fakhfakh, 2016; Hay, 1998). If their 
communications are effective, EAs may not only better identify the scope of the audit, but also 
provide useful recommendations to improve accounting procedures and internal control systems 
(Fakhfakh, 2016; Knechel, 2013). Therefore, audit quality may be enhanced.  
 
The last component is the factors that are beyond the control of EAs. In addition to the above-
mentioned factors, some client-specific factors that cannot be controlled by EAs also significant-
ly influence audit quality (HKICPA, 2010; FRC, 2008). For example, if ACMs are active and 
professional, they may effectively define the scope of audits with EAs and judge the appropriate-
ness of audit opinion with the audit evidence provided by EAs (Fakhfakh, 2016; FRC, 2008; 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhou, 2007; Carcello et al., 2006; DeZoort, 1998). Another example is the re-
porting deadlines that allow the opportunity to perform an audit without undue reliance on the 
work undertaken just prior to the end of the reporting period (FRC, 2008; Glover et al., 2005). If 
the reporting deadlines are found to be appropriate for the workload of the external audits, they 
may have sufficient time to perform appropriate audit procedures and gather sufficient audit evi-
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dence without having to rush in order to form an audit opinion (Lee, Mande and Son, 2009; 
Glover, Prawitt and Wilks, 2005; Jaggi and Tsui, 1999). Therefore, audit quality may be deemed 
high.   
 
In conclusion, AC characteristics may be regarded as the factors outside EAs’ control that influ-
ence audit quality due to the fact that they cannot control clients’ AC structure. If AC characteris-
tics are effective, ACMs may perform their oversight role in a better manner so as to monitor au-
dit quality. Prior studies supporting this argument have been discussed in Chapter 3. EAs’ trust in 
ACMs may not only influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit process, but also the 
reliability of audit report. The effectiveness and efficiency of audit process may be enhanced be-
cause their trust in ACMs may encourage them to discuss audit issues with ACMs, such as audit 
plan, unpresentable tests, risk assessment and managers’ integrity. Developing an understanding 
of these issues may enhance audit quality. The reliability of audit report may be enhanced be-
cause they may seek more information in order to determine the scope of audit and provide more 
useful recommendations beyond the requirements of the audit standards. Consequentially, the 
quality of audit may be high. Prior studies supporting the arguments that trust enhances actors’ 
interactions and performance are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Table 1 highlights the antecedents of audit quality found in the literature.  
 
Table 1: Key Drivers of Audit Quality (FRC 2008) 
Drivers  Indicators  
The culture with-
in an audit firm  
The culture within an audit firm enhances audit quality if the leader-
ship of an audit firm:  
 Creates an environment where achieving high quality is valued, 
invested in and rewarded.  
 Emphasises the importance of “doing the right thing” in the 
public interest and the effect of doing so on the reputation of 
both the firm and individual external auditors 
 Ensures that partners and staff have sufficient time and re-
sources to deal with difficult issues as they arise. 
 Ensures that financial considerations do not drive actions and 
decisions having a negative effect on audit quality.  
 Promotes the merits of consultation on difficult issues and sup-
ports partners in the exercise of their personal judgment.  
 Ensures robust systems for client acceptance and continuation.  
 Fosters appraisal and reward systems for partners and staff that 
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promote the personal characteristics that are essential to quality 
auditing.  
 Ensures audit quality is monitored within firms and across in-
ternational networks and appropriate consequential action is 
taken  
The skills and 
personal qualities 
of audit partners 
and staff 
The skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff enhance 
audit quality if: 
 Partners and staff understand their clients’ business and adhere 
to the principles underlying auditing and ethical standards 
 Partners and staff exhibit professional scepticism in their work 
and are robust in dealing with issues identified during the audit.  
 Staff performing detailed “on-site” audit work has sufficient 
experience and are appropriately supervised by partners and 
managers.  
 Partners and managers provide junior staff with appropriate 
mentoring and on the job training.  
 Adequate training is given to audit personnel in audit, account-
ing and industry specialist issues.  
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The effectiveness 
of the audit pro-
cess 
The audit process enhances audit quality if:  
 The audit methodology and tools applied to the audit are well 
structured and:  
1. Encourage partners and managers to be actively involved in 
audit planning.  
2. Provide a framework and procedures to obtain sufficiently 
appropriate audit evidence effectively and efficiently 
3. Require appropriate audit documentation. 
4. Provide for compliance with auditing standards without in-
hibiting the exercise of judgment.  
5. Ensure there is effective review of audit work.  
6. Audit quality control procedures are effective, understood 
and applied.  
 High quality technical support is available when the audit team 
requires it or encounters a situation that it is not familiar with.  
 The objectives of ethical standards are achieved, providing con-
fidence in the integrity, objectivity and independence of the au-
ditor. 
 The collection of sufficient audit evidence is not inappropriate-
ly constrained by financial pressures.  
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The reliability 
and usefulness of 
audit reporting 
The reliability and usefulness of audit reporting enhance audit quali-
ty if:  
 Audit reports are written in a manner that clearly and unambig-
uously conveys the auditor’s opinion on the financial state-
ments and addresses the needs of users of financial statements 
in the context of applicable law and regulations.  
 Auditors arrive at a proper conclusion with regard to the truth 
and fairness of the financial statements.  
 Communications with the audit committee include discussions 
about:  
1. The scope of the audit. 
2. The threats to auditor objectivity. 
3. The key risks identified and judgments made in reaching 
the audit opinion.  
4. The qualitative aspects of the entity’s accounting and re-
porting and potential ways of improving financial reporting.  
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Factors beyond 
the control of ex-
ternal auditors 
The factors beyond the control of auditors include: 
 An approach to corporate governance within the reporting enti-
ty that attaches importance to corporate and financial reporting 
as well as to the audit process 
 Audit committees that are active, professional and robust in 
dealing with issues identified during the audit 
 Shareholders that support external auditors, where appropriate, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that directors and manage-
ment will comply with their obligations in relation to the prepa-
ration of reliable financial statements.  
 Reporting deadlines that allow the opportunity to carry out an 
audit without undue reliance on work performed before the end 
of the reporting period.  
 Appropriately agreed arrangements for any limitation of liabil-
ity.  
 An audit regulatory environment that focuses on the drivers of 
audit quality  
 
The thesis now turns to consider the various measurement of audit quality proposed in the litera-
ture. 
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2.4.3 Potential Measures of Audit Quality 
 
Audit quality cannot be directly observed, so proxies have been used to measure audit quality 
indirectly. An external audit entails three components: input, process and output, which is why 
the effectiveness and efficiency of an external audit is predicated on these. The input of an exter-
nal audit is the resource used and EAs’ involvement in the audit process. The processes include 
internal control and audit processes so as to ensure high audit quality. The output of an audit is 
the accuracy of the audit opinion and the effectiveness and efficiency of an external audit in or-
der to deter earnings management.  
 
The input proxies used in the previous research included audit fees (Ho and Kang, 2013; Zaman, 
Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Hay, Knechel and Ling, 2008; Griffin, Lont 
and Sun, 2008), size of audit firm (Ho and Kang, 2013; Al-Thuneibat, Al-Issa and Baker, 2011; 
Choi, et al., 2010), audit hours (Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997; O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein, 
1994) and auditor industry specialist (Sun and Liu, 2013; Fung, Gul and Krishnan, 2012; Kwong, 
2011). The studies using input proxies assume that additional resources allocated to an external 
audit may enhance audit quality. For instance, auditor choice measures whether the audit firms 
are Big N auditors. If they indeed are Big N auditors, audit firms are supposed to have more re-
sources. Therefore, they may be able to improve the quality of audit. As another example, if EAs 
are industry specialists, they may provide greater expertise to perform external audits in a specif-
ic industry. Therefore, audit quality should be higher.  
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However, there are some limitations for input proxies. For example, the information about the 
input proxies may be difficult to obtain. For example, EAs’ education, training, experience and 
audit hours are not publicly available (Basiruddin, 2011). Second, although sufficient resource is 
used in an external audit, it cannot guarantee that the resources are used judiciously in the pro-
cess. If that is the case, audit quality may decrease. Whilst audit fees are high for Big N auditors, 
it cannot guarantee that high audit fees are an accurate measure of efforts because the expensive 
fees are also inclusive of a reputational premium (Basiruddin, 2011; Caneghem, 2010). Further, 
although Big N auditors are famous, it is difficult to ensure that they provide a high quality audit 
if they are not independent. Although input resources are provided, the process may influence 
audit quality, so the processes that influence audit quality should also be taken into consideration. 
In terms of audit processes, extant research has investigated the relationship between material 
control weaknesses and audit quality. If internal control systems are substantially defective, the 
information provided by these systems should have a low quality (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Doyle, Ge and McVay, 2007). In contrast, if internal control sys-
tems are effective, they should be able to constrain earnings management or fraudulent reporting. 
Therefore, if input resources are sufficient and internal control systems are effective, it can be 
inferred that an external audit should have a better outcome.  
 
The output proxies used in prior research included earnings accruals (Shankaraiah and Amiri, 
2017; Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Ayemere and Elijah, 2015; Baxter and Cotter, 2009); earn-
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ings response coefficient (Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014), earnings target (Davis, So and 
Trompeter, 2009; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; Kerstein and Rai, 2007),  occurrence of qualified 
opinions and restatement (Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Munsif, Raghunandan and Dasara-
tha, 2013; Hennes, Leone and Miller, 2008; Desai et al., 2006) as well as audit-related litigation 
or financial frauds (Kravet and Shevlin, 2010; Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton, 2009; 
Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). It is assumed that if the output of an external audit is effective, the 
quality of audit is high. For example, if earnings accruals are low, audit quality should be high.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some criticisms of output proxies. High audit quality cannot guarantee a 
low occurrence of restatements and litigation owing to the timing difference between the litiga-
tion and external audit. For example, although EAs provide high quality audit in the last period, 
fraud may occur at the beginning of the current period. Therefore, this does not indicate that the 
audit quality in the previous period is low because of a timing difference. Additionally, frauds 
may occur over a period of time by immaterial amount. They may not discover frauds or mis-
statements although they do provide an effective audit. Furthermore, clients without financial 
restatements or audit-related litigation do not necessarily suggest that audit quality is high since 
the occurrence of restatements, misstatements, or litigation indicates that audit quality is ex-
tremely low. Figure 3 summarises the measures of audit quality. 
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Figure 3: Potential Measures of Audit Quality 
 
The Measures of  
Audit Quality 
Input 
Audit Fees 
Boo and Sharma (2008)  
Griffin et al. (2008) 
 Hay et al. (2008) 
 Ho and Kang (2013)  
Zaman et al. (2011) 
Audit Firm Size: 
Al-Thuneibat et al. (2011)  
Choi et al. (2010)  
Ho and Kang (2013) 
Audit Hours 
Hackenbrack and Knechel 
(1997) 
O’Keefe et al. (1994) 
Auditor Industry  
Specialization 
Fung et al. (2012) 
Kwong (2011) 
Sun and Liu (2013) 
 
 
Political cost 
 
Political cost 
 
Process 
Internal Control 
Weaknesses 
Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010) 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2008) 
Doyle et al. (2007) 
Ge and McVay (2005)  
Krishnan (2005)  
 
Debt-covenant 
Debt-covenant 
Output 
Earnings Accruals 
Ayemere and Elijah (2015) 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) 
Shankaraiah and Amiri 
(2017) 
Yasser and Al Mamun 
(2016) 
Earnings Response Coef-
ficient 
Brown et al. (2014) 
Earnings Target 
Davis, et al. (2009) 
Jacob and Jorgensen 
(2007) 
Kerstein and Rai (2007) 
Qualified Opinion 
or Restatement 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels 
(2014) 
Desai et al. (2006) 
Hennes et al. (2008) 
Munsif et al. (2013) 
Audit-related litigation 
and financial reporting 
frauds 
Palmrose and Scholz 
(2004) Kravet and Shevlin 
(2010) 
Owens-Jackson et al. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
Debt-renegotiation 
Debt-renegotiation 
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In the archival modelling study of the thesis, audit quality is measured by earnings accruals be-
cause this measure provides more information about the magnitude of audit quality as a continu-
ous variable rather than a dichotomous variable such as the occurrence of restatements, mis-
statement, or litigation. Further, more public data are available for calculating earnings accruals 
as discussed in Chapter 1. In the questionnaire survey study of this thesis, audit quality is meas-
ured as effective interactions taking place between EAs and ACMs. The researcher expects trust 
to improve their interactions, resulting in improved effectiveness and efficiency of an audit pro-
cess, so that the quality of audit may be enhanced.  
 
This section has reviewed potential proxies for audit quality. It is determined that earnings ac-
cruals should be used in the archvial modelling study of this thesis and effective interactions be-
tween EAs and ACMs should be used in its questionnaire survey study. However, there are many 
models to estimate earnings accruals. For this reason, the next section discusses the pros and 
cons of each popular model so as to provide a better understanding of models that should be used 
in the study.   
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2.4.4 Measures of Audit Quality: Discretionary Accruals Models 
 
Table 2: Discretionary Accrual Models 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit quality can be measured in different ways, as discussed in Section 2.4.3. One of the meth-
ods is earnings accruals. This section focuses on the discussions of discretionary accruals as a 
measure of audit quality. Accruals can be recognised in two ways: non-discretionary and discre-
tionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are expected accruals, but discretionary accruals are 
unexpected accruals. Discretionary accruals are often the managed accruals. Five methods which 
have primarily been used to estimate discretionary accruals in the prior literature are reviewed.   
 
Firstly, Jones (1991) model was used to estimate earnings accruals. This model captures the rela-
tionship between the change in revenues and the value of property plant and equipment in a sin-
gle year. The residuals are considered to be discretionary accruals. However, this method has 
low explanatory power (R-square approximately 12 percent) because critics argue that the resid-
uals are strongly and positively associated with total accruals (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 
2003) and earnings performance, but negatively associated with cash flow performance. There-
Jones (1991) model 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
Performance matched model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005) 
Discretionary estimation errors (Francis et al., 2005) 
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fore, there is a possibility that this method may be biased. For this reason, Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) modified the model of Jones (1991) to enhance its explanatory power. They ex-
cluded the change in receivables from change of revenues because credit sales are often manipu-
lated. As a result of this modification, the correlation between expected revenues accruals and 
residuals can be eliminated, thus increasing it exploratory power (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 
1995).  
 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) used a performance-matched model to estimate discretionary 
accruals. Sample firms were matched with control firms in accordance with the closest return on 
assets in the same industry and year. Discretionary accruals of the sample firms were deducted 
from those of the control firms. Discretionary accruals of both sample firms and control firms are 
estimated using Jones (1991) model or modified Jones (1991) model. However, since this model 
used the Jones (1991) model or modified Jones (1991) model, the problem of low exploratory 
power persisted in the performance-matched model. Furthermore, when discretionary accruals of 
sample firms were deducted from those of control firms, discretionary accruals may be cancelled 
out. Therefore, this problem may explain why the exploratory power remained low.  
 
Dechow et al. (2010) explained that this method should be used when correlated performance is 
an important concern. Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggested a different way of measuring earn-
ings quality or audit quality. They posited that change in working capital is the function of the 
cash flow in the last period, cash flow in the current period and cash flow in next period. Discre-
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tionary accruals are the standard deviation of the residuals.  In addition, the absolute value of re-
siduals also used as a proxy for accruals quality. They used this method because the accruals an-
ticipate future cash flow and reverse when cash is received and paid when accruals are recog-
nised for them. This exploratory power of this method is higher than that of the Jones (1991) 
model, modified Jones (1991) models and performance-matched model (Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley, 2005).  
 
However, this model did not control for long term accruals because property, plant and equip-
ment was not included in the model, so depreciation and impairment were not accounted for in 
their model, so Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach was a short term approach. Lastly, Francis 
et al. (2005) combined and modified the original Jones (1991) model and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. Firstly, they used the original Jones (1991) model and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model to estimate the residuals. Subsequently, they took the standard deviation of the residuals 
estimated from Jones and Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as a dependent variable in the sec-
ond equation where the independent variables are firm size, whereas the standard deviation of 
cash flow from operation, standard deviation of revenues, logarithm of operating cycle, and the 
number of years of loss. The residuals from the second equation are the discretionary accruals.  
 
Because the Jones (1991) model has low exploratory power, the researcher did not use this mod-
el. Secondly, since this study does not emphasise the performance of the firms and performance-
matched model has low exploratory power, the researcher did not use the performance-matched 
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model. Thirdly, the researcher did not use the Francis et al. (2005) model because it has not been 
extensively used in prior literature, which raises questions on its validity. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) focused on short term accruals but completely ignored long-term accruals, so the re-
searcher did not use it as well. Consequently, the researcher used the modified Jones model con-
trolling for performance of sample firms because this model is expected to have a higher ex-
ploratory power and be more reliable. In addition, this model captures long-term discretionary 
accruals and short-term discretionary accruals.  
 
2.5 Corporate Governance Developments in Hong Kong 
 
Reviewing the development of Hong Kong corporate governance enables the researcher to un-
derstand the rights and responsibilities of a company’s directors to protect the interests of stake-
holders in Hong Kong and how these affect the structure and composition of the board and the 
AC, thereby the effectiveness of their oversight effort. It is noted that Hong Kong’s corporate 
governance started to develop in the early 1990s (Jones, 2015; Dempsey, 2014; Kam, 2006; 
Standard and Poor, 2002). In 1993, the Stock Exchange introduced a requirement into its Listing 
Rules that every board of directors of a listed company must include at least two independent 
non-executive directors (Kam, 2006) and laid down guideline rules to ensure their independence 
(Kam, 2006). A Code of Best Practice was also established in 1993 in order to enhance the ac-
countability of directors of listed companies to their shareholders (; Jones, 2015; Dempsey, 2014). 
Since 1999, the Code of Best Practice recommended that listed companies establish and disclose 
the existence of the AC (Dempsey, 2014). However, the requirements of good corporate govern-
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ance were only found in non-legal and regulatory requirements, generally characterised as ‘best 
practice’ (Jones, 2015; Chau and Leung, 2006). 
 
In 2004, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange issued a draft of Code on Corporate Governance Prac-
tices. According to this Code, companies are required to comply with ‘code provisions’ or ex-
plain why they do not follow ‘recommended best practices’ which are for guidance only (Cheng, 
Lui and Shum, 2015; Jones, 2015; Cheung et al., 2011). The Code’s structure and contents were 
similar to the Combined Code implemented in the UK (Dempsey, 2014). The Code was imple-
mented in 2005, commonly referred to as the Old Code. This was applicable to all companies 
listed on the SEHK (Dempsey, 2014). The Listing Rules required the mandatory establishment 
of the AC comprising of only non-executive directors and the appointment of at least three non-
executive directors to the board with at least one having appropriate professional qualifications 
or experience in financial matters (Kam 2016; HKEx Appendix 14). 
 
The Old Code was amended and renamed the Corporate Governance Code, which came into ef-
fect on 1 April 2012 (Lee and Barnes, 2017). It recommended significant changes to the corpo-
rate governance requirements in the Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Code (Lee and 
Barnes, 2017; Jones, 2015), including requirements for at least one third of the board to be inde-
pendent non-executive directors (Jones, 2015; Dempsey, 2014). 
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The Corporate Governance Code made specific requirements and recommendations regarding 
the composition of the board of directors and its committees (HKEx Appendix 14; Lee and 
Barnes, 2017). The board of directors is a group of elected or appointed members who are collec-
tively responsible for overseeing the functioning of a company (PwC, 2017; HKEx Appendix 14). 
The directors are required to fulfil their fiduciary duties and have the requisite levels of skill, 
care and diligence (Dempsey, 2014; HKEx Appendix 14; Standard and Poor, 2002). The board 
should also regularly review the performance of each director, who should act in the best interest 
of company (Dempsey, 2014; HKEx Appendix 14; Standard and Poor, 2002). It should also pre-
sent a comprehensive assessment of a company’s performance (Jones, 2015; HKEx Appendix 14) 
and ensure that the company maintains an effective internal control mechanism in order to safe-
guard the shareholders’ investments and its assets (PwC, 2017; HKEx Appendix 14; Jones, 
2015). It should also establish a formal and transparent arrangement to consider how it applies 
financial reporting and internal control principles whilst maintaining an appropriate relationship 
with a company’s EAs (PwC, 2017; Dempsey, 2014; HKEx Appendix 14). 
 
In order to effectively perform the oversight duties stated above, the board of directors should 
contain a balanced composition of executive, non-executive and independent non-executive di-
rectors in order to enable the board to exercise independent judgment (Cheng, Lui and Shum, 
2015; Ching, Firth and Rui, 2006; HKEx Appendix 14). There should be a clear division be-
tween the roles of the chairman, who is responsible for leadership of the board, and the chief ex-
ecutive, who is responsible for running a company, so as to maintain a balance of power and au-
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thority. The directors should have appropriate professional qualifications, more specifically ac-
counting or associated financial management expertise. Directors should be provided with timely 
and appropriate information to help them make informed decisions (Dempsey, 2014; HKEx Ap-
pendix 14). The requirements for the structure and composition of board of directors and AC 
committees are as follows (Dempsey, 2014; HKEx Appendix 14): 
 
 A company must appoint at least three independent non-executive directors who should rep-
resent at least one third of the board. 
 
 At least one of the independent non-executive directors must have appropriate professional 
qualifications or accounting or related financial management expertise. 
 
 A company must establish an audit committee comprising of non-executive directors only  
 
 AC committees should have specific written terms of reference. 
 
The Code also establishes a number of principles, followed by code provisions and recommend-
ed best practices (PwC, 2017; HKEx Appendix 14; Jones, 2015). Since then, companies must 
state in the corporate governance report as to whether they have complied with the code provi-
sions (PwC, 2017; HKEx Appendix 14). The code provisions are not mandatory rules and the 
Code provides that deviations from them are acceptable if a company considers that it is more 
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suitable not to comply with the Code (PwC, 2017; Dempsey, 2014; HKEx Appendix 14). Each 
company needs to consider its individual circumstances, the size and complexities of its opera-
tions as well as the nature of the risks confronted by it (Jones, 2015; Dempsey, 2014). It must 
also provide compelling reasons to explain why good corporate governance is achieved by 
means other than strict compliance with the code provisions. The investors and stakeholders who 
read the corporate governance report should then judge the explanation.  
 
Prior studies conducted in Hong Kong concurred that the quality of corporate governance is posi-
tively associated with audit quality as reflected in heightened market values or higher earnings 
quality. For instance, using data from 2003 to 2005, Cheung et al. (2011) found that firms exhib-
iting improvements in the quality of corporate governance displayed a corresponding rise in 
market valuation. The quality of corporate governance was measured in the areas of rights of 
shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transpar-
ency and board responsibilities. Using data from 2002 to 2005, Cheung et al. (2010) noted that 
firms with concentrated ownership structures are associated with low quality corporate govern-
ance. They also observed that the quality of corporate governance was positively associated with 
market returns. Using data from 2001 to 2009, Lei and Song (2012) observed that the quality of 
board structure and internal corporate governance mechanisms was positively associated with 
firm value. Board structure was measured as its independence, balance of power and conflicts of 
interest. Internal corporate governance mechanism was measured using thirteen corporate gov-
ernance attributes, such as a percentage of issued shares and number of substantial shareholders. 
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Using data from 1993 to 2000, Ching, Firth and Rui (2006) observed that independent directors 
and outside block shareholders constrained earnings management in family-controlled firms. 
 
In summary, the importance of effective corporate governance has been highlighted since 1994. 
The rights and responsibilities of the board and AC have been strengthened with a view to safe-
guard the interest of stakeholders. While board of directors is responsible for the overall running 
of a company, the AC is its sub-committee that is responsible for specialising in ensuring high 
quality of its financial statement and audit (Chan et al., 2011; Chau and Leung, 2006). Therefore, 
next section discusses the developments of the AC in Hong Kong.  
 
2.6 Developments of Audit Committee in Hong Kong  
 
The establishment of the AC in Hong Kong can be traced back to year 1993 (Dempsey, 2014) 
when the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, known as Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, adopted the recommendations of Cadbury Committee Report (1992) in order to 
enhance the efficacy of corporate governance of Hong Kong listed companies (Chan et al., 2011). 
One of the recommendations was to establish the AC so as to oversee financial reporting and au-
dit processes in Hong Kong (Lin, Hutchinson and Percy, 2015; Chan et al., 2011). However, not 
many listed firms in Hong Kong paid attention to the recommendations for establishing the ACs 
due to the fact that this establishment was on a voluntary basis (Jaggie and Leung, 2007). 
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In December 1997, The Hong Kong Society of Accountants prepared a report titled A Guide for 
the Formation of an Audit Committee (HKSA, 1997) in order to encourage listed companies in 
Hong Kong to establish ACs. This guide also recommended the duties of an AC, such as review 
and supervision of the financial reporting along with internal control processes (Jones, 2015). It 
also recommended that an AC should have written terms of reference specifying their authority 
and duties (Lin et al., 2015; HKEx Appendix 14). An AC should consist of at least three mem-
bers and that the majority of them should be independent (Lin, Hutchinson and Percy, 2015). 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange adopted these recommendations as the best practice guide of the 
Listing Rules. Subsequently, companies were required to disclose whether they have an AC (Lin, 
Hutchinson and Percy, 2015). Since the absence of an AC may influence the reputation of listed 
companies in Hong Kong, this, in turn, encouraged many firms to establish them voluntarily 
(Jones, 2015). 
The Asian Financial Crisis from July 1997 to August 1998 showed that corporate governance 
mechanisms in Hong Kong were ridden with significant weaknesses (China Centre for Economic 
Research, 2000).  The ineffectiveness of an AC was considered to be one of the reasons of the 
financial crisis. Therefore, in 2002, Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx Appendix 14) recom-
mended that Hong Kong listed companies enhance AC independence (Chan et al., 2011; Jaggie 
and Leung, 2007). In the same year, the Hong Kong Society of Accountants issued a report titled 
A Guide for Effective Audit Committees (HKSA 2002) to improve the guidelines pertaining to the 
formation of an AC (Jones, 2015).  
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In 2004, the details of the guideline issued by The Hong Kong Society of Accountants were con-
tained in the guidelines of corporate governance practices issued by the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change and Securities and Future Commission (HKEx 2004); this guideline highlighted its (AC) 
importance in augmenting the reliability of financial reports (Jaggie and Leung, 2007; Chau and 
Leung, 2006). 
In 2005, HKEx (Chapter 3, p7) stated:  
“Every listed issuer must establish an audit committee comprising non-executive direc-
tors only. The AC must comprise a minimum of three members, at least one of whom is an inde-
pendent non-executive director with appropriate professional qualifications or accounting or re-
lated financial management expertise as required under Listing Rule 3.10(2). The majority of the 
ACMs must be independent non-executive directors of the listed issuer. The AC must be chaired 
by an independent non-executive director.” 
Until 2005, the responsibilities and structures of the AC had been strengthened to enhance its 
oversight effects on financial reporting and audit processes (Jones, 2015; Chau and Leung, 2006; 
HKEx Appendix 15). To illustrate, the AC should review financial information and disclosures 
and focus mainly on its completeness, accuracy and fairness, including the appropriateness of 
statements made by directors of the company (HKEx Appendix 15). In particular, it must be sat-
isfied with and endorse the financial statements and disclosures before presenting them to the full 
board of directors for approval (HKEx Appendix 15). This review of financial information and 
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disclosure should encompass major areas such as the application of significant accounting poli-
cies, the reasonableness of judgmental issues and estimates, disclosure, unusual items, significant 
audit adjustments, EAs’ concerns and significant unadjusted audit differences, as well as con-
sistency of financial information (Yu and Rudge, 2014; Chau and Leung 2006; Hong Kong Soci-
ety of Accounts, 2002; HKEx Appendix 15).  
 
The AC should also monitor internal and external audit coverage in order to ensure that all key 
risk areas are considered (Jones, 2015; HKEx Appendix 15). This may entail reviewing and dis-
cussing the audit plan whilst resolving issues relating to previous years (Jones, 2015). In addition, 
the AC should assess the effectiveness of the internal audit function, including the adequacy of 
its resources as well as its standing within the company (Chau and Leung, 2006). The AC should 
report and make recommendations to the entire board on matters relating to its work and findings 
in areas like financial and other reporting, internal control and risk management, audits and other 
duties and responsibilities (Yu and Rudge, 2014; Chau and Leung, 2006). Therefore, an effective 
AC is expected to enhance audit quality. (Lin, Hutchinson and Percy, 2015; Chan et al., 2011; 
Jaggi and Leung, 2007) 
Extant studies in Hong Kong support the viewpoint that the establishment and structure of AC 
are important for improving financial statement and audit quality. For example, using data from 
1999 to 2000, Jaggi and Leung (2007) observed that the presence of the AC is important to con-
  
 98 
strain earnings management; however, the effectiveness of the AC is significantly reduced when 
family members are present on corporate boards. Using data from 2005 to 2006 in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, Leung, Richardson and Jaggi (2014) observed a positive relationship between 
the independence of AC and firm performance for non-family firms. Using data in 2006, Chan et 
al. (2011) noted that AC meetings and disclosure of sufficiency of resources provided to the AC 
were positively related with the firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Using data relating to 
Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong from 2004 to 2008, Lin, Hutchinson and Percy (2015) 
found that AC independence and experience were negatively associated with earnings manage-
ment, but pointed that there was a significant and positive relationship between AC independ-
ence and experience and earnings management amidst the presence of government officials in 
the AC.    
2.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the agency theory and stakeholder theory to argue that an effective AC 
should exist to safeguard the interest of stakeholders, as well as social interdependence theory to 
argue that ACMs and EAs should have positive interactions to establish trust between them. If 
that is the case, they may improve the effectiveness and efficiency of an audit, so that audit 
quality may be enhanced. It is followed by a discussion of earnings management and audit quali-
ty so that it forms a basis to making the argument that audit quality is important to deter earnings 
management. Thereafter, the chapter provides the framework of the corporate governance and 
AC to demonstrate that the oversight role of AC is to monitor audit quality by exercising its 
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rights to monitor various activities pertaining to the enhancement of audit quality, such as the 
determination of scope of audit, appropriateness of risk assessment and progress of the audit. The 
next chapter discusses the findings of prior studies about the effectiveness of the AC to constrain 
earnings management to identify the desirable characteristics to facilitate their oversight roles. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW (ARCHIVAL MODELLING STUDY) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided the background and theoretical framework for the study. This study now 
turns to the association between AC characteristics and audit quality. The mere presence of an 
AC is unlikely to augment its monitoring activity (Garcı´a, Barbadillo and Pe r´ez, 2012; Krish-
nan, Wen and Zhao, 2011). Accordingly, numerous studies had been conducted in the past to ex-
plore the characteristics of the AC which contribute to the efficacy of the AC, financial reporting 
and audit quality. These characteristics include its size representing the number of directors on 
the AC (Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Baxter and Cotter, 2009), inde-
pendence (Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Leung, Richardson, and Jaggi, 2014), diligence 
(Mohammad et al., 2016; Soliman and Ragab, 2014; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015), expertise 
(Shepardson, 2018; Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 2018; Sulaiman 2017; Badolato, Donelson 
and Ege, 2014; Woidtke and Yeh, 2013), outside directorships (Habbash, Sindzingue and Salama, 
2012; Sharma and Iselin, 2012), tenure (Rickling, 2014; Chan, Liu and Sun, 2013) as well as age 
(Maraghni and Nekhili, 2014; Dao, Huang and Zhu, 2013). The reason why this study focuses on 
these characteristics is that they demonstrate ACMs’ resources, willingness, effort, ability and 
experience to fulfil their responsibility of monitoring financial statements and audit processes 
that may influence audit quality. This section reviews prior studies of the expected effects of 
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these characteristics relating to audit quality. The reviews enable the researcher to form seven 
hypotheses for the archival modelling study. The summary of the chapter content is also provided.  
 
Figure 4 summarises the effects of AC characteristics as expected on audit quality. 
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Figure 4: AC Characteristics and Audit Quality 
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3.2 Audit Committee Size 
The first AC characteristic is its size, indicating the potential manpower availability for the func-
tions of the AC. A large AC may have more expertise, experience and manpower to oversee au-
dit quality (Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Rickling, 2014; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Baxter and 
Cotter, 2009). In a small AC, directors may be unable to perform their duties efficiently since 
their workload of overseeing audit quality is predicated on a small number of directors (Basir-
uddin, 2011; Vafeas, 2005). UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2012), HKSA (2002) 
and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) suggested that the minimum number of ACMs should be three.  
 
The findings of prior studies are mixed. For example, Vlaminck and Sarens (2015) investigated 
the AC characteristics and financial statement quality in the context of Belgium where the estab-
lishment of AC is relatively new. AC characteristics were measured in terms of its size, inde-
pendence, expertise, diligence and directorships. They stated that independent members are more 
resistant to managers’ pressure and are better equipped to maintain their objectivity to monitor 
the financial statements prepared by managers. ACMs with financial expertise have sufficiently 
broad range of competencies that allows them to perform their oversight role. ACMs with exces-
sive directorships may be too busy performing financial reporting process, but their directorships 
help them gain more experience of monitoring by serving as directors in other companies. Dili-
gent ACMs may have more meetings to discuss issues with regard to overseeing financial report-
ing process. A large AC may have greater diversity of expertise to perform their role. Therefore, 
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these characteristics should enable them to effectively monitor financial reporting process. Data 
were collected from 60 observations. Financial reporting quality was measured as discretionary 
accruals estimated by modified Jones model. Its size was measured as the number of ACMs. Af-
ter controlling for the effects of firm size, return on assets, leverage and auditor choice, they not-
ed that only its independence and directorships were positively related to financial reporting 
quality, but its size and diligent did not pertain to quality. However, the limitation is that their 
study only had 60 observations. The sample size is too small. This may limit its generabilities of 
the findings. 
 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) made use of a bigger sample size to examine this issue. They evaluated 
the relationships between the size of ACs and earnings quality for a sample of Australian listed 
companies in 2001. This year was chosen because of the introduction of mandatory AC require-
ments. They contended that AC size, independence and expertise negatively relate to earnings 
management. The sample was drawn from the top 500 Australian companies listed on the ASX 
with financial years ending during 2001. In their study, they found a sample of as many as 309 
companies. They measured earnings quality using the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model but did not find a significant association between AC size and earnings quality. 
One drawback is that this study was conducted within a span of one year.  Therefore, the find-
ings may not be generalised to other years.  
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Other studies found that AC size enhanced audit or financial reporting quality. For instance, 
Yasser and Al Mamun (2016) examined the AC structure on earnings management in Asia Pacif-
ic. Data were obtained from 2011 to 2013 in Australia (60 firms), Malaysia (90 firms) and Paki-
stan (90 firms). They suggested that a large AC allowed ACMs to spread over their workload 
and commit more manpower in order to monitor managers and detect fraudulent behaviour. AC 
meetings enables them to remain informed and knowledgeable about accounting or auditing is-
sues and can direct both internal and external audit resources to address matters in a timely fash-
ion. AC independence enables them to share unbiased views of financial statement quality. AC 
structure was measured as the total number of meetings attended by AC chair in a year, the num-
ber of ACMs, their shareholdings as well as their independence. Earnings management was 
measured as discretionary accruals estimated by performance-adjusted discretionary accruals de-
veloped by Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2010). After controlling for the effects of 
board size, firm age and return on equity, they observed that a larger AC is more effective in re-
ducing earnings management. However, the limitation was that Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan 
had very different corporate governance requirements.  The findings may not be generalised to a 
specific country.  
 
The occurrence of financial restatements may indicate that the oversight of the AC on financial 
statements is ineffective (Lin, Li and Yang. 2006). The General Accountability Office (GAO 
2006, p.1) explained that “a financial restatement occurs when a company, either voluntarily or 
prompted by EAs or regulators, revises public financial information that was previously report-
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ed”. It may be induced by misapplication of the accounting standard and fraudulent behaviours 
(Mohammad et al., 2016; Abdullah, Yusof and Nor, 2010). In a study pertaining to AC charac-
teristics and earnings restatement, Lin, Li and Yang (2006) investigated the relationships be-
tween characteristics of an AC recommended by the BRC in 1999 and earnings restatement. AC 
size was measured as an indicator whether the AC has a minimum of four numbers. They found 
106 listed companies in the US in year 2000. Their dependent variable is reported earnings re-
statement and they found a negative relationship between AC size and earnings restatement. 
They controlled for the effects of auditor tenure, audit fees, non-audit fees, operating cash flows, 
leverage and market value to book value ratio.  
 
Nelson and Devi (2013) examined the relationship between AC expertise and financial reporting 
quality for a sample of Malaysian listed companies. They suggested that AC size, expertise and 
independence negatively relate to earnings management. AC size was measured in terms of the 
number of ACMs. The sample firms were chosen in the year 2008 because the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (MCCG) was revised a year before in 2007. The revision was intended 
to strengthen the board of directors and ACs to discharge their roles. The final sample had 267 
observations. Earnings management was measured as discretionary accruals estimated by modi-
fied Jones Model. However, after controlling for the effects of firm size, board size, length of 
listing, directors’ ownership and industry sectors, they found that AC size positively related to 
earnings management. One caveat is that this study did not investigate the group thinking im-
pacts of a large AC. ACMs may think that they may be able to reduce their efforts in a large AC 
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because they may depend on other members to perform the duties. Therefore, future research 
may investigate the effects of group thinking effects of ACMs in their oversight role.  
 
In Nigeria, the Companies and Allied Matters Acts (1990) stated that a public limited company 
should have an AC with a maximum of six members of equal representation of three members - 
each representing the management, directors and shareholders. Against this backdrop, Ayemere 
and Elijah (2015) investigated the effects of AC characteristics on financial statement quality in 
Nigeria. Ayemere and Elijah (2015) suggested that a larger AC is more effective due to the fact 
that the responsibilities, skills, background and power should be enhanced in a larger AC. Finan-
cial statement quality is measured as discretionary accruals by modified Jones model. AC char-
acteristics were measured as AC independence, AC financial expertise, the number of AC meet-
ings and AC size. They obtained data from the firms listed on the stock exchange in Nigeria from 
2006 to 2013. The final sample contained 453 firm-year observations. After controlling for the 
effects of firm size and leverage, they observed that AC size, financial expertise, independence 
and meetings had positive impacts on financial reporting quality. The limitation is that their 
study did not control for the effects of board characteristics. In addition to the AC, the board may 
serve as a monitoring mechanism to oversee managers and appoint ACMs as well as EAs. There-
fore, board characteristics may positively impact audit or financial reporting quality.  
 
Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017) conducted a study of AC characteristics in a very large scope. 
They examined the impacts of AC quality on financial reporting quality in India. They collected 
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the data from firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchanges from 2002 to 2012 with at least Rs 
50,000,000. They selected this time-frame because the Company Act in India was amended to 
require that every public company with share capital of at least Rs 50,000,000 must have an AC. 
The Listing Agreement was amended to require that an AC should have a minimum of three 
members, with two-thirds of them being independent. In this study, 1,330 companies were ran-
domly selected and the authors followed them from 2002 to 2012. Financial reporting quality 
was measured as the natural log of the absolute value of abnormal accrual measured by the Per-
formance Matched Modified Jones model. AC quality was measured as the proportion of AC 
members who also sit on the compensation committee, AC independence, AC legal expertise, 
AC accounting expertise, number of AC meetings and AC size. After controlling for the effects 
of board characteristics, absolute value of change in net income and natural log of total assets, 
they noted that board size, AC meetings and AC size are negatively associated with the discre-
tionary accruals. However, one limitation is that the result of this study may not be generalised to 
family firms in which family members may perform the oversight role in monitoring audit quali-
ty or financial reporting quality.  
 
Ho and Kang (2013) stated that family firms have historical presence in their firms, usually hold-
ing a large equity position and director positions. They are in a unique position to influence and 
monitor their firms. Therefore, this has two cascading effects. Firstly, they may demand lower 
audit quality due to lower asymmetry and conflicts of interest between managers and investors, 
This explains why they are unlikely to hire Big 4 auditors. Secondly, the concentrated ownership 
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may induce agency conflicts between large and small shareholders. They may hire Big 4 auditors 
as an indication of high audit quality in order to signal that financial reporting is credible.  
 
There are two effects on audit fees. Firstly, since family owners have stronger incentives to mon-
itor managers, which may lead to lower risk of material financial misstatements, lower audit ef-
fort is needed. Hence, lower audit fees may be charged. Secondly, family owners may have 
strong incentives to engage in complex transactions that benefit themselves such as related-party 
transactions. This may increase the risk of fraudulent reporting. EAs are required to perform 
more procedures in order to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level, so audit fees may be higher. 
Ho and Kang (2013) investigated auditor choice and audit fees in family firms. In particular, they 
used AC independence, financial expertise, size and meetings as control variable for AC charac-
teristics. Data were collected from the firms listed on the Standard and Poor 1500 from 2000 to 
2008. The final sample had 9,219 firm-year observations. They found that family firms are less 
likely to hire Big4 auditor and have lower audit fees. Of relevance are the findings that AC size 
positively related to the appointment of Big4 auditor and audit fees in both samples (family and 
non-family firms). This, in turn, indicates that a large AC may hire high quality auditor and de-
mand greater audit efforts. Table 3 summarises the prior research of AC size.  
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Table 3: AC Size 
 
Studies Measures of Size  Results 
Vlaminck and Sarens (2015) Number of ACMs AC size did not relate to finan-
cial reporting quality, but a 
negative relationship for AC 
independence and AC’s direc-
torships.  
Baxter and Cotter (2009) Number of ACMs AC size did not relate to dis-
cretionary accruals. 
Yasser and Al Mamun (2016) Number of ACMs AC size negatively related to 
earnings management.  
 
Lin, Li and Yang (2006) An indicator whether the 
AC size at least comprises 
of four in number. 
AC size negatively related to 
earnings restatement. 
Nelson and Devi (2013) Number of ACMs AC size negatively related to 
discretionary accruals estimat-
ed by modified Jones model.  
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Ayemere and Elijah (2015) Number of ACMs AC size negatively related to 
discretionary accruals estimat-
ed by modified Jones model. 
Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017) Number of ACMs AC size negatively related to 
discretionary accruals estimat-
ed by modified Jones model. 
Ho and Kang (2013) Number of ACMs AC size positively related to 
the appointment of Big4 audi-
tor and audit fees in both sam-
ples (family and non-family 
firms). 
 
 
In conclusion, since the findings are mixed, the researcher expects the beta co-efficient sign be-
tween the size of an AC and audit quality not to have a predetermined sign. The null hypothesis 
to be tested is stated as:  
 
H1: There is no relationship between audit quality and the size of an AC. 
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3.3 Audit Committee Independence 
 
Having many directors on the AC is not enough to cause AC efficiency. ACMs must also exer-
cise independent judgment in order to monitor audit quality. For this reason, I turn to the second 
important characteristic of an AC: Independence. AC independence refers to the freedom from 
any business or other relationship that can materially interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment of audit committee members (Hong Kong Society of Accountants, 2002; Sarbanes Ox-
ley Act 2002; Cadbury Committee, 1992). An independent committee can make its own judg-
ment with audit evidence provided by EAs and challenge the position of managers for their mis-
stated financial statements (Liao and Hsu, 2013; Carcello, et al., 2011; Sharma and Sharma, 2011; 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010; Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010). 
 
Higgs Report (2002) and The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) provided some examples 
that a director in the board or in its committee cannot be deemed independent if a director  
● has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
● has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company 
either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of an entity that has 
such a relationship with the company; 
● has received or continues to receive additional remuneration from the company in addition 
to a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay 
scheme, or is an existing member of the company’s pension scheme; 
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● has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; 
holds cross-directorships or has significant links other directors. 
● holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement 
in other companies or bodies;  
● represents a significant shareholder; or 
● has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election 
 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) stated that a listed company must have an AC with at least three 
directors who are independent. Correspondingly, Higgs Report and Smith Report (2003) pointed 
out that an AC must include a minimum of three members, who are all independent non-
executive directors. It is noteworthy that the Blue Ribbon Committee defined independence as 
the exclusion of current and former employees, relatives of management, persons receiving com-
pensation from the company (except directors’ fees) or controlling for-profit organizations re-
ceiving from or paying the corporation significant sums, and compensation committee interlock-
ing directorships.  
 
According to the SOX (2002), an AC is independent if its member does not, other than in his or 
her capacity as a member of the audit committee, board of directors, or any other board commit-
tee:  
● Accept any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or 
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● Become an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 
 
Cadbury Report (1992) concurred that an independent AC, which can be characterised by the 
number of non-executive directors, serves the role of ascertaining the checks and balances on 
executive directors and resolves the conflict of interest between executive directors and share-
holders. Non-executive directors are the best suited executives for this role because they are less 
directly affected and they can give their independent judgment. 
 
However, non-executive directors only refer to those directors who are not involved in day-to-
day operations of companies (HKICPA 2013a), but may not be independent because they may 
have some relationships with companies. For example, non-executive directors may have busi-
ness relationships with the companies, have worked for the companies or have served as EAs of 
the companies in the past. Besides not being involved in operations of companies, independent 
non-executive directors do not enter into any relationship with the companies that could materi-
ally interfere with the exercise of independent judgment of ACMs apart from the relationship as 
ACMs of the companies.   
 
HICPA (2013a) recognised the difference between non-executive directors and independent non-
executive directors in the requirements of AC independence. It stated that the majority of ACMs 
must be independent non-executive directors and that the chairman of the AC needs to be inde-
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pendent non-executive directors. However, the definition of majority is not defined in Hong 
Kong. Therefore, it is possible for a company to determine the level of independence that is the 
most suitable for it. It implies that although majority of ACMs must be independent non-
executive directors, executive directors and non-executive directors can have a presence on the 
AC.  
 
Prior research supports the view that AC independence is important for the purpose of enhancing 
audit quality. In a study that investigated whether the relationships between the board character-
istics, board committee independence and firm performance are moderated by the concentration 
of family ownership, Leung, Richardson and Jaggi (2014) suggested that the independent direc-
tors are more effective in fulfilling their roles. In particular, independent ACMs may objectively 
review financial statements, audit processes and internal controls in order to ensure that the ac-
counting information remains unbiased. The unbiased accounting information may enhance the 
firm’s performance. However, family firms may use their power to appoint individuals to serve 
as ACMs due to their relationships with family members so that family ownership concentration 
may negatively relate to the appointment of independent members on the AC (Leung, Richardson 
and Jaggi 2014). 
 
They found a sample of 487 firms (from 2005 to 2006) on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
These years were chosen because the latest Code on Corporate Governance Practices was first 
implemented by Hong Kong firms during the financial year ending December 2005. Firm per-
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formance was measured as market-adjusted returns. If a firm is family-owned, the indicator will 
show a value of 1, otherwise it would denote 0. They controlled for the effects of firm size, aver-
age percentage growth in total assets, percentage of outside directors’ ownership, types of indus-
try, CEO ownership and the number of foreign subsidiaries. According to their observation, there 
was a positive relationship between the independence of the board and the independence of the 
AC. There was also a positive relationship between the independence of the AC and firm per-
formance with regard to non-family firms. This relationship was moderated by the concentration 
of family ownership. However, the one caveat is that this study did not control for the effects of 
other AC characteristics. For instance, AC diligence and sufficiency of resource provided to AC 
may allow ACMs to perform their role more efficaciously.  
 
If ACMs are independent, they may be perceived to constrain the managers to manipulate the 
earnings, implying that a firm’s value would increase. In addition, an AC requires adequate re-
sources to fulfil their role, otherwise their role is deemed ceremonial at best (Chen et al. 2011). 
Chen et al. (2011) examined whether the specific structural and operational characteristics of an 
AC in Hong Kong may encourage an AC to safeguard shareholders’ interest. The sufficiency of 
resource provided to an AC was measured as an indicator with a value of 1 for the firms which 
made it evident in their disclosures that adequate resources were provided to ACs in their annual 
reports, otherwise 0. On the other hand, independence was measured as the proportion of inde-
pendent non-executive directors on an AC.  The firm value was measured as Tobin’s Q. 
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They used a sample of 223 companies that were listed on the main board of the HKSE in 2006 
and controlled for the effects of other AC variables as well as firm variables. They did not find 
evidence that AC independence and financial expertise was associated with firm value, but did 
observe that the disclosure of whether an AC was provided with sufficient resource was a signifi-
cant factor to augment firm value. However, the one shortcoming is that sufficient resource could 
not stand alone as a significant independent variable. If an AC is neither independent nor compe-
tent, resource may not be used judiciously to oversee financial reporting and audit process. 
Therefore, future research may entail studying the moderating effects of resource sufficiency on 
the association between AC characteristics and firm value. Another caveat is that this study did 
not examine ACMs’ independence in terms of relationships with CEOs.  
 
While the above studies seemed to examine ACMs’ independence, they may not be independent 
in substance given that they may have personal relationships with the CEOs (Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels, 2014). Such personal relationships are not required to be disclosed in annual reports. 
Notably, CEOs often appoint directors from their informal social networks (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). These friendly relationships impel them to be less critical of 
the CEO’s financial reporting policies and less likely to challenge managers’ assumptions during 
the conflicts arising between managers and EAs (DeZoort, Hermanson and Houston, 2008; De-
Zoort and Salterio, 2001).  
 
When investigating the effects of the social ties between ACMs and CEOs on oversight quality 
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of an AC, Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) selected the sample firms from 2004 to 2008. They 
measured CEO-ACM connections in terms of past or present employment, education, or non-
professional activities. They made 625 firm-year observations for this four-year period in the US. 
The oversight quality of ACMs was measured in terms of discretionary accruals, audit fees, go-
ing concern opinions, disclosure of internal control weakness as well as internal control deficien-
cies.  
 
After controlling for the board and AC effectiveness, profitability, industry type and leverage, 
they observed that the social ties established through the CEO’s friendship network adversely 
affected oversight quality. Managers of such companies engaged more in earnings management, 
and their ACMs purchased less audit efforts. This was evident in lower audit fees. Moreover, 
they observed that EAs in these companies were less likely to report internal control deficiencies 
or issue going-concern opinions for companies in distress when friendships were present.  
 
These results imply that AC independence, which was impaired by social ties with CEOs, may 
affect the oversight quality of ACMs. However, one caveat is that the measures of social ties 
were unable to capture the true interactions between them. For instance, despite graduating from 
the same school, they may not be able to establish connections with one another due to lack of 
interactions. AC independence was not threatened in this case. Further, research may use social 
ties as a context to investigate how they had interacted and how to impair AC independence.   
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Archival research above used proxies such as abnormal accruals, market returns and restatement 
of financial statements in order to measure the levels of audit quality, but they may be unable to 
capture important elements of audit quality such as ACMs’ and EAs’ judgments, thereby threat-
ening the internal validity of the findings. In this regard, the usage of experiments helps enhance 
internal validity by facilitating the more direct measurement of audit quality. For instance, 
ACMs’ support for EAs’ position when they have disagreements with managers is not disclosed 
in the financial statements, which implies that archival research cannot capture their judgments. 
However, their support for EAs is known to enhance audit quality significantly.  
 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) investigated the effects of AC independence and expertise about the 
extent to which ACMs support the position of EAs when they have disagreements with managers. 
As part of this study, they invited 340 ACMs to participate; 68 Canadian ACMs participated, 
leading to a response rate of 27 percent. After a hypothetical case was presented to the partici-
pants, they were then asked to fill out questionnaires. The hypothetical case pertained to the 
change in accounting policy of revenue recognition of an electronic goods retailer. The managers 
wanted to bring about changes in the accounting policy, but EAs asserted that the revenue recog-
nition policy propounded by managers was inappropriate in reflecting the stream of revenues. 
After making the adjustment, net income will decrease by 37 percent and the debt-to-equity ratio 
will violate the debt covenant. Due to their disagreements about the revenue recognition policy, 
these participants were required to act as ACMs in the hypothetical company in order to handle 
the disagreements. They had to decide whether they should choose between EAs and managers 
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in terms of their stance. 
 
In order to measure AC independence, participants were asked for the number of corporate 
boards where they served as independent directors. They were also asked whether they served as 
both senior management and directors on the board of a company. The authors assumed that if 
ACMs had more experience as independent directors, they may be able to make more independ-
ent decisions (Libby and Tan 1995).  Additionally, if they serve as both directors and senior man-
agement on the board, experience may be biased towards understanding and sympathising with 
managers’ position, thereby curtailing independence.  In order to measure financial reporting and 
auditing knowledge, they were asked to respond to the items contained in the questionnaires. 
They observed that serving as both board and senior management encouraged them to support 
managers’ position. Further, they found that while ACMs with knowledge of audit reporting are 
more likely to support EAs’ position, knowledge of financial reporting did not significantly relate 
to their judgments.  
 
These results imply that independent ACMs with sufficient audit reporting knowledge may be 
more likely to enhance audit quality. The results were in consonance with the suggestions of 
SOX, Cadbury Report and Hong Kong Stock Exchange that an AC should be sufficiently inde-
pendent to challenge managers’ assumption and support EAs’ position. However, one caveat is 
that the design of this case ignored the interactions taking place between EAs and ACMs. How-
ever, their interactions are an important factor in deciding whether ACMs should support EAs’ 
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position.  
 
Audit quality is also influenced by clients’ internal audit function because EAs often rely on the 
work of internal audit function (Paino, Razali and Jabar, 2015; Suwaidan and Qasim, 2010). 
Therefore, the issues of audit quality can be investigated in connection with the quality of the 
internal audit function. In this context, Zaman and Sarens (2013) examined the relationships be-
tween AC characteristics and informal interactions between ACs and internal audit functions as 
well as their concomitant effects on internal audit quality. According to their findings, internal 
audit assumes importance for financial reporting quality because ACMs rely on the work of the 
internal audit function to develop their understanding of risk management and efficacy of inter-
nal control. ACMs may fulfil their oversight role more effectively with high quality internal audit 
function. They also suggested that independent ACMs may face greater information asymmetry. 
This explains why independent ACMs are likely to seek more information whilst performing 
their monitoring responsibilities.  
 
Additionally, active ACMs may want to obtain more information and be more interested in inter-
acting with the internal function. They posited that oversight of internal audit function is often 
performed in an informal manner and private meetings. Further they suggested that information 
interactions between ACMs and internal auditors may improve overall exchange of relevant and 
reliable information. Consequently, interactions between ACMs and internal audit functions can 
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enhance the quality of the internal audit function.  
 
The data were collected using a questionnaire survey sent to 672 Chief Audit Executives (CAE) 
in the UK. 187 usable responses were collected, yielding a response rate of 27.8 percent. Infor-
mal interactions between them were measured as whether CAEs have informal interactions with 
AC chair or ACMs besides the regular pre-scheduled meetings. They were asked to indicate the 
number of independent ACMs, total number of the firms’ ACMs and AC chair’s knowledge and 
experience relevant to risk management, internal and external audit and corporate governance. 
They were asked to indicate whether 95 percent of the internal audit plan was completed in order 
to measure internal audit quality. If so, it assumed that the quality of internal audit function was 
high. They were then asked whether their internal audit function was subject to formal and exter-
nal quality assurance and whether their function complied with the Code of Ethics and Standards 
issued by Institute of Internal Auditors.  
 
They controlled for the effects of whether these firms are financial companies or listed on the 
stock exchange. Using regression analysis, they observed that AC independence positively relat-
ed to informal interactions, which, in effect, positively related to internal audit function quality. 
However, this study ignored one important determinant of interactions: the trust between ACMs 
and CAEs. Without this trust, CAEs may not be willing to interact with ACMs, although ACMs 
are independent.  Therefore, future research should examine the effects of CAEs’ trust in ACMs 
on their interactions and audit quality.  
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Table 4 underpins previous studies about AC independence and audit quality in the literature.  
Table 4: AC Independence 
Studies Measures of Independence Results 
Leung, Richardson 
and Jaggi (2014) 
Independence was measured as the 
proportion of independent non-
executive directors on an AC.  
 
There was a positive relationship 
between the independence of the 
board and that of board commit-
tees, including the AC.  
 
Also, there was a positive rela-
tionship between the independ-
ence of board committees and 
firm performance for non-family 
firms. The relationship was 
moderated by the concentration 
of family ownership. 
 
Chen et al. (2011) 
 
AC Independence was measured as 
the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on an AC.  
 
The authors did not find evi-
dence that AC independence and 
financial expertise related to firm 
value, but observed that the dis-
  
 124 
closure of whether an AC was 
provided with sufficient resource 
was a significant factor to en-
hance firm value. 
 
Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels (2014) 
 
Independence was measured as a 
measure of ACMs’ connections with 
CEO in terms of past or present em-
ployment, education or non-
professional activities. 
 
Managers of such companies 
engaged more in earnings man-
agement.  
 
Their ACMs purchased less au-
dit efforts - reflected in lower 
audit fees.  
 
EAs in these companies were 
less likely to report internal con-
trol deficiencies or issue going-
concern opinions for firm in dis-
tress when friendships were pre-
sent. 
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DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) 
 
AC independence was measured as 
the number of independent corporate 
boards served and whether senior 
managers also served as directors on 
the board. 
 
Serving as both board and man-
agement membership encour-
aged ACMs to support manag-
ers’ positions because AC inde-
pendence was reduced. 
Zaman and Sarens 
(2013) 
AC independence was measured as 
the proportion of independent ACMs 
on an AC using a questionnaire sur-
vey.  
They observed that AC inde-
pendence positively related to 
informal interactions, which, in 
effect, positively related to inter-
nal audit function quality.  
 
To conclude, prior studies suggest that independent directors on an AC may protect stakeholders’ 
interests by monitoring audit quality. This is congruent with the expectations of the corporate 
governance in the US (Blue Ribbon Committee and Sarbanes Oxley Act), UK (Smith Report) 
and Hong Kong (Hong Kong Code on Corporate Governance). The researcher opines that the 
beta co-efficient sign between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on an AC 
and audit quality is positive. The null hypothesis to be tested is stated as:  
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between audit quality and AC independence. 
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3.4 Audit Committee Diligence  
 
In addition to being independent, an AC should work diligently to fulfil their responsibility in 
order to monitor the financial reporting and audit processes (Ho, Liu and Wang, 2014; Rickling, 
2014; Suarez et al., 2013; The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012; Sharma and Iselin, 2012; 
Hong Kong Society of Accountants, 2002). Otherwise, audit quality may not be high despite the 
independence of the directors on the AC because their presence is ceremonial. The diligence of 
ACs can be measured by the number of AC meetings. 
 
Higgs Report (2003) and Smith Report (2003) suggested that the meetings of an AC should not 
be fewer than three during a year. Correspondingly, Hong Kong Society of Accountants (2002) 
stated that a typical AC should meet at least three or four times in a year, depending on the range 
and complexity of the matters that an AC need to address. In this regard, Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants (2002) opined that each meeting should be held for between half-a-day and a day. 
ACMs should meet to address the matters of internal control, external audits, risk management as 
well as other duties and responsibilities. Deloitte (2012, p.6) stated that “the importance of AC 
meetings is to allow numbers to foster better communication among non-management directors, 
pose questions of concerns regarding management, external auditors, resources or other issues 
related to financial reporting and internal control”. 
 
Prior studies were conducted to examine the relationships between the number of AC meetings 
and the effectiveness of their oversight role. For instance, Soliman and Ragab (2014) investigat-
  
 127 
ed the effects of AC characteristics on earnings management in Egypt. In the year 2000, the es-
tablishment of an AC was made mandatory for all listed companies across the country. The top 
50 most active-traded companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange were collected from 
2007 to 2010. The final sample had 40 firms. Earnings management was measured as discretion-
ary accruals measured by modified Jones model. AC characteristics were measured as AC size, 
independence, financial expertise and number of meetings. They stated that a higher frequency 
of meetings enables them to have sufficient time to perform their oversight role, so that managers 
may find it more difficult to manage earnings. After controlling for firm size, auditor choice, lev-
erage and cash flows from operations, they found that AC independence, AC financial expertise 
and AC meetings have negative correlations with earnings management.  
 
 
Alzeban and Sawan (2015) examined the impacts of AC characteristics on perceptions of the ef-
fectiveness of implementing internal audit recommendations. They stated that AC independence, 
expertise, diligence and size do influence the perceptions. They also claimed that independent 
ACMs are more likely to preserve their own reputation, so they require higher audit quality by 
demanding internal audit functions to enhance the scope of activities and improve internal con-
trols. In addition, they suggested that a higher number of AC meetings do encourage ACMs to 
provide more support to internal audit functions in order to implement recommendations. Their 
expertise enables them to communicate with external and internal auditors for the implementa-
tion. A large AC may have more manpower to monitor internal audit functions, so it is more 
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likely that internal audit recommendation can be successfully implemented. Equally, frequent 
meetings between ACMs and Chief Audit Executives (CAE) are known to provide more oppor-
tunities for them to be able to exchange information on facilitating internal auditors’ work and 
improving the financial reporting system.  
 
Data were collected using a questionnaire survey sent to 542 CAEs of UK firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. As many as 188 usable questionnaires were received, yielding a re-
sponse rate of 34 percent. The perception of effectiveness was measured as the percentage of 
recommendations suggested by the CAEs and implemented by the internal audit functions. Ac-
cording to their observation, AC independence, financial expertise and frequent meetings be-
tween the AC and CAEs had positive correlations with the perceptions of the efficacy of imple-
mentations. However, this study did not reveal how AC characteristics influence their decisions 
in monitoring external auditor independence. If EAs provided significant amount of non-audit 
service fees to the client, they may not be willing to report that clients’ managers engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting, due to the fear that mangers may refuse to use their services. If 
that happens, they will lose a significant amount of revenues from the client. 
 
Audit quality may be examined in relation to non-audit service fees, which may be used as a 
proxy for auditor independence. High non-audit fee ratio may also imply low AC effectiveness 
in monitoring external auditor independence (Lary and Taylor, 2012). Non-audit service fees are 
considered to impair auditor independence owing to the economic bond between the audit client 
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and EAs. Non-audit fees are expected to reduce the willingness of EAs to challenge managers 
(Lary and Talor, 2012). Notably, Lary and Taylor (2012) investigated the linkage between AC 
characteristics and the effectiveness of their oversight role in Australia. AC characteristics were 
recognised as AC size, expertise and diligence. According to their findings, AC diligence under-
pins the desire of ACMs to conduct their monitoring roles. AC effectiveness was measured as the 
incidence and severity of restatements and non-audit fee ratio. The occurrence of restatement re-
flects low AC effectiveness due to its failure to improve the quality of financial statements.  
 
Data were collected by identifying companies listed on the Australia Stock Exchange that had 
recorded a restatement from 2004 to 2009. In this process, 60 companies reporting a restatement 
were identified. These restatement companies were matched with non-restatement companies 
based on their company size. The final sample consisted of 120 companies. They measured dili-
gence on the basis of whether the AC had at least three members and whether it met at least four 
times a year. After controlling for the effects of auditor switch, industry type, board characteris-
tics and natural log of total assets, the authors noted that AC independence and expertise lowered 
incidence and severity of financial restatements, while an AC, which had at least three members 
and four meetings, had negative correlations with non-audit fees ratio. However, this study ig-
nored the ACs’ characteristics on audit fees which may be used to proxy for EAs’ effort. If an 
EA puts in more effort in the audit process, it could be possible to enhance audit quality (Zaman, 
Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011).  
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Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) investigated the relationship between governance quality and 
auditor remuneration in the UK by utilising the composite measure of four dimensions of AC 
effectiveness: AC independence, financial expertise, diligence and size. They observed that AC 
diligence demonstrates whether these ACs are active. If so, they may require a wider audit scope, 
thereby increasing the audit fees. Also, if they demand a higher effort from EAs, there may be 
less need for managers to use non-audit services, so that non-audit fees may be reduced. Data 
were collected from FTSE 350 between 2001 and 2004. The final sample contained 540 firm-
year observations.  
 
Natural logarithm of audit fees and non-audit service fees were the dependent variables. They 
measured AC diligence as the number of AC meetings. A value of 1 was assigned if an AC was 
fully independent, otherwise 0.  Similarly, a value of 1 was assigned if it had at least one finan-
cial expert, otherwise 0, whereas a value of 1 was assigned if it had at least three meetings. A 
value of 1 was assigned if it had at least three members. AC effectiveness was measured as the 
sum of the scores for AC independence, diligence, size and expertise. Therefore, the maximum 
score was 4, with the minimum score being 0.  
 
After controlling for the effects of board characteristics, duality of CEO and chairman of the 
board, firm size, merger and acquisition, natural logarithm of number of subsidiaries, leverage, 
loss, industry type and number of block shareholders, the authors noted that AC effectiveness, 
AC independence, AC diligence and AC size positively related to the natural logarithm of audit 
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fees. They also noted that AC effectiveness, AC independence and financial expertise negatively 
related to non-audit service fees, although AC size positively related to them. One caveat is that 
this study did not examine the effects of AC characteristics on the early warnings of internal con-
trol problem before year-end external audit. If an AC is found to be effective, they should be able 
to require managers to report that internal control systems are ineffective before EAs ascertain 
the problems in the external audit at the end of a year.  
 
In this regard, Munsif, Raghunandan and Dasaratha (2013) examined the early warnings of in-
ternal control problem before year-end external audit. In the US, Section 404 of SOX comprises 
of two parts. Section 404(a) mandates managers to provide an assessment about the efficacy of 
internal controls over financial reporting, whereas Section 404(b) requires EAs to express their 
opinion on such internal controls. Section 302 of SOX requires that the CEO and CFO certify 
each quarter about the significant deficiency of internal controls.  
 
However, it is assumed that the problems disclosed in Section 404 filings (based on the year-end 
evaluation) were also confronted earlier on in the year, and that it is unlikely that an internal con-
trol problem suddenly occurs at the end of a year. They compared the characteristics of compa-
nies with and without prior warning in the form of Section 302 disclosures in previous quarters 
of the same fiscal year.  Data were collected by using Section 404 reporting in order to identify 
whether companies had internal control weaknesses at year-end. Eventually, they found 305 ob-
servations in 2017 and 296 observations in 2018.  
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If one or more of the material weaknesses disclosed in the Section 404 report were also men-
tioned in at least one of the Section 302 reports, then it can be inferred that prior warning existed. 
They stated that a diligent AC should have more meetings to discuss issues about the detection of 
internal control weaknesses, so that a company is more likely to have early warning disclosure. 
A dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if one or more internal control weaknesses disclosed 
in Section 404 reports also found mention in Section 302 filings made in the quarterly reports 
filed in the previous quarters of the same fiscal year, otherwise 0. They measured AC diligence 
as the number of AC meetings that occurred in a year. After controlling for the effects of litiga-
tion risk, company’s equity and debt issuance, auditor choice, first year audit engagement, non-
audit fee ratio, duality of CEO and chairman, the CFO’s tenure and the number of material 
weaknesses, the authors noted that early warning was more likely for firms with a large AC and 
more frequent AC meetings.  
 
Mohammad (2018) investigated the AC characteristics and its influence over financial restate-
ment in Malaysia. The author stated that AC meetings allow directors to discuss issues pertaining 
to management monitoring and strategy implementation. In addition, higher AC meeting fre-
quency may allow the directors to discuss issues about remedying weaknesses in internal control 
and risk management procedures. Consequently, AC meetings should allow ACMs to perform 
their oversight role and reduce financial restatement. 
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Data were collected from the firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange for 2008 and 
2009. This study used the match-pair process wherein a control group sample was created. They 
found 350 firms with restatements and 350 firms with non-restatements from 2008 to 2009, re-
spectively. This control group included companies that did not restate their annual reports, was 
of a similar size to that of the matched restated companies, and were listed on the same Bursa 
Malaysia board in the same industry. The final sample had a total of 700 firms. The dependent 
variable was measured as the occurrence of financial restatement. They measured AC diligence 
as the number of AC meetings per year. After controlling for the effects of leverage, number of 
subsidiaries, percentage of foreign subsidiaries, board characteristics and market-to-book ratio, 
they observed that its independence, size, meeting and expertise negatively related to financial 
restatements. However, this study ignored the effects of managerial ownership on financial re-
statements. Managerial ownership aligns the incentives of management with those of sharehold-
ers. If managers have ownership, they are more likely to make decisions in the best interest of 
shareholders (Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton, 2009). 
 
 Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009) examined the effects of AC characteristics on 
managerial ownership and fraudulent financial reporting. They stated that if an AC is effective, it 
may effectively oversee financial statements prepared by the managers. This implies that fraudu-
lent reporting is unlikely to occur. The sample included 50 fraud firms and 50 non-fraud firms. 
The dependent variable was measured as whether there is fraud litigation. The independent vari-
ables included AC characteristics and managerial ownerships. AC characteristics were recog-
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nized as AC independence, financial expertise, diligence and directorships. They measured AC 
diligence as the number of meetings held during a year. After controlling for the effects of board 
tenure, leverage, firm size, change in sales and auditor choice, they found that the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting negatively related to AC independence and number of meetings 
They also observed that the probability of fraudulent financial reporting negatively related to the 
level of managerial ownership as well as the number of AC meetings as long as an AC remains 
completely independent.  
 
Table 5 highlights prior studies about AC diligence and audit quality in the literature.  
 
Table 5: AC Diligence  
 
Authors Measure of Diligence Results 
Soliman and Ragab 
(2014) 
 
Diligence was measured as 
number of AC meetings 
AC independence, AC financial ex-
pertise and AC meetings negatively 
related to earnings management. 
 
Alzeban and Sawan 
(2015)  
 
Diligence was measured as the 
number of meetings between 
ACMs and CAEs.  
Frequent meetings between the AC 
and CAEs positively related to the 
perceptions of the effectiveness of 
implementations. 
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Lary and Taylor 
(2012) 
Diligence was measured in 
terms of whether AC had at 
least three members and four 
meetings 
An AC which had at least three 
members and four meetings negative-
ly related to non-audit fees ratio. 
 
Zaman, Hudaib and 
Haniffa (2011) 
Diligence was measured as the 
number of AC meetings  
AC effectiveness, independence, dili-
gence and size positively related to 
natural logarithm of audit fees.  
 
They also noted that AC effective-
ness, AC independence and financial 
expertise negatively related to non-
audit service fees, but AC size posi-
tively related to them. 
Munsif, Raghunan-
dan and Dasaratha 
(2013) 
Diligence was measured as the 
number of AC meetings 
Early warnings were more likely for 
firms with more frequent AC meet-
ings.  
Mohammad (2018) Diligence was measured as the 
number of AC meetings 
AC independence, size, meeting and 
expertise negatively related to financial 
restatements. 
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Owens-Jackson, 
Robinson and Shel-
ton (2009) 
Diligence was measured as 
number of AC meetings 
The likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting negatively related to AC 
independence, meetings and manage-
rial ownership positively related to 
firm size and change of sales. 
 
The likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting given a totally independent 
AC negatively related to the level of 
managerial ownership and the num-
ber of AC meetings.  
 
In summary, the prior studies suggest that a diligent AC should spend more time and resources 
discussing financial reporting and internal control matters, audit scope, audit process, appoint-
ment of EAs and determination of the appropriateness of audit fees in order to enhance audit 
quality. The researcher expects a positive relationship between AC diligence and audit quality, 
so the beta-coefficient is expected to be positive. The null hypothesis to be tested is stated as fol-
lows:  
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the diligence of an audit committee and audit quali-
ty.  
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3.5 Audit Committee Expertise 
 
We now turn to the fourth potentially relevant characteristics of ACs: their expertise. ACs must 
also have the desired expertise to oversee auditing and financial reporting processes in order to 
constrain earnings management (Ho, Liu and Wang, 2014; Rickling, 2014; Dhaliwal, Naiker and 
Navissi, 2010; Naiker and Sharma, 2009).  
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, pp.6) stated that ACMs should have expertise to 
fulfil the duties of an AC: 
 
“The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective du-
ties and responsibilities effectively”. 
 
Although expertise entails many definitions, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) gave a 
tentative definition of a financial expert on October 22, 2002. The Commission (2002, p.790) 
stated: 
 
“A financial expert can be identified to be someone who has, through education and experi-
ence as a public accountant, auditor or a principal financial officer, or controller, or principal ac-
counting officer of an issuer, or from a position, been involved in the performance of similar 
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functions”: 
 
1. An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements; 
2. Experience in the preparation or auditing financial statements of generally comparable 
issuers and the application of such principles in connection with accounting for esti-
mates, accruals, and reserves; 
3. Experience with internal accounting controls; and an understanding of the audit com-
mittee functions. 
 
NYSE and NASDAQ mandated that at least one member must have accounting or financial 
management expertise through experience or education (Deloitte, 2012). On the other hand, 
Higgs Report (2003) and Smith Report (2003) suggested that an AC should have at least one 
member with significantly relevant and recent financial experience, which is inclusive of the ex-
perience of being an auditor or a finance director of a listed company. Hong Kong Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (2013a) recommended that an AC should have at least one member 
with appropriate professional qualifications or accounting or related financial management ex-
pertise. 
 
Prior studies investigated the relationships between AC expertise and the effectiveness of their 
oversight role in monitoring financial reporting and audit quality. For instance, Lin, Liu and 
Wang (2009) found that AC expertise was associated with lower levels of earnings management. 
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They investigated whether the regulations and recommendations in China and Hong Kong have 
been effective in regulating the quality of reported earnings. They selected a sample of firms 
from 2004 to 2008 and compared the sample of 208 HKEX listed companies to 208 Chinese 
firms that were only listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. The level of earnings 
management was measured as discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model. After 
controlling for the effects of returns on assets, book to market value, total assets, industry type 
and year, they found that AC independence, expertise and size were important factors in reducing 
earnings management. They also observed a positive relationship between the presence of gov-
ernment officials on the AC and earnings management. However, they did not find a significant 
relationship between the AC characteristics and earnings management for Chinese firms that 
were only listed on the Chinese domestic Stock Exchange. 
 
The effects of AC expertise on earnings management can be evaluated in connection with family 
control. Strong family control may be able to reduce the effects of oversight role of the AC on 
earnings because family firms may appoint ACMs owing to the relationship with family mem-
bers on the board (Wong, 2011). Despite their expertise, ACMs may be unable to challenge the 
quality of the reported earnings because they are appointed due to their relationship with the 
family members. They may choose to protect the interests of the family members instead of 
stakeholders. Consequently, it may be more probable that earnings management will occur. 
Wong (2011) conducted a study in Hong Kong in order to examine the effects of AC characteris-
tics and family control on earnings management after the listing rule was revised on 31 March 
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2004.  
 
He selected a sample from 2004 to 2008 with 385 firms listed in the mainboard in Hong Kong, 
finding 1,540 firms-year observations. They found that AC financial expertise was a significant 
factor in lowering earnings management. This was not the case with AC independence and dili-
gence. In addition, family firms had ACMs with lower levels of independence and financial ex-
pertise. However, no evidence was found that family control moderated the relationships be-
tween AC characteristics and earnings management. The drawback of Wong (2011) study is that 
it ignored the effect of industry experts on an AC. Industry experts should have a better under-
standing of the effectiveness of internal control as well as auditing process within a specific in-
dustry.  
 
Since financial statements include different estimates reflecting the complexities of business en-
vironment and industry, industry expertise helps an AC evaluate the accuracy of industry-
specific estimates (Cohen, Hoitash and Krishnamoorthy, 2014). Therefore, an AC with industry 
experience and financial expertise should be more competent to monitor financial statements and 
audit quality than his or her counterpart without any industry experience. Cohen, Hoitash and 
Krishnamoorthy (2014) contended that an AC with industry expertise better understands the in-
herent risks and intricacies in the industry, so they are able to communicate more effectively with 
EAs. They are also more likely to understand the nature and extent of audit process within a spe-
cific industry. Therefore, the monitoring of the quality of external audits may be effective, even-
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tually leading to higher audit quality.  
 
Cohen, Hoitash and Krishnamoorthy (2014) evaluated the effects of AC industry expertise on the 
effectiveness of the AC in overseeing the financial report and auditing process. The final sample 
had 18,564 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2007. The occurrence of financial restatements 
and discretionary accruals estimated using a variant of modified Jones model (Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley, 2005) were regressed on the proportion of ACMs with industry experience. It was 
found that ACMs performed better to reduce restatement and discretionary accruals if they are 
industry and accounting experts, thereby indicating that industry and accounting expertise was 
important for the purpose of enhancing audit quality.One caveat is that this study did not control 
for the effects of ACMs’ power which is reflected in ACMs’ status in examining the relation-
ships between earnings quality and ACM’s expertise. 
 
If an AC has a higher status than managers, it may influence how managers view the AC because 
its status enhanced the perception of their ability and authority (Badolato, Donelson and Ege, 
2014; Pollock et al., 2010). Moreover, a higher status AC could seek more information because 
the AC is perceived to be more respected and may exhibit greater willingness to investigate po-
tential problems by potentially challenging managers more than a low status AC (Badolato, Do-
nelson and Ege, 2014). Badolato, Donelson and Ege (2014) examined the effects of financial ex-
pertise and status of AC on earnings management. They measured the status of ACs and manag-
ers using contemporaneous public board directorships, contemporaneous private board director-
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ships and degrees from elite institutions. A value of 1 was assigned if the number of public board 
directorships on AC was found to be higher than the sample median, otherwise 0. The same 
method was adopted for contemporaneous private board directorships and degrees from elite in-
stitutions as well and also to measure managers’ status. Thereafter, the authors assigned a value 
of 1 if the sum of the value assigned for contemporaneous public board directorships, private 
board directorships and degrees from elite institutions is three, otherwise 0.  
 
Subsequently, an indicator was created to denote whether the AC has a higher score than manag-
ers. If that is the case, the indicator will assume a value of 1, otherwise 0. The data was collected 
from 2001 to 2008, and the final sample had 29,073 firm-year observations. Earnings manage-
ment was measured as discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model. After control-
ling for other AC and board characteristics, institutional ownership, leverage and return on total 
assets, they observed that ACs have both financial expertise and high relative status to help deter 
earnings management. However, this study ignored whether ACMs have the specific task experi-
ence in monitoring particular accounting process. An ACM who may be strong at determining 
the fair value of a property may not be strong at determining the impairment of goodwill.  
 
Shepardson (2018) examined whether individual AC task-specific experience influences group 
financial reporting outcomes. She suggested that ACMs who have task-specific experience may 
have more experience in curtailing managerial bias. Task-specific experience was measured in 
terms of whether ACMs had the experience of monitoring goodwill write-offs in other firms. Fi-
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nancial reporting outcomes were measured in terms of whether the sampled company has good-
will impairment. She used goodwill write-off because of its possibility as a critical accounting 
estimate that must be discussed with the AC. She identified ACMs of the firms with goodwill 
balances from 2004 to 2014. Thereafter, she identified each firm with recorded goodwill with 
which the ACMs were associated from t-1 to t-3, either as an ACM, CEO or CFO. Prior three 
years were used to ensure that economic conditions were similar. They found 15,038 firm-year 
observations. After controlling for the effects of the history of goodwill write-offs, firm size, lev-
erage, AC directorships, financial expertise and size, auditor choice, returns on assets, duality 
and board size, they found that ACMs with goodwill write-off experience did enhance their 
oversight role of financial reporting by identifying goodwill impairments and requiring managers 
to write off goodwill in the firm.  
 
In an interview, Sulaiman (2017) explored the effects of the AC on audit quality to provide in-
sights into the conduct of the AC in audit quality and elements that affect the effectiveness of its 
oversight. He asked one question that is relevant to the current study: what are the critical ele-
ments affecting the effectiveness of the AC oversight of audit quality? To answer this question, 
they collected data using semi-structured interviews with ACMs and audit partners; 11 audit 
partners and 11 ACMs participated in this study. Thematic analysis was used to generate the 
themes following the interviews.  
 
According to their findings, both auditor partners and ACMs perceived that the effectiveness of 
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AC oversight on audit quality is affected by knowledge and understanding of the chairman in 
auditing, financial reporting and the clients’ business. They also found that AC is predicated on 
the work of EAs, particularly their expertise and knowledge. This suggested the important role of 
the external audit function as part of the resource components for the AC in pursuing its over-
sight role. Further, his study suggested that an AC’s efficacy is influenced by the quality of their 
relationships. The participants concurred that the interactions and communication between EAs 
and ACMs have become far more frequent over the past few years. To illustrate, interactions oc-
cur between the chairman of the AC and EAs beyond the formal regular meetings. The ACMs 
perceived that the continuous discussion occurring during informal interactions plays an im-
portant role in building trust with EAs that reassures them about the quality of the audit work. 
They concurred that informal process is important for them when it comes to discussing difficul-
ties encountered during the external audit and other sensitive concerns that cannot be touched 
upon in formal meetings. 
 
Some partners explained that although they have more effective communications with ACMs, it 
may not necessarily enhance the audit quality because ACMs do not always want to discuss and 
decipher the accounting or auditing issues that pose challenges to EAs. They opined that this 
stems from the limited understanding of the ACMs in technical auditing and accounting 
knowledge. They added that the current financial reporting becomes more complex and that the 
AC may lack sufficient skills or training on these subjects. This, in turn, may cause misunder-
standing between EAs and ACMs, thus affecting audit quality. 
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Table 6 highlights prior studies about AC expertise and audit quality in the literature.  
 
Table 6: AC Expertise 
Authors Measures of Expertise Results 
Lin, Liu and Wang 
(2009) 
 
AC expertise was measured as the 
financial expertise on an AC. 
AC financial expertise reduced 
earnings management. There was 
a positive relationship between 
the presence of government offi-
cials on the AC and earnings 
management. 
 
Wong (2011) 
 
AC expertise was measured as the 
financial expertise on an AC. 
AC competence was a significant 
factor in reducing earnings man-
agement. Family firm had ACMs 
with less independence and finan-
cial expertise.  
 
However, they did not find any 
evidence that family control mod-
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erates the relationships between 
AC characteristics and earnings 
management. 
 
Cohen, Hoitash and 
Krishnamoorthy 
(2014) 
AC expertise was measured as the 
proportion of ACMs with industry 
experience as well as the propor-
tion of ACMs with accounting ex-
pertise.  
ACMs performed better to reduce 
restatement and discretionary ac-
cruals if they are industry and ac-
counting experts.  
Badolato, Donelson 
and Ege (2014) 
Contemporaneous public board 
directorships, contemporaneous 
private board directorships and 
degrees from elite institutions 
ACs who had the financial exper-
tise and high relative status may 
be more effective to deter earn-
ings management.  
 
Shepardson (2018) AC expertise was measured as 
ACMs’ task-specific experience 
(goodwill impairment) 
ACMs with goodwill write-off 
experience enhanced their over-
sight role of financial reporting 
by identifying goodwill impair-
ments and requiring managers to 
write off goodwill. 
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Sulaiman (2017) ACMs’ knowledge of business 
operation, experience, accounting 
and auditing expertise 
Effective oversight of audit quali-
ty of AC was influenced by the 
knowledge and understanding of 
the chairman concerning auditing, 
financial reporting and the clients’ 
business 
 
 
According to prior studies, if ACMs have the necessary financial expertise, an AC may possess 
greater knowledge to fulfil its oversight role. Therefore, the researcher expects a positive sign of 
co-efficient between audit quality and AC financial expertise. The null hypotheses are stated as:  
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between AC financial expertise and audit quality. 
 
3.6 Audit Committee Directorships 
 
In addition to the four characteristics discussed above, ACMs should have sufficient experience 
so as to make their monitoring efficacious. They should also not be too busy performing their 
oversight role. Therefore, we turn to the fifth characteristic: their directorships. If ACMs have 
more directorships, they should be more experienced in monitoring the financial reporting pro-
cess and audit processes (Rickling, 2014; Kang and Kim, 2011; Alkdai and Hanefah, 2012; Frye 
and Wang, 2010; Ahn, Piraporn and Kim, 2010; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009). However, it is argued 
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that if they have an unusually high number of directorships, they may be too busy performing 
their oversight role in all the firms (Rickling, 2014; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2010; Hab-
bash, Sindzingue and Salama, 2012; Sharma and Iselin, 2012). Therefore, ACMs may actually 
reduce their oversight effort.  
 
The first stream of the research agreed that ACMs with more directorships may enhance audit 
quality. In a study relating to AC characteristics and audit fees in regulated industries, Boo and 
Sharma (2008) claimed that audit fees can be used as a proxy for external auditing efforts and in 
effect, audit quality. If audit firms put in additional efforts in an audit, it is only natural that the 
audit quality should improve. They observed the relationships between AC characteristics and 
audit fees in regulated industries, so as to provide evidence on the nature of the relationships be-
tween the following monitoring mechanisms: the board, ACs, EAs and regulators.  
 
They contended that regulatory oversight may weaken the relationships between AC multiple 
directorships and audit fees because regulatory oversight for external auditing substitutes for ex-
ternal audit efforts. They also argued that ACs with more directorships in regulated companies 
have greater incentives to protect their reputation and they can attain this objective by demanding 
additional assurance from EAs, so that audit fees are increased because they demand more exter-
nal audit efforts.   
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The sample had the firms with total assets exceeding USD 1 billion in the financial year. Larger 
companies were selected because they were highly scrutinised by government; 252 regulated 
firms which had 32 utilities and 220 bank and 217 non-regulated firms, were also found in the 
S&P 500 index. Audit fees were regressed on total assets, number of subsidiaries, ratio of foreign 
subsidiaries to total number of subsidiaries, number of business segments, board characteristics, 
indicator for regulated industry, profitability as well as AC characteristics, such as size, inde-
pendence, average number of AC directorships and the frequency of interactions between regu-
lated industry, independence, directorships and size. They observed that an AC with more direc-
torships required more audit resources in a highly regulated industry. This implies that their di-
rectorships allow them to demand higher audit quality from EAs. However, this study did not 
investigate their efforts in retaining a high quality EA because by doing so, it may be able to 
provide more resources or expertise to a client in an external audit.  
 
 
The second stream of research suggested that ACMs with too many directorships may be too 
busy performing their oversight role. Sharma and Iselin (2012) provided evidence to support this 
argument. Using an experimental study that compared two samples, they examined whether out-
side directorships renders ACMs too busy performing their oversight role; 191 firms with mis-
statements and 191 firms without misstatements were found by matching the year, industry, and 
size. The sample was collected in the US from 2001 to 2007. Misstatement was regressed in 
terms of whether they served on at least three other board seats, AC tenure, indicators for the fi-
nancial year-end prior to July 2002, profitability, AC meetings, AC size, AC expertise and firm 
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size. They observed that ACMs with multiple directorships were less effective in monitoring 
misstatement, implying that if they had more directorships - they may be too busy performing 
their oversight role, thereby affecting audit quality. However, this study ignored the effect of AC 
remuneration on audit quality. High AC remuneration may discourage ACMs to be critical of 
upward earnings management due to the fact that their remuneration is linked to a company’s 
earnings.  
 
 
Habbash, Sindzingue and Salama (2012) evaluated the effects of various AC characteristics on 
audit quality. AC characteristics were recognised as its independence, competence, outside direc-
torships, shareholdings, frequency of meetings, size and remuneration. Audit quality was meas-
ured using performance-matched accrual measure (Kothari et al., 2005). Data were collected 
from the firms listed on FTSE 350 from 2006 to 2007. The final sample had 392 firm-year ob-
servations. AC characteristics were not found to significantly relate to unsigned discretionary 
accruals, but frequency of meetings and average AC remuneration was positively correlated with 
upward discretionary accruals. Meanwhile ACMs’ accounting experience and average number of 
outside directorships were found to positively relate to downward discretionary. This was in con-
sonance with the notion that busy directors were less effective in monitoring financial reporting 
and audit processes. The results were robust for the effects of the listing of FTSE 100, regulated 
industry sector, firm size, leverage, cash flow from operations as well as return on assets. How-
ever, this study regarded different types of directorships homogeneously. ACMs may be much 
busier if they serve as the AC chair or financial experts of other companies.   
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Tanyi and Smith (2015) investigated how the number of AC chair positions and other AC finan-
cial expertise positions held by the AC chairman and AC financial experts impacts their ability to 
oversee a company’s financial reporting process. They suggested that serving as an AC chair and 
financial expert necessitates much time. If ACMs have too many directorships as AC chairs and 
financial experts for other companies, they may become too busy overseeing managers of a 
company, so they may capitalise on the opportunities to engage in earnings management. Tanyi 
and Smith (2015) collected the data from 2004 to 2008. The final sample had 6,535 firm-year 
observations. Financial reporting quality was measured as discretionary accruals estimated by 
modified Jones model adjusted for firm performance and Dechow-Dichev (2002) model. Moreo-
ver, it was measured as whether earnings met the forecast prepared by financial analysts. ACMs’ 
busyness was measured as the number of other AC chair positions and other AC financial exper-
tise positions held by the AC chairman. It was also measured as the average number of other AC 
chair positions and other AC financial expertise positions held by the AC financial experts.  
 
After controlling for the effects of other AC characteristics, natural log of the market value of 
equity, number of business segments, leverage, operating cash flow, auditor choice and loss, they 
found a negative association between financial reporting quality and the number of other AC 
chair positions and other AC financial expertise positions held by the AC chairman or AC finan-
cial experts. Future research may investigate the impacts of other types of directorships or man-
agement positions held by ACMs in other companies on financial reporting quality. For example, 
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serving as a partner in accounting or law firm may make ACMs too busy performing oversight 
role in another company. 
 
Table 7 below highlights prior studies about AC directorships and audit quality in the literature.  
 
Table 7: AC Directorships 
Authors Measures of AC Director-
ships 
Results 
Boo and Sharma 
(2008) 
Directorships were measured 
as average number of ACMs’ 
outside directorships.  
An AC with more multiple direc-
torships required more audit re-
sources in highly regulated indus-
try. 
Sharma and Iselin 
(2012) 
Directorships were measured 
as average number of ACMs’ 
outside directorships. 
ACMs with multiple directorships 
were less effective to monitor mis-
statement. 
Habbash, Sindzingue 
and Salama (2012) 
Directorships were measured 
as average number of ACMs’ 
outside directorships. 
ACMs’ accounting experience and 
average number of outside direc-
torships positively related to 
downward discretionary. 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Multiple directorships were AC accounting experts, who were 
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Navissi (2010) recognised as high or low 
level. 
independent, had fewer director-
ships and shorter tenures were 
more effective to enhance accruals 
quality. 
 
Tanyi and Smith 
(2015) 
ACMs’ directorships were 
measured as the number of 
AC chair position and other 
AC financial expertise posi-
tions held by the AC chair-
man. Their directorships were 
also measured as the average 
number of AC chair positions 
and other AC financial exper-
tise positions held by the AC 
financial experts. 
The number of AC chair positions 
and other AC financial expertise 
positions held by the AC chairman 
or AC financial experts reduced 
financial reporting quality in terms 
of discretionary accruals and meet-
ing analysts’ forecast.  
 
Prior studies suggested that if ACMs have more directorships, they may become more experi-
enced in their oversight role, but busier performing their role. Therefore, the researcher expects 
the sign of co-efficient between audit quality and AC directorships not to be predetermined. The 
null hypothesis is stated as:  
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H5: There is no relationship between AC directorships and audit quality. 
 
3.7 Audit Committee Tenure 
 
Having more directorships only indicates that ACMs have oversight experience in other compa-
nies, but the operations of other companies may be very different from those of a particular com-
pany. They may gain more knowledge and experience of monitoring financial reporting and au-
dit process in a particular company over time, so longer AC tenure should enable them to en-
hance audit quality (Wilson, 2017; Chan, Liu and Sun, 2013; Aldamen et al., 2012; Ghosh, Mar-
ra and Moon, 2010; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). Long tenure ACMs may establish working rela-
tionships with managers so that they can obtain useful information for their judgments on ac-
counting issues (Liu and Sun, 2010). They may have high reputation developed over time, so 
they are likely to ensure that they perform the job effectively to protect their reputation (Sun and 
Liu, 2010). However, long tenure ACMs may become familiar with managers, so their oversight 
role on managers may be impaired (Rickling, 2014; Singhvi, Rama and Barua, 2013; Vineeta 
and Errol, 2012).  
 
The first stream of research agrees that long tenure ACMs may gain more knowledge and expe-
rience in monitoring audit quality of a particular company. For example, Chan, Liu and Sun 
(2013) examined the effects of AC and board tenure on audit fees. Data were found from the 
firms listed in the US from 2005 to 2006. 2,849 firm-year observations were found in their study. 
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They observed that audit fees negatively related to the proportion of long board tenure directors 
on the independent AC, suggesting that long AC tenure increases audit quality, leading to re-
duced audit risk, so they lower audit fees to the clients. This result suggested that longer AC ten-
ure enhanced ACMs’ experience and knowledge in monitoring financial process and substituted 
for external audit effort. The study was robust for the effects of other board and AC characteris-
tics, auditor characteristics, firm characteristics and the ratio of inventory to total assets. This 
study focused on the large firms listed in the US. Future study may be conducted on the effects 
of AC tenure on audit fees using small listed firms.  
 
Wilson (2017) examined whether director tenure increases or decreases AC effectiveness. They 
suggested that ACMs with long tenure should have knowledge of the company’s operations 
which enabled them to perform their oversight role effectively, but long-tenured ACMs may be-
come familiar with managers, so they may not challenge financial reports prepared by managers. 
Hence, their effectiveness of the oversight role may be reduced. Data were randomly collected 
from 100 firms listed on the S&P 500 index and another 100 firms listed on Russell Microcap 
Index which consists of 2,000 of the smallest publicly held companies.  
 
AC effectiveness was measured as the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by 
Jones model. If discretionary accruals are high, earnings management is likely to occur. Their 
tenure was measured as the proportion of ACMs with more than 10 years of service as a director. 
Another measure is whether there is at least one ACM has more than 10 years of services. After 
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controlling for the effects of AC size, board independence, market-to-book ratio, leverage, firm 
size and their tenure, they found that discretionary accruals were negatively associated with the 
proportion of long-tenured ACMs. They also observed that the presence of even one long-
tenured ACM reduces earnings management. Future research may use deferred tax expenses and 
special items which do not occur frequently in order to measure earnings management to in-
crease the reliability of the measures of earnings management.  
 
 
Ghosh, Marra and Moon (2010) examined the effects of AC characteristics on restraining earn-
ings management in pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. AC characteristics were measured as its 
size, frequency of meetings, expertise, ownership and tenure. Earnings management was esti-
mated using performance-adjusted Jones model, absolute value of deferred tax expenses and ab-
solute value of special items. The data were collected from the firms listed on S&P 500, the Mid-
Cap 400, and Small-Cap 600 in the US from 1999 to 2006. In this regard, Ghosh, Marra and 
Moon (2010) found 9,290 firm-year observations. They found that AC size, frequency of AC 
meetings and AC tenure were negatively associated with earnings management after controlling 
for the effects of board characteristics, growth of a firm, auditor choice and leverage. The 
strength of this association was weaker for the post-SOX years as compared to the pre-SOX 
years. However, this study only examined the effects of AC characteristics on earnings manage-
ment using annual data, and managers can manipulate quarterly financial statements to meet the 
target because the quarterly financial statements are subject to less oversight. 
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Due to the fact that quarterly financial statements are not generally audited and have less detailed 
disclosures as compared to annual financial statements, managers may find it easier to manipu-
late the quarterly numbers than annual numbers (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). Thus, fraudulent 
financial reporting often commences with quarterly misstatements (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) investigated the effects of an AC on restraining quarterly earnings 
management. Earnings management was measured using discretionary accruals from Jones 
(1991) model and current accruals from the model adopted by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998). 
AC characteristics were measured as its independence, number of meetings, financial expertise, 
stock ownership, directorships and tenure; 895 publicly firm-year observations were randomly 
collected from 1996 to 2000 in the US. They found that quarterly earnings management nega-
tively related to ACMs’ average tenure and positively related to their stock ownership after con-
trolling for the effects of leverage, size of firms and unexpected earnings scaled by stock price at 
the end of the year. These results imply that although it is easier for managers to manipulate 
quarterly earnings, long tenure did allow ACMs to become more capable of overseeing earnings 
management. However, this study was conducted at a time when the economy was stable, so it 
did not provide insights into the effectiveness of an AC in adverse economic shocks.  
 
During periods of adverse economic shocks, managers may find themselves under immense 
pressure to manage earnings upward in order to impress the investors. ACMs’ oversight role be-
comes even more important in constraining earnings management during this period (Aldamen et 
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al., 2012). Aldaman et al. (2012) investigated the effects of AC characteristics on firm perfor-
mance during the Global Financial Crisis. They assessed the impacts of AC characteristics and 
their significant influence on a firm’s financial and risk decision-making processes. In their study, 
AC characteristics were recognised as its size, independence, expertise, diligence, directorships 
and tenure. They argued that ACMs’ tenure may allow them to gain more knowledge of a com-
pany but impair the independence of their oversight role. The data were collected from S&P 300 
from 2008 to 2009. Two sub-samples of high and low-performing companies were identified by 
selecting the high and low 25 per cent performers from S&P 300 index. They found 120 firm-
year observations. Firm performance was measured as the percentage change in share price from 
2008 to 2009. After controlling for the effects of board characteristics, AC chair tenures, log of 
total assets, leverage as well as firm systematic risk measured as beta and industry, they observed 
that a longer tenured chair on the AC augments a company’s performance.  
 
Another stream of research argues that longer AC tenure may impair ACMs’ objective oversight 
role because they become familiar with managers. Vineeta and Errol (2012) probed the effects of 
their multiple-directorships and tenure on financial misstatements. Data were collected from the 
firms listed in the US with misstatements and those without misstatements from 1999 to 2006 to 
compare their respective performances. They found 191 firms with misstated financial state-
ments and those without misstated financial statements, and observed that AC tenure and multi-
ple-directorships positively related to financial misstatement, indicating that the AC tenure may 
impair their objective oversight role and more directorships may reduce their effort to monitor 
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financial reporting and audit processes, leading to reduce audit quality. This study was robust for 
the effects of other AC characteristics, firm size, the indicator that the year-end of firms was pri-
or to July 2012, profitability and leverage. Nevertheless, it ignored the effects of ACM departure 
on market reaction. If the market perceives that short-tenured ACMs are effective in monitoring 
audit quality, their departure from the company may impel investors to react negatively (Singhvi, 
Rama and Barua, 2013).  
 
Singhvi, Rama and Barua (2013) examined the effects of the characteristics of ACMs who de-
parted from the firms on market reactions. They collected the data from firms with AC director 
department from January 2005 to December 2008 and found 107 firm-year observations in the 
US. The authors suggested that long tenure may lead to better knowledge of the company and 
perhaps result in enhanced monitoring. However, the ACMs may also become less independent 
by becoming more familiar with managers, implying that their oversight effort may be reduced.  
 
They began with a list of ACM departures from 2005 to 2008. They had 107 firm-year observa-
tions. Market reactions were measured as cumulative abnormal returns measured using the eight-
day window. ACMs’ tenure was measured in terms of three levels. ACMs’ tenure was deemed 
short if the tenure of the departing ACM is three years or less. However, it is long if it is at least 
seven years. After controlling for the effects of natural log of market value, leverage, and return 
on assets and market-to-book ratio, they observed that the market reacted significantly negatively 
to the departure of short tenured directors, but not for that of long-tenured directors. As an impli-
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cation, investors do perceive that short-ternured ACMs may be more independent to oversee 
managers, which implies that short-tenured ACMs may provide high quality monitoring.  
 
Rickling (2014) investigated the effects of ACMs’ tenure and directorships on meeting analysts’ 
forecast.  Managers may manage earnings to meet analyst forecast because share price may de-
crease when earnings are lower than forecast. The author argued that a long-tenured AC may not 
be effective in tracking earnings management because they may become closely affiliated with 
managers, so they are less likely to challenge managers’ decisions. They collected data from 
2005 to 2007. The sample had 3,157 firm-quarter observations; an indicator was used to measure 
whether earnings were managed in order to meet analysts’ forecast. If actual earnings reported 
exceed the forecast by one cent per share or less, a value of 1 would be assigned to the indicator, 
otherwise 0. AC tenure was measured as the ratio of the number of members serving on the AC 
for more than seven consecutive years as of 2007. After controlling for the effects of the square 
roots of the number of ACMs, financial experts on an AC and AC meetings, forecast dispersion 
calculated as the standard deviation of earnings forecast, market-to-book ratio, log of market 
value of equity, auditor choice and litigation risk, the authors observed that long-tenured ACs 
and ACMs’ directorships had positive relationships with the likelihood that a firm just meets 
analyst forecast.  
 
Table 8 highlights prior studies about AC directorships and audit quality in the literature. 
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Table 8: AC Tenure 
 
Authors Measure of AC Tenure Results 
Chan, Liu and Sun (2013) AC tenure was measured as 
the proportion of long-tenured 
directors on the independent 
AC 
Audit fees negatively related 
to the proportion of long-
tenured directors on the inde-
pendent AC. 
Wilson (2017) AC tenure was measured as 
the proportion of ACMs with 
the board tenure of 10 or 
more years or whether at least 
one ACM has tenure of more 
than 10 years.  
Discretionary accruals were 
negatively associated with 
the proportion of long-
tenured ACMs. The presence 
of even one long-tenured 
ACM reduced earnings man-
agement. 
Ghosh, Marra and Moon 
(2010) 
AC tenure was measured as 
the number of years the direc-
tors served as ACMs of a 
company.  
AC size, frequency of AC 
meetings and AC tenure were 
negatively associated with 
earnings management.  
 
Earnings management was 
measured as performance-
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adjusted Jones model, abso-
lute value of deferred tax ex-
penses and absolute value of 
special items. 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) AC tenure was measured as 
the number of years the direc-
tors served as ACMs of a 
company. 
Quarterly earnings manage-
ment negatively related to 
ACMs’ average tenure. Earn-
ings management was meas-
ured using discretionary ac-
cruals from Jones (1991) 
model and current accruals 
from Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998) model. 
 
Aldaman et al. (2012) AC tenure was measured as 
the number of years AC chair 
served on the board 
A long-tenured chair on the 
AC enhanced market perfor-
mance measured by the 
change of share price during 
Global Financial Crisis. 
Singhvi, Rama and Barua AC tenure was measured as Abnormal returns were nega-
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(2013) the number of years the direc-
tors served as ACMs of a 
company. 
tively associated with the de-
parture of accounting experts 
and short-tenured directors. 
Vineeta and Errol (2012) AC tenure was measured as 
the number of years the direc-
tors served as ACMs of a 
company. 
AC tenure and multiple-
directorships positively relat-
ed to financial misstatement. 
Rickling (2014) AC tenure was measured as 
ratio of the number of mem-
bers serving on the AC for 
more than 7 consecutive years 
as of 2007. 
AC tenure was positively as-
sociated with the likelihood 
that a firm just meets analyst 
forecast. 
 
Prior studies provided evidence that if ACMs have longer tenure, they may become more experi-
enced in their oversight role because they may better understand the operations of a company, 
although they may also become less objective. For this reason, the researcher suggests that the 
sign of co-efficient between audit quality and AC tenure cannot be predetermined. The null hy-
pothesis is stated as:  
 
 
H6: There is no relationship between average AC tenure and audit quality. 
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3.8 Audit Committee Age 
 
We now turn to the ACMs’ last characteristic: age. Older ACMs may contribute to higher audit 
quality and are more concerned with their reputational and litigation risk. Since they have fewer 
career mobility options, they may put in more efforts in monitoring financial reporting and audit 
processes (Dao, Huang and Zhu, 2013; Huang, Green and Lee, 2012; Van der Zahn, Harjinder 
and Inderpa, 2008). Furthermore, older directors have more knowledge and experience to fulfil 
their oversight role (Mustafa, Che-Ahmad and Chandren, 2018).  
 
Dao, Huang and Zhu (2013) suggested that cost of capital, a proxy for perceived audit quality, is 
negatively associated with ACMs’ average age because older ACMs may be more risk-averse, so 
they may be able to work more diligently to monitor financial statements as well as audit process 
to safeguard their reputation. They collected the data of firms listed in the US. The sample had 
1,733 firm observations from 2007 to 2009. The authors estimated the cost of capital using 
Easton (2004) price-earnings growth method. They noted that their average age negatively relat-
ed to the cost of capital after controlling for the effects of firm specific characteristics, auditor 
type and board and AC characteristics. One limitation of the study conducted by Dao, Huang and 
Zhu (2013) is that risk-aversion may relate more to personality rather than age. For instance, 
some young individuals may be even more risk-averse than their older counterparts. Risk-
aversion is shaped by the environment around them, their friends and families.  
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Unlike Dao, Huang and Zhu (2013), Jintawattanagul (2015) noted that ACMs’ age was positive-
ly associated with cost of capital and accrual quality. He examined whether AC characteristics 
had a significant impact on cost of capital and accrual quality and whether high accrual quality 
lowered the cost of capital. AC characteristics were recognised as its independence, size, meeting 
frequency, gender, tenure, number of directorships and legal and accounting expertise.   
 
He posited that older ACMs have more experience in identifying internal control weaknesses and 
are more conservative than younger ACMs, so they may be more diligent in preventing any ne-
farious collusion between managers and EAs. If so, managers may find it more difficult to ma-
nipulate earnings and investors may perceive that audit quality should be higher. They claimed 
that if the accrual quality is high, investors may perceive that the earnings should have less risk, 
thereby reducing the cost of capital. Hence, ACMs’ age should have positive effects on accrual 
quality and negative impacts on the cost of capital. They used capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) to estimate the cost of capital and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to estimate 
accrual quality. Data were collected from the firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) from 2010 to 2012.  ACMs’ age was measured as the total age of ACMs on an AC. Inter-
estingly, they observed that ACMs’ age positively related to cost of capital and accrual quality. 
The results were found to be robust for the effects of log value of market value of equity, lever-
age, auditor choice and book-to-market ratio. The findings imply that although older ACMs may 
enhance the accrual quality by providing more oversight effort, they are perceived to increase the 
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risk of a company. This may be attributed to the perception that older ACMs may experience dif-
ficulties in keeping abreast with new company or technology-related advancements. 
 
Qi and Tian (2012) examined the effects of ACMs’ personal characteristics such as their age, 
gender diversity and education on firms’ earnings management. They hypothesised that their age 
negatively relates to earnings management because people’s age can be regarded as a proxy for 
their experience and resistance to risk-taking. Earnings management was measured as discretion-
ary accruals estimated by modified Jones model. They found all Chinese listed firms from 2004 
to 2010. The final example consisted of 8,148 firm-year observations. According to the authors, 
ACMs’ age, gender diversity and education level negatively related to earnings management af-
ter controlling for the effects of their financial work experience, AC size, AC independence and 
number of AC meetings, firm size, book to market ratio, financial leverage and sales growth. 
These results indicate that personal characteristics such as age may help enhance audit quality, 
thus constraining earnings management.  
 
Huang, Green and Lee (2012) examined the linkage between the CEO’s age and financial report-
ing quality. ACMs’ age was a control variable in their study. They stated that individuals become 
more ethical and conservative when they become older. This means that older CEOs are less 
likely to engage in aggressive earnings management and are therefore, more likely to be associ-
ated with higher quality financial reporting. Thus, a company is less likely to have financial re-
statements or just meet analyst earnings forecast. The dependent variables are an indicator that 
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showed whether a firm just met the mean consensus forecasted by the analysts and an indicator 
that revealed whether a company had an accounting restatement and an adverse opinion.  
 
CEO age was measured as whether it was greater than or equal to 62. ACM’s age was measured 
as average age of ACMs. Data were collected from firms listed in the US from 2005 to 2008. 
The sample contained 2,402 firms. After controlling for the effects of CEO tenure, market-to-
book ratio, return on total assets, block shareholdings, firm age, loss, earnings price ratio, materi-
al internal control weaknesses, board independence, board size and other AC characteristics, they 
observed that CEO age was negatively associated with firms meeting or beating analyst earnings 
forecast and financial restatement. However, such a linkage was not established with ACMs’ age.  
 
In contrast, Obermire (2016) observed that ACMs’ age helped reduce financial restatements. 
Obermire (2016) examined whether ACMs’ social identities were associated with ACMs’ over-
sight quality. To begin with, she conducted an interview to explore the social identities which 
may impact ACMs’ oversight quality, after which she performed a regression analysis on the re-
lationships between their social identity and oversight quality. ACMs’ average age was a control 
variable in the regression model. These interviews were conducted with 26 ACMs. The respond-
ents stated that ACMs’ public accounting social identity provides them with extensive experi-
ence monitoring financial reporting. Their investment management social identity provides them 
with extensive experience reviewing and interpreting financial statements, but one respondent 
suggested that as investors of other companies, ACMs may have minimal focus on financial re-
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porting rules and requirements. Their financial management identity may cause them to be leni-
ent on CFO because the respondents claimed that they would better understand the pressure fac-
ing CFOs. However, some respondents observed that their financial management identity pro-
vided them with greater financial expertise of overseeing financial reports. Their executive man-
agement identity may lead them to be more likely to identify with management, thereby reducing 
their oversight quality.  
 
Obermire (2016) attempted to examine the relationships between social identities and oversight 
quality suggested by the respondents. The author regressed ACMs’ social identity on oversight 
quality. Dependent variable was measured as whether a company had a financial restatement 
within five years of IPO. Independent variables were ACMs’ social identities that were recog-
nised as public accounting, executive management, financial management and investment man-
agement social identities. Public accounting social identities were measured as the proportion of 
ACMs who served as audit partner or partner in public accounting firm, executive management 
social identities as the proportion of ACMs who served as CEO, president and other executive, 
financial management identity as the proportion of ACMs who served as CFO or Vice President 
of Finance and investment management identity as the proportion of ACMs with experience of 
private equity, venture capital and investment banking.  
 
Data were collected from 2005 to 2009; 293 firms were found. Out of these, 83 restatement peri-
ods were found. The final sample had 1,389 firm-year observations, including both restatement 
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periods and non-restatement periods. They noted that financial management social identities pos-
itively related to financial restatements, but investment management identities negatively related 
to financial restatements. ACMs’ average age was found to negatively relate to financial restate-
ments. These results were robust for other AC characteristics, board characteristics, auditor 
choice, auditor change, merger and acquisition, loss, leverage and log value of market value of 
equity. 
 
Yasser and Mamun (2015) examined the effects of AC characteristics on firm performance in 
Pakistan. They suggested that an effective AC can help improve the transparency of earnings and 
audit process. Data were collected from 480 firms listed in Pakistan in 2013. This year was cho-
sen because the Code of Corporate Governance was revised in 2012. The oversight role of 
ACMs has been strengthened. One of the measures used as proxies for firm performance was 
Tobin’s Q. AC characteristics were recognised as AC independence, the number of AC meetings, 
AC chairman age, the number of ACMs on an AC, block holding representation on an AC, AC 
expertise, AC gender and other AC characteristics. After controlling for the effects of firm age, 
leverage and log value of total assets, they observed that AC chairman age, chairman qualifica-
tion and chairman financial expertise positively related to Tobin’s Q. These results imply that the 
age of AC chairman improves the perception of oversight quality on the transparency of earnings 
and audit process because older AC chairman may have more experience as well as expertise in 
overseeing earnings and audit quality. Older AC chairman may also have fewer career options, 
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so they would be more careful about performing their oversight role in financial reporting and 
audit quality. 
 
Table 9 highlights prior studies about AC age and audit quality in extant literature. 
 
Table 9: AC Age 
Author Measures of AC Age Results 
Dao, Huang and Zhu (2013) Average ACMs’ age ACMs’ average age negative-
ly related to cost of capital. 
Jintawattanagul (2015) Total age of ACMs on an AC ACMs’ age positively related 
to cost of capital and accrual 
quality.  
Qi and Tian (2012) Average ACMs’ age ACMs’ age, gender diversity 
and education level negative-
ly related to earnings man-
agement. 
 
Earnings management was 
measured as discretionary 
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accruals estimated by modi-
fied Jones model. 
Huang, Green and Lee 
(2012) 
Average ACMs’ age ACMs’ age was not signifi-
cantly associated with finan-
cial reporting quality meas-
ured by firms just meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecast nor 
financial restatements.  
Obermire (2016) Average ACMs’ age  ACMs’ age negatively relat-
ed to financial restatements 
within five years of IPOs.  
Yasser and Mamun (2015) AC Chairman’s age AC Chairman’s age positive-
ly related to Tobin’s Q.  
 
Prior studies largely provided credible evidence that older ACMs may be encouraged to perform 
their oversight role. Therefore, the researcher expects a positive sign of co-efficient between au-
dit quality and average AC age. The null hypothesis is stated as:  
 
H7: There is a negative relationship between AC age and audit quality. 
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3.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses seven AC characteristics (size, independence, diligence, expertise, direc-
torships, tenure and age) and their expected effects on audit quality. There is significant evidence 
to suggest that a large and independent AC with financial expertise is more effective in improv-
ing audit quality. Older ACMs may also help improve audit quality, but long-tenured ACMs with 
many directorships may have significant impacts on audit quality, although the directions remain 
uncertain. Seven hypotheses were formed by drawing observations from the literature reviewed 
in this chapter in establishing an academic rationale to answer Research Question 1 that was stat-
ed in Chapter 1.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODS (ARCHIVAL MODELLING STUDY) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides justifications for the use of the archival research method. Once it is out-
lined, the justification for the choice of sample and principal data sources for the study are ex-
plained. Since this is an archival modelling study, a significant portion of this chapter provides 
discussions on identifying and justifying the dependent as well as independent variables used in 
the subsequent analysis. The chapter elaborates on how the dependent variable, audit quality, is 
measured. The definitions and measurement of independent variables, such as AC size, inde-
pendence, expertise, diligence, directorships, tenure and age are also discussed. It also explains 
the regression models employed to examine AC characteristics and audit quality; key assump-
tions of regression models are also discussed in the chapter, which ends with a summary of the 
content. 
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4.2 Justification for the Use of Archival Research Method 
To examine the relationships between AC characteristics and audit quality, the researcher used 
the archival modelling study. Archival research refers to seeking evidence or data from original 
archival records (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2012). Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 
(2012) stated that there is copious amount of data in corporate governance as well as government 
reports. The statistical and financial database can be used to facilitate data collection. However, 
Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2008) stated that researchers may be constrained by the nature of 
administrative records and documents. For example, minutes of AC meetings are not made 
available for researchers because their disclosure is not legally mandated. Internal validity re-
mains a concern because archival research relies on proxy variables to measure a concept; how-
ever, the fact remains that proxy variables are not equivalent to actual concepts. Consequently, 
the relationship between proxy variables and concepts may not be fully captured.  
 
The researcher used this strategy because the objective of this archival modelling study is to ex-
amine the relationships between AC characteristics and audit quality, so archival research is suit-
able for collecting secondary data to examine these relationships. Secondly, it is the most eco-
nomical and convenient strategy of data collection because the data of AC characteristics, audit 
quality and control variables can be found from archival records already existing in the annual 
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report and the access to the data becomes easy because annual report is disclosed to the public.  
 
4.3 Sample Selection and Collection Procedures 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
The researcher used secondary data which were drawn from the sample firms contained in Hong 
Kong Hang Seng Composite Index because it covered 95 percent of market capitalisation of 
listed companies (Hang Seng Indexes, 2018). The period of this study is from 2010 to 2015. The 
researcher used this period of time because to the best knowledge of the researcher, no study has 
been conducted to examine the relationships between AC characteristics and audit quality in 
Hong Kong in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. An effective AC assumes even greater 
importance to constrain earnings management by enhancing audit quality after the financial crisis 
because managers are under immense pressure to manage earnings to demonstrate that the finan-
cial position and performance of a company continue to be strong.  
 
The use of sample firms contained in the index allows the researcher to maximise data availabil-
ity. In addition, the sample firms contained in the index follow the corporate governance recom-
mended by Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) to similar levels. Small firms may not follow 
the corporate governance recommended by HKEx. Financial industries were excluded from the 
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initial sample because their special accounting practices imply that the discretionary accruals 
model does not apply to them (Chtourour et al., 2008; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000). Missing 
corporate governance variables mainly are attributed to the lack of disclosure of AC and board 
meetings and pertinent information about ACMs’ expertise and duality of CEO and chairman. 
Following the elimination, this study contains 1,714 firm year observations. Table 10 summarises 
the sample size and sample selection for the study period.  
 
Table 10: Sample Selection Procedure (Archival Modelling Study) 
Description 2010 2011 2012  2013 2014  2015 Total 
Initial sample 356  361  368 409 437 480 2,411 
Excluded:        
Financial companies (41) (49) (53) (53) (54) (58) (308) 
Missing annual report or 
shorter than 12 months 
fiscal year  
(9) (14) (15) (18) (22) (27) (105) 
Missing corporate gov-
ernance data  
(16) (24) (26) (25) (28) (37) (156) 
Missing financial data (14) (19) (17) (21) (24) (33) (128) 
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Final sample 276 255 257 292 309 325 1,714 
 
4.3.2 Data Collection Procedure 
 
Data on corporate governance variables were hand collected from 2010 to 2015 annual reports 
for each company. The researcher examined the directors’ profiles and the corporate governance 
reports in order to identify AC and board characteristics and also collected financial data for con-
trol variables and calculation of discretionary accruals, proxy for audit quality from Datastream 
and annual reports.  
 
4.4 Statistical Method: Panel Data Regression 
 
Panel data regression was used in the archival modelling study. Panel data refers to the data that 
are the observations of the same individuals or firms, albeit for varying periods of time 
(Wooldridge, 2003). Panel data regression has unobserved individual specific effects ( ) which 
may not vary over time. If individual effects have a significant association with independent var-
iables, OLS can be deemed invalid and panel data analysis should be used (Wooldridge 2003). 
Panel data regression is different from OLS in that panel data regression controls for the effects 
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of the unobserved individual effects (Wooldridge, 2003). The panel data regression is explained 
as follows: 
 
, for all t = 1, 2, …, T  
 
 
   Dependent variable of observation  in time  
 
  Independent variable  of observation  in time  
 
   +  
 
  Coefficient of independent variable  
 
  Specific individual effects of observation  
 
  Idiosyncratic error of observation  in time  
 
 
The two forms of panel data regression include fixed effects panel data and random effects panel 
data. The differences between these two forms are discussed in Section 4.4.5. The assumptions 
of fixed effects and random effects regression are stated below: 
 
The assumptions of fixed effects panel data regression:  
 
 = 0  
 
 =   
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FE4: There are no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory variables. 
 
The assumptions of random effects panel data regression: 
   
 
 
RE4: There are no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory variables. 
 
Key assumptions of panel data regression are discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
 
4.4.1 Key Assumptions of Regression Analysis 
 
This section discusses the key assumptions of regression analysis.  In case of their violation, the 
results may be biased or inefficient. Four key assumptions of regression analysis to be discussed 
include: multi-collinearity, independent error terms, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The 
findings of the tests of these assumptions are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 9 for the quali-
tative and archival modelling study, respectively.  
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4.4.1.1 Multi-collinearity 
 
Multi-collinearity pertains to the linkage between independent variables. Multi-collinearity refers 
to the predicament of high inter-correlations between independent variables (McClave, Benson, 
Sincich, 2011; Hair et al., 2010; Stevens, 1996). If multi-collinearity is present, it is more diffi-
cult to ascertain the effects of an independent variable due to the high correlation of independent 
variables (Hair et al., 2010). Multi-collinearity may cause a value of coefficient to have an oppo-
site sign; hence the results may deviate from expectations (McClave, Benson, Sincich, 2011; 
Panik, 2009). Multi-collinearity leads to a significant change in the values of the previous coeffi-
cients after the addition of a new variable into the model (McClave, Benson, Sincich 2011; Panik, 
2009). Further, a variable with significant effects on dependent variables becomes insignificant 
after the addition of a new variable into the model (McClave, Benson, Sincich. 2011; Pank 2009). 
Multi-collinearity causes the failure to reject a false null hypothesis of the independent variable 
which has no significant impact on the dependent variable (Groebner et al., 2005). 
 
Two methods can be used in order to detect multi-collinearity. The first method is to examine the 
correlations among independent variables from correlation matrix (Stevens, 1996). In this regard, 
Hair et al. (2010) stated that the problem of multi-collinearity occurs if correlations of independ-
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ent variables are 0.9 or higher. 
 
The second method is to examine the variance inflation factors (VIF) for independent variables 
(Stevens, 1996). VIF determines the presence of a strong linear association between an inde-
pendent variable and all the remaining independent variables. It is possible for an independent 
variable to have only moderate or relatively weak relationships with other independent variables 
with regard to simple correlations, but still have a high R-square when regressed on all the other 
independent variables (Stevens, 1996). VIF is the inverse of tolerance value, which refers to the 
amount of variability of an independent variable that is not explained by other independent vari-
ables (Hair et al., 2010). VIF signifies a measure of how much variance of coefficients is in-
creased by the relationship of one independent variable with other independent variables. If VIF 
is more than or equal to 10, the correlations between independent variables are extremely strong 
(Hair, 2010; Myers, 1990). 
 
During the presence of multi-collinearity, highly correlated independent variables can be com-
bined as an independent variable (Stevens, 1996), or one or more highly correlated independent 
variables may be dropped (Hair et al., 2010).  
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4.4.1.2 Endogeneity 
 
Detecting the presence of multi-collinearity only indicates the linkages between independent var-
iables, but the relationship between independent variables and error terms remains nebulous. If 
the error terms are found to be associated with independent variables, endogeneity is present be-
cause of measurement error, simultaneous causality and omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2003). 
Simultaneous causality indicates that variables are co-determined (Wooldridge, 2003). If the er-
ror terms are correlated with independent variables, the estimates of the coefficients of regression 
are deemed biased (Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis can be used if the problem of endogeneity is 
present (Wooldridge, 2003). This method uses an instrumental variable, which is a variable in the 
explanatory equation that is correlated to the endogenous independent variable, but not correlat-
ed to the error term (Wooldridge, 2003). A good instrumental variable has a high correlation with 
an endogenous independent variable, but low correlation with error terms (Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
Endogeneity can be detected using Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2003). This test es-
timates an OLS specification and 2SLS specification of the same equation and makes a compari-
son between the coefficient estimates of OLS and coefficient estimates of 2SLS. It examines 
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whether coefficient estimates are statistically the same. The full hypothesis is that variables are 
exogenous. If it fails to reject the null hypothesis, endogeneity is not present, so OLS should be 
used. Otherwise, endogeneity is present, implying that 2SLS should be used. 
 
4.4.1.3 Heteroscedasticity 
 
Endogeneity does not reveal whether the variance is constant when independent variables change. 
The presence of heteroscedasticity indicates that the variance of the error terms is not statistically 
constant over a range of independent variables (Hair et al., 2010). If heteroscedasticity is present, 
the regression model is not the best linear unbiased estimates (BLUE). Violation of heteroscedas-
ticity does not bias coefficient estimates of OLS, but bias the variance of coefficient estimates 
(Wooldridge, 2003). The coefficient estimates are rendered inefficient (Breusch and Pagan, 
1979). A coefficient estimate of a regression with heteroscedasticity is still unbiased for the rela-
tionships between independent and dependent variables.  
 
As a result, standard errors are incorrect. This means that hypothesis tests will not be valid 
(Wooldridge, 2003). Breusch-Pagan test and Cook-Weisberg test can be used to detect heterosce-
dasticity. If Breusch-Pagan test and Cook-Weisberg test is used, variance of error terms obtained 
from OLS is regressed on independent variables. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient esti-
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mates are statistically equal to 0. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it will conclude that variance 
of errors terms are correlated to independent variables, implying the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity (Wooldridge 2003). Since the researcher uses the fixed effect panel data regression, Modi-
fied Wald test to detect group wise heteroscedasticity will be used. Robust standard errors can be 
used for regression if heteroscedasticity is present (Wooldridge, 2003). Robust standard error 
helps correct heteroscedasticity by adjusting standard error and p-value for heteroscedasticity 
(Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
4.4.1.4 Serial Correlation  
Detecting the presence of heteroscedasticity does not reveal the relationships between error terms 
during different periods of time. Serial correlation indicates the relationships between error terms 
in different periods of time. Serial correlation in panel data models biases and reduces the effi-
ciency of the results (Wooldridge, 2003). Serial correlation occurs when one observation’s error in 
a particular period of time is correlated with the observation’s error term in another period of 
time (Wooldridge, 2003). In order to identify serial correlation, this study conducted Wooldridge 
serial correlation test (2002). In case serial correlation is present, regression with robust standard 
errors should be used (Wooldridge 2003).  
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4.5 Fixed Effects versus Random Effects 
For the purpose of panel data regression, I need to determine whether to use random effect model 
or fixed effect model. Random effect model assumes that the unobserved individual specific ef-
fects do not have a correlation with independent variables. Marashdeh (2014, p.118) stated: 
“That is, as a linear regression model with a compound disturbance that may be consistently, al-
beit inefficiently, estimated by least squares. This random effects approach specifies that is a 
group specific random element, similar to except that for each group there is but a single draw 
that enters the regression identically in each period”.  
 
The fixed effect model assumes that unobserved individual specific effects are correlated with 
independent variables. Notably, it seeks to eliminate the unobserved individual specific effects 
on the regression (Marashdeh, 2014). The traditional view of the fixed effects model is to assume 
that the unobserved effect is a parameter that is to be estimated for each i (Marashdeh, 2014).   
 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test can be used to determine whether the random or fixed effect re-
gression should be used. If the test rejects null hypothesis, it can be inferred that random effects 
are biased and that fixed effects should be used (Wooldridge, 2003). Essentially, the test is used 
to ascertain whether there is a correlation between individual specific effects and independent 
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variables in the model. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between them. The re-
sults for Durbin-Wu-Hausamn test are outlined in Chapter 5.  
 
4.6 Definitions and Measurement of Variables 
 
This section provides the definitions and measurement of variables for the archival modelling 
study.  
 
4.6.1 Audit Quality 
 
Audit quality was measured as the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by modi-
fied Jones model. The reasons why discretionary accruals should be used have been explained in 
Section 1.4. It is used in the statistical models of the main analysis conducted as part of the ar-
chival modelling study. The procedures for estimating the discretionary accruals are discussed in 
Section 4.8. Audit quality refers to the dependent variable in the statistical models. Lower discre-
tionary accruals indicate higher levels of audit quality. For additional analysis, a dichotomous 
variable is used to indicate whether the absolute value of discretionary accruals is higher than the 
sample median. The dichotomous variable will be used as the additional analysis. If the discre-
tionary accruals are found to be higher than the sample median, managers are more likely to ma-
nipulate the earnings without being detected by EAs.  
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4.6.2 Audit Committee Independence 
 
In this study, AC independence was measured as the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on an AC. Independent non-executive directors are the most independent because they 
do not have any other relationship with the firm or its executives apart from the relationship 
through the AC. Independent non-executive directors are better than affiliated directors when it 
comes to monitoring the financial reporting or audit processes because they do not have relation-
ships with the firm or its executive directors that influence independent oversight on managers 
(Ho, Liu and Wang, 2014;  Liao and Hsu, 2013; Carcello,  Hermanson and Ye, 2011; Sharma and 
Sharma, 2011; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010). There-
fore, the researcher expects AC independence to positively relate to audit quality. All listed firms 
in the sample disclosed their independent ACMs.  
 
4.6.3 Audit Committee Expertise 
 
AC expertise was assessed as the proportion of financial experts on an AC.  Financial experts 
should better understand the technical aspects of accounting procedures, recognition criteria, in-
ternal control systems and valuation of assets and liabilities (Ho, Liu and Wang, 2014; Rickling, 
2014; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2010; Naiker and Sharma, 2009). Since internal control sys-
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tems are effective, EAs can depend upon it for external audits.  The researcher expects the pro-
portion of financial experts to have a positive association with audit quality.  
 
4.6.4 Audit Committee Diligence 
 
AC diligence was measured as the number of AC meetings held annually. A diligent AC holds 
more meetings in order to discuss issues such as financial reporting, external and internal audits, 
internal control and relationships with EAs. These issues should significantly influence the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of an external audit and in effect, audit quality (Rickling, 2014; Ho, Liu 
and Wang, 2014; Suarez et al., 2013; Sharma and Iselin, 2012; The UK Corporate Governance 
Code, 2012; Hong Kong Society of Accountants, 2002). If a firm conducts more AC meetings, 
audit quality may improve. The researcher is of the view that the number of AC meetings posi-
tively relates to audit quality. 
 
4.6.5 Audit Committee Size  
 
The number of ACMs may indicate the resources available for the purpose of overseeing audit 
quality. A large AC may have more manpower, experience and expertise to monitor audit quality 
(Ho, Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Liu and Wang, 2014; Rickling, 2014; Nelson and Devi, 2013; 
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Baxter and Cotter 2009). However, prior studies suggest that the results are mixed. The research-
er expects AC size to significantly relate to audit quality without a predetermined sign.  
 
4.6.6 Audit Committee Directorships 
 
If ACMs have more directorships, they should be more experienced in monitoring financial re-
porting process as well as audit processes of different companies (Rickling, 2014; Alkdai and 
Hanefah, 2012; Kang and Kim, 2011; Ahn et al., 2010; Frye and Wang, 2010; Sarkar and Sarkar, 
2009). However, if they are in charge of more directorships, they may be too busy performing 
their oversight role in each of the firms (Rickling, 2014; Habbash, Sindzingue and Salama, 2012; 
Sharma and Iselin, 2012; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2010). Therefore, ACMs may reduce 
oversight effort. The researcher expects the AC directorships to have a significant association 
with audit quality without a predetermined sign.  
 
4.6.7 Audit Committee Tenure 
ACMs may acquire more knowledge and experience of monitoring financial reporting and audit 
process in a specific company over a period of time, so longer AC tenure should help them en-
hance audit quality (Wilson 2017; Chan, Liu and Sun, 2013; Aldamen et al. 2012; Ghosh, Marra 
and Moon, 2010; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). Long-tenured ACMs may establish working rela-
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tionships with managers in order to obtain useful information for their judgments on accounting 
issues (Sun and Liu, 2010). However, long-tenured ACMs may become familiar with managers, 
thus potentially impairing their oversight role on managers (Rickling, 2014; Singhvi, Rama and 
Barua, 2013; Vineeta and Errol, 2012). The researcher expects AC tenure to significantly relate 
to audit quality without a predetermined sign.  
 
4.6.8 Audit Committee Age 
 
Older ACMs are more concerned with their reputational and litigation risk (Ward, Sonnenfeld 
and Kimberly, 1995; Eriksson, 1991; Veiga, 1983). Moreover, older ACMs may have more ex-
perience than their younger counterparts. This may make it easier for them to detect weaknesses 
in internal control systems (Qi and Tian, 2012). Consequently, the researcher expects that AC 
age positively relates to audit quality.   
 
4.6.9 Control Variables 
 
Apart from AC characteristics, other variables which may affect audit quality should also be in-
cluded in a model. A model will be misspecified without controlling for the effects of these vari-
ables (Hair et al., 2010). Controlling the variables to reduce the noise improves the internal valid-
ity of the study.  
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The first control variable is auditor independence, which is measured as the proportion of non-
audit fees to the total fees earned by an audit firm. If high levels of non-audit fees are earned by 
an audit firm from a single client, EAs may be inclined to tolerate earnings management by that 
client.  This, in turn, may reduce audit quality (Lary and Taylor, 2012; Chanhine and Filatotchev, 
2011). Therefore, the researcher expects that the proportion of non-audit fees negatively relates 
to audit quality.  
 
Choice of auditor was measured in terms of whether sample firms appointed Big 4 audit firm as 
their EAs. Big 4 auditors have more manpower and expertise for external audits. Additionally, 
since they face greater risk to their reputation if they provide inaccurate audit opinion, they are 
motivated to perform external audits diligently (Zalata, Tauringgana and Tingbani, 2018; Vla-
minck and Sarens, 2015; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Rickling, 2014; Xu, 2014; Zaman, 
Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; Owens-Jakson, Robinson and Shelton, 2009). Therefore, the re-
searcher expects that the appointment of Big 4 auditors positively relates to audit quality.  
 
Profitability was measured as net income normalised by lagged total assets. Prior studies found 
that profitability positively related to audit quality. If a company reports a loss, it may be more 
likely that managers are under pressure to manipulate earnings, so EAs may find it more difficult 
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to detect earnings management (Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Vlaminck and Sarens, 2015; Bac-
couche, Hadriche and Omri, 2013; Ho and Kang, 2013; Rainsbury, Bradbury and Cahan, 2009). 
For this reason, the researcher expects that profitability positively relates to audit quality. 
 
Inherent risk was measured as the sum of account receivable and inventory to lagged total assets. 
Account receivables and inventory are considered as the items with high inherent risk (Galderon, 
Wang and Klenotic, 2012; Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard, 2007; Hay, Knechel and Wong, 2006). 
High inherent risk in inventory and account receivables makes it difficult for EAs to detect earn-
ings management. Since the recognition and valuation of account receivables and inventory 
highly depends on managers’ subjective judgment, there are more opportunities for earnings 
management. Consequently, EAs may find it more difficult to perform effective audits on ac-
counts receivable and inventory. Thus, the researcher expects that the inherent risk negatively 
relates to audit quality.  
 
Leverage was measured as debt ratio in the model. Firms with high levels of debt may manage 
earnings to meet the requirements specified in debt-covenants (Nelson and Devi, 2013; Ghosh, 
Marra, and Moon, 2010; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2010; Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton, 
2009). Higher leverage may lead to lower audit quality because ACMs may not support EAs’ po-
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sitions that require managers to recognise the items that may increase the levels of leverage of 
firms. Thus, the researcher expects that leverage negatively relates to audit quality.  
 
Firm size was captured by the log value of total assets of the sample firms. Since they are not 
expected to be normally distributed, they are transformed to achieve normality of data distribu-
tion. Managers may find it more difficult to manipulate earnings in a large firm because it is 
more likely to be scrutinised by investors and financial analysts. Also, a large firm has more re-
sources to design effective internal control systems (Wilson, 2017; Hamdan, Mushtaha and Al-
Sartawi, 2013; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Baccouche, Hadriche and Omri. 2013; Rezaei and 
Roshani, 2012; Ghosh, Marra and Moon, 2010; Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton, 2009). 
The researcher expects the firm size to positively relate to audit quality. 
 
The effects of the number of institutional investors were controlled in this study. Cleary and 
Wang (2017) suggested that institutional investors have more incentives and better abilities to 
obtain information and monitor corporate actions more efficiently. Therefore, the number of in-
stitutional investors may negatively relate to discretionary accruals because institutional inves-
tors may serve as another monitoring mechanism to oversee the financial statements of a compa-
ny. Hence, it is more difficult for managers to engage in earnings management. However, when 
firms perform poorly, institutional investors may be forced to sell their investment in the compa-
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nies. This means that managers may be under pressure to manage earnings so that their earnings 
can meet the anaylsts’ forecast (Almutairi, 2013; Bushee, 1998; Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach, 
1998).  This study used the number of institutional investors rather than the proportion of institu-
tional shareholding because the number of institutional investors provides a better measure as 
external monitoring. For example, the external monitoring effects of ten institutional investors, 
each holding 10 percent of the shareholding, are stronger than one institutional investor holding 
40 percent of the shareholding.  The researcher is of the view that the number of institutional in-
vestors significantly relate to discretionary accruals without a predetermined sign.  
 
Duality of the roles of CEO and Chairman was measured as a dichotomous variable which takes 
on the value of 1 if the CEO and chairman of a company is the same person, otherwise 0. The 
roles of CEO and Chairman need to be segregated. If the same person serves as CEO and Chair-
man, he or she can personally monitor the falsified financial statements. Thus, EAs and ACMs 
may find it more difficult to detect earnings management, thus reducing the quality of audit (Xu, 
2014; Chen et al., 2013; Abernathy et al., 2012; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; Griffin, Lont 
and Sun, 2008). Therefore, the researcher expects that duality negatively relates to audit quality.  
 
The other control variables relate to board characteristics, which include board independence, its 
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size, diligence, directorships, age and cumulative equity position in a company. Board independ-
ence was measured as the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board. If 
there are high proportions of independent non-executive directors on the board, the board may be 
able to resist managers’ influence in their oversight role and be more willing to support EAs’ po-
sition (Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 2018; Shankaraiah and Amiri, 2017; Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels, 2014). Therefore, audit quality may be enhanced. The researcher expects that the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board positively relates to audit quality. 
 
Board size was measured as the log value of the number of directors on the board. A large board 
may provide more expertise, experience and manpower with a view to monitor financial report-
ing, so that audit quality may be enhanced (Poretti, Schatt and Bruynseels, 2018; Shepardson, 
2018; Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 2018; Shankaraiah and Amiri, 2017; Xu, 2014; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992).  The researcher expects that board size positively relates to audit quality.  
 
Board diligence was measured as the log value of number of board meetings in a year. A board 
that demonstrates a stronger commitment to fulfilling their oversight responsibilities may intensi-
fy their efforts in their oversight role in the financial reporting and audit processes (Kuang 2011; 
  
 196 
Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa. 2011). This implies a positive impact on audit quality. The re-
searcher expects that board diligence positively relates to audit quality.  
 
Board directorships were measured as the average number of directors’ outside directorships. 
Prior studies suggested that board directorships may positively or negatively relate to audit quali-
ty. It may be positive because directors can gain more experience and expertise by serving on 
other boards (Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 2018; Aldamen et al., 2012; Van den Heuvel, 
Gils and Voordeckers, 2006; Abidin 2009). However, it may be negative because they may be-
come too busy performing their oversight role (Brown, Dai and Zur, 2018; Tanyi and Smith, 
2015). The researchers expect that the board directorships significantly relate to audit quality 
without a predetermined sign.  
 
Board age was measured as the average age of directors on the board. Older directors should 
have more experience and expertise that helps them monitor managers (Mustafa, Che-Ahmad 
and Chandren, 2018; Dao, Huang and Zhu, 2013; Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004), so that au-
dit quality may be enhanced. The researcher expects that board age positively relates to audit 
quality.  
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Board members’ cumulative equity position was measured as directors’ cumulative equity posi-
tions in the sample companies. Prior study suggested that board ownership encouraged directors 
on the board to reduce opportunistic behaviours, so they may become more diligent in oversee-
ing managers, thus lowering the agency cost (Aldamen et al. 2012; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Thus, audit quality may be enhanced. However, another stream of board shareholding research 
suggested that concentration ownerships of board members may encourage them to use their 
power to allow earnings management by reducing audit quality (Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 
2018; Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010; Ching, Firth and Rui, 2006). Consequently, the reseacher 
expects that the cumulative equity position significantly relates to audit quality without a prede-
termined sign. Since the measurement and definitions of variables have been discussed in the 
statistical model, the subsequent section presents the models used to test the relationships be-
tween AC characteristics and audit quality.  
 
Time variables have not been included in the regression model as control variables because from 
2010 to 2015, there were no significant changes in events and Hong Kong corporate governance 
which may have significant impacts on audit quality.   
 
Table 11 summarises the variables under investigation.  
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Table 11: Definitions of Variables (Archival Modelling Study)
1
 
                                                 
1
  This study finds that the number of institutional investors positively and significantly related to the absoluate val-
ue of discretionary accruals. Net income and the choice of Big 4 auditors are positively but insignificantly associated 
with the absolute values of discretionary accruals. These results are unexpected. These can be explained by the fact 
that if a company has many institutional investors, managers may be under pressure to manipulate earnings so that 
the financial performance meets the investors’ expectations, so EAs may find it more difficult to detect earnings 
management. If a company has higher net income, it may have more complex transactions, so they may find it more 
difficult to detect earnings management. Additionally, since Big 4 auditors have dominated positions in the market, 
ACMs have few choices to choose the audit firms although they may reduce their audit effort, so audit quality may 
be lower. Also, they may suffer from over-confidence bias because they believe that their audit procedures provide 
high quality of audit, but ignore whether the procedures are appropriate to a specific company in a specific industry. 
Future research may investigate whether Big 4 auditors suffer from over-confidence bias in external audits.  
 
Variables Definition Data Source 
ABSAUDQ Absolute value of discretionary accruals 
based on modified Jones model 
Datastream 
ASAUDQ1 Indicator that takes a value of 1 if the abso-
lute value of discretionary accruals is high-
er than the sample median  
Datastream 
LOGACSIZE Natural log value of number of ACMs on 
an AC 
Annual report 
ACIND Proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the AC in Hong Kong   
Annual report 
ACCOM The proportion of ACMs with accounting Annual report 
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or finance expertise on an AC 
LOGACDIL Natural log value of number of AC meet-
ings per year 
Annual report  
ACDIRECT Average ACMs’ directorships Annual report 
ACTENURE Average years of ACMs on the board Annual report 
ACAGE ACMs’ average age Annual report 
LOGBSIZE 
 
Natural log value of number of directors 
on the board 
Annual report 
BIND 
 
Proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board 
Annual report 
LOGBDILIGENCE Natural log value of the number of board 
meetings in a year 
Annual report 
BDIRECT  Board members’ average directorships Annual report 
BAGE Board members’ average age Annual report 
CUMBOADEQUITY 
 
Proportion of board members’ equity posi-
tion in a company 
Annual report 
DUALITY Indicator that takes a value of 1 if CEO of Annual report 
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4.7 Regression Model 
 
The archival modelling study has eight models in order to examine the relationships between AC 
characteristics and audit quality. Models 1 and 2 make use of the absolute value of discretionary 
 a company is the same person as chairman 
INSTITINVESTORS Number of institutional investors invested 
in the company 
Bloomberg 
NI 
 
Net income normalised by lagged total as-
sets 
Datastream 
INHERENT The sum of account receivables and inven-
tory normalised by lagged total assets 
Datastream 
NAF  Proportion of non-audit fees to total fees Annual report 
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets Datastream 
SIZE  Natural log value of total assets Datastream 
AUDITOR  Equal to 1 if a firm hires a Big 4 auditor,  
otherwise 0 
Annual report 
LOGAFEE Natural log value of audit fees Annual report 
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accruals as a proxy for audit quality. Discretionary accruals were obtained by firstly regressing 
total accruals on change in revenues, gross property plant and equipment using Jones (1991) 
model with industry and year combination. All of them are normalised by lagged total assets. 
Total accruals were calculated using cash flow approach. The estimates of cofficients obtained in 
the Jones (1991) model were then used to estimate non-discretionary accruals using modified 
Jones model. Thereafter, the discretionary accruals which are subject to managers’ manipulation 
were found. This approach was adopted by Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2001) and Debra and Shiva-
kumar (1991). Models 3 to 4 signify the additional analysis. Models 3 and 4 measure audit quali-
ty in terms of whether discretionary accruals are higher than the sample median. Models 5 to 8 
are the models for robustness checks. Models 5 and 6 make use of the log value of audit fees as a 
proxy for audit quality, whereas Models 7 and 8 use the appointment of Big 4 auditors as a proxy 
for it. The findings of these models are presented in Chapter 5.  The models of the archival mod-
elling study are specified as follows:  
 
Main Analysis  
Model 1: 
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Model 2: 
 
 
 
 
Additional Analysis 
Model 3: 
 
Model 4: 
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Robustness Check: 
Model 5: 
 
Model 6: 
     
 
 
Model 7: 
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Model 8: 
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4.8 Chapter Summary 
Commencing with the justification for archival research method, this chapter discusses the sam-
ple selection process as well as data collection procedure. This final sample for the analysis 
equals 1,714 firm observations. It then goes on to discuss assumptions and justification of panel 
data regression. In addition, this chapter defines the dependent variables, audit quality and inde-
pendent variables for the purpose of statistical analysis. The chapter concludes with an explana-
tion of the regression models and statistical models that are employed in order to examine the 
impacts of AC characteristics on audit quality. 
 
 
  
 206 
 
CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH FINDINGS (ARCHIVAL MODELLING STUDY) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the research findings obtained from the archival modelling that has been 
discussed in Chapter 4; it begins by outlining the descriptive statistics of the variables employed 
in the analysis that investigates the influence of AC characteristics on audit quality. This is fol-
lowed by the results of tests that examine the violation of key assumptions. The chapter then pre-
sents the results of detailed multivariate regression analysis evaluating the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 2. The multivariate analysis includes an investigation of the impact of various AC char-
acteristics on audit quality. This chapter also undertook additional analysis probit panel data re-
gression as well as robustness check using different proxies for audit quality, such as auditor 
choice and audit fees. Finally, the chapter ends by summarising the results of the archival model-
ling study.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive information (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) on depend-
ent and independent variables have been depicted in Tables 12, 13 and 14 respectively.  
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables (Archival Modelling Study) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
ABSAUDQ 0.104 0.33 0.000 11.86 
LOGBSIZE 2.27 0.26 1.38 3.09 
BAGE 54.92 4.95 38.63 71.45 
LOGBDILIGENCE 1.82 0.511 0 4.26 
BIND 0.38 0.09 0.13 0.75 
BDIRECT 0.93 0.86 0 6.4 
LOGACSIZE 1.22 0.196 0.693 1.94 
ACCOM 0.40 0.24 0 1 
ACIND 0.91 0.15 0.25 1 
ACAGE 58.31 6.74 37.67 77.33 
ACDIRECT 1.68 1.55 0 8 
LOGACDIL 1.082 0.41 0 3.09 
ACTENURE 6.15 3.92 0.04 24.03 
INHERENT 0.559 9.72 0 402.81 
NI 0.058 0.42 -2.8 0.95 
INSTITINVESTORS 107.8 99.49 0 733 
CUMBOADEQUITY 0.38 0.56 0 3.81 
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Variables (Archival Modelling Study) 
Dichotomous  
Variables 
Indicator Frequency Percent Cumulative 
AUDITORS 0 176 10.26 10.24 
 1 1,538 89.73 100.00 
DUALITY 0 1,235 72.05 72.05 
 1 479 27.95 100.00 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Absolute Values of Discretionary Accruals by Industry  
(Archival Modelling Study) 
Industry Industry 
Code 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviations 
Min Max 
Customer 
Goods 
1 425 0.11 0.24 0.0003 3.012 
Customer  
Services 
2 301 0.047 0.059 0.00009 0.53 
Energy 3 209 0.084 0.083 0.0001 0.623 
Industrials 4 276 0.142 0.199 0.0005 1.739 
SIZE 16.95 1.573 10.53 21.56 
LEV 0.48 0.22 0.006 2.20 
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Information 
Technology 
5 160 0.114 0.2471 0.00047 2.704 
Properties and  
Construction 
6 344 0.126 0.646 0.00046 11.86 
Total  1714     
 
The mean of absolute values of discretionary accruals is 0.104. In the UK, Habbash (2012) re-
ported that the mean was 0.07 from 2005 to 2007. In Malaysia, Mohammad et al. (2007) reported 
that the means were 0.2284 in 2004, 0.2588 in 2015 and 0.24 in 2016. In Hong Kong, Jaggi and 
Leung (2007) reported that the mean was 0.115 from 1999 to 2000. The mean of this study is 
close to the mean of prior studies in Hong Kong. 
 
On average, firms in industrial industries have the highest mean of discretionary accruals (0.142) 
followed by firms in properties and construction (0.128) and information technology (0.114), but 
customer service companies have the lowest (0.047). The property and construction companies 
have the highest discretionary accrual (11.86) but the customer service companies have the low-
est (0.00009). The property and construction companies have industry specific accounting policy 
and estimates, so it involves complex transactions and valuation process. Information technology 
companies involve complex process, so companies in these industries have higher discretionary 
accruals. The customer service companies have relatively low levels of inventories and accounts 
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receivable, so inherent risk of the assets should be lower. Therefore, it is easier for them to moni-
tor the manipulation of earnings, so the discretionary accruals are the lowest.  
 
For AC variables, the mean of average AC age is 58.31 with the minimum value of 37.67 and the 
maximum value of 77.33. Notably, the youngest AC has the age of 37.67. It is relatively young. 
In the US study, Dao, Huang and Zhu (2013) reported that the average AC age is 60.87 from 
2007 to 2009. The age of this study is close to the age in the US.  
 
The mean of average AC directorships is 1.67 with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value 
of 8. On average, they are not known to be very busy in terms of outside directorships because 
they have 1-2 outside directorships on average. In the US, Garven (2015) reported that the mean 
of average AC directorships is 1.65. Similarly, Dao, Huang and Zhou (2013) reported that the 
mean of average AC directorships was 1.58 from 2007 to 2009. The mean of this study is close 
to the mean in the US.  
 
Concerning the proportion of AC financial experts, the mean is 0.40. On average, 40 percent of 
ACMs on the AC is accounted for by financial experts. In the US, Garven (2015) reported that 
the finance expertise is 0.457. In Hong Kong, Chan et al. (2011) reported that financial expertise 
in 2006 was 0.49. It is interesting to observe that the mean of the proportion of financial experts 
in Hong Kong have decreased by 9 percent.  
 
  
 211 
The mean of the proportion of independent non-executive ACMs is 0.91, with the minimum val-
ue of 0.25 and the maximum value of 1. This is consistent with the findings of Ghafran and 
O’Sullivan (2017), who reported 95.29 percent of AC independence in the UK. In Malaysia, 
Mohammad et al. (2007) reported that the mean of AC independence was approximately 0.7 
from 2004 to 2006. In a study on Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong, Lin, Li and Wang (2006) 
reported that the mean of AC independence was 0.835. In Hong Kong, Chan et al. (2011) report-
ed that AC independence stood at 0.906 in 2006. While the mean was higher than the mean of 
the Chinese companies listed in HK and Malaysia companies, it was lower than the mean of UK 
companies. It may be noted that the mean of the proportion in Hong Kong did not change signif-
icantly.  
 
The mean of the number of ACMs is 3.39 (log value = 1.22). In Hong Kong, Lin, Li and Wang 
(2007) reported that the number of directors on an AC was 3.54 from 2004 to 2008. AC size 
from 2010 to 2015 was close to the size from 2004 to 2008.  
 
The mean of the number of AC meetings is 2.95 (log value = 1.082). In the US, the number of 
AC meetings is 7.91. ACMs are known to be more diligent in the US than ACMs in Hong Kong. 
The mean of average AC tenure on the board is 6.15, with a maximum value of 24.03 and a min-
imum value of 0.04. In the US, Garven (2015) reported that the average AC tenure on the board 
is 7.62. Meanwhile in Hong Kong, the range of average AC tenure on the board is approximately 
24 years. On average, ACMs served on the board for 6.15 years. 
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In terms of board variables, board size is 9.77 (log value = 2.27) In the UK, Habbash (2012) re-
ported that the number of directors on the board from 2005 to 2007 was 9.07. In Hong Kong, 
Cheng, Lui and Shum (2015) pointed out that the number of directors on the board was 8.77. The 
board size is slightly higher than that of the study conducted in the UK and similar to the value 
reported by Cheng, Lui and Shum (2015).  
 
The mean of independent non-executive directors on a board is 0.38. On average, approximately 
38 percent of board members are independent non-executive directors in Hong Kong. This is 
lower than the study conducted by Ghafran and Sullivan (2017), who stated that the mean of 
board independence was 48.23 percent in the UK, but higher than the study conducted by Mo-
hammad et al. (2007) who, in turn, reported a mean of 0.4 in Malaysia. In the US, Garven (2015) 
reported that board independence is 0.742. Lin and Liu (2013) reported that the mean of board 
independence from 1999 to 2007 was 0.33 in Hong Kong. Cheng, Lui and Shum (2015) reported 
that the mean value of board independence stood at 0.395 from 2008 to 2009. Analogously, Chan 
et al. (2011) stated that the independence in 2006 was 0.374. The mean of this study was similar 
to means of other studies that were conducted in Hong Kong and Malaysia. However, board 
members in Hong Kong are less independent than those in the UK and the US.  
 
The mean of the number of board meetings was 6.17 (log value = 1.82). In Malaysia, Moham-
mad et al. (2007) reported that the number of board meetings were 3.98 in 2004, 5 in 2005, and 
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5.12 in 2006. Board members are known to be more diligent in Hong Kong than those in Malay-
sia.  
 
The mean of average board age is 54.92. In a study that was conducted in the US, Dao, Huang 
and Zhu (2013) reported that average board age from 2007 to 2009 was 59.36. In Hong Kong, 
board members are younger than those in the US by five years. 
 
The mean of board of directors’ cumulative equity position is 0.38, with a minimum value of 0 
and a maximum value of 3.81. On average, a board has 38 percent of the equity position of a 
company, with the maximum value being 381 percent. It is more than 100 percent because the 
underlying shares were also included in the cumulative equity position. In the US, Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) reported that cumulative percentage of voting control held by managers and 
directors from 2000 to 2002 was 0.053. In Hong Kong, Lei and Song (2012) reported that the 
ownerships held by directors from 2000 to 2008 were 0.23. The directors’ cumulative equity po-
sition of Hong Kong companies is much higher than that of US companies.  
 
Moreover, 27.95 percent of the firms had the same person as CEO and Chairman in this study. 
Approximately 30 percent of the companies in the sample entrusted the responsibility of both 
CEO and Chairman in the hands of a single person. This is lower than the value of the study 
conducted by Garven (2015) in the US, who reported that the mean of duality was 0.487. In 
Hong Kong, Cheng, Liu and Shum (2015) reported that the duality from 2008 to 2009 was 0.33. 
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Chan et al. (2011) reported that the mean of duality in 2006 was 0.73. The mean is lower than the 
value of the study in the US as well as studies conducted in Hong Kong from 2006 to 2009.  
 
The mean of board directorships is 0.93, which is lower than the mean of the studies conducted 
by Garven (2015) and Dao, Huang and Zhu (2013), who reported that the mean from 2007 to 
2009 was 1.66 and 1.21, respectively. In Hong Kong, Chan et al. (2011) reported that average 
board directorship in 2006 was 2.83. Average board directorship in this study was found to be 
lower than the values of the studies carried out in the US as well as the study conducted in Hong 
Kong in 2006.   
 
For other control variables, the mean of net income normalised by lagged total assets (ROA) is 
0.058. In a study relating to Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong, Lin et al. (2009) reported that 
the mean was 0.05. In Hong Kong, Jaggi and Leung (2007) reported the mean was -0.0350 from 
1999 to 2000.  In this study, 89.73 percent of the companies appointed Big 4 as EAs, indicating 
that most of the companies appointed Big 4 auditors. In Hong Kong, Lin, Li and Yand (2006) 
reported that the percent of Big 4 auditor was 0.78. On the other hand, Lin and Liu (2013) stated 
that the percent of Big 4 auditor from 1999 to 2007 is 0.87. This may imply that more companies 
have shown an inclination to appoint Big 4 auditors in recent years.  
 
The mean of total assets was $22,908,676 (log value = 16.95), equivalent to which are lower than 
the study conducted by Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017), who reported that the mean value of total 
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assets was $10,96,478,196 in the US. Meanwhile, Garven (2015) reported that the mean value of 
total assets was $831,764. In Hong Kong, Jaggi and Leung (2007) reported that the mean of total 
assets from 1999 to 2000 were $74,131. The mean of the number of institutional investors was 
107.8.  
 
The mean of leverage is 0.48, implying that approximately 50 percent of the assets was funded 
by total liabilities in this study. Malaysian companies had lower levels of leverage. Mohammad 
et al. (2007) reported that leverage was 0.27 in 2004, 0.29 in 2006 and 0.31 in 2007.  In the US, 
Garven (2015) mentioned that leverage was 0.497. In Hong Kong, Lin and Liu (2013) reported 
that the mean of leverage from 1999 to 2007 was 0.38, which is higher than the study in the Ma-
laysia, but close to the study in the US. The mean of leverage in this study is also higher than the 
mean of the study conducted in Hong Kong from 1999 to 2007.  
 
The mean of inherent risk was 0.559. On average, 55.9 percent of the total assets had a high in-
herent risk. In the US, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) reported that inherent risk stood at 
0.241 from 2000 to 2002. Hay et al. (2008) reported that inherent risk was 0.25 in 2005. The 
mean of the study was higher than the means of the studies conducted in the US.  
 
5.3 Assumptions of Regression Analysis 
The consequences of violations of assumptions have been discussed in Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.1.4. 
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This section only discusses the results of the tests detecting the violation of the assumptions. Ta-
bles 15 and 16 show the absence of multicollinearity because correlation coefficients between 
variables are lower than 0.90 and that VIF for all variables are lower than 10. Table 17 depicts 
the results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Since the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at p<0.05, 
0.01 or 0.001, it is inferred that endogeneity is not present. Table 18 illustrates the results of 
Modified Wald Test for Group wise Heteroskedasticity for panel data. It indicates that heterosce-
dasticity is present, implying that robust standard errors should be used for regression. This can 
also be corrected using robust standard errors. Table 19 shows the results of Woodridge serial 
correlation test. It indicates that serial correlation is not present since p-value is higher than 0.05.  
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Table 15: Pearson Correlations (Archival Modelling Study) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 1.00              
2 -0.05 1.00             
3 -0.04 -0.21 1.00            
4 0.01 -0.15 -0.00 1.00           
5 -0.06 0.15 -0.16 0.06 1.00          
6 -0.05 -0.05 0.15 -0.08 -0.11 1.00         
7 -0.07 -0.00 0.04 -0.14 -0.08 0.23 1.00        
8 -0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.21 -0.01 0.31 0.43 1.00       
9 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.041 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 1.00      
10 -0.03 0.35 -0.07 -0.06 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.14 -0.50 1.00     
11 0.03 0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.29 -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 0.07 0.01 1.00    
12 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 -0.15 0.11 0.21 0.44 0.74 0.14 0.16 -0.13 1.00   
13 0.01 0.07 0.09 -0.12 -0.10 0.74 0.32 0.35 0.15 0.04 -0.16 0.36 1.00  
14 -0.06 -0.04 0.10 -0.06 -0.22 0.09 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
15 0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 0.25 
16 0.52 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.05 
17 0.13 -0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.09 
18 0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.025 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.05 
19 -0.10 0.21 -0.11 -0.08 -0.36 0.08 0.14 0.26 -0.04 0.38 0.13 0.31 0.13 -0.15 
20 0.85 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
21 -0.07 0.20 -0.01 -0.1 0.35 0.08 0.19 0.26 0.05 0.34 0.02 0.31 0.15 -0.16 
22 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 -0.06 0.13 -0.17 0.11 0.13 0.09 
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 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
15 1.00        
16 0.01 1.00       
17 0.10 0.07 1.00      
18 0.00 0.04 -0.01 1.00     
19 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.05 1.00    
20 -0.01 0.72 0.06 0.08 0.01 1.00   
21 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.65 -0.03 1.00  
22 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.12 1.00 
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Where:  
1 ABSAUDQ 12 BAGE 
2 LOGACSIZE 13 BDIRECT 
3 ACIND 14 CUMBOADEQUITY 
4 ACCOM 15 DUALITY 
5 LOGACDIL 16 NI 
6 ACDIRECT 17 INHERENT 
7 ACTENURE 18 NAF 
8 ACAGE 19 SIZE 
9 BIND 20 LEV 
10 LOGBSIZE 21 INSTITINVESTORS 
11 LOGBCDIL 22 AUDITOR 
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Table 16: VIF (Archival Modelling Study) 
Variables  VIF 1/VIF 
2 1.41    0.71 
3 1.21 0.83 
4 1.11 0.90 
5 1.4 0.71 
6 3.35 0.30 
7 1.43 0.70 
8 2.72 0.37 
9 1.90 0.53 
10 2.18 0.46 
11 2.99 0.33 
12 3.72 0.27 
13 1.26 0.79 
14 1.20 0.83 
15 1.16 0.86 
16 1.30 0.77 
17 1.05 0.96 
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18 1.08 0.92 
19 1.30 0.77 
20 1.51 0.66 
21 2.17 0.46 
22 1.16 0.86 
Mean VIF 1.80  
 
Table 17: Durbin-Wu-Hausman (Archival Modelling Study) 
Durbin (score) chi-square = 11.41 (p = 0.08) 
Wu-Hausman F(3,1687)  = 0.494   (p = 0.08) 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table 18: Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity (Archival Modelling Study) 
Modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
Chi-square  1.2e+06 
Prob>chi2 0.0000*** 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
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Table 19: Wooldridge Serial Correlation Test 
F(1, 292) = 1.166 
p-value = 0.2812 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table 20 summarises the violation of assumptions for regression analysis.  
 
Table 20: Violation of Assumptions for Regression 
Assumptions Violated  Correction 
Multi-collinearity No No corrections are needed. 
Endogeneity No No corrections are needed. 
Heteroscedasticity Yes Robust standard errors were used. 
Serial Correlation No No corrections are needed. 
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5.4 Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  
 
The details of Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test have been discussed in Section 4.5. As a result, this 
section only presents the results of the test. Table 21 depicts that the chi-square is equal to 76.30 
and p<0.001, implying that the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, fixed effect panel data re-
gression should be used.  
 
Table 21: Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
Chi-square 76.38 
Prob>Chi-square 0.0000*** 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
5.5 Main Findings  
 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 concluded that fixed effect panel data regression with robust standard errors 
should be utilised in the archival modelling study.  The main objective of this analysis is to in-
vestigate the research hypothesis concerning the impact of effective characteristics of an AC on 
audit quality. The main models were run for two separate regressions. The models’ dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. R-squares are 0.745 and 0.697 in Models 
1 and 2, respectively; they are higher than that of similar studies conducted by Aier et al. (2005) 
at 0.0053, Baxter and Cotter (2009) at 0.003, Nelson and Devi (2013) at 0.042, Rainsbury, Brad-
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bury and Cahan (2009) at 0.066. Model 1 displays the results using effective characteristics of an 
AC as well as other control variables without effective board characteristics as control variables. 
The findings of Model 1 have been summarised in Table 22. Model 1 is specified as follows: 
 
 
 
Table 22: Results of Model 1 
 Co-efficient  Robust Standard Error p-values 
LOGACSIZE -0.377 0.132 0.005** 
ACIND -0.028 0.058 0.0636 
ACCOM -0.121 0.041 0.004** 
LOGACDIL -0.042 0.065 0.520 
ACDIRECT -0.016 0.013 0.248 
ACTENURE -0.005 0.002 0.029* 
ACAGE -0.002 0.001 0.238 
INSTITINVESTORS 0.0002 0.0001 0.028* 
NAF 0.0086 0.04 0.820 
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NI 0.145 0.13 0.278 
INHERENT 0.085 0.0186 0.000*** 
LEV 0.033 0.004 0.000*** 
SIZE -0.081 0.048 0.097 
AUDITOR 0.010 0.072 0.134 
Constant 0.99  0.019* 
R-square (within) 0.789   
R-square (between) 0.510   
R-square (overall) 0.745   
F-statistics 12971.41  0.0000*** 
N=1714    
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
According to the results, the proportion of ACMs’ financial expertise and log value of the num-
ber of AC members negatively relate to the absolute value of discretionary accruals at p<0.01. 
Average AC tenure negatively relates to the accruals at p<0.05. For control variables, the number 
of institional investors positively relate to discretionary accruals at p<0.05. Inherent risk and lev-
erage positively relate to discretionary accruals at p<0.001. This indicates that managers may be 
under pressure to manipulate earnings to target institutional investors’ expectation if they are 
looking at the company’s earnings. Inherent risk makes EAs more difficult to detect earnings 
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management. Mangers may manage earnings if a company has higher leverage, because they 
want to show that the financial health of their companies is still strong. The results confirm that 
AC size, financial expertise and tenure are important in the context of improving audit quality. 
The result demonstrates that Model 1 is significant at p<0.001 and R-square is 0.745, which in-
dicates that 74.50 percent of the variance of audit quality can be explained by independent varia-
bles.  
 
Model 2 shows the results using both effective board and AC characteristics with other control 
variables. The findings have been summarised in Table 23. The model is specified as follows:  
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Table 23: Results of Model 2 
 Co-efficient  Robust Std Error p-values 
LOGACSIZE -0.23 0.114 0.041* 
ACIND -0.014 0.060 0.804 
ACCOM -0.100 0.034 0.005** 
LOGACDIL -0.019 0.058 0.747 
ACDIRECT 0.001 0.008 0.856 
ACTENURE -0.003 0.002 0.175 
ACAGE 0.004 0.002 0.040* 
BIND -0.067 0.081 0.405 
LOGBSIZE -0.211 0.172 0.219 
LOGBDILLIGENCE -0.018 0.037 0.637 
BAGE -0.014 0.004 0.003** 
BDIRCT -0.054 0.032 0.098 
CUMBOADEQUITY 0.087 0.069 0.208 
DUALITY 0.010 0.018 0.588 
NI -0.015 0.012 0.220 
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INHERENT 0.084 0.016 0.000*** 
NAF 0.022 0.032 0.491 
SIZE -0.077 0.041 0.058 
LEV 0.033 0.003 0.000*** 
INSTITINVESTORS 0.0003 0.0001 0.008** 
AUDITOR 0.093 0.057 0.104 
Constant 1.515  0.004** 
R-square (within) 0.7957   
R-square (between) 0.3741   
R-square (overall) 0.697   
F-statistics 16960  0.0000*** 
N=1714    
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
According to the results, the proportion of AC financial expertise negatively relates to the abso-
lute value at p<0.01. The log value of AC size negatively relates to it at p<0.05. However, aver-
age AC age positively relates to it at p<0.05. Average average board age negatively relate to it at 
p<0.01. Similaly, inherent risk and leverage relate to it positively at p<0.001. Number of institu-
tional investors positively relate to it at p<0.01. R-square is equal to 0.697. Consequently, the 
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hypothesis positive significant relationships exist between audit quality and AC expertise and 
size. However, average AC age negiatively relates to audit quality.  
 
In conclusion, the study uses fixed effect panel data analysis with robust standard errors to con-
trol for firm heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity. As a result, it has the potential to provide more 
compelling evidence. Panel data results show positive impacts of effective AC characteristics on 
audit quality. Additionally, board members’ average age may help enhance audit quality. The 
results clearly imply that company should form an AC with effective characteristics so that an 
AC is effective in monitoring audit quality to protect stakeholders.  Table 24 summarises the 
findings of Models 1 and 2. 
 
Table 24: List of Null Hypotheses Rejected and Not Rejected  
(Fixed Effect Panel Data Regression with Robust Standard Errors) 
No Null Hypotheses Results 
(Model 1) 
Results 
(Model 2) 
H1 There is no relationship between audit quality 
and size of an AC. 
Rejected Rejected 
H2 There is no relationship between audit quality 
and AC independence 
Not Rejected Not Rejected 
H3 There is no relationship between diligence of Not Rejected Not Rejected 
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an audit committee and audit quality. 
H4 There is no relationship between AC compe-
tence and audit quality 
Rejected Rejected 
H5 There is no relationship between AC director-
ships and audit quality. 
Not Rejected Not Rejected 
H6 There is no relationship between average AC 
tenure and audit quality. 
Rejected Not Rejected 
H7 There is a negative relationship between AC 
age and audit quality. 
Not Rejected Rejected 
 
5.6 Additional Analysis 
An indicator that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is higher than the sample median 
was used as further analysis. The indicator is equal to 1 if they were found to be higher than the 
sample median, otherwise 0. Models 3 and 4 used the indicator as the dependent variable. Ran-
dom effect probit panel data regression was used given that the dependent variable is binary and 
fixed effect model is unavailable for probit panel data.  
 
Model 3 demonstrates the results using the effective characteristics of an AC and control varia-
bles without effective board characteristics as the independent variables. These findings were 
summarised in Table 25.  It is specified as follows: 
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Table 25: Results of Model 3 
 Co-efficient  Robust Std Error p-values 
LOGACSIZE -0.33 0.492 0.504 
ACIND -0.34 0.260 0.184 
ACCOM -0.26 0.162 0.105 
LOGACDIL -0.21 0.224 0.344 
ACDIRECT -0.03 0.031 0.386 
ACTENURE -0.13 0.012 0.261 
ACAGE 0.001 0.007 0.914 
INSTITINVESTORS 0.001 0.001 0.027* 
NAF 0.135 0.241 0.574 
NI 0.160 0.182 0.379 
INHERENT 0.506 0.222 0.023* 
LEV 0.371 0.142 0.009** 
SIZE -0.268 0.096 0.005** 
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AUDITOR -0.280 0.130 0.829 
Constant 2.24 0.827 0.007** 
Log pseudolikelihood -1138   
Wald chi2 (21) 43.10   
Prob>chi2   0.0001*** 
N=1714    
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
According to the findings, AC variables are not significantly associated with discretionary accru-
als. For control variables, inherent risk and the number of institutional investors positively relate 
to it at p<0.05. Log value of total assets negatively relate to it at p<0.01. Leverage is positively 
significant at p<0.01. The model is found to be significant at p<0.001. Log pseudolikelihood is 
equal to -1138.  
 
Model 4 depicts the results using both effective board and AC characteristics with control varia-
bles. These findings were summarised in Table 26. It is specified as follows:  
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Table 26: Results of Model 4 
 Co-efficient  Robust Standard Error p-values 
LOGACSIZE -0.48 0.526 0.364 
ACIND -0.67 0.276 0.015* 
ACCOM -0.26 0.163 0.105 
LOGACDIL -0.11 0.234 0.629 
ACDIRECT -0.199 0.053 0.703 
ACTENURE -0.007 0.012 0.569 
ACAGE 0.0229 0.010 0.016* 
BIND 0.768 0.65 0.237 
LOGBSIZE 0.60 0.512 0.245 
LOGBDILLIGENCE -0.105 0.184 0.569 
BAGE -0.045 0.013 0.001** 
BDIRCT -0.118 0.096 0.217 
CUMBOADEQUITY 0.068 0.072 0.349 
DUALITY 0.213 0.091 0.020* 
NI 0.149 0.176 0.400 
INHERENT 0.029 0.22 0.195 
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NAF 0.106 0.24 0.658 
SIZE -0.245 0.098 0.012* 
LEV 0.355 0.138 0.010** 
INSTITINVESTORS 0.001 0.0006 0.025* 
AUDITOR -0.083 0.131 0.522 
Constant 2.796 0.963 0.004** 
Log pseudolikelihood -1125.71   
Wald chi2 (21) 65.73   
Prob>chi2   0.0000*** 
N=1714    
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
As per the findings, the proportion of the independent non-executive directors on an AC nega-
tively relates to the indicator at p<0.05. With regard to board characteristics, average board 
members’age negatively relates to it at p<0.01. The duality of CEO and chairman positively re-
lates to it at p<0.05. For other control variables, the findings are similar to those of Model 3. The 
model is significant at p<0.001. Log pseudolikelihood is equal to -1125.71. The results may in-
dicate that AC independence and average board members’ age may improve their effectiveness 
in monitoring audit quality. However, average AC age may negatively impact their monitoring 
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effectiveness. Further, the duality of CEO and chairman may impair their independence to re-
duce earnings management.  
 
Table 27 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing for Models 3 to 4. Similarly, Table 28 
summarises the results of panel data regression for Models 1 to 4. 
 
Table 27: List of Null Hypotheses Rejected and Not Rejected (Probit Panel Data with Robust 
Standard Errors) 
 
No Null Hypotheses Results 
(Model 3) 
Results 
(Model 4) 
H1 There is no relationship between audit quali-
ty and size of an AC. 
Not Rejected Not Rejected 
H2 There is no relationship between audit quali-
ty and AC independence 
Not Rejected Rejected 
H3 There is no relationship between diligence of 
an audit committee and audit quality. 
Not Rejected Not Rejected 
H4 There is no relationship between AC compe-
tence and audit quality 
Not Rejected Not Rejected 
H5 Average AC directorships are not signifi- Not Rejected Not Rejected 
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cantly associated with audit quality. 
H6 Average AC tenure is not significantly asso-
ciated with audit quality. 
Not Rejected Not Rejected 
H7 Average AC age is not significantly associ-
ated with audit quality. 
Not Rejected Rejected 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 237 
 
 
Table 28: Results of Models 1 to 4 
 
Variables Model 1 
Coefficients 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
Model 4 
Coefficients 
LOGACSIZE -0.377** 
(0.005) 
-0.23* 
(0.041) 
-0.33 
(0.504) 
-0.48 
(0.364) 
ACIND -0.028 
(0.0636) 
-0.014 
(0.804) 
-0.34 
(0.184) 
-0.67* 
(0.015) 
ACCOM -0.121** 
(0.004) 
-0.1** 
(0.005) 
-0.26 
(0.105) 
-0.26 
(0.105) 
LOGACDIL -0.042 
(0.520) 
-0.019 
(0.747) 
-0.21 
(0.344) 
-0.11 
(0.629) 
ACDIRECT -0.016 
(0.248) 
0.001 
(0.856) 
-0.03 
(0.386) 
-0.199 
(0.703) 
ACTENURE -0.005* 
(0.029) 
-0.003 
(0.175) 
-0.13 
(0.261) 
-0.007 
(0.569) 
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ACAGE -0.002 
(0.238) 
0.004* 
(0.040) 
0.001 
(0.914) 
0.0229* 
(0.016) 
BIND  -0.067 
(0.405) 
 0.768 
(0.237) 
LOGBSIZE  -0.211 
(0.219) 
 0.60 
(0.245) 
LOGBDILLIGENCE  -0.018 
(0.637) 
 -0.105 
(0.569) 
BAGE  -0.014** 
(0.003) 
 -0.045** 
(0.001) 
BDIRCT  -0.054 
(0.098) 
 -0.118 
(0.217) 
CUMBOADEQUITY  0.087 
(0.208) 
 0.068 
(0.349) 
DUALITY  0.010 
(0.588) 
 0.213* 
(0.020) 
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NI 0.145 
(0.278) 
-0.015 
(0.220) 
0.160 
(0.379) 
0.149 
(0.400) 
INHERENT 0.085*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
0.506* 
(0.023) 
0.029 
(0.195) 
NAF 0.0086 
(0.820) 
0.022 
(0.491) 
0.135 
(0.574) 
0.106 
(0.658) 
SIZE -0.081 
(0.097) 
-0.077 
(0.058) 
-0.268** 
(0.005) 
-0.245* 
(0.012) 
LEV 0.033*** 
(0.000) 
0.033*** 
(0.000) 
0.371** 
(0.009) 
0.355* 
(0.010) 
INSTITINVESTORS 0.0002* 
(0.028)  
 
0.0003** 
(0.008) 
0.001* 
(0.027) 
0.001* 
(0.025) 
AUDITOR 0.010 
(0.134) 
0.093 
(0.104) 
-0.280 
(0.829) 
-0.083 
(0.522) 
Constant 0.99* 1.515** 2.24** 2.796** 
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(0.019) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
R-square (within) 0.789 0.7957   
R-square (between) 0.510 0.3741   
R-square (overall) 0.745 0.6973   
F-statistics 12971.41 16960   
P-value 0.0000*** 0.0000***   
Log pseudolikelihood   -1138 -1125.71 
Wald chi2 (21)   43.10 65.73 
Prob>chi2   0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
N=1714     
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
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5.7 Robustness Check  
This section considers the sensitivity of the results to a variety of alternative measures of audit 
quality. The robustness checks generate similar results to those presented above by illuminating 
some identical patterns of statistical significance and signs in all checks. Notably, these tests use 
the log value of audit fees and choice of auditor as measures of audit quality. At the end of this 
section, the results of robustness check tests are compared to those of Models 1 to 4. 
 
5.7.1 Audit fees  
Audit fees are determined by the costs associated with audit efforts and audit risks evaluated by 
EAs (Choi et al., 2008). Audit fees are specified as a function of the EAs’ cost in performing the 
audit, expected litigation risks as well as normal profit (Asthana and Boone, 2012). As the AC 
serves as the corporate governance mechanism overseeing issues surrounding financial reporting 
integrity (CGPR, 2007), the AC may demand additional external audit effort from EAs in terms 
of scope and effort so that financial reporting leads to high credibility and audit quality. This 
demand increases the audit fees (Carcello, Hermanson and Ye, 2011). Zaman, Hudaib and Hanif-
fa (2011) observed that AC effectiveness, independence, diligence and size positively relate to 
audit fees. Bruynseels and Cardinels (2014) found that social ties formed through the CEO’s 
network reduced oversight quality, so that ACMs purchased less audit efforts, as evident in lower 
audit fees. Ho and Kang (2013) observed that AC size positively relates to audit fees in family 
  
 242 
firms as well as non-family firms. Boo and Sharma (2008) took cognisance of the fact that an AC 
with more directorships required more audit resources in highly regulated industry. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) observed that AC demanded greater effort when they perceived greater risk; 
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) and Hay (2013) meanwhile found positive linkages between audit 
fees and AC expertise. However, an effective AC may result in strengthening internal controls, 
which then leads to a reduced control risk for EAs (Zhang, Zhou and Zhou, 2007), so that the EA 
may charge lower audit fees. Some research found negative associations between audit fees and 
AC expertise (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009) or AC tenure (Chan, Liu and Sun, 2013). This is 
consistent with lower audit risk assessments.  
 
Therefore, Models 5 and 6 were formed in order to examine the effects of AC characteristics on 
audit quality measured by the log value of audit fees as a measure of robustness checks. Model 5 
were only inclusive of AC characteristics and other control variables without board characteris-
tics. Model 6 included AC characteristics and control variables, including board characteristics. 
Fixed effect panel data regression was used to examine the relationships in Model 5 and Model 6.  
The findings of Models 5 and 6 are presented in Tables 29 and 30. Model 5 is specified as fol-
lows: 
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Table 29: Results of Model 5 
 
Variables  Coefficients  P-value 
LOGACSIZE 0.135 0.026* 
ACIND 0.049 0.207 
ACCOM 0.064 0.009**    
LOGACDIL -0.020 0.518 
ACDIRECT -0.023  0.000***     
ACTENURE 0.033 0.064   
ACAGE -0.0000 0.957  
NI -0.130 0.000***    
INHERENT 0.0223 0.000***  
NAF -0.199  0.112     
SIZE 0.280  0.000***     
LEV -0.0222 0.000***     
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INSTITINVESTORS -0.0001    0.154     
AUDITOR 0.050 0.077    
Constant 1.475 0.427 
R-square (within) 0.239  
R-square (between) 0.433  
R-square (overall) 0.440  
F-statistics 30.49  
P-value  0.0000*** 
N=1714   
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
Model 5 shows that the log value of AC size and AC expertise are positively associated with the 
log value of audit fees at p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively, which indicates that a large AC and AC 
with financial expertise necessitates more efforts from EAs. However, ACMs’ average director-
ships negatively relate to the log value of audit fees at p<0.001. As implication, EAs perceive 
that ACMs’ directorships may help them acquire more experience in monitoring audit quality, so 
they perceived that audit risk is lower, and that audit fees are reduced. Net income normalised by 
lagged total assets is negatively associated at p<0.001, indicating that EAs perceive the company 
has low audit risk if a company has high profitability. Log value of total assets positively relate 
to audit fees at p<0.001, indicating the fact that a large company has more resources at its dis-
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posal to appoint a high quality EA.  
 
Model 6 includes board characteristics as control variables.  The findings of Model 6 are pre-
sented in Table 30. Model 6 is specified as follows: 
 
 
 
Table 30: Results of Model 6 
 
Variables  Coefficients P-value 
LOGACSIZE 0.113 0.108 
ACIND 0.0536 0.185 
ACCOM 0.060 0.017* 
LOGACDIL -0.0195 0.531 
ACDIRECT -0.0205 0.002** 
ACTENURE 0.004 0.050 
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ACAGE -0.001 0.506 
BIND -0.074 0.281 
LOGBSIZE 0.178 0.015* 
LOGBDILLIGENCE -0.012 0.588 
BAGE 0.002 0.250 
BDIRCT -0.006 0.683 
CUMBOADEQUITY -0.02 0.279 
DUALITY -0.007 0.580 
NI -0.192 0.129 
INHERENT 0.022 0.000*** 
NAF -0.130 0.000*** 
SIZE 0.278 0.000*** 
LEV -0.0213 0.000*** 
INSTITINVESTORS -0.000 0.190 
AUDITOR 0.047 0.101 
Constant 1.300 0.645 
R-square (within) 0.248  
R-square (between) 0.451  
R-square (overall) 0.456  
F-statistics 21.23  
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P-value  0.000*** 
N=1714   
 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
The results show that AC financial expertise is positively associated with the log value of audit 
fees at p<0.05. On the other hand, ACMs’ average directorships negatively relate to log value of 
audit fees at p<0.01. Log value of board size positively relates at p<0.01. Non-audit fee ratio is 
negatively associated at p<0.001. Log value of total assets are positively associated at p<0.001. 
Leverage is negatively associated at p<0.001. These findings may indicate that AC financial ex-
pertise may help enhance audit quality, ACMs’ average directorships may reduce the audit risk 
perceived by EAs and a large board demands greater efforts on the part of EAs.  
 
5.7.2 Audit Choice 
Big 4 auditors may have greater manpower and expertise to perform external audits for their cli-
ents, so that they are perceived to provide better audit quality (Mustafa, Che-Ahmad, Chandren, 
2018; Lawrence, Minutti-Meza and Zhang, 2011; Al-Jimi, 2009; Choi et al., 2008). Also, if Big 
4 auditors are unable to provide high quality audit, their reputation could be adversely affected. 
For this reason, they are required to perform high quality audit (Hsin and Chen, 2011; Francis 
and Wang, 2008). Gajevszku (2014) found that the existence of AC was positively associated 
with the appointment of Big 4 auditor. Hsu, Lin and Tsao (2017) observed that the presence of 
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the AC was positively associated with the appointment of Big 4 auditors after controlling for 
family ownership. Similarly, Ho and Kang (2013) observed that AC size positively related to the 
appointment of Big 4 auditors in family and non-family firms. Therefore, Models 7 and 8 were 
formed to investigate the effects of AC characteristics on audit quality measured as the appoint-
ment of Big 4 auditors. Model 7 only includes AC characteristics and other control variables 
without board characteristics. Model 8 is inclusive of AC characteristics and control variables, 
including board characteristics. The findings are summarised in Table 31. Model 7 is specified as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
Table 31: Results of Model 7 
 
Variables  Coefficients  P-value 
LOGACSIZE 7.60 0.144 
ACIND 0.60 0.770 
ACCOM 0.24 0.861 
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LOGACDIL -0.71 0.686 
ACDIRECT -0.11 0.676 
ACTENURE -0.011 0.924 
ACAGE 0.007 0.933 
BIND   
LOGBSIZE   
LOGBDILLIGENCE   
BAGE   
BDIRCT   
CUMBOADEQUITY   
DUALITY   
NI 0.53 0.419 
INHERENT 0.026 0.847 
NAF 0.262 0.821 
SIZE 0.875 0.150 
LEV -0.030 0.810 
INSTITINVESTORS -0.002 0.753 
Constant -2.32 0.786 
Prob>chi2 0.325  
Wald chi2 (20) 14.72  
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Log likelihood -165.8  
N=1714   
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
According to Model 7, the AC variables and control variables do not relate to the appointment of 
Big 4 auditors. The findings of Model 8 are summarised in Table 32. Model 8 is specified in the 
following manner:  
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Table 32: Results of Model 8 
 
Variables  Coefficients  P-value 
LOGACSIZE 7.04 0.179 
ACIND -0.82 0.940 
ACCOM 0.175 0.803 
LOGACDIL -0.105 0.891 
ACDIRECT 0.365 0.003** 
ACTENURE -0.010 0.848 
ACAGE 0.247 0.592 
BIND 0.531 0.803 
LOGBSIZE 1.55 0.605 
LOGBDILLIGENCE -1.12 0.156 
BAGE -0.034 0.444 
BDIRCT -0.48 0.020* 
CUMBOADEQUITY 0.27 0.488 
DUALITY 0.48 0.176 
NI 0.218 0.678 
INHERENT 0.107 0.649 
NAF 0.399 0.678 
SIZE 0.848 0.029* 
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LEV -0.103 0.654 
INSTITINVESTORS -0.0016 0.280 
Constant -3.194 0.642 
Prob>chi2 0.8895  
Wald chi2 (20) 12.71  
Log likelihood -167.74  
N=1714   
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
Model 8 shows that average AC directorships positively relate to the appointment of Big 4 audi-
tor at p<0.01, but board directorships negatively relate to it at p<0.05. The results of the robust-
ness check have been summarised in Table 33.  
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Table 33:  List of Results of Models 5 to 8 
          
 Model 5 
LOGAUDITFEES 
(Coefficients) 
Model 6 
LOGAUDIT-
FEES 
(Coefficients) 
Model 7 
AUDITORS 
(Coefficients) 
Model 8 
AUDITORS 
(Coefficients) 
LOGACSIZE 0.135* 
(0.026) 
0.113 
(0.108) 
7.60 
(0.144) 
7.04 
(0.179) 
ACIND 0.049 
(0.207) 
0.0536 
(0.185) 
0.60 
(0.770) 
-0.82 
(0.940) 
ACCOM 0.064** 
(0.009) 
0.060* 
(0.017) 
0.24 
(0.861) 
0.175 
(0.803) 
LOGACDIL -0.020 
(0.518) 
-0.0195 
(0.531) 
-0.71 
(0.686) 
-0.105 
(0.891) 
ACDIRECT -0.023***  
(0.000) 
-0.0205** 
(0.002) 
-0.11 
(0.676) 
0.365** 
(0.003) 
ACTENURE 0.033 0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
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(0.064) (0.050) (0.924) (0.848) 
ACAGE -0.0000 
(0.957) 
-0.001 
(0.506) 
0.007 
(0.933) 
0.247 
(0.592) 
BIND  -0.074 
(0.281) 
 0.531 
(0.803) 
LOGBSIZE  0.178* 
(0.015) 
 1.55 
(0.605) 
LOGBDILLIGENCE  -0.012 
(0.588) 
 -1.12 
(0.156) 
BAGE  0.002 
(0.250) 
 -0.034 
(0.444) 
BDIRCT  -0.006 
(0.683) 
 -0.48* 
(0.020) 
CUMBOADEQUITY  -0.02 
(0.279) 
 0.27 
(0.488) 
DUALITY  -0.007  0.48 
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(0.580) (0.176) 
NI -0.130*** 
(0.000) 
-0.192 
(0.129) 
0.53 
(0.419) 
0.218 
(0.678) 
INHERENT 0.0223*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.847) 
0.107 
(0.649) 
NAF -0.199  
(0.112) 
-0.130*** 
(0.000) 
0.262 
(0.821) 
0.399 
(0.678) 
SIZE 0.280***  
(0.000) 
0.278*** 
(0.000) 
0.875 
(0.150) 
0.848 
(0.029) 
LEV -0.0222*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.000) 
-0.030 
(0.810) 
-0.103 
(0.654) 
INSTITINVESTORS -0.0001    
(0.154) 
-0.000 
(0.190) 
-0.002 
(0.753) 
-0.0016 
(0.280) 
AUDITOR 0.050 
(0.077) 
0.047 
(0.101) 
  
Constant 1.475 1.300 -2.32 -3.194 
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(0.427) (0.645) (0.786) (0.642) 
R-square (within) 0.239 0.248   
R-square (between) 0.433 0.451   
R-square (overall) 0.440 0.456   
F-statistics 30.49 21.23   
Wald chi2 (20)   14.72 12.71 
P-value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.325 0.8895 
Log pseudolikelihood   -165.8 -167.74 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
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In summary, the findings reveal that AC size is important in enhancing audit quality. In Models 1, 
2 and 5, AC size is found to negatively relate to discretionary accruals. In Model 5, it is found to 
positively relate to audit fees. A large AC may be more effective in constraining earnings man-
agement, demanding greater external audit effort. 
 
AC independence does not significantly relate to discretionary accruals, audit fees or appoint-
ment of Big 4 auditors in all models with the exception of Model 4. Although these results are 
insignificant, the signs of coefficients point out the fact that independent ACMs may reduce 
earnings management, demand more external effort and appoint Big 4 auditors.  
 
Furthermore, AC financial expertise is negatively associated with earnings management in Mod-
els 1 and 2 and positively linked with audit fees in Models 5 and 6. However, it is not signifi-
cantly associated with the appointment of Big 4 auditors in Models 7 and 8, potentially indicat-
ing that AC expertise may help reduce earnings management and demand greater additional ef-
forts on the part of EAs. However, ACMs who have the financial expertise may perform their 
oversight role effectively like a Big 4 auditor, implying that they may not need to appoint a Big 4 
auditor for external audits.  
 
AC diligence is not associated with discretionary accruals in Models in any of the models. How-
ever, in Models 1 to 4, the negative signs show that AC meetings may indicate that they may 
help to enhance audit quality although the effects are not significant.  
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ACMs’ average directorships are not found to relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 to 4, 
but negatively relate to audit fees in Models 5 and 6. The directorships positively relate to the 
appointment of Big 4 auditors in Models 8. This may indicate that EAs may perceive that ACMs 
with more directorships may have greater experience in overseeing audit quality, so that they 
charge lower audit fees to their clients. ACMs with more directorships amy be inclined to ap-
point the Big 4 auditors because they have more reputation risk. In order to protect their reputa-
tion, they are inclined to appoint high quality auditor.  
 
ACM’s tenure is significantly associated with lower discretionary accruals in Model 1. This may 
support the argument that long tenured ACMs have gained experience and knowledge of the op-
erations of a company, so their monitoring effort becomes more effective.  
 
ACMs’ average age positively relates to discretionary accruals in Model 2 and 4 but does not 
relate to audit fees nor the appointment of Big 4 auditors in Models 5 to 8. This may imply that 
senior ACMs may have less energy to perform their roles of monitoring. Further, they may have 
difficulities in updating their knowledge and keeping abreast of changing environment of the 
companies or technology. Therefore, their monitoring effectiveness is reduced.  
 
For board characteristics, board members’ ages are found to negatively relate to discretionary 
accruals in Models 2 and 4, but are neither associated with audit fees in Models 5 and 6 nor the 
  
 259 
appointment of Big 4 auditors in Models 7 and 8. As an implication, board members’ age may 
enable them to have higher status in the company when they monitor managers and even ACMs. 
Thereby, they have more power to request information for overseeing managers or require them 
to make changes. The effects of ACMs’ age and board members’ age are different: the higher the 
ACMs’ age the lower the audit quality, but it is opposite in the case of board members. Firstly, a 
board is bigger than an AC. Therefore, on average although some board members are older, they 
may have other younger members to compensate for their reduced energy. Therefore, taken as a 
group, the effectiveness of monitoring has not been reduced, but increased. For example, the sen-
ior board members may share their experience of monitoring financial reporting with junior 
members on the board, so that they can then implement changes suggested by the senior member. 
However, it is difficult for a AC to do so because they are usually smaller than a full board. Sec-
ondly, although ACMs are old, they may not have power because of the size of the AC. However, 
a full board which is large and have high status due to seniority can deter managers to engage in 
earnings management.  
 
However, their age does not relate to audit fees and appointment of Big 4 auditors.  Since a full 
board has more power and higher status, it serves as an effective monitoring systmes, this is 
known to have substitution effects for EAs’ effort and the appointment of Big 4 auditors. Conse-
quently, the companies do not require EAs to put in additional efforts in external audits or ap-
point Big 4 auditors.  
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Duality of CEO and chairman positively relates to discretionary accruals in Model 4 but does not 
relate to audit fees or the appointment of Big 4 auditors. This may indicate that the duality im-
pairs independence, which, in turn, means that CEO does not require additional efforts from EAs 
or appoint Big 4 auditors. As a result, managers may find it easier to manipulate earnings. The 
CEO may have the power to influence the companies to demand lesser effort from EAs or 
choose to appoint non-Big 4 auditors.  
 
With regard to control variables, net income normalised by lagged total assets is found to nega-
tively relate to audit fees in Model 5. because if a company has higher net income, EAs may per-
ceive that managers are less likely to manipulate earning due to facing lesser pressure. Since au-
dit risk is lower, EAs may charge lower audit fees. 
 
Inherent risk is positively associated with discretionary accruals in Models 1, 2 and 3, but neither 
relates to audit fees nor the appointment of Big 4 auditors – indicating that inherent risk provides 
managers with more opportunities to engage in earnings management. If companies have high 
inherent risk, audit risk is perceived to be high, so EAs may charge higher audit fees.  
 
Firm size is not found to relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 to 2, but negatively relate to 
them in Model 3 and 4. It also positively relates to audit fees in Models 5 and 6. This indicates 
that a large company may have more resources to monitor internal control systems, so managers 
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may find it more difficult to manipulate earnings. Moreover, higher audit fees are paid to com-
pensate for EAs’ efforts and resources to audit large companies.  
 
Leverage is found to positively relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 to 4. This indicates 
that managers are under high pressure to manipulate earnings if companies have high levels of 
leverage. In Models 5 and 6, leverage negatively relates to log value of audit fees, indicating the 
fact that companies with high leverage are less likely to demand auditors’ effort so that they can 
manage the earrnings as shown in Models 1 to 4.  
 
The number of institutional investors positively relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 to 4. 
They are not associated with audit fees or the appointment of Big 4 auditors. It may be noted that 
although institutional investors may serve as another monitoring mechanism to monitor audit 
quality, they may intensify pressure on managers to maintain high levels of profitability, so that 
they are more likely to manipulate earnings upward since the board is responsible for the overall 
performance of companies.  
 
5.8. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter answers Research Questions 1: 
 
 RQ 1: what are the impacts of AC characteristics on audit quality in Hong Kong? 
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This chapter investigates the impact of various AC characteristics on audit quality, which is de-
noted by discretionary accruals. It commences by presenting the descriptive statistics for the 
sample. The regression results are then presented in order to elucidate the impact of various AC 
characteristics on audit quality. The findings reported in discretionary accrual analysis shows 
that AC size, expertise, tenure and age are key determinants of audit quality. According to the 
analysis of audit fee, a AC with financial expertise demands additional audit efforts on the part 
of EAs. More AC directorships enable EAs to perceive that companies have lower audit risk, 
thereby reducing audit fees. Furthermore, ACMs with more directorships are likely to appoint 
Big 4 auditors in order to protect their reputation. Viewed collectively, an AC with effective 
characteristics is essential for enhancing audit quality so that earnings management can be con-
strained.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION (ARCHIVAL MODELLING STUDY) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings mentioned in Chapter 5. According to its findings, AC size, 
expertise, diligence and age are positively associated with audit quality that is measured by the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. This section compares the findings of this study to ex-
tant studies concerning AC characteristics to demonstrate their implications and relevance to-
wards the improvement of audit quality. Sections 6.2 to 6.8 discuss the findings of seven AC 
characteristics as well as their implications on audit quality. Section 6.9 summarises the entire 
chapter.  
 
6.2 AC Size 
 
AC size is found to negatively relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 and 2 This result is 
consistent with the stance adopted in prior studies. For instance, in a study examining the effects 
of AC structure on earnings management in Asia Pacific, Yasser and Al Mamun (2016) observed 
that a larger AC is more effective in reducing earnings management. Similarly, in a study that 
investigated the relationships between AC characteristics and earnings restatement, Lin, Li and 
Yang (2006) found a negative linkage between AC size and earnings restatement. The findings 
in this study also find supports in Ayemere and Elijah (2015), who investigated the impacts of 
AC on the quality of financial statement in Nigeria. Ayemere and Elijah (2015) observed that AC 
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size had positive impacts on the quality of financial reporting. When examining the impacts of 
AC quality on financial reporting quality measured as natural log of the absolute value of ab-
normal accrual in India, Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017) found that AC size are negatively associ-
ated with discretionary accruals. Correspondingly, in a study of examining the relationships be-
tween AC characteristics and auditor choice and audit fees in family firms, Ho and Kang (2013) 
observed that AC size positively relates to the appointment of Big 4 auditors and audit fees in 
family and non-family firms.  
 
This study provides evidence that a larger AC may significantly enhance audit quality so that 
earnings management gets constrained. In Hong Kong, AC size is essential for safeguarding the 
stakeholders’ interest by providing more oversight resources on audit quality.  
 
6.3 AC Independence 
 
Unlike Model 4, AC independence is not found to significantly relate to discretionary accruals in 
Models 1 to 3. This result is inconsistent with the findings of extant research which found that 
AC independence positively relates to audit quality. To illustrate, Leung, Richardson and Jaggi 
(2014) investigated whether the relationships between the board and AC independence and firm 
performance are moderated by the concentration of family ownership. They observed a positive 
linkage between the independence of the AC and firm performance for non-family firms. In a 
study that investigated whether AC independence in varying institutional settings affects the 
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market reaction measured by abnormal stock returns variance and abnormal trading volume, 
Poretii, Schatt and Bruynseels (2018) observed that the market reactions to earnings announce-
ments were significantly larger when the AC enjoys greater independence in countries with weak 
institutional settings. 
 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014), in their study that investigated the effects of the social rela-
tionships between ACMs and CEOs on oversight quality of an AC, observed that social ties 
formed through the CEO’s friendship network adversely affected oversight quality. They ob-
served that EAs in these companies were less likely to report internal control deficiencies or is-
sue going-concern opinions for firm in distress under the influence of personal relationships. In a 
study investigating the effectiveness of the AC on managers’ tendency to manipulate earnings 
forecast guidance downward, Ho, Liu and Wang. (2014) observed that AC independence nega-
tively relates to downward earnings forecast guidance after post-SOX period. In an experiment 
that evaluated the impacts of AC independence and expertise on the extent to which ACMs sup-
port the position of EAs when they have disagreements with managers, DeZoort and Salterio 
(2001) observed that serving as both board and senior management encouraged ACMs to support 
managers’ position, so that AC independence is impaired to reduce oversight efforts. In a ques-
tionnaire survey examining the relationships between AC characteristics and informal interac-
tions taking place between ACs and internal audit functions as well as their effects on internal 
audit quality, Zaman and Sarens (2013) observed that AC independence positively related to in-
formal interactions, which, in effect, positively related to the quality of internal audit function. 
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In summary, this study does not provide credible evidence that ACMs’ independence enhances 
ACMs’ freedom for monitoring audit quality in Hong Kong. This may be attributed to the classi-
fication of independence. The HKEx classification of independence may not capture certain rela-
tionships between ACMs and managers. For example, they are not required to report their friend-
ships in the annual report. For this reason, the reported levels of independence may not truly re-
flect their independence.  
 
6.4 AC Expertise 
AC expertise is found to negatively relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 and 2. The re-
sults are consistent with the findings of prior research. For instance, in a study examining the as-
sociation between voluntary AC characteristics and incentives facing directors on the AC and 
earnings management in New Zealand, Vineeta et al. (2014) concluded that an independent AC 
with financial expertise reduces the probability of earnings management. The findings in this 
study are also consistent with the observations made by Lin et al. (2009), who investigated 
whether the regulations and recommendations in China and Hong Kong have been effective in 
regulating the quality of reported earnings. Lin et al. (2009) observed that AC financial expertise 
were important factors in reducing earnings management. Similar results were reported by Wong 
(2011), who examined the effects of AC characteristics and family control on earnings manage-
ment after the listing rule was revised on 31 March 2004. He noted that AC financial expertise 
was a significant factor in lowering earnings management in Hong Kong. Cohen, Hoitash and 
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Krishnamoorthy (2014), in their study that investigated the effects of AC industry expertise on 
the effectiveness of AC in overseeing the financial report and auditing process, noted that ACMs 
performed better to reduce restatement as well as discretionary accruals if they happen to be in-
dustry and accounting experts. In their study of investigating whether ACMs’ accounting and 
legal expertise help enhance the effectiveness of oversight role of the audit committee in East 
Asia, Woidtke and Yeh (2013) found that firms which had financial experts and legal experts on 
the AC had more transparent earnings. Similarly, Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani (2018) ob-
served in a study of investigating the effect of AC financial expertise and gender on earnings 
management in the US that female directors with financial expertise were negatively associated 
with earnings management.  
 
In a study that examined the effects of financial expertise and status of AC on earnings manage-
ment, Badolato, Donelson and Ege (2014) noted that ACs have both financial expertise and high 
relative status that helps deter earnings management. In another study which examined whether 
individual AC task-specific experience affects group financial reporting outcomes, Shepardson 
(2018) posited that ACMs with goodwill write-off experience enhanced their oversight role of 
financial reporting by identifying goodwill impairments and requiring managers to write off 
goodwill. Similarly, in an experiment that examined whether ACMs’ oversight experience made 
judgments more professional than their counterparts without such experience, DeZoort (1998) 
found that that auditing experts made a judgment as professional as audit experts. In the inter-
views that explored the conduct of the AC in audit quality and elements affecting the effective-
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ness of its oversight, Sulaiman (2017) observed that limited understanding of the AC, particular-
ly the chairman of the AC concerning technical auditing and accounting knowledge, diminished 
the quality of discussions concerning important issues affecting audit quality.  
 
In summary, this study provides evidence that ACMs’ financial expertise enables them to im-
prove audit quality because financial experts should have a better understanding of the technical 
aspects of accounting procedures, recognition criteria, internal control systems as well as valua-
tion of assets and liabilities (Krishnan, 2005), so that they may be more effective and efficient  in 
improving audit quality.  
 
6.5 AC Diligence 
According to this study, AC diligence does not relate to discretionary accruals in Models 1 to 
and 4. These results are not consistent with prior research. For instance, Soliman and Ragab 
(2014) noted in a study of investigating the effects of AC characteristics on earnings manage-
ment in Egypt that the number of AC meetings negatively related to earnings management meas-
ured as discretionary accruals. The findings of Soliman and Ragab (2014) are similar to those of 
Hamdan, Mushtaha and Al-Sartawi (2013), who concluded that the number of AC meetings help 
enhance earnings quality. Further, in a questionnaire survey that investigated the effects of AC 
characteristics on the perceptions of the effectiveness of implementing internal audit recommen-
dations, Alzeban and Sawan (2015) pointed out that the number of AC meetings between the AC 
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and Chief Audit Executives positively related to the perceptions of the effectiveness of imple-
menting recommendations that were proposed by Chief Audit Executives, so audit quality is ex-
pected to be higher. 
 
Lary and Taylor (2012) noted in a study of investigating the association between AC characteris-
tics and the effectiveness of ACMs’ role in Australia that an AC which had at least four meetings 
in a year was negatively associated with non-audit fees ratio. Similarly, in a study investigating 
the relationship between governance quality and auditor remuneration in the UK, Zaman, Hudaib 
and Haniffa (2011) observed that AC diligence positively related to natural logarithm of audit 
fees. Correspondingly, Munsif, Raghunandan and Dasaratha (2013) concluded in a study of ex-
amining the early warnings of internal control problem before year-end external audit that early 
warning was more likely for firms with more frequent AC meetings. Mohammad (2018) ob-
served in a study investigating the AC’s characteristics and its influence over financial restate-
ment in Malaysia that the number of AC meetings negatively related to financial restatements. In 
a similar vein, Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009) observed in their study of investi-
gating the effects of AC characteristics on managerial ownership and leverage on fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting negatively related to the 
number of AC meetings. 
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In summary, this study does not support the viewpoint that diligent ACMs have more meetings 
to discuss issues relating to accounting and control-related matters, so that audit quality can be 
improved in Hong Kong.  
 
6.6 AC Directorships 
This study does not find significant linkage between average AC directorships and discretionary 
accruals in Models 1 to 4. The results are inconsistent with the prior research in either the first or 
second stream of arguments presented in Section 3.6. The first stream of research concurs that 
ACMs with more directorships may enhance audit quality. Boo and Sharma (2008) noted in a 
study relating to AC characteristics and audit fees in regulated industries that an AC with more 
directorships required more audit resources in a highly regulated industry.  
 
The second stream of research suggests that ACMs with excessive directorships may be too busy 
performing their oversight role, thus lowering audit quality. For example, Sharma and Iselin 
(2012) observed in a study that examined whether more directorships make them too busy 
providing their efforts to perform their oversight role using experimental study that compared 
two samples that ACMs with multiple directorships were less effective in monitoring misstate-
ment. Similarly, in a study examining the effects of various AC characteristics on audit quality, 
Habbash, Sindzingue and Salama (2012) observed that ACMs’ average number of outside direc-
torships positively related to downward discretionary.  
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In another study that evaluated the effects of interactions of AC expertise as well as other AC 
characteristics on accrual quality, Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) observed that ACs with 
fewer directorships were found to be more effective in enhancing accruals quality. In a study that 
investigated how the number of AC chair positions as well as other AC financial expertise posi-
tions held by the AC chairman and AC financial experts affects their ability to oversee a compa-
ny’s financial reporting process, Tanyi and Smith (2015) found a negative association between 
financial reporting quality, the number of AC chair positions and other AC financial expertise 
positions that were held by the AC chairman or AC financial experts.  
 
In summation, this study does not find support for the viewpoint that ACMs’ directorships may 
help them gain more oversight experience or become familiar with managers, thus impairing 
their independence.  
 
6.7 AC Tenure 
This study finds significant negative relationship between average AC tenure and discretionary 
accruals in Model 1. The results are consistent with prior research which suggests that AC tenure 
may help improve audit quality. The first stream of research concurred with the view that long-
tenured ACMs may gain more knowledge and experience in monitoring audit quality of a partic-
ular company. For example, Chan, Liu and Sun (2013) examined the effects of AC and board 
tenure on audit fees. They observed that audit fees were negatively associated with the propor-
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tion of board directors with long tenure on the independent AC, suggesting that long AC tenure 
increased audit quality. This led to lower audit risk, thereby reducing audit fees. Wilson (2017) 
noted in a study of examining whether director tenure increases or decreases AC effectiveness 
that discretionary accruals were negatively associated with the proportion of long-tenured ACMs. 
They also observed that the presence of even one long-tenured ACM lowers earnings manage-
ment. Similarly, Sun and Liu (2010) concluded in a study of examining whether ACMs’ tenure 
on the independent AC affects the AC effectiveness in oversight of financial reporting that the 
proportion of long tenure directors on the independence of AC was negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. 
 
The findings of Sun and Liu (2010) were in line with the observations made by Ghosh, Marra 
and Moon (2010) who investigated the effects of AC characteristics on restraining earnings man-
agement in pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. Ghosh, Marra and Moon (2010) found that AC ten-
ure was negatively associated with earnings management. In a study that investigated the effects 
of an AC on restraining quarterly earnings management, Yang and Krishnan (2005) observed 
that quarterly earnings management negatively related to ACMs’ average tenure. Aldaman et al. 
(2012) noted in a study that investigated the effects of AC characteristics on firm performance 
during the Global Financial Crisis that a long-tenured chairman on the AC enhances firm per-
formance.  
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Meanwhile the findings do not support the viewpoint that longer AC tenure may impair ACMs’ 
objective oversight role because audit quality may be reduced as they become familiar with man-
agers. To illustrate, Vineeta and Errol (2012) investigated the effects of their multiple-
directorships and tenure on financial misstatements, and found that AC tenure positively related 
to financial misstatement. Singhvi, Rama and Barua (2013) observed in a study examining the 
impacts of the characteristics of ACMs who departed from the firms on market reactions that the 
market reaction was significantly negative for the departure of short-tenured directors. This was 
not the case with long-tenured directors. In a study investigating the effects of ACMs’ tenure and 
directorships on meeting analyst forecast, Rickling (2014) observed that long-tenured ACMs 
were positively associated with the probability of a firm barely meeting analyst forecast.  
 
In summary, the study finds evidence that ACMs may acquire more knowledge and experience 
of monitoring financial reporting and audit process in a company over a period of time.  
 
6.8 AC Age  
This study finds evidence that average AC age positively relates to discretionary accruals in 
Models 2 and 4. The results are inconsistent with the findings of previous research. For example, 
Dao, Huang and Zhu (2013) observed in a study of examining the effects of ACMs’ age on cost 
of capital that there was a positive association between under-pricing and the age difference of 
independent directors on an AC. Similarly, Qi and Tian (2012) concluded in a study investigat-
ing the effects of ACMs’ personal characteristics on firms’ earnings management that ACMs’ 
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age may help enhance audit quality, thus constraining earnings management. Whilst examining 
the effects of board members’ age on corporate financial fraud, Xu, Zhang and Chen (2018) ob-
served that the age difference between board members’ age and CEO’s age moderated the corre-
lation between board members’ age and occurrence of financial fraud. In turn, this indicates that 
if board members are older than CEO, the effects of board age on the occurrence of financial 
fraud are stronger. As a case in point, Mustafa, Che-Ahmad and Chandren (2018) examined how 
ownership concentration affects the oversight role of corporate board through the quality of audit 
services. They observed that board members’ age positively related to the appointment of Big 4 
auditors as well as industry specialist EAs. 
 
In summary, this study provides evidence that older ACMs may reduce audit quality because 
they may have less energy to perform their oversight role or have difficulities of keeping a breast 
of changing environment of companies or technology.  
 
6.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter compares the findings of this study to earlier studies. The findings are largely con-
sistent with those of previous research studies. This provides evidence that a larger AC size pro-
vides more manpower to perform their oversight role. ACMs’ expertise may enable them to have 
greater technical knowledge to monitor audit quality. Long tenured ACMs may gain more 
knowledge of the operations of a company. Therefore, these AC characteristics assume signifi-
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cance in the context of improving the audit quality of listed companies in Hong Kong. However, 
caution should be taken in regard to senior ACMs on an AC because they may reduce audit qual-
ity. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LITERATURE REVIEW (QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY STUDY) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 3 to 6 relate to the archival modelling study that investigated the relationships between 
AC characteristics and audit quality in Hong Kong. However, it does not provide insights into 
the effects of EAs’ trust in ACMs on their interactions, which may assume significance in im-
proving audit quality. Their trust in ACMs may influence the effectiveness and efficiency of au-
dit process as well as the overall reliability of audit report. The effectiveness and efficiency of 
audit process may be enhanced because their trust in ACMs may encourage them to discuss audit 
issues with ACMs, such as audit plan, unpresentable tests, risk assessment and managers’ integri-
ty. Developing an understanding of these issues may help enhance audit quality. The reliability of 
audit report may be enhanced because they may seek more information to determine the scope of 
audit and provide more useful recommendations beyond the requirements of audit standards.  
 
Since the reliability of audit report and effectiveness of audit process are some of the key com-
ponents of audit quality as discussed in Section 2.4.2, the improvement in these are likely to en-
hance audit quality. As demonstrated in Section 3.5, Sulaiman (2017) observed that the effec-
tiveness of an AC is affected by the quality of their relationship, interactions and communication 
in the interviews. It was concluded that informal process is important for them to discuss diffi-
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culties encountered during the external audit and discuss sensitive concerns that cannot be done 
in formal meetings. Therefore, a high level of trust in ACMs on the part of EAs may facilitate 
interactions between them, leading to improved performance in external audit. Consequentially, 
the effectiveness and efficiency of an external audit may be enhanced; as a result, audit quality is 
expected to be high. Hence, it is important to explore how EAs’ trust in ACMs affects their inter-
actions. This, in turn, may impact audit quality.  
 
Apart from the positive effects on audit quality as expected above, since trust is multi-
dimensional, trust may have negative effects on audit quality. For instance, if EAs place too 
much trust on ACMs, the ACMs may reduce their efforts to question managers and monitor in-
ternal control systems of a company and EAs may reduce their efforts to question ACMs. How-
ever, since they have common goals to enhance audit quality to protect the financial statement 
users’ interests, so it is more likely that trust will facilitate their interactions rather than reduce 
their effort. Furthermore, since information is very transparent in Hong Kong, if ACMs abuse 
EAs’ trust, and if this results in low audit quality and misstated financial statements, ACMs’ rep-
utation will be damaged. This reputation risk may encourage ACMs to cooperate with EAs by 
using EAs’ trust appropriately. Therefore, this study focuses on the positive effects of trust on 
interactions between them.   
 
This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of trust and is followed by a review of prior 
studies which examined the factors that may influence the levels of trust and the relationships 
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between the levels of trust and actors’ performance. It ends with a summary of the main points 
discussed in the study.  
 
 
7.2 Definitions of Trust  
 
In the parlance of psychology, the definition of trust mainly focuses on interpersonal trust. In 
psychology, trust is perceived to be a learned behaviour as opposed to an inherent personality 
trait (Rotter, 1967) and established from past experiences or interactions (Rempel, Holmes and 
Zanna, 1985). If actors perceive that they cannot receive the expected gains through dependence 
on one another, or if they feel that they will be taken advantage of, trust may not be developed.  
 
Rempel, Holmes and Zanna (1985) suggested that trust is established based on past experience 
and future expectation. They concurred that trust refers to the expectation that a partner can be 
relied upon to be responsive to each another’s needs as well as to promote one another’s best in-
terests, both now and in the future. Rotter (1967, p.444), who defined trust in accordance with 
the reliability of others, argued that trust is “an expectancy held by an individual or a group that 
the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual group can be relied on”. His 
definition ignored the dependence on one another and only focused on the accuracy of the infor-
mation or consistency of others’ behaviour.  
 
Trust is only established in a situation where dependence on each another is high because an ac-
tor may be able to achieve a goal by himself or herself without trusting one another if depend-
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ence is not important. In this regard, Deutsch (1973) suggested that trust is an expectation of gain 
through dependence on the partner. Although Deutsch (1973) agreed that trust tends to develop 
in a situation with high dependence, he ignored that a situation must involve risk for trust to de-
velop.  
 
In risky situations, trust develops only if partners do not take advantage of one another even if 
they have the opportunity to do so. Colquitt et al. (2012, p.1) defined trust as “confident and pos-
itive expectations about the words, actions, and decisions of another in situations entailing risk.” 
On the other hand, Robinson (1996, p.576) concurred that trust reduces opportunistic behaviour 
by defining trust as person’s “expectations, assumptions, or belief about the likelihood that an-
other’s future actions will be beneficial, favourable, or at least not detrimental to one’s interests”. 
If trust develops, partners may not take advantage of one another because their actions will not 
be detrimental to the interests of one another.  Psychologists opine that trust is a positive expecta-
tion of one another to behave in a manner which is beneficial or at least not detrimental to one 
another in a situation where the levels of risk or dependence on one another remains high. 
 
In the field of management, actors may place trust in each another from different organisations; it 
is necessary that the actors from different organisations have competence, goodwill and integrity. 
Actors are unable to trust each other if they lack the competence to perform, intention to perform 
or honesty to behave positively. Barber (1983, p.165) poignantly observed that trust involves 
competence and integrity by suggesting that “trust is the expectation of technically competent 
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performance and of fiduciary obligation and responsibility”.  Correspondingly, Ring and Ven de 
Ven (1992) defined trust as the amount of confidence in each other’s goodwill. Trustors can rely 
on trustees due to high competence, goodwill and integrity. In this regard, Hill et al. (2009) stat-
ed that trust exists when individuals can rely on each other to voluntarily recognise and protect 
the interests and rights of their firms.  
 
The definitions of trust by Barber (1983) and Ring and Ven de Ven (1992) gave insights into how 
trust is formed, but ignored the scenarios where trust can manifest between two organisations. 
Ireland and Webb (2007) emphasised that trust develops in a situation where interdependence 
and vulnerability exists between different organisations. They opined that trust refers to the will-
ingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of partner behaviour. Predicta-
bility, dependability and faith are the three key components of trust. They argued that when there 
is trust, a firm does not fear its partner’s actions, because both parties depend on each other to 
achieve a common purpose. Lui and Ngo (2004) concurred that trust is the expectation of a part-
ner fulfilling a collaborative role in a risky situation, as well as the reliability of both partners’ 
intention to perform and ability to do so.  
 
Puranam and Vaneste (2009) suggested that trust refers to the expectation that a partner will not 
behave opportunistically, even when the victim cannot detect such behaviour. Zaheer, McEvily 
and Perrone (1998) noted that trust is the expectation that an actor can be relied upon to fulfil 
their obligations, will behave in a predictable manner and will act and negotiate fairly when the 
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possibility of opportunism is present. Deutsch (1962) emphasised that even if trustors cannot 
control the situation in which they may be taken advantage of, they are still assured by a firm 
belief that trustees will not behave opportunistically. He defined trust as the actions that increase 
one’s vulnerability to another whose behaviour is not under one’s control in a scenario where 
penalty one suffers if another abuses the vulnerability is greater than the benefit one acquires if 
another does not abuse that vulnerability. 
 
In the field of management, trust definitions emphasised the antecedents of trust and the situation 
where trust develops between two organisations. Trust can be formed in the wake of competence, 
goodwill and integrity of actors from different organizations; it can be established in a situation 
where dependability and vulnerability exist. An external audit involves vulnerability. If the audit 
failure occurs, EAs and ACMs may be sued or lose their reputation. It involves interdependence 
because they depend on and cooperate with one another in order to obtain reliable information 
for the purpose of high quality audit.  
 
Since this research examines the effects of EAs’ trust in ACMs on audit quality, I adopt the defi-
nition of Ireland and Webb (2007) because an external audit involves vulnerability, dependability 
and positive expectation.  
 
Table 34 highlights prior studies about definitions of trust in the literature. 
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Table 34: Definitions of Trust 
Authors Dimensions Definitions 
Rempel, Holmes 
and Zanna (1985)  
Promotion of interests Trust denotes the expectation that a partner 
can be relied upon to be responsive to one’s 
needs and to promote one’s best interests, 
both now and in the future. 
Barber (1983) Competence, fiduciary 
obligation and respon-
sibility 
Trust refers to the expectation of technically 
competent performance and of fiduciary obli-
gation and responsibility. 
Ring and Ven de 
Ven (1992) 
Goodwill Trust is the confidence in the other’s good-
will. 
Hill et al. (2009) Reliability Trust exists when reliability occurs so that 
other parties can be relied upon to voluntarily 
recognise and protect the interests and rights 
of a firm. 
Rotter (1971) Reliability Trust is an expectancy held by an individual 
or a group that the word, promise, verbal, or 
written statement of another individual group 
can be relied upon. 
Zaheer, McEvily Predictability and act- Trust is the expectation that an actor can be 
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and Perrone 
(1998) 
ing and negotiating in a 
fair manner 
relied upon to fulfil obligations, will behave 
in a predictable manner and will act and nego-
tiate fairly when the possibility of opportun-
ism is present. 
Robinson (1996) Positive expectations Trust denotes the expectations, assumptions, 
or beliefs about the likelihood that another’s 
future actions will be beneficial, favourable or 
at least not detrimental to one’s interests. 
Deutsch (1973) Dependence Trust is an expectation of gain through de-
pendence on the partner. 
Colquitt et al. 
(2012) 
Positive expectations 
and risk 
Trust refers to positive expectations about the 
words, actions, and decisions of another in 
situations entailing risk. 
Deutsch (1962) Risk and vulnerability Trust comprises of actions that increase one’s 
vulnerability to another whose behaviour is 
not under one’s control in a situation where 
penalty one suffers if the other abuses that 
vulnerability is greater than the benefit one 
gains if the other does not abuse that vulnera-
bility. 
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Lui and Ngo 
(2004) 
Collaborative role in a 
risky situation 
Trust refers to the expectation of different par-
ties to fulfil their collaborative role in a risky 
situation. 
Purana, and Van-
neste (2009) 
Undetectable actions Although actions cannot be detected by vic-
tims, trust forms an expectation that an ex-
change partner will not behave opportunisti-
cally. 
Ireland and Webb 
(2007)  
Acceptance of vulnera-
bility, positive expecta-
tions, predictability, 
dependability and faith  
Trust refers to the willingness to accept vul-
nerability based on positive expectations of 
partner behaviour. Predictability, dependabil-
ity and faith are the three key components of 
trust.  
 
7.3 Antecedents of Trust in Auditing 
 
Section 7.2 reviews trust definitions, so I can firstly define trust in the context of auditing. Sec-
tions 7.3 and 7.4 review relevant studies on the antecedents of trust in order to explore the factors 
that may influence trust. This assumes significance because ACMs and EAs can understand how 
they build trust among one another. Although no literature thus far has suggested how trust is 
established between these two entities, there are studies that discuss how trust is established be-
tween EAs and their clients’ managers. These factors are expected to help explain the factors that 
may influence their trust in ACMs.  
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In a study that explored the factors of trust between EAs and clients’ managers, Shaub (1996) 
recognised the importance of three components: past experience, situational factors and disposi-
tional factors. He formed 11 research hypotheses about the factors that influenced trust between 
them. These factors were EA tenure, past inaccuracies, quality of communication, industry type, 
clients’ gender and EA’s evaluation of the clients’ independence. Shaub (1996) used question-
naires and experiments during the course of this study and manipulated the levels of variables as 
high or low in his experiments. For example, the quality of communication of board minutes was 
manipulated to be good or poor in order to measure the quality of communication.  The level of 
trust was indicated in the scored items in the questionnaires. This sample had as many as 119 
managers or senior managers. He found that EA tenure, past inaccuracies and quality of client-
auditor communication had a significant impact on their trust in clients’ managers.  
 
Likewise, Shaub and Lawrence (1996) conducted a study to examine the factors that influence 
the scepticism between clients’ managers and EAs. They contacted the participants at the firm’s 
national training centre to fill out questionnaires after reading the hypothetical cases. Nine cases 
were used with a modification of the risk levels. Subsequently, these participants were asked to 
estimate the probability as per which they would suspect the presence of irregularities and scep-
tical behaviour. These independent variables included the existence of related party transactions, 
auditor-client friendship, EA tenure, clients as source of referrals, last accuracy, client incentives 
to misstate, significance of clients, quality of communication as well as gender of clients. Ac-
  
 286 
cording to their findings, the five factors that significantly influenced EA’s professional scepti-
cism included the following: existence of related party transactions, client motive to misstate due 
to financial stress, clients’ past accuracies and poor quality of EA-client communication.  
 
Since poor quality of communication is known to reduce trust, it is reasonable to expect that 
communication barriers may reduce the levels of prevailing trust. Golan (1997) narrowed down 
the factors affecting client and auditor relationships on communication barriers. The purpose of 
this study was to evaluate client perceptions of the seriousness and frequency of potential com-
munication barriers in external audits. This study is relevant because these results may show the 
most serious factors reducing the quality of communication, which may be a significant factor 
that influences their trust in ACMs.  
 
In the study, 264 questionnaires were sent, of which 163 questionnaires were collected, yielding 
a response rate of 62 percent. Notably, 29 items pertaining to communication barriers were in-
cluded in the questionnaires. Four latent variables were created, including credibility and back-
ground, hostility and conflict, physical environment and competitiveness. The latent variables of 
credibility and background, along with hostility and conflict, were found to be the most serious 
barriers to healthy communication. The ten most serious factors affecting communication be-
tween EAs and clients included the following: distortion or omission of information, lack of 
credibility, hostile attitude, inadequate common accounting knowledge, tendency not to listen, 
inability to provide feedback, lack of understanding of technical accounting terms, personality 
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conflicts, and “either-or” thinking. 
 
In the disagreement between clients’ managers and EAs, the former’s degree of openness of 
communication and concerns are expected to positively relate to their trust in managers because 
if clients’ managers who are neither able to communicate openly nor demonstrate concern cannot 
generate an improved feeling of trust by EAs, the situation can worsen to a level that even leads 
to distrust (Rennie Kopp and Lemon, 2010). Secondly, the duration of the relationship between 
EAs and clients is expected to have a positive correlation with trust because longer relationships 
are likely to enhance relationship quality. The frequency of disagreements is expected to nega-
tively relate to trust because if disagreements happen more frequently, EAs can cast doubts on 
client’s managers who may neither follow GAAP nor influence audit process (Rennie, Kopp and 
Lemon, 2010).  
 
Rennie, Kopp and Lemon (2010) made use of questionnaires to examine the level of trust be-
tween EAs and clients’ managers in the context of conflicts. Their objective was to use the con-
text of disagreements to explore client behaviours and aspects of EA-client relationship that may 
potentially influence the level of trust between them. This study is relevant because the results 
may provide actionable insights into the factors that may influence EAs’ trust in ACMs during 
disagreements. Notably, these agreements may exist because they may have different opinions on 
the scope of the audit, audit planning and the judgment of accounting estimates.  
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The authors invited 120 EAs to participate in their study that was conducted in Canada. They 
saw the participation of 71 EAs, yielding a response rate of 71 percent. The dependent variable 
was the assessment of overall trust. The independent variables were the assessment of the man-
agers’ openness of communication and demonstration of concern during the disagreements, fre-
quency of disagreements with the clients and length of association in years. They found that the 
openness of communication and concern during a disagreement were positively associated with 
the trust. The duration of association positively related to the trust, but the frequency of disa-
greement negatively related to the trust after controlling for the effect of the EA’s satisfaction 
with the outcome of the disagreement and EA’s predilection to trust. 
 
To conclude, the above factors influencing EAs’ trust in clients’ managers can be recognised as 
their perception of clients’ managers’ competence, integrity and goodwill. For instance, the lack 
of understanding of technical accounting terms can be regarded as incompetence, omission of 
information can be considered to be low integrity and lack of credibility and low level of inde-
pendence can be deemed as low goodwill. Therefore, the researcher expects their perceptions of 
ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill to possibly influence their trust in ACMs. 
 
Table 35 summarises the findings of prior studies about antecedents of trust in auditing. 
 
 
 
  
 289 
Table 35: Antecedents of Trust in Auditing 
Authors Antecedents of Trust Results 
Shaub (1996) Competence (past inaccuracies) 
 
Goodwill (auditor tenure and 
quality of communication) 
 
 
EA tenure, past inaccuracies 
and quality of EA-client 
communication significantly 
influenced EAs’ trust in cli-
ents’ management. 
 
Shaub and Lawrence 
(1996) 
Competence (clients’ past accu-
racies) 
 
Integrity (client motive to mis-
state financial statements) 
 
Goodwill (poor quality of 
communication 
Five factors that significant-
ly influenced EA’s profes-
sional scepticism: existence 
of related party transactions, 
client motive to misstate due 
to financial stress, clients’ 
past accuracies and poor 
quality of EA-client com-
munication.  
 
Golen (1997) Integrity (distortion or omission 
of information) 
The ten most serious factors 
influencing communication 
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Goodwill (tendency not to lis-
ten; lack of credibility; person-
ality conflicts; either-or-
thinking) 
 
Competence (inadequate com-
mon accounting knowledge; 
failure to give feedback; lack of 
understanding of technical 
terms) 
between EAs and clients in-
cluded: distortion or omis-
sion of information, lack of 
credibility, hostile attitude, 
inadequate common ac-
counting knowledge, ten-
dency not to listen, inability 
to provide feedback, lack of 
understanding of technical 
accounting terms, personali-
ty conflicts, and “either-or” 
thinking. 
 
Rennie, Kopp and Lemon 
(2010) 
Goodwill (concern during a dis-
agreement) 
 
Integrity (openness of  
communication) 
The openness of communi-
cation and concern during a 
disagreement were positive-
ly associated with trust. The 
length of association posi-
tively related to the trust, but 
the frequency of disagree-
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ment negatively related to 
trust 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Antecedents of Trust: Goodwill, Competence and Integrity Trust in Other Fields 
 
Section 7.4 provides a generic view about how EAs’ trust in ACMs may be established. This sec-
tion narrows down the antecedents of trust on goodwill, competence and integrity. Plenty of stud-
ies in psychology, marketing and alliances support the view that goodwill, competence and integ-
rity significantly influence the level of trust between partners when it comes to business relation-
ships. Against this backdrop, the current section begins by introducing three types of trust: 
goodwill trust, competence trust and integrity trust. It is then followed by a review of previous 
studies. 
 
The first type of trust is goodwill trust, which is established if a partner commits to respond be-
yond the levels required by the prevailing norm or can be recognised as actions which prioritises 
another party’s benefits over one’s own (Cherry, 2016; Liu, Ke, Wei, 2015; Laaksonen, Pajunen 
and Kulmala, 2008; Sako, 1992) Goodwill trust concerns one’s intention to perform according to 
agreements (Cherry, 2016; Liu, Ke and Wei, 2015 Nooteboon, 1996). In this study, EAs’ trust in 
ACMs’ goodwill has been defined as their trust in ACMs’ commitment to be responsive to EAs’ 
request beyond the standard requirements of audit standards and ACMs’ discretionary actions to 
  
 292 
adjust their efforts in facilitating EAs’ work in an external audit. 
 
However, goodwill trust only provides some assurance that partners may behave in a consistent 
way due to past behaviour and prioritises the other party’s benefits, but remains salient about the 
confidence in improving performance unless partners are trusted about competence (Dirks and 
Skarlicki, 2008). In the realm of auditing, EAs and ACMs are required to communicate with one 
another in terms of technical knowledge of accounting and auditing. Since they cannot com-
municate effectively without competence, competence trust cannot be established. Competence 
trust concerns one’s ability to perform in accordance with agreements (Connelly et al., 2018; 
Cherry, 2016; Liu, Ke and Wei, 2015; Laaksonen, Pajunen and Kulmala, 2008; Nooteboom, 
1996). Blomqvist (1997) suggested that competence is reflected in one’s professionalism, capa-
bility, realistic judgment, experience and interpersonal skills. In this study, EAs’ trust in ACMs’ 
competence is defined as their level of trust in ACMs’ financial expertise, professionalism and 
experience of forming appropriate judgments and overseeing the internal controls, financial 
statements and audit processes. 
 
Perceiving partners as trustworthy due to their competence might only show that partners have 
valuable resources for exchange; however, this perception remains salient about whether partners 
may reciprocate or even behave in an opportunistic manner during the course of an exchange 
(Connelly et al., 2018; Dirks and Skarlicki, 2008). Bews and Rosssouw (2002, p.382) defined 
integrity as “the application of a set of moral and ethical rules acceptable to both trustor and trus-
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tee, which are predictable and reliable and which lead to equity”. Integrity leads to integrity trust 
because if integrity exists, partners may expect to receive fair treatment from one another (Con-
nelly et al., 2018; Dirks and Skarlicki, 2008). If one party is perceived to have integrity, another 
party may expect that he or she may not be taken advantage of in a relationship and may tend to 
respond in kind (Connelly et al., 2018; Dirks and Skarlicki, 2008). In this study, EAs’ trust in 
ACMs’ integrity has been defined as their trust in ACMs’ application of a set of moral and ethical 
rules acceptable to EAs, so that ACMs’ behaviour becomes predictable and reliable.  
 
Prior studies in other fields provided evidence that EAs may trust ACMs if they display goodwill, 
integrity and competence. For instance, Lapidot, Kark and Shamir (2007) conducted a study to 
examine the relative importance of factors that build and erode trust. The authors used the critical 
incidents method in their study which elicited the participation of 736 respondents. The authors 
found that integrity, benevolence and ability were positively and negatively associated with trust 
building and trust erosion, respectively. Followers were more likely to recall more leaders’ be-
haviour that showed leaders’ benevolence in trust building; however, followers were more likely 
to recall more leaders’ behaviour that demonstrated integrity and ability in the case of trust ero-
sion. The relevance of these findings is that it is very difficult to build trust but very easy to de-
stroy it. Therefore, EAs’ trust in ACMs should be built before its erosion. Secondly, their percep-
tion of ACMs’ integrity, benevolence and competence encourage them to trust ACMs. These fac-
tors may significantly erode their trust in ACMs if their perceptions of ACMs’ integrity and be-
nevolence are low.  
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Actors place their trust not only in leaders, but also in subordinates and peers. Knoll and Gill 
(2011) investigated antecedents of trust in supervisors, subordinates and peers in a study whose 
objective was to explore the development of trust in upward, downward and lateral relationships 
in workplace. They also investigated whether the relative importance of integrity, benevolence 
and integrity is different in the establishment of trust in supervisors, subordinates and peers. Ac-
cording to their findings, employees become vulnerable when they trust their supervisor because 
supervisors have influence over resource allocation and make decisions that may have significant 
impacts on them. Therefore, the authors suggested that employees care more about their supervi-
sors’ benevolence and integrity. Further, since supervisors rely on the quality of work performed 
by their subordinates to fulfil their duties, subordinates’ ability is a more important factor that 
influences supervisors to place trust in subordinates. For this reason, the authors suggested that 
subordinates’ ability is a more important factor that influences supervisors’ trust in employees. 
 
The authors recruited participants from members of a human resources department in a large Ca-
nadian corporation; 81 members participated in the study, yielding a response rate of 51 percent. 
An invitation to participate in this survey was posted on the association’s website for four weeks. 
This survey witnessed the participation of 109 members. They found that ability, benevolence 
and integrity were all important factors which influenced the level of trust in supervisors, peers 
and subordinates. These results also confirmed their expectation that supervisors’ benevolence 
and integrity were more important factors that encourage employees to trust their supervisors and 
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demonstrated that subordinates’ ability was a more important factor that influenced supervisors 
to trust their subordinates. This finding implies that if ACMs display high levels of integrity, be-
nevolence and ability, EAs may be inclined to trust ACMs. Since ACMs control the resources 
allocated to them and make decisions that may have significant impacts on their work, integrity 
and benevolence are expected to be important factors that encourage them to trust ACMs.  
 
These studies above did not examine whether trust and distrust may coexist. Distrust is different 
from the erosion of trust or low levels of trust. Erosion of trust only indicates a negative change 
in trust, whereas lack of trust only indicates low levels of trust, but distrust has been defined as 
“lack of confidence in the other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does 
not care about one’s welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile”. (Govier, 1994, p.240) For 
this reason, distrust signifies an extreme low level of trust. In a study that aimed to provide new 
perspectives of managing relationships effectively by exploring the dimensions of trust and sug-
gesting distrust as an additional dimension, Welch (2006) examined the relationships between 
antecedents of trust and the levels of trust as well as distrust using semi-structured interviews in 
the UK.   
 
It was argued that trust and distrust can coexist between different firms. For example, a firm may 
trust the fact that its partner has ability to perform, but does not actually trust that the partner will 
perform. Welch (2006) conducted seven interviews with three corporate communication teams 
and four interviews with their service providers. It was found that trust and distrust may coexist 
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between firms; also integrity, dependability and competence were identified as important sources 
of trust. Guile, self-interest, lack of care, disrespect, suspicion, intuitive scientist, lack of confi-
dence and concern about harm were all important sources of distrust.  Thus, it is important to un-
derstand the factors that influence EAs’ trust in ACMs because while they may trust ACMs’ in-
tegrity and goodwill, they may not trust ACMs’ accounting knowledge to conduct their work 
smoothly.   
 
How trust is formed can be examined at the growth stage of a business-to-business relationship 
because growth stage requires the highest level of interactions. Dowell (2013) conducted inter-
views to investigate how competence, integrity and goodwill trust were established in a buyer 
and seller relationship at the growth stage. The purpose of this study was to improve the under-
standing of the development of drivers of trust during the growth phase of the relationship 
lifecycle. In this study, 18 interviews were conducted with the managers from liquor industry in 
Australia. This industry was chosen because it was highly competitive. They found that compe-
tence trust was formed by performance, expertise and high quality of communication. Integrity 
trust was collectively formed by honesty, integral actions and candid responses. Goodwill trust 
was formed by discretionary activities undertaken by partners and positive attitude towards part-
ners. These findings imply that EAs’ perception of ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill 
may encourage them to trust ACMs in external audits. 
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Table 36 highlights prior studies about antecedents of trust in other fields in the literature. 
 
Table 36: Antecedents of Trust in Other Fields 
Authors Antecedents of Trust Results 
Lapidot, Kark and Shamir 
(2007) 
Integrity, benevolence 
and ability 
 
Leaders’ benevolence: 
increase in trust.  
 
Leaders’ integrity: de-
crease in trust 
Followers were more likely to 
recall the incidents that eroded 
trust than the incidents that built 
trust.  
 
Integrity, benevolence and abil-
ity positively related to trust 
building and trust erosion.   
 
Followers were more likely to 
recall more leaders’ behaviour 
that showed leaders’ benevo-
lence in the case of trust build-
ing.  
 
Followers were more likely to 
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recall more leaders’ behaviour 
that showed integrity and ability 
in the case of trust erosion. 
Knoll and Gill (2011) Ability, benevolence and 
integrity.  
 
Increase in trust in super-
visors: benevolence and 
integrity.  
 
Increase in trust in subor-
dinates: ability.  
Ability, benevolence and integ-
rity were all important factors 
that influenced trust in supervi-
sors, peers and subordinates.  
 
Supervisors’ benevolence and 
integrity were more important 
factors that influenced employ-
ees to trust supervisors and  
 
Subordinates’ ability was the 
more important factor that in-
fluenced supervisors to trust 
their subordinates.  
 
Welch (2006) Increase in trust: integri-
ty, dependability and 
Integrity, dependability and 
competence were important 
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competence.  
 
Increase in distrust: 
goodwill (lack of caring, 
disrespect, suspicion, in-
tuitive scientist and con-
cern about harm).  
 
Integrity: (self-interest 
and guile) 
 
Ability: (lack of confi-
dence) 
sources of trust.  
 
Guile, self-interest, lack of car-
ing, disrespect, suspicion, intui-
tive scientist, lack of confidence 
and concern about harm were 
all important sources of distrust. 
 
Dowell (2013) Competence (expertise 
and quality of communi-
cation) 
 
Integrity (honesty and 
intention) 
 
Competence trust was formed 
by performance, expertise and 
high quality of communication.  
 
Integrity trust was formed by 
honesty, integral actions and 
candid responses.  
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Goodwill (discretionary 
activities and positive at-
titude) 
 
Goodwill trust was formed by 
discretionary activities under-
taken by partners and positive 
attitude towards partners. 
 
 
Prior studies provide evidence that actors may trust one another if they display competence, in-
tegrity and goodwill. The researcher expects the same relationships to be applicable on the rela-
tionships between EAs and ACMs. Accordingly, the following propositions are formed in order 
to answer Research Question 2: 
 
P1: EAs trust ACMs if they have and display competence.  
P2: EAs trust ACMs if they have and display integrity.  
P3: EAs trust ACMs if they have and display goodwill.  
 
7.5 Trust, Interactions and Performance 
Many prior studies have been conducted to examine how trust between actors facilitates their 
interactions, leading to improve their performance. With high levels of trust, actors are likely to 
establish mutual and collective expectations, so trust encourages actors to interact. They are 
more likely to coordinate and to communicate effectively (Costa and Anderson, 2011), thus en-
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hancing performance. They become willing to accept opposing opinions (Pinjani and Palvia, 
2013) and encourage another to participate in collaborative relationships around difficulties and 
issues. However, a lack of trust may result in defensive behaviours and reduce the cooperative 
behaviour and flow of information (Colquitt et al., 2007).  
 
Although there is no existing literature arguing that EAs’ trust in ACMs improves their interac-
tions with ACMs which may have positive impacts on audit quality, studies relating to other 
fields suggest that trust enhances interactions between partners in different firms, leading to im-
proved performance. The researcher expects that similar relationships may be applied to the rela-
tionships between the EAs and ACMs. For instance, their trust may encourage them to share 
more information and coordinate diligently. They may become willing to share their opinions on 
managers’ performance and their experience on improving internal control systems with ACMs. 
They need to engage in effective communication in order to determine the scope of the audit and 
perform risk assessment. Their trust encourages them to contribute more resources in terms of 
manpower and expertise during the course of the audit process. Additionally, they need to have 
high levels of cooperation and commitment. For example, they are required to hold meetings in 
order to discuss audit plan, audit process and audit progress. If they are able to identify internal 
control weaknesses, they need to report the same to ACMs. They also need to cooperate so that 
ACMs may support EAs’ positions and devote significant amount of manpower and expertise in 
external audits beyond the requirement of the audit standard. Without trust, EAs may only be 
able to meet the minimum requirements as suggested by the audit standard without devoting ad-
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ditional resources to audit processes. The researcher expects these effective interactions between 
EAs and ACMs to enhance their performance, resulting in improved effectiveness and efficiency 
of audit processes.  
 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 provide evidence that one may trust another because of the perception that 
another displays competence, integrity and goodwill. However, the understanding of the ante-
cedents of trust per se does not help the researcher investigate whether EAs’ trust improves inter-
actions with ACMs, which, in turn, may improve audit quality. Hence, Section 7.6 reviews pre-
vious studies about the effects of trust on interactions and actors’ performance. At the end of this 
section, the relevance of findings is drawn to the linkage between EAs and ACMs.  
 
7.5.1 Prior Interview Studies about Trust, Interactions and Performance 
 
Qualitative studies can be used to explore the effects of trust on interactions and performance. It 
may be possible that EAs’ trust in ACMs helps improve their interactions and in effect, their per-
formance, thus leading to high audit quality. Therefore, it is important to explore the relationship 
between heightened level of trust and performance.  
 
Hadjielias and Poutziouris (2015) investigated the conditions that improve the cooperative rela-
tionship between family businesses. Trust is considered to be useful when the cooperation be-
tween family firms is governed by their mutual expectations and obligations as opposed to legal 
contracts and formal controls (Coletti, Sedatole and Toery, 2005; Kroeger, 2011). In this sense, 
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trust is seen as an important mechanism of informal cooperation, which effectively substitutes 
the need for the formal control of actions and interactions taking place between transacting or-
ganisations.  
 
Hadjielias and Poutziouris (2015) used a firm, Zenon, as the case study. It is a legal entity that is 
owned and controlled by family-owned and controlled businesses. Zenon was organised for the 
purpose of providing services to its member firms. Thus, inter-firm cooperation would assume 
the form of interpersonal relations and interactions between family members from various family 
businesses. They had conducted the study for a period of 18 months. Data were collected from as 
many as 16 interviewees within the cooperative association under concern.  
 
The findings suggested the presence of cooperation between family businesses, which indicated 
that it was important to establish trust and maintain cooperative ties between family businesses. 
Trust between family leaders was important in building altruism and collective thinking with a 
view to maintain the cooperation between their respective firms. Self-interest weakened the posi-
tive relationship between trust and cooperative relationships, although critical incidence that re-
quired intensive interactions strengthened the positive relationship between trust and cooperative 
relationships. However, their study was conducted in a particular cooperative association of fam-
ily businesses and their findings may not be generalised to other types of businesses.  
 
The effects of trust can be investigated in the context of public sector partnerships because these 
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partnerships involve a high level of interdependence and cooperation in order to achieve com-
mon goals. Bogt and Tillema (2016) explored the role of trust and accounting information in the 
context of public sector partnerships. It may be noted that the theatres rely on municipalities for 
the purpose of financial support. Municipalities meanwhile depend on the skills of the theatre 
professionals for their performance. It is for this reason that they are highly interdependent on 
one another. The authors suggested that trust improves openness and information sharing. 
 
They asked one research question relevant to the study: what are the roles of trust at the opera-
tional level of organizations involved in a public sector partnership? To this end, they conducted 
studies from 2010 to 2013; 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted involving 21 persons 
in the five theatres along with their municipalities. They observed that annual formal agreements 
were not very elaborative because the actual performance of theatre was difficult to quantify. 
Therefore, it was not possible to strictly control the theatre’s activities. The municipality depend-
ed on the competence of professionals in the theatre, which could only be assessed via qualitative 
information and informal contacts. Their research showed that the municipality had a great deal 
of trust in the competence of the theatre. Even as the low measurability of the theatre’s outputs 
and outcomes complicates the process of control utilised by municipality, trust may serve a form 
of control. 
 
As per their observations, participants from the theatres showed that trust in government offi-
cials’ goodwill and competences did encourage open discussions. These findings are relevant be-
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cause the quality of external audits is difficult to qualify and ACMs cannot elaborate on the terms 
and conditions of a contract with EAs. ACMs largely depend on their competence and experience 
to perform a high quality audit as well as their goodwill to provide recommendations beyond 
statutory requirements.  
 
The effects of trust can be investigated in a scenario involving the change of trust from low to 
high levels. Minnar et al. (2017) explored how contracts, control structures and trust interactively 
shape and change an interfirm relationship. They pointed out that contracts and trust can serve as 
control mechanisms because contracts may reduce risk and facilitate cooperation in a partnership. 
These two mechanisms interact with one another to determine the level of cooperation. Perfor-
mance is expected to be better as the level of cooperation is improved.  
 
Minnar et al. (2017) conducted the study by means of field research and semi-structured inter-
view in 2008. Lecorg was the parent company of Semorg. The top management of Lecorg and 
Fasorg signed the contract. Semorg’s managers demonstrated a low level of trust and cooperation 
in Fasorg because Semorg’s managers did not support the outsourcing decisions made by Lecorg. 
The contract caused conflicts in regard to assignment of responsibilities, accountability and in-
centivising issues. Semorg’s managers become non-cooperative due to the conflicts of the con-
tract. Therefore, the contract was renegotiated in 2007. Since ideas were shared between the two 
parties’ managers and terms were fairly determined to establish trust. The managers exchanged 
their ideas and business plans. They became open to discussing the issues of savings in projects. 
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They changed the practice of having one hour meetings once a week to having a full afternoon 
once a month and expressed that a full afternoon meeting was more useful because that allowed 
them to discuss the issues in greater detail. This study has implications that if EAs trust ACMs, 
they may spend more time discussing audit issues with ACMs. They may be willing to share 
their audit plans or other information with ACMs, so that the effectiveness and efficiency of au-
dit processes may be improved. 
 
Similarly, Edelenbos and Eshuis (2012) conducted two case studies of two projects in Nether-
lands to investigate the effects of change of trust on performance. They were interested in exam-
ining the interplay between trust and control in decision-making processes in the setting of public 
management. The two cases used included urban renewal in the Dutch city of Breda and nature 
conservation in the province of Friesland. Data were collected through a combination of inter-
views, observations and document analyses; 13 and 15 semi-structured interviews were conduct-
ed for Breda and Friesland, respectively.  
 
The project of Breda was focused on improving the livability of citizens’ surroundings. The in-
habitants had low levels of trust in the capacity of municipality, which wanted to improve the 
level of trust from the inhabitants by ceding some controls to the inhabitants to participate in the 
project. The municipality had the responsibility of the allocated budget, but the citizens were free 
to use the budget.   
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The citizens were in charge of the project and able to influence its implementation. The inhabit-
ants started to trust the fact that the municipality was serious about improving the neighbourhood. 
The inhabitants submitted 220 ideas for implementation; interaction and communication between 
the civil servants and the citizens eventually flourished. However, the project did not go well. 
The implementation failed and the spending eventually ran out of budget. Therefore, municipali-
ty started to take away the control from the citizens.  As a result, the citizens distrusted the mu-
nicipality again. Subsequently, there was a decline in the number of plans and ideas that were 
submitted.  
 
In the case of Friesland, the farmers felt that the municipality prioritised the conservation of the 
landscape over agricultural production. As a result, the farmers began to distrust the intentions of 
the municipality. Implementation of the plan turned out to be problematic because many farmers 
did not cooperate. The municipality realised that the policy process would not be successful 
without the farmers’ cooperation, and the farmers understood that not complying with the law 
would cause a lot of trouble.  
 
Farmers in a neighbouring municipality initiated an environmental cooperative and started a sub-
sidised landscape management project. They started to trust one another because they had a 
common interest: landscape management, so mutual understanding developed. A formal monitor-
ing system with specified output-control parameters was developed. An independent inspection 
committee was also established. The monitoring team was accepted and trusted by all the parties 
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based on their independence and expertise. The moderate level of trust that developed after 
agreeing to have a common interest (landscape management) made it possible to have a collabo-
rative way of creating and implementing a monitoring system.  
 
The results of two cases showed that trust improved cooperation. In the first case, the result 
showed that once trust did not exist, the ideas submitted for implementation were significantly 
reduced. In the second case, when trust did not exist, it was found that the actors may not coop-
erate. This study is relevant because EAs’ trust may encourage them to cooperate with ACMs. 
For example, they may be willing to spend more time discussing with ACMs for effective and 
feasible recommendations.  
 
Another study demonstrates that trust is important for moderating the effects of controls on per-
formance. Although the controls are tight, partners may not cooperate, if trust does not exist, so 
performance is reduced. Hence, trust may have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
control and performance. Yan and Gray (1994) explored the effects of balance of bargaining 
power on balance of management control in the joint ventures between US and Chinese firms. 
Yan and Gray (1994) conducted the study using in-depth interviews and archival data of the 
firms. The interviews were conducted with the executives and managers of the US and Chinese 
firms. These executives and managers were involved in joint ventures. Four firms involving US 
and Chinese joint ventures were selected. These selected joint ventures were manufacturing joint 
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ventures because manufacturing joint ventures accounted for the largest portion of joint ventures 
between US and Chinese firms.  
 
The interviews were conducted from May 1991 to January 1992. Nine factors were identified 
that influenced the bargaining power, such as alternatives available, expertise and local 
knowledge and four management controls used in joint ventures. According to their findings, 
unbalanced bargaining power led to unbalanced management control in all cases. For example, if 
US firms have more bargaining power due to more alternative sources, the US firms may use 
more management controls on Chinese firms. However, the effects of balanced management 
controls on performance were inconsistent.  
 
Therefore, the authors investigated the inconsistence by conducting interviews. They found that 
mutual trust was an important factor that moderated the effects of management control on per-
formance. When management control was dominant in one partner, trust was important to en-
hance their cooperation. In the absence of trust, another partner with lesser control may perceive 
that they may be taken advantage of, so they may not want to cooperate. The findings may be 
applied to the relationships between EAs and ACMs. In addition to the duties mandated by the 
contract between EAs and ACMs, they are also required to interact and cooperate in external au-
dits for high quality audit. Therefore, trust plays a significant role in moderating their coopera-
tion efforts.  
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Actors in education industry also require trust for cooperation in order to succeed. Oortmerssen, 
Woerkum and Aarts (2014) explored the relationship between trust and interactions over time in 
a collaborative project in the education industry. They posited that trust promotes exchange of 
knowledge and information, so that performance is improved. They conducted these studies us-
ing interviews with board members in professional education industry. They also observed and 
audio recorded the board meetings over a year, finding that board members of the schools 
worked on a project that set up a centre. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine 
board members across two varying periods of time. 
 
In the first interview, the board members were asked about the evolution of their collaboration, 
interactions about other board members, expectations about the collaboration and other board 
members. In the second interview, the board members were requested to reflect upon collabora-
tive developments over the past and explain the impact of trust in interaction patterns. Observa-
tion memos of board meetings were used as a secondary data source so as to understand the at-
mosphere during the meetings. 
 
They found that trust improved the level of openness for discussions and responsiveness to ques-
tions and increased the pace of conversation between board members. This implies that discus-
sions and interactions are intensified. They also noted that perceptions of competence and good-
may increase the level of trust. This study may imply that EAs’ trust encourages them to ex-
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change information and cooperate. Further, their trust encourages them to openly discuss issues 
with ACMs and respond speedily to ACMs’ questions.  
 
Fadol and Sandhu (2013) explored the role of trust in long-term commitment between partners in 
strategic alliance with firms coming from different cultures. Fadol and Sandhu (2013) concurred 
that trust allows a free exchange of useful information. For this purpose, they selected a case 
with foreign partners from countries with different cultural backgrounds. A joint venture formed 
by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, British Petroleum (BP)-UK, Tokyo Electric Power Com-
pany (TEPCO)-Japan and Total-France was utilised in this city that produced and sold Liquefied 
Natural Gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas. The major goals of these joint ventures were to re-
duce gas which polluted the environment and to exploit these resources as a source of income for 
the country. Nineteen interviews were conducted from February to March 2010. Those that were 
interviewed included managing directors and chief executive managers. Thematic analysis was 
used to code the data to generate theoretical concepts.  
 
They observed that trust enabled partners to exchange resources faster, devote more funds to the 
venture and exchange knowledge and information smoothly. They observed that building trust 
between partners helped avoid bureaucratic obstructions and enhanced the decision making pro-
cess. Moreover, trust and cooperation enabled the partners to swiftly contribute more resources 
to implement their joint project. As a result, decision-making processes were expedited. The rel-
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evance of these findings is that high levels of EAs’ trust in ACMs may encourage them to ex-
change resources in terms of manpower and expertise and may accelerate their decision making.  
 
Table 37 summarises prior interview studies about trust, interactions and performance in the lit-
erature. 
 
Table 37: Trust, Interactions and Performance: prior interview studies about trust, interactions 
and performance 
Authors Dimensions Results 
Hadjielias and Poutziouris 
(2015) 
Trust, altruism and self-
interest 
Trust was important to enhance 
cooperation between family 
firms. Trust may strengthen al-
truism, which, in effect, en-
hances cooperation.  
 
Self-interest may weaken the 
positive relationships between 
trust and cooperation.  
Bogt and Tillema (2016) Difficulties to specify 
outcome, control mech-
Annual formal agreements were 
not very elaborative because the 
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anisms and information 
sharing. 
real performance of theatre is 
difficult to quantify.  
 
Strict controls of the theatre’s 
activities were not considered 
possible. The municipality de-
pended on the competence of 
professionals in the theatre.  
 
Competence of professionals 
could not be expressed by quan-
titative indicators but via quali-
tative information and informal 
contacts.  
 
The municipality had a great 
deal of trust in the competence 
of the theatre, both at opera-
tional and the higher level. As 
the low measurability of the 
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theatre’s outputs and outcomes 
complicates the control used by 
municipality, trust may serve as 
a form of control.  
 
Participants from the theatres 
showed that trust in government 
officials’ goodwill and compe-
tences encourages open discus-
sions.  
 
Minnar et al. (2017) Cooperation, effort to 
exchange ideas, helping 
one another, open dis-
cussions and intense in-
teractions.  
As Fasorg’s and Semorg’s man-
agers and terms were fairly de-
termined between these two 
companies, trust was estab-
lished. Semorg’s and Fasorg’s 
managers became more cooper-
ative.  
 
Therefore, their behaviour was 
  
 315 
more cooperative and perfor-
mance of contract was more 
effective after trust was estab-
lished.  
 
Edelenbos and Eshuis (2012) Efforts to provide ideas, 
collaboration for imple-
mentation 
In the project of Breda, trust 
was encouraged. The inhabit-
ants submitted 220 ideas for 
implementation. In the case of 
Friesland.  
 
The moderate level of trust that 
developed after agreeing to 
have the same interest (land-
scape management) made it 
possible to have a collaborative 
way of creating and implement-
ing a monitoring system.  
Yan and Gray (1994) Moderating effects of 
power on cooperation.  
When management control was 
dominant in one partner, trust 
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was important to enhance their 
cooperation.  
 
In the absence of trust, another 
partner with lesser control may 
perceive that they may be taken 
advantage of, so they may not 
want to cooperate, leading to 
worse performance. 
 
Oortmerssen, Woerkum and 
Aarts (2014) 
Intense interactions, 
open discussions and 
responsiveness  
Trust boosted interactions and 
vice versa. They found that trust 
enhanced openness for discus-
sions and responsiveness to 
questions.  
 
Trust increased the pace of con-
versation between board mem-
bers. It implies that discussions 
and interactions are intensified. 
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They also noted that percep-
tions of competence and good-
will increases the level of trust. 
 
Fadol and Sandhu (2013) Faster speed of exchang-
ing resource, knowledge 
and information 
 
Better cooperation, 
commitment, reliability 
and fairness 
 
Lower opportunistic be-
haviour 
 
Combining partners’ ca-
pabilities  
 
Improvement of compet-
itive advantage 
Trust helped partners exchange 
resources faster, devote more 
funds to the venture and ex-
change knowledge and infor-
mation smoothly.  
 
Trust resulted in high levels of 
cooperation, commitment, reli-
ability and fairness and no op-
portunistic behaviour. 
 
Trust also helped combine the 
partners’ capabilities so that the 
strategic alliance and competi-
tive advantage of all partners 
could be improved further than 
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Commitment of re-
sources 
 
Fast speed of decision-
making 
any partner could have achieved 
alone.  
 
Trust and cooperation helped 
the partners quickly commit 
more resources as and when 
needed as well as to implement 
their joint project, a decision 
which speeded up the decision-
making. 
 
 
 
7.5.2 Prior Questionnaire Survey Studies about Trust, Interactions and Performance  
 
The above mentioned qualitative studies provide evidence that if the level of trust between actors 
is found to be high, their performance may be enhanced because of improved interactions. Past 
quantitative studies of trust in international joint ventures and alliances, research and develop-
ment and supply chain management reinforced these results by consistently demonstrating evi-
dence that trust enhances interactions and performance.  
 
 
Trust is important to the success of international joint ventures and alliances by strengthening 
informal control mechanisms so that partners will not behave opportunistically (Ng, Lau and 
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Nyaw, 2007). Trust also promotes cooperation (Hadjielias et al., 2015), facilitates interactions 
(Jiang, Henneberg and Naude, 2011) and enhances satisfaction (Silva, Bradley and Sousa, 2012), 
which allows partners to have better interactions with one another. In addition, trust encourages 
resources mobilisation, which encourages partners to contribute their resources toward a com-
mon goal (Robson, Katsikeas and Bello, 2008).  These elements are also critical in the context of 
external audits.  
  
Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012) suggested that the similarities between partners improve the ex-
change relationships that enhance satisfaction, thus strengthening the relationship between trust 
and performance. They investigated the antecedents of trust and performance in international al-
liance, claiming that trust improves performance by enhancing the level of their satisfaction. This 
is reflected in the perception of performance. The study was conducted in Portugal when ques-
tionnaires were mailed to 3,705 firms with international business activities; 232 responses were 
received, yielding a response rate of 6.3 percent. Performance was measured in terms of profita-
bility and satisfaction. They noted that the positive relationship between trust and performance 
was moderated by partner similarity. The results may imply thatEAs’ trust in ACMs improves 
their performance in external audits. In particular, these findings may provide insight into wheth-
er the similarity between EAs and ACMs may strengthen the positive relationship between trust 
and their performance. 
 
Alliance size is also expected to moderate the relationships between trust and performance be-
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cause a high level of trust is needed to coordinate activities in a large firm (Robson, Katsikeas 
and Bello, 2008). Park and Ungson (1997) argued that if the size of an alliance increases, greater 
bureaucratic structuring may weaken the network connections among different partners. Robson, 
Katsikeas and Bello (2008) examined the effects of trust on alliance performance in international 
strategic alliances and concurred that trust improves performance by encouraging partners to 
transfer their resources. To this end, McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer (2003, p.97) said: “mobilising 
involves motivating actors to contribute their resources to combine, coordinate and use them in 
joint and use them in joint activities, and to direct them toward the achievement of organizational 
goals”. They collected the data from 342 firms in the US, Western European and Far Eastern 
with partners from the UK. Questionnaires were mailed to the directors or project managers of 
these firms and 177 responses were collected, yielding a response rate of 52 percent. Alliance 
performance was measured in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness.  
 
They observed that the positive effects of trust on alliance performance were higher in a small 
alliance. This study is relevant because the findings imply that if EAs trust ACMs, they may be 
more willing to contribute their resources towards the cause of an external audit. If so, they may 
become more diligent in evaluating internal control systems and accounting procedures. ACMs 
may also be more willing to discuss significant risk area of operations with them, so that they can 
focus on auditing high risk areas. Hence, audit quality may be enhanced. Secondly, this study 
may imply that if client firms are large, they may be more bureaucratic, thus weakening the posi-
tive relationships between EAs’ trust and their interactions with ACMs, so that a higher level of 
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trust may be required for EAs to perform a large scale of audit in large companies.  
 
In the context of research and development, trust is essential for enhancing performance because 
partners are required to share their knowledge and skills if they want to succeed. Research and 
development organisations need to share knowledge for creation from different fields (Bien, Ben 
and Wang, 2014; Cheng, Chen and Shih, 2014; Berends et al., 2006). Trust is also required in 
order to reduce members’ anxiety about sharing their knowledge and ideas to create mutual un-
derstandings of problems as well as to coordinate activities (Bien, Ben and Wang, 2014; Nielsen 
and Nielsen, 2009; Panayides and Venus, 2009).  
 
Arranz and Arroyabe (2011) argued that partners may formulate their reciprocal expectations by 
building trust which helps them obtain information and make partners open to one another.  This 
cooperative atmosphere may help establish the requisite confidence. Arranz and Arroyabe (2011) 
investigated the effect of governance mechanisms in formal contracts and trust on the perfor-
mance of research and development. In this study, they mailed questionnaires to the CEOs of bi-
otechnology companies. The sample was selected by stratified sampling, proportional to groups 
of type of project (exploration and exploitation) and European country; 371 usable question-
naires were received under this project. Performance was measured as satisfaction with attain-
ments of goals, financial performance and overall performance. The results were controlled for 
the effects of asset specificity, technological uncertainty as well as measurement difficulty.  
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The result confirmed that the use of contract and trust positively related to performance. As a re-
sult, it was concluded that contractual mechanisms were more effective in improving the perfor-
mance of exploitation projects than trust, but trust was more effective in improving the perfor-
mance of exploration projects than contractual mechanisms. The results imply that trust plays a 
critical role in creating confidence through cooperation. EAs and ACMs may become more open 
towards exchanging information. Further, trust may reduce opportunism and increase coopera-
tion in an unpredictable environment, particularly after the introduction of new auditing or ac-
counting standards, thereby leading to improved audit quality.  
 
Trust also plays a critical role in supply chain management. Partners need to respond to demands 
for greater flexibility and have a high level of cooperation in supply chain relationships (Halil et 
al., 2016; Wang, Ye and Tan, 2014; Chan and Chan, 2009; Hult, Ketchen, Arrfelt, 2007). Trust 
enables partners to share information about orders, operations, strategy and competition with 
their suppliers (Uca et al., 2017; Halil et al., 2016; Chen, et al., 2013; Salzarulo and Jacobs 2014; 
Chan and Chan, 2009), so that trust enhances commitment and collaboration in strategic supply 
chain alliances (Uca et al., 2017; Yeung et al., 2009). 
 
Bryan, Sinkovics and Kim (2010) suggested that trust and technology uncertainty influences the 
levels of learning, in effect affecting market performance. According to them, trust reduces the 
anxiety of keeping confidential information, so learning will be improved. Technological uncer-
tainty refers to the unpredictability concerning the usage of technology. Since uncertainty is high, 
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firms may be willing to share more important information to overcome the adaption problems, 
thus improving learning. As a result, buyers and sellers may have mutual understanding accord-
ingly, so that they can engage in mutual learning in a relationship, thereby enhancing market per-
formance.  
 
They conducted the questionnaire survey using the relationships between Taiwanese suppliers 
and their international buyers; 246 account and marketing managers responded in the study, 
yielding a response rate of 23.29 percent. After controlling for the effects of firm size, they found 
that trust and technology uncertainty positively related to learning, leading to improve market 
performance. These results imply that if EAs’ trust in ACMs is established, learning may occur, 
resulting in improved performance in external audits. This may be particularly important if the 
clients have high levels of unpredictability relating to the use of technology. For instance, a cli-
ent may simply adopt new accounting information systems.  However, this study ignored the ef-
fects of coercive power on the levels of trust, which can possibly lead to threats and penalties, 
thus lowering the level of trust. 
 
The effects of trust on supplier performance may be mediated by conflicts and negotiation cost. 
For instance, Fiala, Rrokop and Zivelova (2012) investigated the relationships between inter-
organisational trust and performance in the Czech Republic. They posited that trust reduces the 
negotiating cost because time and money will not be wasted in bargaining and monitoring one 
another. Consequently, performance is improved.  
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Questionnaires were sent to organisations with over 20 employees. As part of this study, 515 
questionnaires were sent and 395 usable questionnaires were received. Performance was meas-
ured in terms of the customers’ perception of timeliness of delivery, high quality supply and price 
competitiveness. They found that trust helped reduce conflicts and negotiation cost. As a result, 
supplier performance was increased by reducing conflicts and negotiation costs. These results 
may indicate that if EAs trust ACMs, they may not waste time negotiating with one another. For 
instance, they may not do so for defining the responsibilities of one another, leading to faster de-
cision making. Therefore, the efficiency of an audit may be improved. Further, since conflicts are 
reduced, EAs’ anxiety may also go down correspondingly. As a result, they may express their 
willingness to share information with ACMs and provide more manpower during the course of 
audit process. 
 
Table 38 summarises the findings of prior questionnaire survey studies on the effects of trust on 
interaction and performance.  
 
Table 38: Trust, Interactions and Performance: Prior Questionnaire Survey Studies 
Authors Dimensions Results 
Silva, Bradley and Sousa 
(2012) 
Profitability and satisfaction, 
moderating effects of similari-
Shared values and com-
munication positively re-
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ty on the positive relationships 
between trust and performance 
lated to trust, but oppor-
tunistic behaviour nega-
tively related to trust. 
 
Trust improved perfor-
mance. The positive rela-
tionships between trust 
and performance were 
moderated by partner 
similarity. Performance 
was measured in terms of 
profitability and satisfac-
tion. 
 
 
Robson, Katsikeas and Bello 
(2008) 
Effectiveness, efficiency, re-
sponsiveness, moderating ef-
fects of alliance size on the 
positive relationships between 
trust and performance 
Distributive fairness and 
partner similarity were 
positively related to trust, 
leading to high alliance 
performance. Also, the 
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smaller the alliance size, 
the higher the positive ef-
fects of trust on alliance 
performance. Alliance per-
formance was measured in 
terms of effectiveness, ef-
ficiency and responsive-
ness. 
Arranz and Arroyabe (2011) Satisfaction with attainments 
of goals, financial perfor-
mance and overall perfor-
mance 
 
The use of contract, rela-
tional norms and trust all 
positively related to per-
formance.  
 
Contractual mechanisms 
were more forceful in im-
proving the performance 
of exploitation projects 
than relational norms and 
trust.  
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Relational norms were 
more forceful in improv-
ing the performance of 
exploration projects than 
contractual mechanisms. 
Performance was meas-
ured as satisfaction with 
attainments of goals, fi-
nancial performance and 
overall performance. 
 
Arranz and Arroyabe (2011) Satisfaction with attainments 
of goals, financial perfor-
mance and overall perfor-
mance 
 
The use of contract, rela-
tional norms and trust all 
positively related to per-
formance.  
Contractual mechanisms 
were more forceful in im-
proving the performance 
of exploitation projects 
than relational norms and 
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trust.  
 
Relational norms were 
more forceful in improv-
ing the performance of 
exploration projects than 
contractual mechanisms. 
Performance was meas-
ured in terms of the satis-
faction with the attain-
ments of goals, financial 
performance and overall 
performance. 
 
Bien, Ben and Wang (2014) Cooperation to achieve sales 
growth, increase market 
shares, develop new products 
and improve information of 
new technology  
Asset exclusivity, the use 
of formal contract and in-
formal exchange increased 
the level of trust, resulting 
in better cooperative per-
formance.  
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Cooperative performance 
was measured in terms of 
the cooperation to achieve 
sales growth and coopera-
tion to increase market 
shares, develop new prod-
ucts and provide important 
information of new tech-
nology. 
Bryan, Sinkovics and Kim 
(2010)  
 
Trust, uncertainty and the anx-
iety of keeping confidential 
information 
 
 
 
Trust and technology un-
certainty positively related 
to learning, leading to im-
prove market perfor-
mance. 
 
Fiala, Rrokop  and Zivelova 
(2012) 
Inter-organisational trust and 
performance in the Czech Re-
public 
 
Trust helped reduce con-
flicts and negotiation cost. 
As a result, supplier per-
formance was improved 
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by reducing conflicts and 
negotiation costs. 
 
 
In summary, the findings of prior studies show that trust improves actors’ interactions, which, in 
turn has a positive impact on performance. A high level of trust improves cooperation, coordina-
tion and communication. In auditing, cooperation, coordination and communication between 
EAs and ACMs are important elements of interactions which may enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of an external audit. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that EAs’ trust in ACMs may en-
hance audit quality. Trust also encourages partners to share their knowledge and information. 
This may be applied to the relationships between EAs and ACMs. For instance, they may share 
their audit expertise in a specific industry with ACMs so that internal control systems can be im-
proved. ACMs may also share information with them so that they can perform appropriate risk 
assessment and determine appropriate scope of audits.  
 
Moreover, their trust in ACMs should enhance performance because trust provides the requisite 
flexibility for them to be able to continue to interact. This is particularly important because they 
may have disagreements when determining the scope of audits, materiality threshold and re-
sources to be used, performing risk assessment and conducting unpredictable tests. They may 
also have disagreements when managers refuse to adjust the accounting records as requested by 
EAs when the case gets escalated to ACMs. Trust may allow them to have more effective discus-
  
 331 
sions on adjustment. Taken together, trust may encourage them to interact with ACMs, so that 
their performance may be improved. Therefore, the following proposition is formed to answer 
Research Question 3 and 4: 
 
P4: EAs’ trust in ACMs has positive effects on the interactions with ACMs and in effect, audit 
quality.  
 
Figure 5 summarises the potential determinants of EAs’ trust and the effects of trust on their in-
teractions and audit quality.      
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: Positive Effects 
Figure 5: Trust and Audit Quality 
 
Audit Quality 
EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ 
Integrity 
 EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ 
Competence 
Interactions 
Efficiency of  
Audit Process 
EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ 
Goodwill 
Effectiveness of 
Audit Process 
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7.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter begins by the discussions on the definitions of trust that allows me to better under-
stand the meaning of trust in the context of auditing. This is followed by discussions on the de-
terminants of trust. It can be seen that several previous studies have examined factors that influ-
ence the levels of trust and examined the correlation between trust, interactions and performance. 
These findings show that trust enables actors to have effective interactions, leading to improve 
performance. Four research propositions were formed to answer Research Questions 2, 3 and 4 
stated in Chapter 1. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 were developed to answer Research Questions 2, 
whereas proposition 4 was developed to answer Research Questions 3 and 4.  
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CHAPTER 8 
RESEARCH METHODS (QUESTIONNIRE SURVEY STUDY) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The chapter discusses the research methods that are used to explore the effects of trust by inves-
tigating propositions 1 to 4 developed in Chapter 7. This chapter begins by providing justifica-
tions for the use of questionnaire survey. Thereafter, it outlines the procedures of selection of 
participants and explains the research instruments for this study, followed by data analysis pro-
cedures and the verification of non-response bias. The summary of chapter content is also pro-
vided.  
8.2 Justification for the Use of Questionnaire Survey 
The researcher collected the primary data using a questionnaire in order explore the effects of 
EAs’ trust in ACMs on audit quality. A questionnaire survey can be used to directly measure the 
attitude or opinion of individuals. It is suitable when the questions of a questionnaire survey are 
standardised and can be interpreted by all respondents in the exact same way (Robson, 2002). 
Sekaran and Bougie (2007) suggested that data of wide geographic regions can also be gathered 
and anonymity can be ensured. Researchers do not need full access to remain in an organisation, 
so this strategy should create less ethical concerns. Although a questionnaire survey should be 
used for descriptive or explanatory research, it is not suitable for exploratory research with many 
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open-ended questions. Descriptive research is used to measure the attitude and opinion to deter-
mine the difference of phenomena, but explanatory research is used to find out or explain the re-
lationships between different variables.  
 
A questionnaire survey often uses cross-sectional designs with a large sample, so this strategy 
can enable a researcher to simultaneously investigate the relationships between variables 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2012). A sample size of a questionnaire survey should be 
larger than that of an interview or an experiment because it is more convenient for participants to 
fill out a questionnaire survey in a convenient manner. Additionally, a questionnaire survey can 
eliminate interviewer bias due to the absence of an interviewer. It has been suggested that ‘char-
acteristics such as ethnicity, gender, and social background of interviewers may affect the an-
swers that respondents provide. Since interviewers are absent, a questionnaire survey does not 
suffer from the bias that questions are asked in different orders or in different ways’ (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007, p.242). 
 
Nevertheless, researchers should ensure the representative of samples and need to spend suffi-
cient time piloting questionnaires and ensuring that a response rate is acceptable. The result of a 
questionnaire survey is not impervious to biases. For instance, LaPiere (1934) argued that re-
spondents’ actual behaviour may differ from their answers in questionnaire survey, implying that 
their answers may not adequately represent the reality. Therefore, time should be spent on fol-
low-up procedures for non-responses. Sekaran and Bougie (2007) stated that response rates are 
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usually low, adding that a response rate of 30 percent is very acceptable. Ethical concern is a po-
tential problem when using a questionnaire survey because participants may fear that their identi-
ty will be leaked out if researchers disclose their information and identity to other parties.  
 
The researcher used this strategy because the questionnaire survey study aims to explore the ef-
fects of EAs’ trust in ACMs on audit quality; hence, a questionnaire survey is suitable for collect-
ing data on their opinions about trust in ACMs and how that trust influences their interactions 
and audit quality. Importantly, a questionnaire survey enables the researcher to ask open-ended 
and closed-ended questions in an economical and convenient way. Given the distinctiveness be-
tween quantitative and qualitative research methods as discussed in Section 1.5, Part One of the 
questionnaire survey study should use the quantitative research method to identify the correla-
tions between the trust variables and the variable of the perception of the quality of interactions. 
Part Two of this study should use the qualitative research method to explore the meanings of 
trust in the audit process and audit quality. In this way, the researcher can use closed-ended ques-
tions to explore the effects of trust in ACMs on audit quality, and open-ended questions to ex-
plore what factors influence their trust in ACMs and how this trust influences their interactions, 
which may have an impact on audit quality.  
 
8.3 Questionnaire Data Collection Stage  
 
A questionnaire was developed and sent to EAs. The questionnaire is divided into two parts: the 
first part contains 20 closed-ended questions that allowed the researcher to assess the level of 
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EAs’ trust in ACMs as well as their interactions in external audits. The study asked respondents 
to indicate their answers on a Likert-scale from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree. The sec-
ond part comprises of four open-ended questions. Open-ended questions are used so that re-
spondents can provide unusual and more detailed responses in their own words. 
 
8.4 Selection of Participants 
 
The data were collected by electronic questionnaire survey from EAs with a job title of Audit 
Manager or above in professional audit firms performing external audits on listed companies in 
Hong Kong. They are likely to be knowledgeable about external audits and to have had interac-
tions with ACMs in the past
2
 
 
8.5 Research Instrument 
 
The questionnaire primarily focuses on the level of EAs’ trust in ACMs and their interactions. It 
consists of 24 questions, most of which are adapted from previous studies. One of the benefits 
for adapting pre-existing questions is their high reliability and validity as they have already been 
tested (Hyman et al., 2006). Hence, the researcher could ask questions that convey the intended 
meaning.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This research did not investigate ACMs’ trust in EAs because the response rate from ACMs was extremely low. 
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In Part One of the questionnaire, the first three questions were used to assess the perception of 
the quality of interactions before client acceptance. They were adapted from Butcher, Harrison 
and Ross (2013) and Accounting and Corporate Regulatory (2010). Questions 4 and 5 were used 
to measure the perception of the quality of interactions during both pre-audit and interim audit 
stages. Question 4 meanwhile was adapted from Deloitte (2015), while Question 5 was adapted 
from Contessotto and Moroney (2014). Questions 6, 7 and 8 were used to measure the perception 
of the quality of interactions during the final audit stage; these were adapted from Al-matarneh 
(2011) and Contessotto and Moroney (2014). Similarly, Questions 9, 10 and 11 were used to 
measure the perception of the quality of interactions during the reporting stage. Questions 9 and 
10 were adapted from Grant Thornton and KPMG (2013), whereas Question 11 was adapted 
from the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority.  
 
Question 12, 13 and 14 were used to examine their level of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence; in 
particular, Questions 12 and 14 were adapted from Kramer and Tyler (1996) and McKnight, 
Choudhury and Kacmar (2002); Question 13 was created by the researcher. Questions 15, 16, 17 
were used to assess their trust in ACMs’ integrity and were adapted from McKnight (2002), 
McKnight, Choudhury and Kacmar (2002) and Kramer and Tyler (1996). Question 18, 19 and 20 
were used to assess their trust in ACMs’ goodwill and were adapted from Sako (1992), Sako and 
Helper (1998).  
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Questions 21, 22, 23 and 24 were used to investigate whether and how EAs’ trust in ACMs af-
fects their interactions. Questions 21 and 24 were created by the researcher. Question 22 and 23 
were adopted from KPMG (2013) and PwC (2013). Prior to completing the final version of this 
questionnaire, its formatting was subjected to pilot-testing in order to ensure that questions were 
comprehensive, relevant, appropriate and efficient in addressing the issues raised in this study 
(Bryman and Ball, 2007).   
 
In consonance with the suggestions of Etchegaray and Fischer (2011), the researcher sent the 
questionnaire to two university academics with research experience in auditing and trust. The 
questionnaire was also sent to one audit manager and two audit partners. Notably, amendments 
to questions 22 to 24 were made after receiving constructive feedback. The comments received 
from respondents as well as the questions before and after the amendments are included in Ap-
pendix 2.  
 
8.6 Participant Information Sheet 
A single page letter explained the purpose and content of this study. It outlined the benefits of 
participating in the study and stated that personal details will be treated confidentially. Further, 
the letter described the instructions and options on how to complete the questionnaire, the ap-
proximate time to complete it as well as instructions to complete the questionnaire electronically. 
A consent form was attached in the email to participants.  The participant information sheet and 
consent form can be found in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4. 
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8.7 Part One of the Questionnaire: Closed-Ended Questions 
 
Part One of the questionnaire allowed the researcher to assess their level of trust in ACMs’ com-
petence, integrity and goodwill, as well as their perception of the quality of interactions with 
ACMs. Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement to the first 20 statements.  
 
A variable representing the perception of the quality of interactions was created by taking a sim-
ple average of the scores of questions 1 to 11. A variable representing competence-based trust 
was established by taking a simple average of the scores of questions 12 to 14. A variable of in-
tegrity-based trust was then created by taking a simple average of the scores of questions 15 to 
17. Similarly, a variable of goodwill-based trust was established by taking a simple average of 
the scores of questions 18 to 20. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5. 
 
8.8 Part Two of the Questionnaire: Open-ended Questions 
 
Part Two of the questionnaire was used to explore the role of their trust in enhancing the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of external audits. These questions focus on how trust affects their inter-
actions with ACMs – and in effect, the quality of an audit – thereby providing insights into the 
extent that they place trust in ACMs, how their trust develops and how their trust affects empha-
sis of audit approaches on control-based versus substantive testing. Participants were specifically 
asked to provide their written responses on the space allocated next to questions 21 to 24.  
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Thematic analysis was used for open-ended questions. The researcher coded the responses of 
open-ended questions of the questionnaire survey and then formed different themes that enabled 
the researcher to answer the research questions. Open coding was used to code the data. Ester-
berg (2002) suggested that open coding is a process where “you work intensively with your data, 
line by line, identifying themes and categories that seem of interest” (p. 158). This thesis fol-
lowed the data analysis and coding procedures suggested by Creswell (2009) and Esterberg 
(2002). The importance of these themes to audit quality is stated in Appendix 6. 
 
This study followed the Creswell’s (2009) six steps of the data analysis process as follows:  
 
Step 1: Organise and prepare the data for analysis (p. 185). Accordingly, the researcher reviewed 
responses from the questionnaires and transferred the responses to a Word document. 
 
Step 2: Read through the data (p. 185). For this step, the researcher read through the responses on 
the Word document as many as five times to understand the ideas conveyed by the participants.   
 
Step 3: Begin detailed analysis with the coding process (p. 186). The researcher followed Cre-
swell’s procedure of organising the materials into segments by extending the text data and seg-
menting sentences into themes. 
 
  
 342 
For Step 3, the reasearcher had initially assigned codes to the text data by writing words or 
phrases next to the text data highlighted. Subsequently, the codes were reviewed three times. 
Some of them were found very similar, so they were combined. For example, the researcher 
found that “knowledge” and “ability” were very similar, so they were combined in order to pro-
duce a code of “knowledge and ability.” Further, the codes of “information exchange” and “In-
formation beyond statutory requirements” were combined to produce a code of “information ex-
change at planning stage.” The researcher also renamed some of the codes to allow them to bet-
ter encapsulate a broader meaning of textual data. For instance, the researcher combined the code 
of “independence” and “support” to produce a new code of “independence.” The codes assigned 
can be found in Appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10.  
 
Step 4: Use the coding process to generate a description of the setting or people as well as cate-
gories or themes. (p. 189). For this step, codes assigned led to generalising a small number of 
categories or themes. The researcher had initially used the codes assigned to form themes. 
Thereafter, the themes were reviewed to identify similarities so that they could be combined 
them. Further, the researcher looked for themes with small numbers of codes so that they could 
be dropped or combined them other themes.  
 
In totality, four categories were created. For instance, “experience”, “involvement in monitoring 
progress”, “support” and “integrity” enabled the researcher to form a theme to explain the factors 
that influence EAs’ trust in ACMs. “Encourage to ask questions”, “information beyond statutory 
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requirements” and “reporting significant issues” produced a theme to explain how their trust in 
ACMs positively affects information flow between them. The manner in which these themes 
emerged from the codes can be found in Appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10.   
 
Step 5: Advance how the description of the themes will be represented in the qualitative narra-
tive (p. 189). For Step 5, the researcher used the themes that emerged logically from the partici-
pants’ responses to produce the findings. In Chapter 4, the researcher had prepared narrative pas-
sages for the themes. These narrative passages represent the researcher’s own interpretations of 
why the responses could be logically grouped into themes.  
 
Step 6: Interpret the meaning of the data (p. 189). Creswell (2009) recognised that a researcher’s 
own background plays just as important a part of the meaning making process as a researcher’s 
fidelity to a theoretical lens. For this step, the researcher explained the implications of the find-
ings in the context of external audits and trust in Chapter 5. The findings of prior studies were 
used to explain the development of EAs’ trust in ACMs and why trust is important in auditing. 
The researcher explained how these themes are relevant for audit quality.  
 
8.9 Administration of the Questionnaire 
 
A survey link was generated and respondents could click on it to complete the questionnaire 
online. Electronic questionnaire survey enabled the researcher to save cost because there was no 
need to print and post hard copies to 493 participants. It also helped save time because partici-
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pants were able to receive the survey immediately online. Audit managers or EAs with a more 
senior title will not stay back in their respective offices to receive my postal questionnaires be-
cause they need to perform external audits around the world. Even they can receive my email 
questionnaire and complete it immediately regardless of their location (Cope, 2014). The re-
sponse rate benefited from an anonymous and private approach when asking about sensitive top-
ics.  
 
However, some drawbacks were found in using an electronic questionnaire survey. For example, 
some participants had several email addresses and they did not regularly check them all. Also, 
internet security filters may have blocked some messages.  
 
As many as 493 potential participants were contacted via email and asked to participate in the 
questionnaire survey. If they agreed to participate, a consent form along with an electronic link 
or an attached questionnaire were emailed to them.  
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8.10 Sample Response Rate 
 
A total of 142 responses were obtained from the 493 potential participants. Eight responses had 
to be eliminated because the questionnaires were incomplete. Therefore, 134 usable responses 
were collected, yielding a response rate of 27.2 percent
3
.  
 
The questionnaires were sent electronically to the participants in four stages. A total of 493 elec-
tronic questionnaires were sent in June 2016. The first second and third reminder of emails was 
sent in August, October and December of 2016, respectively. As compared to the response rate 
of other studies exploring the effects of trust on performance [Aulakh, Kotabe  and Sahay, 1996 
(39.4%); Bryan, Sinkovics and Kim, 2010 (23.29%); Carson et al., 2003 (32%); Gundlach and 
Cannon, 2010 (24%); Krishnan, 2005: (18%); Liao and Shi, 2015 (22%,); Mohr and Spekman, 
1994 (25%); Poppo, Zhou and Li, 2015 (35.2%); Silva, Bradley and Sousa, 2012 (6.3%); Zaheer, 
McEvily and Perrone, 2008 (15%)], this study’s response rate is deemed fairly reasonable and 
may present a fair reflection of EAs’ views. The details of response rate can be found in Table 39.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
The questionnaire did not ask questions about EAs’ personal information because this information is sensitive in 
nature. Inclusion of these questions may significantly drop the response rate of the questionnaires returned by EAs.  
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Table 39: Survey Returned 
 
 Number returned Percentage of Potential Participants 
Initial letter 61 12.37 
Reminder 1 38 7.71 
Reminder 2 14 2.84 
Reminder 3 21 4.26 
Total 134 27.18 
 
8.11 Verification of Non-Response Bias 
 
An independent t-test was also performed on the responses of the closed-ended questions of 
questionnaire survey. These responses from early responders were compared with those from 
late responders in order to investigate whether there was any significant difference (Lambert and 
Harrington, 1990). Lindner, Murphy and Briers (2001) claimed that late responders are similar to 
non-responders. This allows a researcher to use the late responder group as a proxy for non-
responders. If there is any significant difference between early and late responses, it can be in-
ferred that non-response bias is present.  
 
The researcher followed the procedures suggested by Lindner, Murphy and Briers (2001) and 
treated the last two reminders as late responses. The responses were not significantly different 
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between early and late responders at significance level of 1% in both cases; this implies the ab-
sence of non-response bias.   
 
8.12 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the research method employed during the course of this questionnaire 
survey study. Beginning with the justification for the use of questionnaire survey, this chapter 
discusses the participant selection process, the data collection procedure and the research instru-
ments. This final sample contains 134 usable responses, yielding a response rate of 27.2 percent. 
Procedures of data analysis and verification of non-response bias are also explained.  
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CHAPTER 9 
RESEARCH FINDINGS (QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY STUDY) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research questions and the manner in which they are answered. It then 
presents the findings of responses to closed-ended questions and open-ended questions contained 
within the questionnaire. Finally, a summary of the chapter’s content is provided. The relevance 
of these findings to audit quality is discussed in Chapter 10. The research questions to be an-
swered during the course of questionnaire survey study are as follows: 
 
RQ2: What factors influence EAs’ trust in ACMs in Hong Kong? 
RQ3: Does EAs’ trust affect the interactions with ACMs in Hong Kong? 
RQ4: How does the interaction between EAs and ACMs impact audit quality in Hong Kong?  
 
Research Question 3 is addressed by examining EAs’ responses to closed-ended questions that 
assess EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill, as well as their perception of the 
quality of interactions with ACMs. On the other hand, Research Questions 2 and 4 are addressed 
by looking at EAs’ responses to open-ended questions concerning the factors that influence EAs’ 
trust in ACMs and how EAs’ trust affects their interactions with ACMs.  
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9.2 Findings of Responses to Closed-Ended Questions 
 
The researcher used independent t-tests and regression analysis in order to analyse these re-
sponses. Before presenting the findings of closed-ended questions, it is important to check the 
distributions of the concerned variables. Therefore, the next section presents the associated de-
scriptive statistics.  
 
9.2.1 Descriptive Statistics: Closed-Ended Questions 
 
Table 40: Descriptive Statistics (Questionnaire Survey Study) 
Variables Obs Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
1 134 3.867 0.494 2.27 5 
2 134 3.482 0.561 1.67 4.67 
3 134 3.761 0.625 1.67 5 
4 134 3.547 0.698 1 5 
 
Where  
1 = Average score of perceptions of the quality of interactions 
2 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence 
3 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity 
4 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ goodwill 
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Table 40 depicts the descriptive statistics of the average scores of variables on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Section 8.7 shows which questions contained in the questionnaire survey are used to measure 
EAs’ perceptions of the quality of interactions and EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity 
and goodwill. On average, they place their trust in ACMs’ goodwill, competence and integrity 
higher than the middle level. In addition, the perception of the quality of interactions is higher 
than the middle level. Standard deviations of the average scores of these perceptions concerning 
the quality of interactions and their trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill are 0.494, 
0.56, 0.62 and 0.70, respectively. Since the standard deviations are not 0, it provides variations 
for the studies.  
 
9.2.2 Independent T-tests and OLS 
 
Section 9.2.1 shows the variables provide variations to be examined. This section presents the 
findings of the independent t-tests and regression analysis that allows the researcher to decipher 
whether their trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill positively affects the percep-
tion that trust relates to their interactions with ACMs, as well as whether the trust in ACMs en-
courages them to perceive that the quality of their interactions with ACMs is better.  
 
9.2.2.1 Independent T-tests 
 
Tables 41, 42 and 43 depict that the means of their trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and 
goodwill are significantly higher in the group of EAs who agreed with the perception that trust 
positively impacts their interactions with ACMs. These independent t-tests suggest that the re-
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sults are significant at p<0.05 and 0.01 but not siginificat at p<0.001, respectively. These results 
imply that their trust in ACM’s competence, integrity and goodwill is positively associated with 
the perception that trust affects their interaction with ACMs. This finding indicates that if they 
place trust in ACM’s competence, integrity and goodwill, they may be willing to interact with 
ACMs.  
 
Table 41: Competence-based Trust and EAs’ Perception that Trust Affects Interactions: 4 
 
Group Observations Mean 
0 54 3.36 
1 80 3.56 
   
Mean difference (MD)  -0.20 
  MD < 0: p-value = 0.022* 
  MD ≠ 0: p-value = 0.44 
  MD > 0: p-value = 0.98 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
                                                 
4
 The indicator of 1 shows that the EAs stated that trust influences their interactions with ACMs, other-
wise 0. The means are the average scores of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence (Table 41), integrity (Table 
42) and goodwill (Table 43). Since the mean of Group 0 (3.36) is significantly less than the mean of 
Group 1 (3.56), so the difference of mean beween Groups 0 and 1 is significantly less than 0. MD <0 
means that the mean value of Group 0 is less than that of Group 1. MD ≠ 0 means that the difference of 
mean values of Groups 0 and 1 is not equal to 0.  MD > 0 means that the mean value of Group 0 is larger 
than that of Group 1. This applies to Tables 41, 42, 43 and 44.  
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Table 42: Integrity-based Trust and EAs’ Perception that Trust Affects Interactions: 
Group Observations Mean 
0 54 3.60 
1 80 3.87 
   
Mean difference (MD)  -0.27 
  MD < 0: p-value = 0.0084** 
  MD ≠ 0: p-value = 0.017* 
  MD > 0: p-value = 0.99 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table 43: Goodwill-based Trust and EAs’ Perception that Trust Affects Interactions: 
Group Observations Mean 
0 54 3.36 
1 80 3.68 
   
Mean difference (MD)  -0.32 
  MD < 0: p-value = 0.0047** 
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  MD ≠ 0: p-value = 0.0094** 
  MD > 0: p-value = 0.995 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
According to Table 44, the mean of the perception of the quality of interactions with ACMs is 
not significantly higher in the group of EAs who concurred with the perception that trust affects 
their interaction with ACMs. As an implication, EAs’ perception that trust encourages them to 
interact with ACMs has no significant impact on their perception of the quality of interaction 
with ACMs. These independent t-tests show that the results are not significant at the significance 
level of p<0.05, 0.01 and 0.001, respectively.  
 
Table 44: EAs’ Perception that Trust Affects Interactions and Perception of the Quality of 
 Interactions with ACMs:  
 
Group Observations Mean 
0 54 3.78 
1 80 3.92 
   
Mean difference (MD)  -0.14 
  MD < 0: p-value = 0.0562 
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  MD ≠ 0: p-value = 0.113 
  MD > 0: p-value = 0.94 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
However, the independent t-tests only enabled the researcher to investigate whether their trust in 
ACMs’ competence, goodwill and integrity does encourage them to interact with ACMs. How-
ever, the results do not indicate whether their trust in ACMs’ competence, goodwill and integrity 
enhances the perception of the quality of interactions with ACMs. Therefore, the researcher used 
regression analysis in order to get perception regressed relating to the quality of their interactions 
with ACMs on their trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill. 
 
9.2.2.2 Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) 
This section presents the results of the tests detecting the violation of assumption and investigat-
ing the relationships between different types of trust and the perception of the quality of interac-
tions. OLS refers to a statistical technique that finds the best fit line so that the sum of the 
squared deviation of all the distances from the line gets minimised (Abu-Bader, 2010).  The de-
pendent variable is EAs’ perception of the quality of interactions with ACMs. This is used as a 
proxy for audit quality because higher quality of their interactions may smooth audit work, so 
audit quality is higher. Independent variables are EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and 
goodwill. This regression examines whether higher levels of EAs’ trust can enhance their percep-
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tion of the quality of their interactions. If so, audit quality should be enhanced.  
 
In the simplest form, the OLS model can be stated as:  
 
 
Where:  
 = dependent variable  
= independent variable   
= coefficient of independent variable  
 = error terms 
 = y-intercept 
 
The use of OLS requires dependent variables to be continuous variables, although independent 
variables can be measured at any level of measurement, such as nominal, categorical, ordinal, 
interval or ratio (Abu-Bader, 2010). OLS is used in the questionnaire survey study in order to 
examine the relationship between EAs’ perception of the quality of interactions with ACMs and 
competence-based, integrity-based and goodwill-based trust.  
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If these assumptions are violated, OLS will become unreliable and the results of the findings will 
be deemed invalid (Hair et al., 2010). Key assumptions of OLS are as follows:  
 
Multi-collinearity  
Normality of the error term distribution  
Constant variance of the error terms 
Independence of the error terms  
 
The details of assumptions were discussed in Section 4.4.1. This section only presents the results 
of the tests investigating the violation of the assumptions. The reseacher used Pearson Correla-
tion Matrix and Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect the problem of multicollinearity. Table 
45 shows that all the correlations are less than 0.9 and Table 46 depicts that VIFs are all less than 
10, so it can be inferred that the problem of multicollinearity is not present. Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg test was used to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity. Table 47 shows that p-
value is less than 0.001, so it can be inferred that heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Table 47: Pearson’s Correlations (Questionnaire Survey Study) 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1 1    
2 0.43 1   
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3 0.60 0.42 1  
4 0.58 0.56 0.65 1 
 
Where 
1 = Average score of perceptions of the quality of interactions 
2 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence 
3 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity 
4 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ goodwill 
 
Table 46: Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
2 2.12 0.47 
3 1.76 0.57 
4 1.47 0.68 
Mean VIF 1.78  
 
Where: 
1 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence 
2 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity 
3 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ goodwill 
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Table 47: Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity  
(Questionnaire Survey Study) 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Chi-square = 23.11 
p-value = 0.0000*** 
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
Since heteroscedasticity is present, OLS with robust standard errors should be used to investigate 
the relationships between different types of trust and the perception of the quality of interactions. 
Table 48 reveals that the means of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ goodwill and integrity are positively as-
sociated with the mean of EAs’ perception about the quality of interactions with ACMs at signif-
icance level of p<0.05 and p<0.001, respectively, although the mean of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ 
competence is not significantly associated. The model is significant because Prob>F is found to 
be less than 0.001. This result indicates that if EAs place trust in ACMs’ goodwill and integrity, 
they may have a better perception of the quality of their interactions with ACMs.  
 
Table 48: OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
 
 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
1 0.10 0.175 
2 0.29 0.000*** 
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3 0.19 0.014* 
Cons 1.71 0.000 
R-square 0.43  
* p-value < 0.05 ** p-value <0.01 *** p-value <0.001 
 
Where: 
1 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence 
2 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity 
3 = Average score of EAs’ trust in ACMs’ goodwill 
 
The findings of closed-ended questions enable the researcher to answer the questions whether 
their trust in ACMs encourages them to interact with ACMs, as well as whether their trust en-
hances their perception of the quality of their interactions with ACMs. The findings in this sec-
tion provide answers to Research Question 3. The summary of the findings of closed-ended 
questions is presented in Figure 6.  
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EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ 
Competence 
EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ 
Integrity 
EAs’ Perception that the Trust 
Affects Interactions 
EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ 
Goodwill 
EAs’ Perceptions of the Quality 
of Interactions 
Significant Positive Relationships 
No significant Relationships 
 
Figure 6: Findings of Closed-Ended Questions 
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9.2.3. Findings of Responses to Open-Ended Questions 
 
Based on the findings of these closed-ended questions, the research observes that 
EAs’ trust in ACMs positively affects their interactions with ACMs, but these find-
ings do not help answer Research Questions 2 and 4. Hence, the researcher now turns 
to the findings of open-ended questions. For this purpose, the researcher categorised 
the responses to open-ended questions 21-24 into five themes that helped answer Re-
search Questions 2 and 4. Theme One answers Research Question 2. Themes Two, 
Three, Four and Five answer Research Question 4.  
 
9.2.3.1 Antecedents of EAs’ Trust in ACMs 
 
Theme One:  EAs Develop Trust in ACMs If They Perceive that ACMs Have and 
Display Competence, Goodwill and Integrity. 
 
Firstly, it is important to investigate the factors that influence EAs’ trust in ACMs be-
cause trust can only be managed if the factors that influence EAs’ trust can be clearly 
identified. These factors will, in effect, encourage them to interact with ACMs, result-
ing in better perception of quality of interactions with ACMs, so that they are willing 
to share information, cooperate and communicate with ACMs. 
 
The researcher discusses three sub-themes below with regard to how Theme One 
emerged from the sub-themes. The sub-themes are discussed in three parts: 1) compe-
tence, 2) goodwill and 3) integrity.  
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In general, EAs reported that perception of ACMs’ competence enhances their trust in 
ACMs. The perception of competence includes the perception of ACMs’ ability, ex-
perience, professionalism and accounting and finance knowledge. Respondent 91 
(R91) summed: 
 
 “Trust is affected by audit committee members’ competence and commitment” 
(R91).  
 
Thirteen other participants concurred that knowledge and competence are important 
for the development of EAs’ trust in ACMs. 
 
Other participants stated that finance or accounting expertise is important for EAs to 
trust ACMs. Although ACMs have experience, they do not understand the impacts 
and rationales of the audit procedures and approaches, if they do not have accounting 
nor finance background. Therefore, EAs will not want to waste their time interacting 
with ACMs because they do not expect useful comments on their approaches to en-
sure their audit work goes smoothly. R4 mentioned: 
 
“Trust is built by audit committee members’ experience and financial back-
ground” (R4).  
 
Five other participants agreed that finance and accounting expertise is essential for 
EAs to trust ACMs. ACMs with broad experience understand strengths and weak-
nesses of internal controls in different industries. In particular, ACMs can share broad 
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experience with EAs about how to oversee financial reporting in different industries. 
In this regard, R69 suggested: 
 
“Trust is high if audit committee members are broadly experienced” (R69).  
 
Six other respondents provided similar responses. Apart from broad business experi-
ence, specific industry experience pertinent to the company is important. If ACMs 
have specific industry experience, EAs do not need to waste time explaining ration-
ales behind their audit approach for a company in a specific industry. Time for meet-
ings can be better spent on significant issues. For example, ACMs who have experi-
ence in the energy industry may not understand the strengths and weaknesses of the 
property industry’s internal control systems. R28 explained that,  
 
“Trust is affected by AC members’ experience, knowledge of its indus-
try………” (R28)  
 
R30 and R129 provided similar responses.  If ACMs are competent, EAs will expect 
ACMs to share their experience with them and ask pertinent questions when meeting 
the ACMs. If ACMs have accounting or finance knowledge, they will be able to dis-
cuss more complex and significant accounting issues such as the appropriateness of 
accounting policy and estimates with ACMs because they can trust the fact that 
ACMs understand their point. If ACMs have generic or specific industry experience, 
they will be able to decipher the rationales of internal controls. Resultantly, they trust 
that ACMs can answer their questions about the rationales of internal control systems. 
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Although ACMs may have competence in terms of experience and accounting and 
finance expertise, it will be difficult to believe that ACMs will actively seek to im-
prove quality of an audit if they do not have goodwill. ACMs’ goodwill can be evi-
denced by ACMs’ diligence and independence of executives. If ACMs are not dili-
gent in overseeing financial reporting, their oversight will become ceremonial at best. 
If ACMs are not independent of executives, they will not believe that ACMs will use 
their discretion to support the position of EAs even though their position may better 
reflect the financial position of a company. In this regard, R65 stated: 
 
“Trust is affected by audit committee members’ competence and involvement. 
No involvement of audit committee members leads to low level of trust, result-
ing in low interactions” (R65).  
 
If ACMs are not involved in overseeing a company’s financial reporting, they will not 
understand its current activities and hence, cannot be described as ‘diligent.’ R28 
agreed by responding that,  
 
“Trust is affected by audit committee members’ experience, level of involve-
ment in understanding current development activities of the company”. (R126) 
  
R69 provided more examples about the involvement and diligence in monitoring the 
current activities of a company by stating: 
 
“Trust is affected by whether audit committee members had timely reviews on 
budget vs. actual, follow ups on prior year audit issues, action plan and execu-
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tion, internal audit activities, reviews and approval, input and follow ups, etc.” 
(R69).  
 
R126 and R38 provided similar responses.  If ACMs are not diligent in following up 
issues found in prior audit and action plans, EMs will not believe that ACMs are ef-
fective in overseeing management. At the same time, if ACMs do not have timely re-
views on budget, they will not believe that ACMs use budgetary control to evaluate 
the reasonableness of a company’s reported financial position. If ACMs do not follow 
up on issues of interim audit activities, they cannot believe that they can depend upon 
the work of internal audits. Therefore, the level of trust is low. 
 
Even if ACMs are competent and diligent, the lack of ACM independence will un-
dermine EAs’ trust in ACMs. R32 support this view by stating that: 
  
“Trust is low if AC members are not independent from the executives” (R32).  
R114, R35, R53 and R37 provided similar responses.  
 
R22 explained that if ACMs have close connection with management, they will nei-
ther objectively evaluate and monitor performance of management nor support EAs in 
cases where they have disagreements with management. If the board and controlling 
shareholders have close connection with ACMs, they will not believe that the board or 
controlling shareholders will use their power to oversee the activities of ACMs. The 
response of R22 reflects this sentiment.  
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“Trust is low if AC members have close connection with controlling sharehold-
ers, board and management because there may be less incentive for them to take 
up the monitoring role” (R22).  
 
Without ACMs’ diligence and independence, EAs do not believe that ACMs enable 
them to ensure their audit work is conducted smoothly. If ACMs’ integrity is high, 
they will be able to trust ACMs’ representations by believing that the information 
provided to them is reliable. For instance, they can ask ACMs questions about internal 
control weaknesses, fraud indicators, integrity and performance of management, liti-
gation in progress, significant risk of the industry, ongoing concern problem, and 
changes of accounting policy, among others. The answers to these questions are im-
portant for EAs to plan their audit, determine the scope of audits and provide recom-
mendations. Since ACMs’ reliable representations ensure their work goes on smooth-
ly, they will place more trust in ACMs. R119 stated: 
  
“Trust is affected by ………… integrity, independence…….. and so on” (R119).  
 
R11, R15, R30, R88 and R118 provided similar responses.  In conclusion, EAs’ trust 
in ACMs is enhanced by their perception in ACMs’ competence, goodwill and integ-
rity. If ACMs are perceived to be competent, they will believe that ACMs understand 
their points and that they will communicate effectively. If ACMs are perceived to 
have goodwill, they will believe that ACMs are independent of executives and sup-
port their position. They will also believe that ACMs oversee accounting processes 
and internal control systems diligently, so that they can rely on a firm’s internal con-
trol systems. If ACMs are perceived to have a high level of integrity, they will believe 
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that the information received from ACMs is reliable. Viewed collectively, this will 
result in a high level of trust.  
 
9.2.3.2 EAs’ trust in ACMs, Better Understanding and Discussions 
 
Theme Two: EAs’ Trust in ACMs Enables EAs to Better Understand Audit Risk 
and Improve Discussion  
 
Based on Theme One, the researcher understands the factors that influence EAs’ trust 
in ACMs, but the understanding of these factors per se does not answer the questions 
of whether and how EAs’ trust affects their interactions with ACMs. In Section 9.5.2, 
the researcher investigates how EMs’ trust in ACMs allows them to have better inter-
actions with ACMs, resulting in a better understanding of audit risk and improved 
discussions.  
 
The researcher discusses how Theme Two emerged from two sub-themes below: first-
ly, better understanding of a company’s audit risks, and secondly, high quality of dis-
cussions between EAs and ACMs. 
 
9.2.3.2.1 Better Understanding of Audit Risks of a Company 
ACMs enable EAs to understand the operations and risk of a company because they 
provide useful information about, for example, the appropriateness of business plans 
and effects of significant contracts on a company’s profits. After engaging in discus-
sions with ACMs, they can incorporate ACMs’ comments into their audit plans as 
well as scope of audit. Therefore, such discussions ensure that they will not miss sig-
nificant risk areas. R69 agreed that,  
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“We can have deeper interactions in discussions helping understanding the 
points, disagreements and risks. We can have more sharing of thoughts on risk 
areas” (R69).  
 
R4, R18, R23, R25, R33, 48, R69 and R47 provided similar responses.  R49 provided 
examples of potentially high risk areas in business plan and significant contracts.  
 
“We will be advised about their business plan and significant contracts in a very 
early stage, allowing both of us to discuss with sufficient time rather than in a 
rush at a last minute” (R49).  
 
If EMs have a good understanding of the business plan and significant contracts of the 
company, they will be able to discern whether the business plan is too aggressive or 
will expose the firm to unacceptable levels of risk. Understanding the impacts of sig-
nificant contracts enables EAs to evaluate whether the company relies too heavily on 
a few revenue sources. If the business plan is not realised or if the company loses a 
significant contract, managers will be under pressure to misstate financial statements. 
Possessing this information enables them to plan ahead in a better manner.  
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If EAs are willing to provide details of unpredictable tests, ACMs will be able to 
comment on the appropriateness of these tests. Hence, the tests are more likely to de-
tect material misstatements of financial statements. R129 expressed that,  
 
“I am slightly more inclined to give details of unpredictable tests, material lev-
els, risk areas of the audits and responses” (R129). 
 
EAs’ trust encourages them to discuss issues at an early stage with ACMs. If that is 
the case, they will have more time to adjust their audit plan and approaches at an early 
stage. R53 said that,  
 
“We can discuss audit issues more often and at an earlier stage. We can com-
municate the audit approaches at a more persuasive manner and at earlier stage 
to deal with the feedback from audit committee members” (R53).  
 
Their trust also encourages them to incorporate ACMs’ comments on audit plan. By 
doing so, they will be able to effectively design the audit plan by taking the operation 
and risk of a company into consideration. R79 highlighted: 
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“Comments from ACMs are very important because their insights provide more 
information about how the audit should be performed. Therefore, if auditors can 
incorporate the comments from ACMs, audit plan will be more appropriate to 
the significant areas for an audit. We can have deeper discussions. High levels 
of trust in audit committee members motivate us to discuss our views with them 
and incorporate their comments in our audit plan. Of course we do what is nec-
essary to do but we can improve audit quality when we obtain their insights” 
(R79). 
 
Their trust in ACMs encourages them to obtain and utilise more useful information 
from ACMs, which in turn, enables them to plan their audit. 
 
9.2.3.2.2 High Quality of Discussions between EAs and ACMs  
 
EAs’ trust helps enhance the quality of discussions through improved mutual under-
standings and greater openness of discussions. R8 explained why trust plays such a 
key role in communication: 
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“If trust is higher, it is easier to understand expectations of audit committee 
members. Higher trust means more effective communications” (R8).  
 
R48 highlighted that in addition to the improvement in the quality of general discus-
sion, the nature of discussions over causes of issues and their impacts also improves. 
R48 claimed that,  
 
“I can be more open with ACMs, so we can have better quality discussions over 
the reason of issues and impacts” (R48).  
 
R18, R9, R29, R33, R42, R49, R65, R66, R74 and R129 provided similar responses. 
If EAs can be open and candid with ACMs, they can freely initiate discussions about 
significant accounting policies, appropriateness of accounting estimates, internal con-
trol weaknesses and integrity and performance of management. Since the quality of 
discussions is improved, ACMs and they will be able to engage in more in-depth dis-
cussions.   
 
Their trust in ACMs encourages them to spend more time in meeting with them. R11 
opined: 
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“If trust is low, I do not spend much time explaining but do basic communica-
tions as required by standard” (R11).  
 
R10, R30 and R130 provided similar responses. In summary, a high level of trust en-
ables EAs and ACMs to exchange information, spend more time on discussions and 
have high quality discussions. They can also better understand the risk of a company. 
Therefore, they have more information about company operations and develop a bet-
ter understanding of the high risk areas so that they can focus their resources in a bet-
ter manner.  
 
9.2.3.3 EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ Integrity and Their Assessment of Managers 
   
Theme Three: EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ Integrity Improves Their Willingness to 
Provide ACMs with an Assessment of the Quality of Managers 
 
Themes Two, Three, Four and Five all combine to address Research Question 4. 
Theme Two was considered in S.9.2.3.2; the researcher now turns to Theme Three. 
The quality of management includes the ability, style, integrity and performance of 
management. Although EAs should have assessed this quality at the planning stage, 
they may need to re-assess this quality during the audit. A high level of EAs’ trust in 
ACMs’ integrity encourages them to listen to ACMs’ comments on the quality of 
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management. For instance, they may receive useful information from ACMs about the 
irregularities of financial reporting certified by management and internal control 
weaknesses that are not ratified by management, as explained by R22,  
 
“If trust is high, I am more willing to listen to know what management is doing” 
(R22).  
 
Their trust in ACMs’ integrity also encourages them to share sensitive information 
about the quality of management with ACMs, such as inappropriate accounting esti-
mates used by executive managers, dishonest information provided by management to 
mislead EAs, low levels of cooperation of management as well as internal controls 
overridden by management. If ACMs possess this information, it may usefully influ-
ence their actions with respect to executive management. As a result, higher quality 
management may be able to implement more effective internal control systems and 
accounting processes. R71 elaborated: 
 
“If trust in ethics of AC members is low, we are more hesitant to criticize the 
performance of management to AC members (In Executive Session) because 
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our views on management and internal controls are communicated back to ex-
ecutive management by certain AC members” (R71).  
 
R71, R57, R94, R103 and R109 provided similar responses. R31 provided examples 
of sensitive information, which can pertain to managers’ judgment in accounting pro-
cess and forecasts. If EAs share this information with ACMs, the latter will be able to 
determine whether judgments are inappropriate and forecasts too aggressive. For in-
stance, management can manipulate recoverable amount of non-current assets upward 
if forecasts of future cash flow are biased. Therefore, impairment loss can be reduced, 
resulting in increased net income. If EAs are willing to share this information with 
ACMs, the latter will be able to require management to adjust cash flow forecast so 
that it becomes more difficult for managers to manipulate impairment loss. In this re-
gard, R31 contended: 
 
“High trust may impact the way you discuss how management might be biased 
in their judgments e.g. when looking at forecasts” (R31).  
 
The quality of management includes the style of management. R105 highlighted that,  
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“If trust is high, you can be more candid in private conversations, for example, 
about style and quality of senior management” (R105). 
 
Style of management is another important indicator for EAs to detect the manipula-
tion of earnings. If managers are too aggressive, they may be more likely to manipu-
late earnings upward for higher bonus. If EAs know the style of managers from 
ACMs, they will understand the fact that representation by managers may not be reli-
able and thus, put more effort into corroborating managers’ representations.  
 
To conclude, if EAs place trust in the integrity of ACMs, on the one hand, they will 
believe that ACMs will not communicate their comments back to management, so 
that they will be willing to share their assessment of the quality of management to 
ACMs. If that is the case, ACMs will be able to determine whether the management is 
appropriate to the company. On the other hand, if they do trust ACMs, they will be 
willing to accept ACMs’ comments relating to the quality of management from 
ACMs. This, in turn, will enable them to determine the level of integrity, ability, style 
as well as performance of managers so that they can assess the likelihood that manag-
ers engage in aggressive earnings management.  
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9.2.3.4 EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ Ability, Audit Findings and Recommendation 
 
Theme Four: EAs’ Trust in ACMs’ Ability Encourages EAs to Diligently Discuss 
Findings and Recommendations  
 
Theme Four forms part of the addressing of Research Question 4. Three sub-themes 
below are discussed in order to explain how Theme Four emerged: 1) abilities and 
attitude towards recommendations; 2) driving management to make a change; and 3) 
open and detailed discussions about recommendations and reporting. 
 
9.2.3.4.1 Abilities and Attitude towards Recommendations 
 
Effective corporate governance requires that ACMs take the recommendations of EAs 
seriously and have the ability to implement them. If that is not the case, EAs will be 
disinclined to waste their time exploring different alternatives with ACMs. If their 
level of trust in ACMs is high, they will be more willing to engage effectively. They 
need to explore alternative recommendations and ACMs need to determine the most 
suitable methods about the operation of their company. R38 stated:  
“If we trust audit committee members are capable, we discuss all the audit ad-
justments, including adjusted and unadjusted and give recommendation when 
we figure out any room for improvement” (R38).  
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R90 provided similar responses. If they believe that ACMs take the recommendations 
seriously, they will understand that ACMs want to improve audit quality. R109 
seemed to agree:  
 
 “I will provide more opinions about internal control or control environment. I 
am able to openly voice my opinions and concerns and my opinion is taken se-
riously” (R109).  
 
Similar responses were provided by R18, R20 and 26.  
 
9.2.3.4.2 Driving Management to Make Changes 
 
Although ACMs may have the ability to implement and are serious about EAs’ rec-
ommendations, necessary changes will not be made if they do not have the power to 
drive management in order to make changes. R22 claimed that,  
 
“We are more willing to make in-depth analysis and provide more value-added 
recommendations because we believe audit committee members can drive man-
agement to make a change” (R22).  
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In-depth analysis assumes significance because EAs and ACMs need to discuss the 
feasibility and effectiveness of these recommendations.  If EAs’ trust is low, their 
findings and recommendations will be limited to regulatory requirements because 
they will not have interactions with ACMs and inputs, such as identification of signif-
icant risks. In this regard, R122 said: 
 
“The level of trust is high one would report it to the AC even if management 
opposes the recommendation if management are reluctant to accept the recom-
mendation” (R122).  
 
R22 provided similar responses.  If they trust that ACMs do have the power to require 
managers to implement recommendations suggested by EAs, they will be willing to 
explore alternative recommendations. 
 
9.2.3.4.3 Open and Detailed Discussions about Findings and Recommendations 
 
The final sub-theme of Theme Four pertains to EAs’ willingness to spend time openly 
discussing detailed as well as technical issues. If EAs trust ACMs, they will be open 
about the possibility of discussing significant issues and making recommendations to 
ACMs. For instance, they may find that accounting estimates are inappropriate or 
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forecasts too aggressive when compared to other companies within the same industry. 
In these cases, it is important that they can discuss issues openly with ACMs. They 
may also openly discuss new accounting or auditing issues with ACMs, and exchange 
their experiences and ideas about how to improve financial reporting or internal con-
trols.  
 
For example, if a new accounting standard of revenue recognition has been used, EAs 
and ACMs will be able to share their experiences and views on how to oversee finan-
cial reporting of revenue recognition. Therefore, they are more likely to detect manip-
ulation of revenue. R95 stated that,  
 
“If trust is high, there are more tendencies to be open to new ideas and recom-
mendations” (R95).  
 
Responses of R16, R18, R46, R91, R95, R107, R111, R114 and 124 are similar to 
those mentioned above.  Feedback from ACMs is important not only at the planning 
stage, but also at the stages of recommendation and reporting. If EAs are better in-
formed about ACMs’ feedback, the operations and nature of a company will be thor-
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oughly considered. This implies that the recommendations will be more appropriate 
for a company, as indicated by R53: 
  
“If trust is high, I will be more open with their feedback and more willing to 
provide recommendations to the client” (R53). 
 
Furthermore, EAs’ trust encourages them to point out the potential areas for im-
provements. R87 agreed: 
 
“The audit team would be more candid in pointing out potential areas that need 
improvements. If it lacks the trust, the audit team might be more cautious in 
raising the recommendations with the fear that the audit committee might 
“twist” the facts and accuse them of not doing a good work” (R87). 
 
EAs’ trust even encourages them to spend more time discussing the details of 
their recommendations and reporting. R117 suggested: 
 
“Trust does not affect my openness but I am willing to spend more time 
discussing the rationale behind my recommendations” (R117).  
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Their trust also plays an important role in encouraging them to spend more time 
exploring different alternatives of recommendations. To that end, R136 said:  
 
“If trust is high, I am more likely to take time exploring recommendation 
options” (R136).  
 
The response of R118 is similar to that of R136.  More time spent on discussion 
can be reflected in the number of meetings held by EMs with ACMs. In this con-
text, R47 said;  
 
“If trust is low, I will have no meetings or less meetings with audit com-
mittee members” (R47).  
 
Without trust, meetings may be used for compliance purposes only to meet the 
minimal standards of audit. Meetings cannot be used to serve the purpose of hav-
ing in-depth discussions. R21 commented: 
 
“If trust is low, meetings tend to be for compliance” (R21).  
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R54 provided a similar response.  
 
Discussions must go into detail when discussing auditing and accounting issues. 
If that is the case, EAs and ACMs will be able to share significant industry expe-
rience as well as accounting and auditing knowledge in order to improve a firm’s 
internal control systems. R79 stated: 
 
“If trust is high, more interactions occur. It helps how deep we discuss 
the matters with them” (79).  
 
Responses of R31, R65, R68, R79, R77 and R101 are similar to those mentioned 
above.   
 
In conclusion, if EMs repose their trust in ACMs, they will believe that ACMs 
will take their recommendations seriously and have the ability and power to im-
plement these recommendations. They will also spend more time on open discus-
sions which will become more detailed as opposed to merely be ‘ceremonial’ to 
meet the minimum requirements of audit standards.  
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9.2.3.5 EAs’ Trust in ACMs and Audit Strategies 
 
Theme Five: EAs’ Trust in ACMs Encourages EAs to Select Control-based More 
Than Substantive-based Testing. 
 
This final theme contributes to answering Research Question 4 and comprises of 
two sub-themes emerging from responses to the open-ended questions: 1) audit 
risk and internal control 2) tone from the top. 
 
9.2.3.5.1 Audit Risk and Internal Control 
 
If the level of trust is high, perceived audit risk is low. This means that control-based 
approaches can be utilised because EAs believe that ACMs perform their roles effec-
tively in order to monitor financial reporting as well as internal controls. Therefore, 
EAs believe that they can depend upon internal control systems for the audits. It is not 
always possible for them to substantively audit every transaction in a company, but 
they can definitely test the procedures and controls which transactions go through us-
ing the control-based approach. R23 explained the view that:  
 
“If trust is high, risk will be less, so more control-based tests can be used” 
(R23).  
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If EAs trust ACMs, they can depend upon ACMs’ statements as evidence in an audit. 
By doing so, they can corroborate ACMs’ statements with substantive tests that they 
perform and the evidence becomes more reliable. For example, they can ask ACMs 
questions about the procedures of determining the net realisable values of inventory 
and whether they write off the cost of inventory if the cost of inventory is more than 
the net realisable value. They can then perform substantive tests to verify the records 
of inventory. If the records show significant difference from what is suggested by 
ACMs, they should be aware that managers deviate from standard procedures for 
writing off the cost of inventory. EAs may require managers to adjust the accounting 
record of inventory so that managers cannot inflate the amount of earnings. However, 
if EAs do not trust ACMs, they will not be able to depend upon ACMs’ statements to 
ascertain the procedures of writing off cost of inventory, so that they will be unable to 
ascertain whether managers deviate from standard procedure of the company in order 
to determine the amount of inventory to be written off. EAs can only use their experi-
ence to judge it. R47 stated: 
 
“If trust is high, we may trust their statements, so we prefer to use control-based 
approach” (R47).  
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R37, R69, R103, R86, R88, R111, R118, R119 and R127 provided similar responses. 
If EAs trust the fact that ACMs are effective monitors of financial reporting, they will 
also believe that audit risk is reduced. As a result, they can depend more on control-
based tests supplemented with substantive tests.  
 
9.2.3.5.2 Tone from the Top  
 
An effective internal control system should have appropriate support from ACMs. If 
ACMs are unable to set a good tone, managers may not care about the effectiveness of 
its internal control systems. Therefore, EAs will not trust that their internal control 
systems are effective. R31 specified: 
 
“If trust is low, it indicates a lack of care of audit committee members (tone 
from the top)” (R31).  
 
R33 claimed that,  
 
“If higher trust translates into a better assessment of governance structure, high-
er perception of the tone from the top, a more control-based audit might be an 
option” (R33).  
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The responses of R79 and R129 are similar to the ones observed above. In summary, 
if EAs believe that tone from the top is appropriate and that ACMs are able to effec-
tively oversee internal control systems, audit risk is diminished, so that they can use 
more control-based tests supplemented with substantive tests. Figure 7 summarises 
the findings of open-ended questions. 
 
9.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter first presents three research questions to be answered by the question-
naire survey study as follows: 
 
 RQ 2: what factors influence EAs’ trust in ACMs in Hong Kong?  
 RQ 3: does EAs’ trust have positive effects on their interactions with ACMs in 
Hong Kong?  
 RQ 4: how does EAs’ trust in ACMs impact their interactions and audit quality in 
Hong Kong? 
 
The findings of closed-ended questions helped answer Research Question 3. Inde-
pendent t-test reveals that EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence, integrity and goodwill 
encourages them to interact with ACMs. The results of regression analysis suggest 
that their trust in ACMs’ integrity and goodwill augments their perception of the qual-
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ity of interactions with them. Therefore, their trust affects their willingness to interact 
and the perception of the quality of interactions.   
 
The findings of open-ended questions helped answer Research Questions 2 and 4. The 
findings show that EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from their perceptions of ACMs’ 
competence, goodwill and integrity. These findings demonstrate that their trust en-
courages them to have more effective interactions with ACMs throughout these audits. 
The summary of the findings of open-ended questions is presented in Figure 7. 
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EAs’ Perception of  
ACMs’ Competence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EAs’ Perception of  
ACMs’ Goodwill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EAs’ Perception of  
ACMs’ Integrity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EAs’ Trust in ACMs 
 
 
 
Effective Interactions: 
 
EAs’ trust in ACMs ena-
bles EAs to better under-
stand audit risk and im-
prove discussion. 
 
EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integ-
rity improves their willing-
ness to provide ACMs with 
an assessment of the quali-
ty of management.  
 
EAs’ trust in ACMs’ abil-
ity encourages EAs to dili-
gently discuss findings and 
recommendations. 
 
EAs’ trust in ACMs en-
courages EAs to select con-
trol-based more than sub-
stantive-based testing. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Better Audit 
Quality 
: Positive Effects 
 
Figure 7: Findings of Open-ended Questions 
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CHAPTER 10 
DISCUSSION (QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY STUDY) 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The results of this questionnaire survey study support the viewpoint that EAs’ trust encourages 
them to interact with clients’ ACMs. Their interactions are attributed to the fact that they are in-
terested in ensuring that agency cost is reduced to the minimum and that information asymmetry 
is reduced. They share a common objective in detecting earnings management so that sharehold-
ers’ interests are protected (Whittington and Pany, 2001; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Alchain and 
Demsetz, 1972). If they have effective interactions, they may be able to discuss important issues 
in detail, such as audit plan, internal controls, risk assessment and application of accounting es-
timates as well as accounting policy. These issues have an impact on audit process, efficiency, 
effectiveness and audit quality. This chapter discusses the findings obtained in Chapter 9 by 
comparing the findings of the questionnaire survey study to those of prior studies. A summary of 
the chapter’s content is also provided. 
 
10.2 Discussions on Findings of Responses to Open-ended Questions  
10.2.1 Determinants of EAs’ Trust in ACMs 
This study finds that EAs develop trust in ACMs if they have and display competence, goodwill 
and integrity. If ACMs are perceived to be competent, EAs may believe that ACMs understand 
their points. This may then allow them to communicate effectively. If ACMs are perceived to 
  
 390 
have goodwill, they are likely to believe that ACMs are diligent in overseeing financial reporting 
and independent of executives. Hence, they may feel that ACMs’ presence is not ceremonial and 
that ACMs are likely to support their stance. If ACMs are perceived to have a high level of integ-
rity, they may believe that the information received from ACMs is reliable. The development of 
their trust in ACMs pertains to the likelihood of obtaining positive outcomes in an external audit 
by interacting with ACMs. Their trust can be regarded as the expectation that they know what 
ACMs do, so that they can adjust their efforts in communication, information sharing and coop-
eration.  
 
The findings of antecedents of their trust in ACMs concur with the results of prior studies. Alt-
hough there is limited extant literature on EAs’ trust in ACMs, these findings are consistent with 
the results from that of previous studies, which examine their level of trust in clients’ managers. 
For example, in their study of evaluating client perceptions about the seriousness and frequency 
of potential communication barriers in external audits, Golen (1997) found that inadequate 
common accounting knowledge and impaired understanding of technical accounting terms re-
duced the level of trust between EAs and client management. Inadequate knowledge combined 
with the lack of understanding can be regarded as the lack of competence. In their study of trust 
in clients’ managers, Shaub (1996) noted that EAs place trust in clients’ managers because of the 
perception that managers have a high level of goodwill. In particular, he observed that the quality 
of communication and their evaluation of managers’ independence has a positive impact on their 
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trust in clients’ managers. Quality of communication and managers’ independence can be re-
garded as goodwill.  
 
In their study of examining EAs’ trust in clients’ managers in the context of their disagreements, 
Rennie, Kopp and Lemon (2010) reported similar issues, but also noted that they placed trust in 
clients’ managers due to the perception that managers displayed a high level of integrity. They 
found that the openness of communication (integrity) and concern (goodwill) during a disagree-
ment were positively associated with trust.  
 
The results from other studies in adjoining fields support the view that trust is established be-
cause partners perceive that the other party displayed integrity, competence and goodwill. In the 
context of business-to-business financial service relationships between managers and customers, 
Theron, Terblanche and Boshoff (2011) observed that relationship managers trust their clients if 
their clients display competence and that clients trust relationship managers if they display com-
petence, effective communication and customisation. The findings in this study are also con-
sistent with the views of Burke et al. (2007) who investigated the effects of trust in the relation-
ships between supervisors and subordinates. They reported similar results that trust is formed due 
to their perception of competence, but specifically observed that integrity positively affects trust 
between supervisors and subordinates. Knoll and Gill (2011) found in the study of trust in the 
relationships between supervisors, subordinates and peers that in addition to ability and integrity, 
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benevolence (which is similar to goodwill) is a significant factor that positively affects people to 
repose their trust in supervisors, subordinates and peers in workplace.  
 
The findings in this study are also in consonance with the viewpoint of Lapidot, Kark and Sha-
mir (2007), who examined trust building and trust erosion in the correlation between supervisors 
and subordinates. They suggested that subordinates are more likely to recall the incidents of trust 
erosion than incidents of trust building. Lapidot, Kark and Shamir (2007) reported that if super-
visors display integrity, benevolence and ability, subordinates may place trust in them. However, 
if supervisors lack integrity, benevolence and ability, they will reduce their level of trust in their 
supervisors. In their study of trust in the relationship between a buyer and a seller at the growth 
stage of a company, Dowell (2013) made similar observations, but provided additional insights 
into how integrity trust and goodwill trust are formed. They specifically observed that integrity 
trust was formed by honesty, integral actions and candid responses, and that goodwill trust was 
formed by discretionary activities undertaken by partners and positive attitude towards partners.  
 
In the context of an external audit these findings suggest that ACMs are required to display high 
levels of competence, integrity and goodwill so that EAs are encouraged to place their trust in 
them. For instance, only being competent is not sufficient to encourage EAs to interact with them. 
They must display integrity and goodwill as well.  
 
  
 393 
10.2.2 Better Understanding of Audit Risk and Better Quality of Discussions 
This study notes that trust plays an important role in the relationships between EAs and ACMs in 
that it improves quality of discussion and information sharing between them. The findings have 
implications for audit process and effectiveness as it implies that they could receive more infor-
mation from ACMs which improves their understanding of clients’ audit risk.  
 
Whilst there are limited studies within the audit discipline that have explored these issues, these 
findings are consistent with results from previous studies in adjoining fields in that trust im-
proves mutual understanding, leading to better interactions. For example, in a study that explored 
the conditions that improve the cooperative relationships between family businesses, Hadjielias 
et al. (2015) noted that trust was important for the establishment and maintenance of cooperative 
relationship and mutual understanding between family businesses. Trust between family leaders 
was important in building altruism and collective thinking in order to sustain the cooperation be-
tween their respective firms.  
 
The findings in this study also find supports from Krishnan (2006), who examined the moderat-
ing effects of uncertainties on the positive relationships between trust and performance in inter-
national alliances. In the study, it was found that trust enhances mutual understanding between 
actors and reduces the cost of inter-partner conflict, thus leading to enhanced performance. In 
their study of determinants of international joint venture, Ren, Gray and Kim (2009) suggested 
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that trust increases mutual understanding and mutual benefits, so that communication is im-
proved, thus resulting in better performance. In their study of citizens’ trust in government and 
citizens’ efforts towards improving the livability of surroundings, Edelenbos and Eshuis (2012) 
noted that the level of trust between citizens and government is enhanced, leading to better mu-
tual understanding. If that is the case, the citizens will endeavour to suggest ideas on how to im-
prove the livability of their surroundings.  
 
The findings of prior studies also support the view that trust improves the quality of discussions, 
so that partners are willing to share information. For instance, in a study that explored the con-
nection between trust and interactions over time in a collaborative project within the education 
industry, Oortmerssen, Woerkum and Aarts (2014) observed that trust boosted interactions and 
vice versa. They found that trust enhances the openness for discussions and responsiveness to 
questions. They also confirmed that trust increased the speed of conversations between board 
members. In turn, this implies that discussions and interactions are intensified. In a study that 
explored how contracts, control structures and trust interactively shape an interfirm relationship, 
Minnar et al. (2017) found that after the establishment of trust, their behaviour was more cooper-
ative and the performance of contract was found to be more effective. The managers exchanged 
ideas through day-to-day interactions as well as their business plans. They became open to dis-
cussing the issues of savings in projects. 
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In their study of the role of trust and accounting information in the context of public sector part-
nerships, Bogt and Tillema (2016) observed that trust implies greater openness and better infor-
mation sharing. Similarly, in a study which explored how contracts, control structures and trust 
interactively shape and change an interfirm relationship, Minnar et al. (2017) noted that with 
trust, partners became open to discussing the issues of savings in facility management projects 
and diligent towards discussing the issues of service and operation in the meetings.  
 
In the context of an external audit, these findings suggest that EAs’ trust improves mutual under-
standing between ACMs and them. If they trust ACMs, they will become willing to share infor-
mation with ACMs and diligently discuss risk factors as well as audit plans with ACMs. ACMs 
can then provide their comments about the appropriateness of risk identification and audit plans. 
Their trust in ACMs encourages them to incorporate ACMs’ comments into their audit plan. In 
doing so, the scope of audit becomes more appropriate and it becomes possible to identify signif-
icant risks at the planning stage. As a result, they can design subsequent audit approaches in or-
der to target the significant risk area. Consequently, audit process is improved and audit effec-
tiveness is enhanced, which then leads to improved audit quality.  
 
According to Canadian Chartered Professional Accountants (2014), one of the key areas affect-
ing audit quality is the quality of communications and interactions between ACMs and EAs. Ac-
counting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (2010) stated that open and effective communica-
tions between ACMs and audit partners are an important factor in enhancing regular interactions 
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between them, thus leading to high audit quality. Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada 
(2014) and HKCPA (2015) agreed that they should interact with one another to determine the 
appropriation of risk identification. Through these interactions, they can improve their under-
standing of business risk or financial risk of their clients, so that they will be able to improve the 
assessment of their clients’ risk. Consequently, they will more effectively determine materiality 
thresholds to be used in an external audit, and the extent of dependence on and testing of internal 
controls over financial reporting. By doing so, audit quality may be enhanced. 
 
After identifying the risks, EAs should communicate with ACMs on how they customise their 
audit plan for their clients’ situation in accordance to the level of risks (Accounting and Corpo-
rate Regulatory Authority, 2010). For instance, they should discuss the locations to be audited 
and assets to be verified (Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 2014). Meanwhile ac-
counting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (2010) and HKICPA (2015) suggested that one of 
the most important interactions between them is the review and discussion of the audit plan. This 
not only allows ACMs to understand and approve the scope of the audit and gain insight into the 
audit approach of the audit team, but also allows them to understand clients’ business and busi-
ness risks (HKICPA, 2015).  
 
They should discuss the rationales supporting important audit planning decisions (with ACMs) in 
accordance with the risks of a company and whether their analysis of a company’s business risks 
demonstrates sufficient knowledge of the business (HKICPA, 2015; Chartered Professional Ac-
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countants of Canada 2014). In addition, they must discuss about finding ways of ensuring effec-
tiveness and efficiency of an external audit before the audit is actually performed (HKCPA, 2015; 
Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 2014). For example, they should set up the time-
line for the communication with key deliverables (HKICPA, 2015; Chartered Professional Ac-
countants of Canada, 2014).  
 
After formulating an audit plan, they can discuss the estimation of resources scheduled according 
to the audit plan, such as partner leadership and involvement, specialised resources, industry ex-
perience as well as expected levels of technical consultations (Chartered Professional Account-
ants of Canada, 2014). In order to ensure sufficient resources for an external audit, they should 
determine the appropriate audit fees with ACMs (HKICPA, 2015). Chartered Professional Ac-
countants of Canada (2014) suggested that they should discuss the reasonableness of audit fees 
with regard to the size, complexity and risk of the engagement as compared to similar engage-
ments so as to ensure that the proposed audit fees are sufficient for fully implementing the activi-
ties in an audit plan. If they do not have sufficient interactions with ACMs, they may not be able 
to discuss audit plans and procedures in detail, so that the proposed audit fees may not provide 
sufficient resources for them to be able to perform audit procedures. Due to insufficient re-
sources, audit quality remains low.  
 
In summation, if EAs trust ACMs, they may be able to communicate issues early enough, so that 
they can deal with the comments from ACMs well before they start performing audit procedures. 
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Therefore, they can design an appropriate audit plan with comments from ACMs because they 
may then have a better understanding about the tone from the top, operations, indicators of fraud, 
integrity of management as well as perceived effectiveness of internal control systems. This in-
formation also allows them to determine the appropriate resources to be used for an external au-
dit. Viewed collectively, it is expected that audit quality is enhanced. 
 
10.2.3 Sharing of Sensitive Information about Managers with ACMs  
The study observes that EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity reduces their anxiety to share sensitive 
information about managers with ACMs and encourages them to consider the information pro-
vided by ACMs on managers. The sensitive information may include the comments on managers 
and any difficulties caused by managers that undermine audit process, efficiency, effectiveness 
and thereby, audit quality. The findings have implications for EAs as well. If they trust ACMs, 
they may become willing to report any difficulties caused by managers to ACMs, so that ACMs 
can take immediate actions to enable them to effectively perform an external audit. The findings 
also have implications for ACMs. If EAs trust them, they will be willing to provide their com-
ments on managers. Using these comments, ACMs can appoint high quality management, so that 
tones from the top may be improved.  
 
The findings of this study are consistent with the results from previous studies in that trust ena-
bles partners to exchange confidential and sensitive information. For instance, Bryan, Sinkovics 
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and Kim (2010) examined the effects of innovation orientation and technology uncertainty on the 
levels of relationship learning and market performance. According to their observation, trust re-
duced the tension of keeping confidential information in the relationship between buyers and 
sellers, so as to facilitate learning. In their study of investigating how characteristics of partner-
ship, communication behaviour and conflict resolution techniques affected the success of part-
nership between dealers and their manufacturers, Mohr and Spekman (1994) noted that trust led 
to better performance by enabling buyers and sellers to exchange confidential information. The 
findings in this study are in consonance with the results reported in Gundlach and Cannon (2010), 
who examined the effects of trust and formal verification on supplier performance. In particular, 
they showed that formal evaluation of suppliers did not significantly improve supplier perfor-
mance, but trust improved supplier performance.  
 
The findings in this study are in line with the report of Bogt and Tillema (2016), who found that 
trust between government officers and professionals in performance art enhanced the openness 
of discussion and information sharing, thereby improving financial performance of theatre. In 
their study of the relationships between inter-organisational trust and performance in the Czech 
Republic, Fiala, Rrokop and Zivelova (2012) observed that performance between suppliers and 
customers improved because a high level of trust may reduce opportunistic behaviour of partners 
and encourage them to share information.  
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In the context of an external audit, these findings imply that EAs’ trust encourages them to share 
sensitive information about managers with ACMs. Chartered Professional Accountants of Cana-
da 2014) and HKICPA (2015) concurred that they should share specifically information with 
ACMs, reporting any difficulties caused by managers to ACMs, such as significant delays 
caused by managers in conducting particular tasks, no access to certain personnel in the compa-
nies, managers’ unwillingness to provide important information, areas where the audit lags be-
hind schedule and the reasons for the same, unanticipated and extensive EAs’ effort to obtain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence.  
 
Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada (2014) and HKICPA (2015) suggested that if 
management does not cooperate with EAs, they should initiate discussions with ACMs, so that 
ACMs can have sufficient time to collect sufficient evidence by requiring managers to eliminate 
inefficiencies and respond to EAs immediately. They should ensure that they can gain sufficient 
support from ACMs in lending credence to their opinions on accounting matters which increase 
the tension between them and their managers (Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 
2014). It was also observed that EAs should report to ACMs when they are impelled to rely on 
particular staff members by managers for information to conduct an external audit, or if manag-
ers overly control the relationship with EAs. They should discuss with ACMs whether the man-
agers are too defensive about issues raised by them, or about the request for information to sup-
port managers’ discernments and judgments. They also should talk to ACMs in case managers 
are unwilling to document and support various accounting estimates or to meet their requests for 
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an assessment of a company’ ability to continue as an ongoing concern (HKICPA, 2015; Char-
tered Professional Accountants of Canada, 2014).  
 
Another important issue which EAs should make it a point to communicate with ACMs is that 
managers refuse to correct material misstatements of financial statements and inappropriately 
apply accounting methods for unusual transactions, emergent areas or inappropriately prepares 
sensitive accounting estimates (HKICPA, 2015; Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 
2014; PCAOB, 2012). They should also undertake discussions if managers consult with other 
accountants on auditing and accounting matters. They should express their views about signifi-
cant matters that are the subject of consultation (HKICPA, 2015; PCAOB, 2012). This assumes 
importance for audit quality. For instance, if they do trust ACMs, they may report inappropriate 
application of accounting methods on the part of managers. ACMs may also require managers to 
adjust the accounting methods, to enhance both audit effectiveness and quality. 
 
To conclude, if EAs choose to repose their trust on ACMs, they may share information about 
managers with ACMs, including their comments on managers and difficulties caused by them. 
This may render the audit process smooth, thus improving audit quality.  
 
10.2.4 Discussions about Findings and Recommendations 
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According to this study, EAs’ trust in ACMs’ ability encourages them to believe that ACMs take 
the recommendations seriously and are able to require the managers to implement the recom-
mendations. It also encourages them to devote their time and efforts to engaging in more infor-
mal discussions with ACMs and asking more specific questions. They may become open and 
candid to provide more recommendations and report their findings. In addition, they may be will-
ing to provide more in-depth analysis and value-adding recommendations and spend more time 
exploring recommendation options as well as discussing rationales behind their recommenda-
tions. These findings have implications for audit processes and effectiveness since it indicates 
that effective communication about recommendations and findings allows ACMs to identify the 
problems of accounting processes and require the management to remedy them. 
 
The findings of previous studies in other fields support the view that trust encourages actors to 
cooperate. In essence, partners are willing to contribute more resources to a relationship because 
of the underlying belief that they can achieve common goals. For example, in their study of de-
scribing specific mechanisms that influence interaction patterns and organizational processes m 
McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer (2003) found that trust encourages actors to contribute their re-
sources in joint activities, which leads to better performance. Robson, Katsikeas and Bello (2008) 
suggested in their study of the role of social and bureaucratic factors in cooperative processes in 
international alliance that trust improves performance by improving mobilisation of mechanisms, 
which enable partners to transfer their resources in an alliance. Specifically, they noted that the 
smaller the alliance size, the stronger the positive relationships between trust and performance. 
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Liao and Shi (2015) noted in their study of the effects of inter-firm trust and dependence on e-
business integration and operational performance in supply chain management in China that a 
high level of trust is known to enhance the operational performance of partners in supply chain 
management by enabling partners to have cooperative mindsets in business operations. In turn, 
this leads to optimal resource sharing. In particular, they observed that if behavioural uncertainty 
is high, trust assumes even greater importance in improving supplier performance.  
 
The findings in this study is consistent with the results of Yan and Gray (1994), who explored 
the effects of bargaining power on management control in joint ventures between US and Chi-
nese firms. Particularly, they observed that mutual trust is an important factor which moderates 
the effects of management control on performance. When management control is found to be 
dominant in one partner, trust assumes more importance for enhancing their cooperation. Mean-
while, in their study of exploring the connection between trust and interactions over time in a 
collaborative project in education industry, Oortmerssen, Woerkum and Aarts (2014) reported 
similar results. In particular, they noted that trust improved interactions and vice versa. They also 
observed that trust enhances openness for discussions and responsiveness to questions. Similarly, 
Carson et al. (2003), in their study of exploring the relationships between trust-based governance 
and performance in outsourced research and development engagements, showed that trust-based 
governance would enhance task performance by improving overall cooperation and coordination. 
More specifically, they noted that positive relationships were moderated by clients’ task-related 
and teachability of task. 
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The findings in this study are also consistent with the results of Bien, Ben and Wang (2014), who 
investigated the relationships between trust and firm performance in the realm of research and 
development cooperation. They suggested that trust enhances cooperative performance by 
providing opportunities for cooperation, enhancing flexibility, reducing coordination costs and 
facilitating knowledge transfer. They also found that the usage of formal contract and informal 
exchange increases the level of trust, resulting in better cooperative performance. In their study 
of investigating the role of trust in cooperative agreements in research and development, Monro-
ro-Sanchez, Mora-Valentin and Guerras-Martin (2010) argued that trust enhances cooperation, 
thus improving performance in research and development. They observed that both initial and 
ongoing trust enhances cooperation and performance. Analogously, Silva, Bradley and Sousa 
(2012) noted in their study of investigating the antecedents of trust and examining the trust-
performance relationship in international alliance that trust improves performance by enhancing 
the level of satisfaction between actors in the context of international business activities. Interest-
ingly, they reported that the more similar the partners are, the stronger the positive linkage be-
tween trust and performance is.  
 
These findings in the context of an external audit suggest that if EAs trust ACMs, they may en-
deavour to spend additional time on discussions relating to findings and recommendations with 
ACMs. For example, if modified opinions are issued, they need to discuss the underlying reasons 
for this development. They may expect that managers have serious disagreements with their 
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opinions and judgments about accounting estimates (HKICPA, 2015; Chartered Professional Ac-
countants of Canada, 2014; PCAOB, 2012). If they trust ACMs, they may be willing to spend 
more time discussing the above issues. Consequently, ACMs may develop a better understanding 
of the underlying rationale behind their judgments about accounting estimates. Since an external 
audit becomes more effective, audit quality is enhanced.   
 
EAs’ trust also encourages them to endeavour to discuss the changes necessitated in an external 
audit with ACMs. To illustrate, ACMs may inform them about any significant transactions or 
changes in the business which may affect the progress of audits and in effect, audit report (Ac-
counting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, 2010; HKICPA, 2015). Chartered Professional 
Accountants of Canada (2014) stated that if necessary, ACMs may request them to perform addi-
tional audit procedures beyond the requirements of audit standards (HKICPA, 2015; Chartered 
Professional Accountants of Canada, 2014). If they trust ACMs, they may be willing to discuss 
the impact of significant transactions or changes unfolding in businesses. Further, they may be-
come more flexible in performing additional audit procedures beyond the requirements of audit 
standards because they are willing to contribute more resources (their time and effort) to an ex-
ternal audit. Since more resources can be appropriately used in an external audit, audit quality is 
enhanced. 
 
Another example is that after performing substantive test on these transactions, they may find 
that there are material misstatements in some transactions, so they may need to discuss the 
  
 406 
changes of scope of the audit and the impact of these changes with ACMs (HKICPA, 2015; 
Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 2014). If they do trust ACMs, they may discuss 
the need of changes of audit scope with ACMs. Since the scope of audit can be adjusted in ac-
cordance with the level of risk and emerging issues of a company, audit quality is enhanced.  
 
In their discussions about findings and recommendations, they may share their personal experi-
ence with ACMs to facilitate the benchmarking to best practices (Accounting and Corporate 
Regulatory Authority, 2010). If they trust ACMs, they may provide recommendations using their 
experience acquired from the audits of other companies to ACMs. Accordingly, ACMs can use 
these recommendations to improve internal audit function of a company.  
 
To conclude, EAs’ trust encourages them to discuss such issues with ACMs as the need of 
changes of the scope of an external audit, changes of business circumstances that are not antici-
pated in audit plan, sufficiency of audit procedures as well as appropriateness of the audit re-
port’s conclusion. Further, they may have in-depth discussions about the recommendations as 
well. Since an external audit is adjusted in connection with unanticipated events and recommen-
dations are considered thoroughly, audit quality is enhanced.  
10.2.5 Selection of Audit Approaches 
According to this study, if EAs trust ACMs, they tend to use control-based approaches because 
they believe that ACMs may hold managers accountable, perceived audit risk is less and internal 
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controls can be depended upon. If the level of trust is low, they may be less certain about con-
trols in place and perceive that ACMs’ care in overseeing financial reporting is lacking. These 
findings have significant implications for the audit process, effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Firstly, EAs cannot perform substantive tests on all transactions of a company because of the 
sheer size of volume (Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen and Stein, 2003), but they can test internal controls 
that the transactions should go through. The usage of control-based tests leads to speedier audit, 
which could reduce the resources required in an external audit. Apart from optimal use of scarce 
audit resources, both substantive tests and control-based tests can also be used for high risk areas. 
For instance, if they find that internal controls are strong for revenue cycle, they may reduce sub-
stantive tests on the amount of revenues. As a result, they may be able to use the saved time to 
perform both control-based and substantive tests on purchasing equipment. By doing so, audit 
resources can be directed to appropriate areas, so that audit quality may be enhanced.  
 
Secondly, the evidence obtained from substantive and control-based tests can be corroborated, so 
that the findings may be more reliable. To illustrate, they can test the approval process about 
which transactions of revenues should go through. They can then substantively test the amount 
of revenues. If the results of substantive tests reveal that the amount of revenues is correct and 
the results of control-based tests show that the revenues have been appropriately approved, EAs 
will have strong evidence to back the claim that revenues are not misstated.  
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The results of prior studies in other fields demonstrated that trust reduces opportunism; therefore, 
actors perceive that risk is low. For instance, in their study of trust and perceived risk in the con-
text of strategic alliances, Das and Teng (2001) suggested that goodwill trust reduces perceived 
risk because it reinforces the reputation and attitude of care about partners’ benefits in alliances. 
Therefore, partners feel more assured that they may cooperate in good faith, and not behave op-
portunistically. Hence, the likelihood that partners act opportunistically is reduced. Further, they 
suggested that competence trust reduces perceived risk because high competence of partners 
suggests a high probability of getting things accomplished successfully.  
 
In a study which explored the role of trust in the long-term commitment between partners in stra-
tegic alliances with firms belonging to different cultures, Fadol and Sandhu (2013) found that the 
high level of trust between ADGAS partners did not lead to any opportunistic behaviour from 
ADGAS partners. Trust and cooperation helped the partners quickly commit more resources as 
needed and implement their joint project, a decision that accelerated decision-making.  
 
Similarly, in their study that tested the Das and Teng’s conceptual framework of trust, risk and 
control for pharmaceutical buyer-supplier relationships in Turkey, Sengun and Nazli (2007) re-
ported similar results. The findings were similar to the results found in the study conducted by 
Ren, Gray and Kim (2009), who suggested that trust serves the purpose of social control mecha-
nisms in order to reduce opportunism in the context of international joint venture. In their study 
of evaluating the relationship between trust and risk in the context of partnerships of education 
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services, Walker (2007) noted that goodwill trust and competence trust reduce perceived risk by 
illuminating the intention not to behave opportunistically. As a result, the risk that the partners 
do not cooperate is reduced.  
 
Competence trust gives confidence that partners have the ability to achieve tasks successfully, 
implying that perceived risk is low. In their study of examining the effects of trust and perceived 
risk on exchange performance, Delbufalo (2015) observed that trust reduces perceived risk by 
encouraging partners to expect that they are not taken advantage of. As a result, cooperation is 
enhanced and exchange performance is improved. In particular, they noted that high perceived 
risk reduces the effectiveness of governance structure by increasing the cost of monitoring. Con-
sequently, partners need to spend excessive resources monitoring one another (Nooteboom, 
1996). In a study investigating the effects of balance of bargaining power on the balance of man-
agement control in joint ventures between US and Chinese firms, Yan and Gray (1994) conclud-
ed that mutual trust was an important factor which moderated the effects of management control 
on performance. When management control was found to be dominant in one partner, trust was 
deemed important for enhancing their cooperation. 
 
The findings in this study are in line with the results obtained by Swiatowiec-Szczepanska 
(2012), who investigated appropriate risk management mechanisms under varying characteristics 
of relationships. They reported similar results, but observed that trust did not necessarily guaran-
tee the reduction of perceived risk if it was unsupported by activities of one another, or if rela-
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tional norms were unilateral, since partners will fear that their partners will take advantage of 
their trust to engage in opportunistic behaviours. In their study about the linkage between control 
problems, trust and formal controls in the relationship between a supplier of railway safety sys-
tems and government department responsible for maintaining the Dutch rail infrastructure sys-
tem, Dekker (2004) observed that trust enables partners to perceive that risk is low. As a result, 
control problems are perceived to be reduced. Additionally, the study demonstrated that formal 
control provided partners with the direction of alliances to achieve common goals. Capability 
trust and goodwill trust strengthened the effects of formal controls on enhancing the coordination 
of activities and reducing opportunistic behaviours. Hence, perceived risk is low. 
 
In a study relating to the effects of trust on positive outcomes in marketing channels, Geyskens et 
al. (1996) reported that trust improves satisfaction and long-term orientation because when part-
ners trust one another, they tend to feel secure by the implicit beliefs that actions of a partner will 
bring in positive outcomes or at least prevent a negative outcome. In the long run, partners will 
commit themselves to the relationships due to the establishment of trust. Specifically, they noted 
that environmental uncertainty and the use of coercive power were negatively associated with the 
levels of trust, but pointed out that dependence and communication was positively associated 
with trust, thereby improving satisfaction and long-term orientation. In their study about the ef-
fects of trust on risk and the moderating effects of interpersonal relationships on the linkage be-
tween trust and risk in marketing channels, Liu et al. (2008) found similar results. Liu, Wang and 
Yan (2011), in their study relating to the correlations among control, trust and risk in supply 
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chain in China, reported that trust reduces perceived risk by showing cooperation intention of 
supply chain members. Moreover, partners can reduce their concerns about the problems in co-
operation, thus lowering perceived risk. More specifically, they reported that behaviour control 
and performance control helped reduce perceived risk.  
 
In order to identify the antecedents of risk to manage the overall satisfaction of outsourcing ex-
perience, Willenweber, Jahner and Krcmar (2008) conducted a study showing that trust reduces 
financial risk, resulting in high satisfaction. If the level of trust is high, actions leading to unex-
pected service cost due to opportunistic behaviours are unlikely to occur; this implies that finan-
cial risk is reduced. In their study about the linkage between the effects of governance and trust 
on risk perceived by partners in alliances of microelectronics assembly industry, Nooteboom, 
Gerger and Noorderhaven (1997) showed that trust reduces perceived risk in terms of probability 
of loss as opposed to the size of loss because trust reduces the intention and motives of partners 
of engaging in opportunism. In a study investigating the roles of trust on commitment in logistics 
alliances, Moore (2006) found that buyers’ trust reduces perceived risk, leading to enhanced rela-
tionship commitment because a buyer thinks that their partners will fulfil their future obligations. 
In their study which examined the effects of governance mechanisms in forms of formal con-
tracts, relational norms and trust on the performance of exploration, exploitation joint research 
and development, Arranz and Arroyabe (2011) observed that trust curbs the opportunism of part-
ners through shared norms and values, so that risk is perceived to be low. Partners will be able to 
  
 412 
formulate their reciprocal expectations, leading to improved performance between partners in 
exploration projects.  
 
These findings have significant implications in the context of an external audit. If EAs do not 
trust ACMs, they may doubt ACMs’ behaviour and internal controls due to the perception that 
audit risk is high. By only relying on substantive tests rather than control-based tests, they may 
not be able to use control-based tests to obtain evidence that has been corroborated with evidence 
obtained from substantive tests, rendering them less reliable. Additionally, if they only depend 
upon substantive tests, they may be able to use less time to cover other high risk areas, thereby 
compromising audit quality. 
 
10.3 Discussions about Findings of Responses to Closed-Ended Questions  
The findings of closed-ended questions are consistent with the results of open-ended questions 
and previous studies in that EAs’ trust encourages them to interact with ACMs and perceive that 
the quality of interactions with ACMs is high. Similarly, the findings of independent t-tests sup-
port the notion that their trust in ACMs encourages them to develop the perception that trust in-
creases interactions with ACMs. As per the findings of regression analysis, their trust in ACMs’ 
integrity and goodwill encourages them to perceive that the quality of interactions with ACMs is 
improved. These findings imply that if they place their trust in ACMs’ goodwill and integrity, 
the perceptions of the quality of their interactions with ACMs will also improve.  
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10.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter compares the findings of the questionnaire survey study undertaken in this research 
to prior studies and explains their implications. The researcher has elucidated how EAs’ trust 
improves their interactions with ACM, which, in turn, enhances the efficiency, effectiveness and 
quality of audit process. ACMs are required to display high levels of competence, integrity and 
goodwill so that EAs can trust them. By doing so, they may perceive the fact that the quality of 
interactions with ACMs is enhanced. Consequently, effective interactions will occur, leading to 
high audit quality.  
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CHAPTER 11 
SYNTHESIS OF ARCHIVAL MODELLING AND QUESTIONNAIRE STUDIES 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by discussing the findings and implications of the archival modelling and 
questionnaire survey studies. Thereafter, the discussion focuses on how the findings of both stud-
ies are integrated with each other. 
 
11.2 Findings and Implications of the Archival Modelling Study 
The archival modelling study provides evidence that ACMs’ financial expertise, AC size, tenure 
and age are important determinants of audit quality. Readers of accounting reports can use the 
data on these characteristics as indicators of audit quality. For this reason, Hong Kong regulatory 
authorities may mandate that a Hong Kong listed company must have certain number of directors 
with financial expertise on the AC. Additionally, they may mandate that ACMs’ age must not 
exceed a maximum level so that stakeholders’ interests can be protected. However, it does not 
support to establish maximum years of ACMs’ service period because long tenured ACMs may 
help enhance audit quality. Mandatory rotation of ACMs may reduce audit quality. This study 
fails to find evidence that AC independence, diligence and directorships relate to audit quality.  
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The archival modelling study documents evidence that an effective AC helps enhance audit qual-
ity after the financial crisis. The findings provide practical implications for corporations’ needs 
to satisfy the needs of stakeholders and attract potential investors. Measuring the impact of effec-
tive AC characteristics allows decision makers to evaluate the role of these monitoring systems 
in enhancing stakeholders’ perception about the quality of financial information. If stakeholders 
are able to obtain reliable information about corporate performance, their financial decisions can 
then become more accurate and effective. This study reveals findings that may enable stakehold-
ers to improve their decision-making. Measuring different AC characteristics enables stakehold-
ers to be mindful of ACMs’ effectiveness in monitoring audit quality in order to reduce earnings 
management as well as to evaluate the reliability of financial information.  
 
Hong Kong’s corporate governance authorities can use this study as empirical support for devel-
oping their regulations and making further recommendations relating to corporate governance. 
Stock market authorities can also use this study’s results to evaluate the current disclosure re-
quirements of corporate governance practices in improving audit quality. New corporate govern-
ance practices and revisions of existing corporate codes after the financial crisis in 2008 should 
be based on evidence provided by empirical studies, such as the evidence provided by this re-
search.  
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11.3 Findings and Implication of the Questionnaire Survey Study 
The questionnaire survey study finds that EAs trust ACMs because ACMs display integrity, 
competence and goodwill. Their trust also encourages them to seek more useful information to 
perform risk assessment, determine the scope of audit and material thresholds and share sensitive 
information with ACMs. Armed with high levels of trust, EAs may be able to determine more 
appropriate audit approaches. For instance, if they have a high level of trust in ACMs, they 
should leverage a control-based audit approach, so that resources can be directed to high risk ar-
eas. If they have low levels of trust in ACMs, they may choose to use more substantive ap-
proaches. Since resources can be used in appropriate areas, the effectiveness and efficiency of an 
audit is likely to increase, leading to improved audit quality. 
 
The questionnaire survey study also provides insights to regulators. Regulators may require 
ACMs to have and display high levels of competence, goodwill and integrity in order to encour-
age EAs to trust them. For example, regulators may require them to have sophisticated financial, 
accounting and industry expertise. This may increase EAs’ trust in their competence. Regulators 
may also require them to keep EAs’ comments on managers confidential. This, in turn, may in-
crease EAs’ trust in their integrity. Regulators may strengthen the independence requirements of 
ACMs, requiring them to diligently cooperate with EAs and oversee financial reports. For in-
stance, regulators can require them to hold certain numbers of meetings with EAs and mandate 
the content of discussions taking place between them in each meeting. The regulators may also 
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specify and strengthen the information that should be communicated between them. By doing so, 
EAs may be more willing to trust their goodwill, thus enhancing the perception relating to the 
quality of interactions. As a result, the reliability of financial statements can be improved. This 
allows stakeholders to make better decisions using high quality financial statements.  
 
11.4 Synthesis of the Findings of Both Studies 
Sections 11.2 and 11.3 discussed the findings as well as implications of the archival modelling 
and quanlitative studies. This section discusses how these findings are integrated.  
 
A high level of EAs’ trust in ACMs is expected to strengthen the positive association between 
AC characteristics and audit quality because EAs’ trust in them improves their interactions, 
which are important for enhancing the audit processes. As demonstrated in the study conducted 
by Sulaiman (2017) and mentioned in Section 3.5, audit quality may be influenced by the quality 
of their relationships and interactions. She agreed that interactions often occur between ACMs 
and EAs outside the formal meetings to discuss sensitive and important audit issues, which may 
have an impact on audit quality. This result is supported by the findings of the study conducted 
by Gendron (2004), who showed that EAs, ACMs and managers had interactions to discuss the 
coherence of financial reports and ACMs assess EAs’ competence on the basis of whether their 
audit plan reflected their understanding of the impacts on audit risks. Gendron (2004) suggested 
that the one area where ACMs have interactions with EAs is to assess EAs’ performance and in-
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dependence. ACMs have private meetings with EAs to assess the quality as well as ability of 
managers. They discuss whether they have unimpaired access to information and experienced 
any difficulties during the course of their audit.  
 
Cohen et al. (2007) reviewed prior literature and proposed that EAs should discuss factors that 
might impel managers to make aggressive accounting choices, such as analyst forecast data and 
understand how audit fees are determined with explicit consideration of achieving quality ser-
vices. This information should also be disclosed in the engagement letter. They should evaluate 
each of the components of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) as well as the 
convergence of the MD&A with external information. Beattie, Fearnley and Hines (2013) con-
ducted semi-structured questionnaire surveys with CFOs, AC chairs and audit partners to explore 
the factors that may influence audit quality during the post-SOX period in the UK. They noted 
that EAs’ communication with ACMs on key issues associated with audit and ethical standards 
was the most important factor which influenced audit quality.  
 
In their interviews, Salleh and Stewart (2012) found that EAs faced difficulties in handling mat-
ters highly subjective in nature and as a result, had disputes with managers. If these issues are 
material, they will be submitted to the AC for resolving them. The participants agreed that when 
EAs submit their audit plan at the beginning of a financial year, they raise concerns about poten-
tial audit issues. The AC is alerted at an early stage about issues that may potentially cause disa-
greements between managers and them. At the reporting stage, all audit findings and proposed 
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audit adjustments are discussed with the AC. They also observed that the AC’s authority of me-
diating in disputes is strengthened by the AC’s expertise because it allows them to make system-
atic judgments about accounting disputes between EAs and managers.  
 
Based on these studies, the researcher can understand that although a large AC has independent 
and diligent ACMs who are financial experts, important issues cannot be solved such as audit 
plan, material areas subject to subjective judgments, disagreements between EAs and managers, 
if they do not have effective interactions with ACMs. Hence, the quality of an external audit may 
be low. The questionnaire survey study demonstrates that trust is an important factor that en-
courages EAs and ACMs to have more interactions. If ACMs have effective characteristics and 
EAs may trust them, they are not only able to effectively monitor the quality of the audit work, 
but also discuss with EAs how to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit process. 
Thus, it is expected that audit quality is further enhanced. For instance, if ACMs are financial 
experts and EAs trust them to be independent, EAs may be willing to discuss the likelihood that 
managers engage in aggressive earnings management. Therefore, ACMs may allow EAs to have 
a wider scope of the audit, so that the effectiveness, efficiency and quality of audit processes may 
be enhanced. 
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11.5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that ACMs’ financial expertise, AC size, tenure and age are important deter-
minants of audit quality. EAs tend to trust ACMs because they display integrity, competence and 
goodwill. EAs’ trust in them may improve their interactions to discuss important issues, which, 
in turn, may enhance audit quality. In totality, EAs’ trust in ACMs may moderate the positive 
associations between ACMs’ characteristics and audit quality. The next chapter provides the 
summary and conclusion of the entire thesis.  
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CHAPTER 12 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises this study and its major findings. It will be organised as follows:  
1. Restatement of the research questions 
2. Description of the research methods undertaken to answer the research questions.  
3. Summary of the research results 
4. Limitation of this research 
5. Avenues for further research 
 
12.2 Restatement of the Research Questions 
Opportunistic earnings management practice leads to misleading reported earnings that do not 
truly reflect a company’s performance. In turn, this may reduce the usefulness of financial state-
ments for stakeholders’ economic decisions. When managers’ opportunistic behaviour is con-
strained by monitoring systems, reported earnings may become more reliable. One of the control 
mechanisms found effective in earnings quality is to enhance audit quality via efficacious AC 
characteristics and their interactions with ACMs so as to constrain the opportunistic earnings en-
gaged by managers.  
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The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of AC characteristics and EAs’ trust in ACMs 
on audit quality in Hong Kong. Accordingly, four research questions were asked:  
 
1) What are the impacts of AC characteristics on audit quality in Hong Kong?  
2) What factors influence EAs’ trust in ACMs in Hong Kong? 
3) Does EAs’ trust have positive effects on their interactions with ACMs in Hong Kong? 
4) How does EAs’ trust in ACMs impact their interactions and audit quality in Hong Kong? 
 
12.3 Summary of Research Methodology  
This study used the archival modelling and questionnaire survey studies. The archival modelling 
study enabled the researcher to collect secondary data to examine the hypotheses in regard to the 
relationships between AC characteristics and audit quality using the quantitative research method 
The questionnaire survey study enabled the researcher to explore the effects of EAs’ trust in 
ACMs on audit quality in the context of Hong Kong coporate governance using both the quanti-
tative and qualitative methods.   
 
Using agency theory, this study investigates the effects of corporate governance and external au-
dit systems on restricting earnings management. Part One of this research is an archival model-
ling study that examines the impacts of effective AC characteristics on audit quality. A review of 
relevant literatures identifies seven AC characteristics: AC size, independence, diligence, compe-
tence, directorships, tenure and age. Consistent with prior research (Shankaraiah and Amiri, 2017; 
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Yasser and Al Mamun, 2016; Ayemere and Elijah, 2015; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Baxter and 
Cotter, 2009), this study incorporated discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model 
to proxy for audit quality.  
 
Eight models were constructed and seven hypotheses were tested. Models 1 and 2 denote the 
main analysis of the relationships between AC characteristics and audit quality measured in 
terms of absolute value of discretionary accruals. As additional analysis, Models 3 and 4 use the 
indicator whether the absolute value of discretionary accruals is higher than the sample median. 
Models 3 to 4 helped ascertain whether the results are sensitive to alternative statistical methods. 
Similarly, models 5 and 6 use the log value of audit fees as a proxy for audit quality; on the other 
hand, models 7 and 8 use the choice of EAs as a proxy for audit quality. Models 5 to 8 serve as 
robustness checks to determine alternative measures of audit quality.   
 
These models were tested using a sample of firms contained in Hong Kong Hang Seng Compo-
site Index. Firms belonging to the financial industry were excluded due to their different accrual 
choices and valuation processes. The study covers the period from 2010 to 2015. Panel data re-
gression was used to investigate whether these AC characteristics significantly improve audit 
quality.  
 
Part Two of this research comprises of a questionnaire survey study that explores the effects of 
EAs’ trust in ACMs based on their interactions and in effect, audit quality. Semi-structured ques-
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tionnaires were sent to EAs in order to investigate their levels of trust in ACMs and effectiveness 
of their interactions and help me understand the impacts on audit quality. OLS with robust stand-
ard errors and independent t-test were used for analysing the responses to closed-ended questions. 
Similarly, thematic analysis was used to analyse open-ended questions.  
 
The archival modelling study demonstrates what characteristics are important for ACMs to per-
form their oversight role on audit quality. The questionnary survey enables the researcher to ex-
plore EAs’ trust in ACMs and their interactions. Particularly, the data of their trust and interac-
tions with ACMs cannot be collected from secondary data. This mixed method allows the re-
searcher to triangulate the findings obtained from the arichival modelling and questionnaire sur-
vey so that this will enable the researcher to obtain better understandings of the critical oversight 
role of the ACMs on audit quality as shown in Chapter 11.  
 
12.4 Summary of the Research Results 
This section summarises the findings of the archival modelling and questionnaire survey studies.  
 
 
12.4.1 Summary of Findings of the Archival Modelling Study  
Seven hypotheses and the key findings of their tests were summarised in Tables 30 and 35. Sev-
en hypotheses are re-stated as follows: 
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H1: There is no relationship between audit quality and the size of an AC. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between audit quality and AC independence. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the diligence of an audit committee and  
audit quality.  
H4: There is a negative relationship between AC financial expertise and audit quality. 
H5: There is no relationship between AC directorships and audit quality. 
 
H6: There is no relationship between average AC tenure and audit quality. 
 
H7: There is a negative relationship between AC age and audit quality. 
 
 
The overall results suggest that effective AC characteristics are important for the purpose of en-
hancing audit quality in Hong Kong.  
 
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the result shows that AC size positively relates to audit quality in 
Hong Kong in Models 1 and 2.  The result indicates that a larger AC may have more resources at 
its disposal, such as expertise, experience and manpower, to perform their oversight role in order 
to improve audit quality. Inconsistent with hypothesis 2, the coefficients of AC independence are 
only significant in Model 4 and insignificant in Models 1 to 3. Therefore, it does not support the 
view that AC independence enables them to monitor managers without any intervention. A pos-
sible explanation of this result is that HKEx classification of independence may not truly reflect 
AC independence. For example, friendships between managers and ACMs are not required to be 
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reported in an annual report. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the findings show that AC expertise 
positively relates to audit quality in Models 1 to 2. It is indicated that AC financial expertise is 
important for enhancing audit quality in Hong Kong because accounting or finance experts have 
a better understanding of technical internal controls and auditing procedures. Inconsistent with 
hypothesis 4, the result does not show that AC diligence relates to audit quality in Models 1 to 4. 
This can be explained by the fact that the number of ACMs’ meetings does not show the quality, 
length or issues of the discussion. Particularly, this does not show the interactions between 
ACMs and EAs. Thereby, the number of meetings may not fully capture ACMs’ diligence, so 
this does not relate to audit quality. 
 
Inconsistent with hypothesis 5, the result demonstrates that AC directorship does not significant-
ly relate to audit quality in Models 1 to 4. This can be possibly attributed to the nature of direc-
torships. If they serve as directors of other companies within the same industry, the experience 
may enable them to improve their oversight role. However, if they serve as directors of compa-
nies in other industries, this experience may not be applied to their oversight role of the sampled 
companies. This indicates that there is no significant relationship. Also, the number of director-
ships may not adequately capture ACMs’ busyness. For example, a director who serves on five 
small listed companies may not be as busy as the one who serves on three giant large listed com-
panies.  
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Consistent with hypothesis 6, the result shows that this study finds a significant relationship be-
tween average AC tenure and discretionary accruals in Models 1. The results of this study pro-
vides evidence that ACMs may acquire more knowledge and experience of monitoring financial 
reporting and audit process in a company over a period of time (Fiedier, 1970). These findings 
do not support the viewpoint that a long-tenured ACM may become familiar with managers, so 
their oversight role on managers may be impaired (Vineeta and Errol, 2012) in Hong Kong. Sur-
prisingly, the result shows that average AC age positively related to discretionary accruals in 
Models 2 and 4. This study provides evidence that older ACMs may contribute to lower audit 
quality because they have less energy to monitor audit and financial reporting process and cannot 
keep a breast of the changing enviroment of a company or technology.  
 
12.4.2 Summary of Findings of the Questionnaire Survey Study 
The findings are consistent with the four propositions stated in Chapter 7 as follows:  
 
P1: EAs trust ACMs if they have and display competence.  
P2: EAs trust ACMs if they have and display integrity.  
P3: EAs trust ACMs if they have and display goodwill 
 
P4: EAs’ trust in ACMs has positive effects on the interactions with ACMs and in effect, audit 
quality.  
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An analysis of responses to open-ended questions suggests that it is important for ACMs to dis-
play high levels of integrity, competence and goodwill, so that EAs are more willing to interact 
with them. Furthermore, trust plays an important role in their relationships with ACMs by im-
proving the quality of discussion and information sharing between them. The findings have im-
plications for audit process and effectiveness since EAs could receive more information from 
ACMs, thus enhancing their understanding of clients’ audit risk.  
 
Moreover, their trust in ACMs reduces their anxiety to share sensitive information about manag-
ers with ACMs and encourages them to consider the information provided by ACMs on man-
agement. Their trust in ACMs’ ability encourages them to believe that ACMs take the recom-
mendations seriously and are able to mandate managers to implement them. Thus, they will en-
deavour to discuss their recommendations and findings. It encourages them to devote their time 
and efforts to engaging in more informal discussions with ACMs and asking more specific ques-
tions. They may become open and candid for providing more recommendations and reporting 
their findings. They may also be willing to provide more in-depth analysis and value-adding rec-
ommendations, whilst also spending more time exploring recommendation options and discuss-
ing rationales behind their recommendations. The findings have implications for audit processes 
and effectiveness since it is indicated that effective communication about recommendation and 
findings enables ACMs to identify the problems of accounting processes and require managers to 
remedy them. 
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If they trust ACMs, they may tend to use control-based approaches because they believe that 
ACMs may hold managers accountable, perceived audit risk is less and internal controls can be 
relied upon. If the level of trust is low, they may be less certain about the controls in place and 
perceive that ACMs’ care in overseeing financial reporting is lacking. In contrast, their trust en-
courages them to focus their resources on high risk areas, so as to make the process of audit more 
efficient and effective.   
 
The findings and the propositions are consistent with the social interdependence theory. Since 
EAs and ACMs have common goals to achieve high audit quality to protect shareholders, so they 
depend on one another. Therefore, they may develop trust in ACMs if ACMs can smooth EAs’ 
work. In order to smooth their work, ACMs should display high levels of competence, integrity 
and goodwill. If they trust ACMs, they will be willing to share information and suggest recom-
mendations beyond the minimum requirements suggested by the audit standards, have better co-
operation and become more diligent in external audits, as predicted by social interdependence 
theory.  
 
12.5 Implication and Significance of This Research 
 
Implication of the findings has been discussed in Chapter 11. This section focuses on the discus-
sions on the implication and significance to the users of this research. This research shows that 
ACMs’ size, financial expertise and tenure are positively associated with audit quality, but their 
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age negatively relates to it. Therefore, the financial statement users can use these variables to as-
sess the level of audit quality of a listed company to make their economic decisions. For example, 
investors can assess these variables to determine the level of audit quality of a listed company 
they want to invest in. If a company has a small and old AC with low levels of financial expertise 
as well as short tenure, the investors need to pay particular attention to its audit quality because it 
may be easier for managers to manipulate earnings, so the financial information they rely on to 
make investment decision may not be reliable, resulting in making inappropriate decisions. The 
regulators should mandate certain AC characteristics. For instance, they may legally require an 
AC to have a minimum number of members and financial experts in a year and a maximum age 
requirement for ACMs. Therefore, it is expected that audit quality of Hong Kong listed compa-
nies can be enhanced to protect the interests of financial statement users so that the risk of finan-
cial crisis can be mitigated.  
 
This research also demonstrated that EAs may trust ACMs if they display competence, integrity 
and goodwill. This provides evidence to current Hong Kong ACMs that if they want their EAs to 
trust them, they should display competene, integrity and goodwill. This research elucidated how 
EAs’ trust improves their interactions with ACM, which, in turn, enhances the efficiency, effec-
tiveness and quality of audit process. It provides additional support for the views that regulators 
should legally require the AC to have the minimum levels of independence and financial exper-
tise. Therefore, these regulations may enhance their competence, integrity and goodwill, so 
ACMs may be more willing to trust and interact with EAs.  
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This research implies that a large and young AC with high levels of financial expertise may im-
prove audit quality, but if they cannot establish trust with EAs, audit quality may still be low be-
cause they may not have effective interactions with EAs. On the contrary, although EAs trust 
ACMs, if the AC does not have the desired characteristics found in this research, audit quality 
may still be low. 
 
If regulators require an AC to have a certain number of members and expertise, and impose max-
imum age rerquirement, not only does it improve the AC characteristics, but also encourage EAs 
to trust ACMs because they are expected to display higher levels of competence, integrity and 
goodwill so that the perception of the quality of interactions may be enhanced. Therefore, the 
regulations on meetings, financial experts and age are expected to have twofold positive effects 
on audit quality.  
 
12.6 Potential Limitations of the Research 
Although this thesis was theoretically conducted on a systematic basis under the supervision of 
qualified and specialised supervisors, there it is not impervious to potential limitations, and the 
reader should be aware of the same when interpreting the research findings. These research limi-
tations have been divided into two sections. The first section pertains to the limitations of the ar-
chival modelling study. The second section is concerned with the limitations of the questionnaire 
survey study. 
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12.6.1 Potential Limitations of the Archival Modelling Study 
The first limitation relates to the validity of statistical conclusions and the probability that the 
statistical results are representative of the actual relationship with the data set. In this study, the 
sample used is limited to the companies contained in the Hong Kong Hang Seng Composite In-
dex. This may lead to a size bias. However, this bias is likely to reduce survivorship bias during 
the course of the study period because larger firms are less likely to be delisted than their smaller 
counterparts.  
 
The second limitation relates to the selection of the study sample. The sampled firms are selected 
from the index, as opposed to being randomly selected from the listed companies. This may in-
troduce an inherent bias and possible inaccurate associations arising from the sample design. 
However, since the formation and closure of an AC is voluntary, it is more likely that companies 
contained in the index may accurately disclose the information of an AC for this study. For this 
reason, it is difficult for the study concerning Hong Kong to select firms randomly.  
 
This study used data from Hong Kong. Care should be taken in generalising the results to the 
markets of other countries that have different regulations, practices, and economic features and 
whose capital market may exhibit different characteristics. However, the similarity in the results 
of this study and the findings of research in other countries may indicate a high degree of gener-
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alisability. Even in Hong Kong, the generalisability of results to all listed companies may be re-
duced because financial companies were excluded from the sample.   
 
The use of discretionary accruals as audit quality in this study may also have some limitations. 
Although the use can be justified theoretically, it may not be accurately measured. However, this 
limitation has been minimised through unambiguous operational definitions of the measures in 
Chapter 3.  
 
In terms of the dependent variable (discretionary accruals), the literature indicates a high level of 
measurement errors in the accrual models that are commonly used as a proxy for audit quality. 
Another limitation is that audit quality can be measured in various ways, such as financial re-
statement, audit fees and abnormal market returns. Currently, no clear method exists for the pur-
pose of measuring audit quality.  
 
A further limitation of this study is that there may be other factors which influence audit quality 
in addition to corporate governance. While additional control variables were identified for inclu-
sion in tests to control further potential influencers of audit quality, it is possible that other fac-
tors not controlled in this study could impact audit quality. However, this study does not aim to 
test causality; instead it endeavours to determine the relationship between audit quality and at-
tributes of AC effectiveness. Therefore, the effects of this specific limitation on the findings may 
be considered to be of minor consequence.  
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12.6.2 Potential Limitations of the Questionnaire Survey Study 
The findings rely on the respondents’ self-reported cross-sectional data, as opposed to longitudi-
nal data. This may not reflect changing situations and the series of relationships phenomena be-
tween EAs and ACMs over a period of time. The cross-sectional data may be affected by the re-
spondent’s predisposition of any events that have occurred in the past or by the mental position 
at the period of filing in the questionnaire.  
 
Notably, the data have been collected only from EAs. This might not explore the full picture of 
trust and interactions between EAs and ACMs, because interactions between them are predicated 
on EAs’ cooperation with ACMs and vice versa. The data have been collected from EAs who 
performed audits for Hong Kong listed companies. This facilitated data collection and control-
ling diversity, but limited the generalisation of the findings.  
 
The findings may also be subject to selection bias. It is more likely that EAs with a high level of 
satisfaction with ACMs may respond to the questionnaire survey. Unsatisfied EAs may opt not 
to participate in the questionnaire survey. This implies that this research may not capture the ef-
fects of extreme low levels of EAs’ trust on their interactions.  
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Moreover, this study only used semi-structured questionnaire survey, so the researcher could not 
probe in-depth questions by asking the respondents following questions. Therefore, this research 
may not generate data for the analysis of in-depth relationships between trust and audit quality. 
Further, this research did not collect EAs’ personal data such as gender, experience and Big 4 
auditors. This may influence how EAs trust ACMs and their actions with ACMs.  
 
This study only focuses on the positive aspect of trust on their interactions and audit quality, but 
it may result in negative effects as discussed in Section 7.1, so this study does not show the nega-
tive impacts of trust on audit quality.  
  
It only examines the effects of EAs’ trust on the interactions between EAs and ACMs, but ig-
nored the interactions between EAs and finance managers or between EAs and internal audit 
managers.  
 
12.7 Recommendations for Future Research  
This study’s results provide evidence (in the archival modelling study) that a number of corpo-
rate governance attributes significantly relates to audit quality in Hong Kong. However, there are 
several areas that are not covered by this study but could be of relevance to corporate governance 
and audit quality.  
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One possible avenue for future research is testing additional AC characteristics that may influ-
ence audit quality. Examples for such additional characteristics include the diversity of ACMs’ 
expertise, their scandals and other controversial news, education levels and diversity of their eth-
nicity in Hong Kong.  
 
Another avenue for future research is to evaluate the impacts of AC characteristics on other as-
pects of audit quality, such as abnormal audit fees controlled for audit risk factors or abnormal 
market returns. It would be interesting to investigate the effects of these factors on these the 
measures of audit quality.  
 
The number of institutional investors signifcantly relate relate to audit quality. It is interesting to 
observe that the beta co-efficient is positive. This is different from the findings of prior research 
in that institutional investors provide additional monitoring mechanism on audit quality. The 
number of institutional investors may increase managers’ pressure to meet the earnings target so 
they may even engage in aggressive earnings management, particularly in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Future research may investigate the impacts of the number of institutional inves-
tors on audit quality.  
 
As this study covers large firms and excludes financial companies, future research would do well 
to investigate the effects of AC characteristics on audit quality in smaller companies or financial 
companies.   
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In the questionnaire survey study, future research may examine the effects of different levels of 
EAs’ trust in ACMs’ competence on the perception of the quality of interactions with ACMs. It 
is possible that if they are highly competent, they may not want to interact with EAs by thinking 
they are competent, despite wanting to interact with them. Therefore, the perceptions of the qual-
ity of interactions remain low. The competence trust may have a U-curve effect. The reason is 
that highly competent ACMs may become too self-arrogant, so they do not think that interactions 
with EAs are useful. This may provide explanation to the insignificant correlation between their 
trust in ACMs’ competence and the perception relating to the quality of interactions with them in 
this study. Furthermore, since the questionnaire survey study is unilateral because questionnaires 
were sent to only EAs, future research may investigate the effects of ACMs’ trust in EAs on au-
dit quality.  
 
Future research may also combine both archival modelling and questionnaire survey studies in 
AC characteristics and audit quality. It would be interesting for future research to examine the 
moderating impacts of EAs’ trust on the relationship between AC characteristics and audit quali-
ty. Their trust in ACMs is expected to strengthen the positive relationship between effective AC 
characteristics and audit quality. 
 
It can use semi-structured or unstructured interviews to explore the issues of EAs’ trust and audit 
quality in an in-depth manner. For instance, future research can use follow-up questions to inves-
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tigate deeper issues than this research. Also, it can collect EAs’ personal data to analyse whether 
male or female EAs, Big 4 auditors, or EAs with ten year experience will respond differently.  In 
this way, future research will be able to contribute to the existing literature by providing more 
insight into how to manage the trust relationships between EAs and ACMs so that audit quality 
will be enhanced. Meanwhile, interviews can be used to probe in-depth questions to investigate 
the positive and negative effects of trust on their interactions and audit audit quality.  
 
It may investigate the effects of trust on the interactions between EAs and finance managers or 
between EAs and internal audit managers. Since EAs’ responsibility is to audit the financial re-
ports prepared by finance managers, their position is in conflict because EAs and finance manag-
ers have different goals. Therefore, it is expected that high levels of EAs’ trust in managers may 
reduce their independence from managers, so audit quality may be reduced. However, since in-
ternal audit managers report to ACMs, they should have the same goal as the ACMs, so the ef-
fects of EAs’ trust in them may help to improve audit quality.  
 
 
12.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presents a summary and the conclusions of the research. After restating the research 
question, it outlines the research methods that have been undertaken to answer the research ques-
tion. The results of this research are summarised, after which their implications have been dis-
cussed. The potential limitations of this research are then presented before the avenues for future 
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research are highlighted.  
 
The archival modelling study finds that effective AC characteristics may enhance audit quality. 
The results show that AC size, competence, tenure and age are key characteristics to discretion-
ary accrual. This indicates that these characteristics help enhance audit quality to constrain earn-
ings management. The questionnaire survey study observes that ACMs’ competence, integrity 
and goodwill are important determinants of EAs’ trust and that their trust helps improve the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of audit processes, which results in improved audit quality.  
 
The primary contribution to knowledge of this research study is to expand the body of literature 
on the role of ACMs in enhancing audit quality and applying it to other fields in the context of 
auditing research. These results are usable by stock market participants in their evaluation of the 
roles of ACMs for the purpose of enhancing audit quality. In addition, these findings will also 
help regulators better define corporate governance attributes and assess the requirements for dis-
closure of corporate governance practices.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
AC Research in Hong Kong 
 
Authors Purpose/ 
Statistical Models/Years 
Variables Results 
Chau and 
Leung 
(2006) 
Purpose: investigate the 
impacts of family share-
holding, non-executive di-
rectors and independent 
chairman on the existence 
of audit committees across 
a sample of 397 publicly 
traded firms in Hong Kong. 
Statistical Model: logistic 
regression model  
Year: 2002 
 
Dependent variables: 
The existence of audit committee 
 
Independent variables: 
 Family shareholding 
 Board independence 
 Independence of chairman 
 
Control variables: 
 Net profit before extraordi-
nary items over book value 
of equity 
 Net sales  
 Current ratio 
 Long-term debt over book 
value of common equity 
 Big 4 auditor  
Family shareholding and 
chairman and board inde-
pendence positively related 
to the existence of audit 
committee 
 
 
Chan et al. 
(2011) 
Purpose: examine specific 
structural and operational 
characteristics of ACs for 
firms in Hong Kong, where 
regulators have strived to 
adhere to international 
compliance standards 
 
Dependent variables: 
 Tobin’s Q 
 
Independent variables: 
AC structure and operation varia-
bles 
 
 S1: AC financial expertise 
S8 negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q 
 
OP2 positively related to 
Tobin’s Q.  
  
OP5 negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q 
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Statistical Model: OLS  
 
Year: 2006 
 S2: AC independence 
 S3: average AC tenure 
 S4: percentage of ACMs re-
tired during the year. 
 S5 :average AC directorships 
 S6: whether any ACM was 
the company’s former audi-
tor. 
 S7: whether any ACM was 
the company’s former of-
ficer. 
 S8: average AC remunera-
tion 
 OP1: coverage of the terms 
of reference 
 OP2: sufficiency of re-
sources provided to the AC. 
 OP3: proper minutes for AC 
meetings kept. 
 OP4: change of AC Chair 
 OP5: number of AC meet-
ings  
 OP6: average attendance rate 
of AC meetings. 
 
Firm characteristic control varia-
bles 
 FC1: natural log of the mar-
ket capitalisation  
 FC2: natural log of the lev-
erage  
 FC3: the numbers of years 
listed in the Exchange. 
 
CG1 negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q 
 
FC1 positively related to 
Tobin’s Q 
 
FC2, FC3 and FC4 nega-
tively related to Tobin’s Q 
 
 
  
 488 
 FC4: natural log of the ratio 
of PPE to turnover. 
 
Corporate governance control 
variables. 
 CG1: ownership of the larg-
est shareholder. 
 CG2 percentage of INEDs in 
the board. 
 CG3 (Duality): whether the 
positions of the CEO and the 
board chair are held by the 
same person 
 
Jaggi and 
Leung 
(2007) 
Purpose: examine whether 
the establishment of audit 
committees by Hong Kong 
firms would constrain earn-
ings management, especial-
ly in firms with family-
dominated corporate 
boards, a condition unique 
to Hong Kong. 
Statistical Models: simul-
taneous regression models,  
three-stage (3SLS) regres-
sion and OLS controlling 
for endogeneity among 
earnings management  
Years 1999-2000 
Dependent variable: 
 Absolute value of discre-
tionary accruals (modified 
Jones model)  
 
 Absolute value of perfor-
mance-adjusted current dis-
cretionary accruals 
 
 Independent variables: 
Natural log of the total num-
ber of directors on the board. 
 Ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items to total 
assets.  
 Proportion of family mem-
Overall audit committees 
play a significant role in 
constraining earnings man-
agement even in the busi-
ness environment of higher 
ownership concentration.  
 
The effectiveness of audit 
committees is, however, 
significantly reduced when 
family members are pre-
sent on corporate boards, 
especially when family 
members dominate the 
corporate board. 
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 bers 
 Board independence 
 Number of shares held by 
Chief Executive Officer di-
vided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. 
 Number of shares held by all 
non-executive directors di-
vided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. 
  
Natural log of one plus the 
total number of subsidiaries 
incorporated outside Hong 
Kong. 
 Natural log of the total assets 
in US dollars in million. 
 Ratio of long term debt to 
total assets. 
 Ratio of the firm’s market 
value of common equity to 
book value of common equi-
ty at the beginning of fiscal 
year. 
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 Absolute value of change in 
net income before extraordi-
nary items between years t − 
1 and t, scaled by lagged to-
tal assets.  
 Ratio of fixed assets to the 
sum of the market value of 
ordinary share capital and 
the book values of prefer-
ence capital and debt.  
 Presence of audit committee 
 Big 5 auditor 
 Loss 
Ching, 
Firth and 
Rui 
(2006) 
Purpose: the study exam-
ined the use of discretion-
ary current accruals by 
firms that make seasoned 
equity offers (SEOs).  
Statistical Model: OLS 
 
Years: 1993-2000 
Dependent variables 
 Post-issue earnings perfor-
mance (computed as the first 
difference in annual ROA. 
ROA is defined as income 
before extraordinary items 
scaled by beginning assets 
less the proceeds from the 
SEO) 
 Independent variables: 
Pre-issue discretionary cur-
Family-owned firms are 
more likely to use positive 
discretionary accruals prior 
to making an SEO.  
Independent directors and 
outside blockholders con-
strain earnings manage-
ment in family-controlled 
firms. SEO firms that have 
a larger board size have a 
higher degree of earnings 
management around SEOs.  
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rent accruals. 
 Non-discretionary current 
accruals 
 Operating cash flow scaled 
by prior total assets. 
 Post-issue earnings perfor-
mance. 
 Post-issue returns 
 Pre-issue family control 
 Board independence 
 Board size 
 Blockholders 
 Big 6 auditors 
 Market capitalization in 
$million. 
 Book-to-market 
 Extreme earnings perfor-
mance. 
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 Financial leverage. 
 Total assets in $million. 
 Offering frequency dummy 
 Security type dummy (plac-
ing = 1, rights offer = 0) 
Lee and 
Barnes 
(2017) 
Purpose: the study investi-
gated the corporate gov-
ernance and performance 
between founding family 
firms and non-founding 
family firms in Hong 
Kong, and the performance 
inside founding family 
firms under three different 
management status. 
 
Statistical Models: 
OLS/IV-2SLS Regression 
 
Years: 2008-2012 
Dependent variables:  
 Tobin’s Q 
 Return on assets 
 Return on equity 
 
Independent variables: 
 Ln_Age of firms 
 Board Size 
 Board Independence 
 Family members 
 Total Assets 
LnAge of firms, board size 
and independence are sig-
nificant with ROA.  
 
In IV-2SLS regression, the 
result is consistent with the 
OLS results. 
Cheng, 
Lui and 
Shum. 
(2015) 
Purpose: the study investi-
gated the effects of the cri-
sis from 2008 to 2009 on 
the share performance of 
976 companies listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change in the Hong Kong 
SAR and examined the link 
between share performance 
Dependent variables: 
 AbnorRtn measures the cu-
mulative share return adjust-
ed by the market return for 
the same period, based on 
the HKHSI.  
 Rtn_Fall is calculated by 
The results present evi-
dence that firms which had 
a higher proportion of in-
dependent directors and a 
greater concentration of 
ownership had lower share 
performance, but lower 
price volatility, during the 
global financial crisis.  
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and corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
Statistical Model: OLS 
Years: 2008-2009 
subtracting the starting price 
for the period from the abso-
lute value of the lowest 
price, dividing by the start-
ing price and multiplying by 
100%.  
 Rtn_Bounce is calculated by 
subtracting the lowest price 
in the period from the abso-
lute value of the highest 
price after the occurrence of 
the lowest price (trough), di-
viding by the lowest price 
and multiplying by 100%.  
 Day_Fall is the number of 
trading days between the 
start of the period and the 
trough 
 Day_Bounce is the number 
of trading days between the 
trough and the rebound to 
the highest price (peak)  
 Independent variables: 
 Duality of Chairman and 
CEO 
 Chairman of the BODs is a 
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non-executive director 
(NED)  
 Size of the BODs  
 Adoption of the three key 
committees (Audit, Remu-
neration and Nomination)  
 Board independence 
 AC independence 
 Remuneration Committee 
independence  
 Proportion of shares held by 
independent directors on the 
Audit Committee  
 Proportion of shares held by 
independent directors on the 
Remuneration Committee  
 Proportion of shares held by 
the CEO  
 Proportion of shares held by 
the directors excluding the 
CEO  
 Proportion of shares held by 
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substantial shareholders ex-
cluding inside shareholdings  
 Leverage   
 Log value of sales 
 Industry  
Cheung et 
al. (2011) 
Purpose: the study exam-
ined the relation between 
changes in the quality of 
corporate governance prac-
tices and subsequent mar-
ket valuation among large 
listed companies in Hong 
Kong.  
Statistical Model: fixed 
effect panel data regression 
with firm clustering 
 
Years: 2002 -2005 
Dependent variables: 
 Change in Tobin’s Q  
 Change in market-to-book 
ratio 
Independent variables: 
 Percentage change between 
the corporate governance in-
dex (CGI) in the current sur-
vey year and the score in the 
preceding survey year.  
 The CGI score ranges from 0 
to 100. The survey covers 
five areas: 1) rights of share-
holders, 2) equitable treat-
ment of shareholders, 3) role 
of stakeholders, 4) disclosure 
and transparency, and 5) 
Firms that exhibited im-
provements in the quali-
ty of corporate govern-
ance displayed a subse-
quent increase in market 
valuation. 
Additionally, the impact 
is greater for firms that 
are included in the 
MSCI index or with a 
China affiliation. The 
results provide evidence 
in support of the notion 
that good corporate 
governance can predict 
future market valuation 
.  
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board responsibilities  
 Change in the transparency 
index in the current survey 
year and the score in the pre-
ceding survey year. TDI is 
composed of disclosure-
related questions from the 
corporate governance survey  
 Change in the non-
transparency index in the 
current survey year and the 
score in the preceding survey 
year. Non_TDI is composed 
of the remaining survey 
questions from the corporate 
governance survey that are 
not included in the TDI  
 Natural logarithm of total 
assets in millions of Hong 
Kong dollars 
 Change in ROA  
 Return on assets  
 Debt ratio 
 Arithmetic average of the 
annual growth rate in sales 
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over the preceding three 
years  
 Cash to assets ratio 
 Net plant, property, and 
equipment divided by total 
sales 
 Capital expenditures divided 
by total assets. 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm is in-
cluded in the MSCI index 
and 0 otherwise 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm is a 
“red-chip” or H-share firm 
and 0 otherwise 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the CGI score is 
above the median value of 
the CGI averaged over three 
preceding surveys 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if SIZE is above 
the median value of total as-
sets averaged over 2002-
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2005 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the value of 
GROWTH is above the me-
dian growth rates of sales 
over the three previous years 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the change in 
the CGI score (CGI) is less 
than or equal to 0, implying 
that the CGI did not improve 
or deteriorated from the 
preceeding survey 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if a firm has a To-
bin’s Q value over the medi-
an value of Tobin’s Q aver-
aged over 2002-2005 
 Dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if a firm has a 
market-to-book value over 
the median value of MVBV 
averaged over 2002-2005 
Lin, 
Hutchinso
n and Per-
cy. (2015) 
Purpose: the study extend-
ed research on the corpo-
rate governance practices 
of transitional economies 
Dependent variables: 
 Abnormal accruals models 
estimated by the modified 
Jones model (Jones 1991) 
AC independence and ex-
perience are negatively as-
sociated with earnings 
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by examining whether the 
ability of the audit commit-
tee to constrain earnings 
management in Chinese 
firms is associated with the 
listing environment and the 
presence of government 
officials on the audit com-
mittee. 
 
Statistical Model: Random 
effects generalised least 
square (GLS) regression 
estimated with clustered-
robust  
Years: 2004-2008 
 
and Butler et al. (2004) as a 
proxy for earnings manage-
ment.  
 
Independent variables:  
 Dummy variable 1 if a Chi-
nese listed firm is cross 
listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, and 0 if 
listed in mainland China on-
ly  
 
 Dummy variable 1 if an au-
dit committee includes gov-
ernment officials as inde-
pendent members; otherwise 
0 
 Dummy variable 1 if a listed 
firm has an audit committee; 
otherwise 0 
 Number of independent di-
rectors divided by total 
number of directors on the 
audit committee  
 A factor score of independ-
ent audit committee mem-
bers’ accounting, financial 
and industry experience is 
created by using principal 
components’ factor analysis 
management.  
There was a significant and 
positive association be-
tween audit committee in-
dependence and experience 
and earnings management 
when there are government 
officials on the audit com-
mittee.  
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and scaled by audit commit-
tee size  
Control variables 
 Dummy variable 1 if the 
proportion of State share-
holdings to total issued 
shares is greater than or 
equal to the median; other-
wise 0 
 Dummy variable 1 if the 
firm is audited by a Big4 ac-
counting firm; otherwise 0 
 Leverage  
 Dummy variable 1 for ROE 
less than zero; otherwise 0 
 Book to market value  
 Firm size is measured as to-
tal assets in million RMB. A 
natural logarithmic trans-
formation is performed to 
normalise data 
 Dummy variable for each 
year 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 
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and 2008 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Amendments to Questions after Pilot-testing 
Comments and Responses Old Questions New Questions 
Comments: 
The new question should help 
to receive more insights into 
audit approaches, not just risk 
assessment because the new 
question includes broader ap-
proaches of an audit. 
 
Responses: 
I change the question to new 
question so that I can capture 
broader approaches of an audit.  
22. Please explain how your level of 
trust in audit committee members 
affects your evaluation of audit 
risks.  
 
 
If appropriate, please describe an 
illustrative example from your own 
experience. 
 
 
22. Please explain how your level 
of trust in audit committee mem-
bers affects communications of 
your approaches to audit commit-
tee members.  
 
 
If appropriate, please describe an 
illustrative example from your 
own experience. 
 
Comments: 
Determination of scope highly 
depends on trust in manage-
ment rather than audit commit-
tee members. 
 
Audit committee members and 
EAs have more communica-
23. Please explain how your level of 
trust in audit committee members 
affects the determination of the 
scope of the external audits.  
 
 
 
If appropriate, please describe an 
23. Please explain how your level 
of trust in audit committee mem-
bers affects your level of open-
ness when you provide recom-
mendations for improving their 
internal control systems 
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tions when EAs report findings 
and recommendations.  
 
Responses: 
I change the question to new 
question so that I can under-
stand the effects of trust on the 
interactions between EAs and 
ACMs when EAs report find-
ings and recommendation.  
illustrative example from your own 
experience. 
 
 
If appropriate, please describe an 
illustrative example from your 
own experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments: 
Trust in ACMs does not affect 
EAs’ ability to determine the 
appropriateness of clients’ ac-
counting estimates, but affects 
EAs’ approach for an audit 
such as control-based or sub-
stantive approaches.  
 
Responses:  
I change the question to new 
question so that I can under-
stand howEAs’ trust in ACMs 
affects their audit approaches.  
24. Please explain how your level of 
trust in audit committee members 
affects your ability to determine the 
appropriateness of your clients’ ac-
counting estimates. 
 
If appropriate, please describe an 
illustrative example from your own 
experience. 
 
24. Please explain how your level 
of trust in audit committee mem-
bers affects the relative emphasis 
on substantive approaches versus 
control-based approaches of au-
diting. 
 
 
 
If appropriate, please describe an 
illustrative example from your 
own experience. 
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Appendix 3 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects on Audit Quality of Trust between Audit Committee 
Members and External Auditors: Evidence from Hong Kong 
 
Dear XXXX 
 
This questionnaire is part of a research project to understand the effects on audit quality of trust between audit com-
mittee members and external auditors. Your responses are important in enabling me to understand this issue.  
 
This questionnaire should take about 15 minutes to complete. The information you provide will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. You are not asked to include your name, or address anywhere on the questionnaire. Your partici-
pation is optional. You will be able to withdraw from the study without any penalty or reason. However, since the in-
formation will be processed anonymously, participation may not be withdrawn when filled questionnaire has been 
received because it is not possible to identify specific response by individual. 
 
The responses will be used as the main data source for my degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting and Finance 
at the University of the West of England. If you would like to be emailed a summary of the responses obtained in this 
research, please supply your email address at the end of the form.  
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I hope that you will find completing the questionnaire enjoyable. Please return the completed questionnaire to me in 
the return envelope or via email.  
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
Cheung Kwok Yip (Steven) 
Doctoral Student 
Bristol Business School 
The University of the West of England 
Coldharbour Lane, Bristol 
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone:  
 
Email:  
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Appendix 4 
Consent Form 
 
   
 
Project title: The Effects on Audit Quality of Trust between Audit Committee Members and External Audi-
tors: Evidence from Hong Kong 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the participant information sheet for the above study and have had the op-
portunity to ask questions. I understand that I will be able to withdraw from the study without any penalty or reason 
but since the information will be processed anonymously, participation may not be withdrawn when filled question-
naire has been received because it is not possible to identify specific response by individual. 
 
I consent to participating in the questionnaire survey            
 
 
 
Name of Participant  
 
 
Signature of Participant  
 
 
Signature of Researcher  
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Date  
 
 
Cheung Kwok Yip (Steven) 
Doctoral Student 
Bristol Business School  
The University of the West of England 
Coldharbour Lane 
United Kingdom  
 
Telephone:  
 
Email:  
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Appendix 5 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
This questionnaire is to be completed by the external auditor. For statements 1-20, please indicate which of 1 to 5 best 
represents your general experience with audit committee members in external audits. For questions 21-24, please write 
your responses on the space provided next to the questions.  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1. Audit committee members 
are generally an important 
source of information about 
the conduct of senior man-
agement for pre-
engagement investigation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Audit committee members 
are generally willing to dis-
cuss their company’s gov-
ernance structure with me 
for pre-engagement inves-
tigation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3. Audit committee members 
are generally willing to tell 
me their company’s policies 
about the supervision of 
quality control process of 
financial reporting. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I generally have productive 
discussions with audit 
committee members when 
assessing clients’ business 
risk  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Audit committee members 
generally meet with me 
without the attendance of 
management and executive 
directors. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am generally satisfied that 
audit committee members 
properly follow up out-
standing actions arising 
from my discussions with 
them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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7. In general, I communicate 
effectively with audit 
committee members about 
the approach to monitor in-
ternal control systems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I often openly communicate 
unadjusted audit differences 
to audit committee mem-
bers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. In general audit committee 
members support my posi-
tion when I have disagree-
ments with clients’ man-
agement.  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I am generally satisfied that 
audit committee members 
had appropriate dialogues 
with me on the major issues 
from the external audit. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I generally have productive 
discussions with audit 
committee members about 
hours to be spent on exter-
nal audits. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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12. In my experience as an ex-
ternal auditor, I rarely ques-
tion audit committee mem-
bers’ capabilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The ability of audit com-
mittee members is general-
ly important to the smooth 
working of the audit pro-
cess. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. In general, I could rely on 
audit committee members’ 
knowledge to facilitate my 
audit planning.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Audit committee members 
generally address auditing 
and reporting issues honest-
ly.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I find that audit committee 
members’ actions often 
match their words when 
they are asked about how 
they evaluate internal con-
trol systems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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17. I feel that I rarely need to 
be aware that information 
from audit committee 
members may be mislead-
ing. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Audit committee members 
are generally reputable and 
I am inclined to trust them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I can generally rely on audit 
committee members to help 
me beyond the minimum 
requirements of the formal 
engagement contract.  
1 2 3 4 5 
20. In dealing with audit com-
mittee members, I generally 
do not spend a lot of time 
haggling over issues such 
as responsibility for prob-
lems.  
1 2 3 4 5 
For questions 21-24, please write your responses on the space provided next to the questions 
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21. Does your level of trust au-
dit committee members af-
fect your interactions? 
 
Please identify the ways 
and effects. If appropriate, 
please feel free to give an 
illustrative example from 
your experience. 
 
 
If the ways and effects are not covered in your answer to question 21 above, please respond to questions 22-24. 
22. Please explain how your 
level of trust in audit com-
mittee members affects 
communications of your 
audit approaches to audit 
committee members? 
 
If appropriate, please de-
scribe an illustrative exam-
ple from your own experi-
ence. 
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23. Please explain how your 
level of trust in audit com-
mittee members affects 
your level of openness 
when you provide recom-
mendations for improving 
their internal control sys-
tems. 
 
If appropriate, please de-
scribe an illustrative exam-
ple from your own experi-
ence. 
 
 
24. Please explain how your 
level of trust in audit com-
mittee members affects the 
relative emphasis  on sub-
stantive approaches versus 
control-based approaches 
of auditing 
 
   If appropriate, please de-
scribe an illustrative exam-
ple from your own experi-
ence. 
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Appendix 6 
Importance of Themes and Sub-themes to Audit Quality 
 
Themes Themes that emerged from 
sub-themes 
Importance to audit quality 
Theme 1 EAs develop trust in ACMs If 
they perceive that ACMs have 
and display competence, good-
will and integrity. 
Only when the factors that influence EAs’ trust are identified, EAs and ACMs can 
manage the levels of trust with ACMs, so the perceptions of the quality of interac-
tions can be enhanced by improving the factors that influence EAs’ perception of 
the quality of interactions with ACMs.   
Theme 2 The level of EAs’ trust in ACMs 
enables EAs to better understand 
audit risk and improve discus-
sion.  
If the level of trust in ACMs is high, EAs can better understand audit risks at the 
planning stage so that the EAs can design appropriate audit plans and subsequent 
audit approaches to target for the significant risk area. EAs can better understand 
audit risks because they will put more efforts to discuss issues and operations of 
the company with ACMs.  
 
Also, EAs are more willing to sooner report major issues identified to ACMs. 
Therefore, ACMs can provide their comments on how the audits can be performed 
so that the audit will be more appropriate to the operations of a company. ACMs 
will provide more information to EAs about risk areas, operations and tone of 
management to EAs.  
 
The EAs are more willing to incorporate the comments from ACMs into their audit 
plan so that their audit plan is more specific to the risk and operations of  EAs' cli-
ents. In doing so, it is reasonable to expect that the scope of audit is appropriate 
and significant risks should be identified at the planning stage, so audit quality is 
enhanced. 
 
Furthermore, it is easier to understand expectation of ACMs. Communications be-
come more open and effective, leading to high quality of discussion in meetings 
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between ACMs and EAs at planning stage. Issues will be communicated sooner, so 
that EAs can deal with the feedback from ACMs with sufficient time before they 
started performing audit procedures.  
 
Extra information beyond statutory requirement will be communicated to ACMs. 
EAs are also willing to spend more time for discussions about special issues be-
cause they believe that ACMs are able to understand it.  
 
With feedback from ACMs and high quality of discussions about the audits, EAs 
should better understand the situations of a company such as tone from the top, op-
erations, indicators of fraud, integrity of management, perceived effectiveness of 
internal control systems. Therefore, EAs can determine the appropriate resources 
to be used for the audits and which areas they should focus on. Therefore, it is ex-
pected that audit quality is enhanced. 
 
Theme 3 EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity 
improves their willingness to 
provide ACMs with an assess-
ment of the quality of manage-
ment.  
If trust in ACMs' integrity is low, EAs are more hesitant to criticise the perfor-
mance of management because EAs will doubt that their comments will be com-
municated back to the management. The comments include quality of manage-
ment, managers' bias in their judgment, managers' integrity, style and performance 
of setting up and implementing internal control systems.  
 
If trust in ACMs' integrity is high, EAs are more willing to provide qualitative as-
sessment of management and listen to ACMs about what management is doing. 
Since EAs  have the comments of management from ACMs, EAs are able to per-
form more accurate risk assessment and determine whether they can trust the rep-
resentations of management.  
 
For example, if ACMs tell EAs that the management is not trustworthy, EAs will 
understand that after they have interviewed the management, they should spend 
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more time collecting evidence to corroborate with the representations of manage-
ment. Since effort will be more appropriately used for corroboration in clients with 
high risk, audit quality should be enhanced. 
 
Further if ACMs receive assessment of management performance, the members 
can determine the levels of integrity and abilities of managers and whether the 
members should change managers with high levels of integrity and abilities. If the 
managers have high levels of integrity, control environment will be improved. If 
the managers are capable, they can design better internal control systems. Taken 
together, audit quality will be enhanced. 
 
Theme 4 EAs’ trust in ACMs’ ability en-
courages EAs to diligently dis-
cuss findings and recommenda-
tions 
 
If the level of trust in ACMs’ ability is high, EAs will be open and candid to pro-
vide more recommendations and report their findings. EAs will provide more in-
depth analysis and value-adding recommendations. EAs are willing to spend more 
time exploring recommendation options and discussing rationale behind their rec-
ommendations.  
 
EAs are willing to have more informal meetings with AC members to discuss is-
sues. The reason is that EAs are confident that ACMs take the recommendations 
seriously and have the ability to require the management to implement the recom-
mendations.  
 
Since constructive recommendations are suggested by EAs and implemented by 
ACMs, internal control systems will be more effective, so audit quality will be en-
hanced. Further, EAs will also ask more specific questions. If EAs have more 
technical discussions about risk areas and operation of the clients, they can better 
understand whether their recommendations and conclusions of their findings are 
appropriate.  
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However, if trust in ability is low, EAs will spend less time having meetings with 
ACMs because EAs do not believe that there are meaningful results. Low levels of 
trust may have opposite effects on the level of details of communications because 
some respondents stated that if the level of trust is low, they will communicate 
with ACMs in more details and make sure that AC members understand their 
points. 
Theme 5 EAs’ trust in ACMs encourages 
EAs to select control-based more 
than substantive-based testing. 
If the level of trust is high, in general, EAs will use control-based approach more 
because they believe that ACMs will hold management accountable. EAs also be-
lieve that audit risk is less and have higher perception that the clients have better 
assessment of governance structure.  
 
If level of trust is high, EAs can trust the statement of ACMs and internal controls 
can be relied on because the EAs trust that ACMs can effectively oversee the in-
ternal control systems. If the level of trust is low, in general, EAs will use substan-
tive-based approach more because they are less sure about controls in place.  
 
EAs also perceive that care of ACMs in overseeing financial reporting is lacking. 
Since the selection of audit approaches is more appropriate according to the level 
of risks and effective internal control systems, audit quality will be enhanced.  
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Appendix 7 
Codes and Themes after First Categorisation 
 
Codes  Sub-themes that emerged from the codes  Themes that emerged from the sub-
themes 
“experience” (1.1) 
 
“financial background” (1.2)  
 
“ability” (1.3) 
 
“industry knowledge” (1.4) 
 
“independence” (1.5)  
 
“support” (1.6) 
 
“involvement in monitoring” (1.7) 
 
“integrity” (1.8) 
 
“effectiveness of governance and con-
trol” (1.9)  
 
 
“effort to follow up outstanding issues 
1.1 EAs’ trust in ACMs is enhanced by 
ACMs’ experience. 
1.2 EAs’trust in ACMs is enhanced by ACMs’ 
financial background. 
1.3 EAs’ trust in ACMs is enhanced by 
ACMs’ ability. 
1.4 EAs’ trust in ACM is enhanced by ACMs’ 
industry knowledge.  
1.5 EAs’ trust in ACMs is enhanced by 
ACM’s independence. 
1.6 EAs’ trust in ACMs is enhanced by 
ACMs’ support.  
1.7 EAs’trust in ACMs is enhanced by in-
volvement in monitoring progress. 
1.8 EAs’ trust in ACMs is enhanced by 
ACMs’ integrity. 
1.9 EAs’ trust in ACMs is enhanced by the 
effectiveness of governance and internal 
control process. 
1.10 EAs’trust in ACMs is enhanced by 
ACMs’ efforts to follow up outstanding is-
1) EAs develop their trust in 
ACMs due to EAs’ perception 
of ACMs’ experience, ability, 
financial background, industry 
knowledge, independence from 
executives, support for EAs, 
involvement in monitoring, in-
tegrity, effectiveness of gov-
ernance and control and effort 
to follow up outstanding issues 
and respect. 
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and respect from ACMs” (1.10) 
 
 
 
“encourage to ask questions” (2.1) 
“information exchange” (2.2) 
“Information beyond statutory re-
quirements” (2.2) 
 
“reporting significant issues” (2.3)  
 
“comments on audit plan” (2.4) 
 
 
 
“Understanding of expectations” (3.1) 
 
 
“Appreciation for strategies” (3.2) 
 
 
 
“better quality of discussion” (3.3)  
 
“early reporting” (3.4) 
 
 
 
 
“openness for communication” (3.5)   
sues and by respect from EAs. 
 
 
 
2.1 Trust encourages ACMs to ask questions. 
2.2 Trust encourages ACMs to provide more 
information. 
 
 
2.3 EAs are more willing to inform ACMs of 
major issues identified. 
2.4 EAs put more effort into discussing points 
with ACMs and incorporating their com-
ments into the audit plan. 
 
3.1 EAs can better understand ACMs' expecta-
tions. 
 
3.2 EAs can effectively communicate audit 
strategy with ACMs and become willing to 
listen to ACMs' comments. 
 
3.3 Quality of discussions between auditors 
and ACMs is enhanced by auditors’ trust  
3.4 Auditors are more willing to report issues 
at early stage so that they can incorporate 
the feedback from ACMs into external au-
dits.  
 
3.5 EAs become more open and honest in their 
 
 
 
 
2) EAs’trust in ACMs positively 
affects information flow be-
tween them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) EAs’ trust in ACMs in-
creasesEAs’ spending of time 
with ACMs for discussions. 
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“time spent on discussion” (3.6)  
 
 
“meetings” (4.1) 
 
 
“technical discussions” (5.1) 
 
“detailed communications” (5.2) 
 
 
“assessment of management” (6) 
 
 
 
 
“Time for exploration” (7.1) 
 
 
“openness for recommendations” (7.2) 
 
“serious actions on recommendation 
(7.3) 
 
 
 
“driving management to make a 
change (7.4) 
communications with ACMs. If what? 
3.6 EAs will spend more time discussing is-
sues with ACMs.  
 
4.1 EAs spend more time and have more 
meetings with ACMs.  
5.1 EAs are more willing to have discussions 
about technical issues.  
5.2 If trust is high, EAs ' communications with 
ACMs will be more detailed.  
 
6.1 There are no sub-themes.  
 
 
 
 
7.1 EAs spend more time exploring alterna-
tives of recommendations  
7.2 EAs are more open and willing to provide 
more recommendations or detailed reports 
of findings. 
7.3 EAs are more confident that ACMs are 
able to and seriously take their recommen-
dations. 
7.4 EAs are confident that ACMs will drive 
the management to make the changes. 
 
8.1 Trust is only one factor that affects the use 
of audit approaches but it is not determina-
tive. 
 
 
 
 
4) EAs’ trust in ACMs affect the 
number of meetings they have. 
 
5) The trust affects the levels of 
details of communications with 
ACMs. 
 
6) Trust encourages EAs to assess 
the performance of manage-
ment and report it to ACMs. 
 
 
7) Trust encourages EAs to pro-
vide recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8) Trust encourages EAs to select 
control-based procedures rather 
than substantive-based proce-
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“one factor to consider” (8.1) 
 
 
 
“risk and audit approaches” (8.2) 
 
 
 
“control strength and audit approaches 
(8.3) 
 
 
 
“tone from the top and audit approach-
es” (8.4) 
 
8.2 If the level of trust is high, perceived audit 
risk is low, control-based approaches can 
be used. 
 
8.3 If trust is low, it is less that sure internal 
control is effective or in place, so substan-
tive test should be used. 
 
8.4 If trust is high, tone from the top is appro-
priate. Since control environment should 
be effective, control-based tests can be 
used.  
dures. 
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Appendix 8 
Codes and Themes after Second Categorisation 
 
Codes Sub-themes that emerged from the codes Themes that emerged from the 
sub-themes 
“experience” (1.1) 
 
“accounting and finance background” 
(1.2) 
 
“involvement in monitoring” (1.3)  
 
 
“knowledge and ability” (1.4) 
 
“integrity” (1.5) 
 
“independence” (1.6) 
 
“support” (1.7) 
 
“effort to follow up outstanding issues 
and respect from ACMs” (1.8) 
 
 
 
 
“better information exchange at planning 
stage” (2.1)  
“encourage to ask questions” (2.2) 
1.1 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from experience 
of ACMs. 
1.2 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from finance and 
accounting expertise of ACMs. 
1.3 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from involve-
ment of ACMs’ involvement in monitoring.  
1.4 EAs’ trust develops from knowledge and abil-
ity of ACMs. 
1.5 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from integrity of 
ACM. 
1.6 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from independ-
ence of ACMs. 
1.7 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from ACMs’ 
support for them. 
1.8 EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from ACMs’ ef-
fort to follow up outstanding issues. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Trust encourages ACMs to ask questions at 
audit planning stage. 
2.2 Trust encourages ACMs to provide more in-
formation in planning stage. 
2.3 EAs are more willing to report major issues 
1) EAs develop their trust 
in ACMs due to EAs’ 
perception of ACMs’ 
experience, accounting 
and finance background, 
involvement in monitor-
ing, knowledge and abil-
ity, integrity, independ-
ence from executives, 
support for EAs, effort 
to follow up outstanding 
issues and respect from 
ACMs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) The level of trust ena-
bles EAs and ACMs to 
exchange information 
and motivates EAs to 
incorporate comments 
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“Reporting significant issues” (2.3) 
 
“better understanding of audit risk” (2.4) 
 
“appreciation of comments” (2.5) 
 
 
“understanding of tone from the top” 
(2.6) 
 
 
 
“understanding of expectations” (3.1) 
 
“appreciation of comments” (3.2) 
 
“better quality of discussions” (3.3) 
 
“early reporting” (3.4) 
 
 
 
“openness for communication” (3.5) 
 
“time spent on discussion” (3.6) 
 
 
“meetings” (4.1) 
 
identified. 
2.4 Auditors can better understand audit risk.  
 
2.5 Auditors put more efforts to discuss points 
with ACMs and incorporate their comments in 
audit plan. 
2.6 Tone from the top is appropriate, so EAs can 
understand that audit risk is less at the plan-
ning stage.  
 
3.1 EAs can better understand ACMs' expecta-
tions. 
3.2 EAs can better communicate audit strategy and 
respects ACMs' comments. 
3.3 Quality of discussion between EAs and ACMs 
is enhanced.  
3.4 EAs are more willing to report issues at early 
stage so that they can incorporate the feedback 
from ACMs into external audits. 
 
3.5 EAs become more open and honest in their 
communications with ACMs. 
3.6 EAs will spend more time discussing issues 
with ACMs. 
 
4.1 EAs spend more time and have more meetings 
with ACMs. Also, they will have more infor-
mal meetings with ACMs. 
 
4.2 EAs are more willing to have discussions 
of ACMs.  EAs can bet-
ter understand audit risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) The level of trust en-
hances quality of discus-
sions between EAs and 
ACMs and encourages 
EAs to report significant 
issues at an early stage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) The level of trust en-
courages EAs to spend 
more time on detailed 
discussions about tech-
nical audit issues with 
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“technical discussions” (4.2) 
 
 
 
“detailed communications” (4.3) 
 
 
 
 
“assessment of management” (5)  
 
 
 
 
 
“time for exploration” (6.1) 
 
“openness for recommendations” (6.2) 
 
 
“serious actions on recommendations” 
(6.3) 
 
 
“drive management to change” (6.4) 
 
 
“trust is one of the factors to consider” 
about technical issues. 
 
 
4.3 If trust is high, EAs ' communications with 
ACMs will be more detailed.  
 
 
 
5.1 There are no sub-themes.  
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 EAs spend more time exploring alternatives of 
recommendations. 
6.2 EAs are more open and willing to provide 
more recommendations or detailed reports of 
findings. 
6.3 EAs are more confident that ACMs are able to 
and seriously take their recommendations. 
6.4 EAs are confident that ACMs will drive the 
management to make the changes. 
 
7.1 Trust is only one factor that affects the use of 
audit approaches but it is not determinative. 
7.2 If the level of trust is high, perceived audit risk 
is low, control-based approaches can be used. 
7.3 If trust is low, it is less that sure internal con-
trol is effective or in place, so substantive test 
ACMs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5) The level of trust affects 
EAs to assess the per-
formance of manage-
ment and report it to 
ACMs. 
 
6) EAs’ trust positively af-
fects  EAs to provide 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7) EAs’ trust positively af-
fect EAs’ selection of 
control-based approach 
and substantive-based 
approaches. 
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 (7.1) 
 
“risk and audit approaches” (7.2) 
 
“control strength and audit approaches” 
(7.3) 
 
 
“tone from the top and audit approaches” 
(7.4) 
 
 
 
“trust in management and selection of 
approaches” (7.5) 
 
should be used. 
7.4 If trust is high, tone from the top is appropri-
ate. Since control environment should be effec-
tive, control-based tests can be used.  
7.5 If trust in ACMs is low, trust in management is 
low, so it is suspected that management sets up 
effective internal control systems, so substan-
tive test should be used. 
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Appendix 9 
Codes and Themes after Third Categorisation 
 
Codes Sub-themes that emerged from the codes Themes that emerged from the sub-
themes 
“experience” (1.1) 
 
“competence” (1.2) 
 
“diligence” (1.3) 
 
“integrity” (1.4) 
 
“Independence and support” (1.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“information exchange at planning an au-
dit” (2.1) 
 
“better understanding of audit risk” (2.2) 
“effort and appreciation” (2.3) 
 
 
“better quality of discussions” (2.4) 
1.1. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from ex-
perience of ACMs. 
1.2. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from 
competence of ACMs. 
1.3. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from in-
volvement of ACMs of monitoring. 
1.4. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from in-
tegrity of ACMs. 
1.5. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from in-
dependence and support of ACM. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Trust encourages ACMs to provide more 
information at planning stage. 
2.2 Auditors can better understand audit risk. 
2.3 Auditors put more efforts to discuss 
points with ACMs and incorporate their 
comments in audit plan. 
2.4 Quality of discussion between auditors 
and ACMs is enhanced. 
1) EAs develop trust in ACMs 
due to their perception of 
ACMs’ experience compe-
tence, diligence, independ-
ence from executives and 
their integrity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) The level of trust enables 
EAs and ACMs to have bet-
ter quality of audit plan 
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“honest and open discussions” (2.5)  
 
“time spent on discussions” (2.6) 
 
 
“trust in ACMs’ integrity and assessment 
of management performance” (3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“open recommendations and reporting” 
(4.1) 
 
 
“abilities to adopt and attitude towards 
recommendations” (4.2) 
 
“drive management to make changes” 
(4.3) 
 
 
 
 
“meetings with ACMs” (5.1)  
 
 
2.5 Auditors become more open and honest 
in their communications with ACMs. 
2.6 EAs will spend more time discussing is-
sues with ACMs. 
 
3.1 There are no sub-themes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Auditors are more open and willing to 
provide more recommendations or de-
tailed reports of findings. 
4.2. Auditors are more confident that ACMs 
are able to and seriously take their rec-
ommendations. 
4.3. EAs are confident that ACMs will drive 
the management to make the changes. 
 
 
 
5.1. EAs spend more time and have more 
meetings with ACMs. Also, they will 
have more informal meetings with 
ACMs. 
5.2. EAs are more willing to have discussions 
about technical issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
3) The level of trust affects au-
ditors to assess the perfor-
mance of management and 
report it to ACMs 
 
 
 
 
4) The level of trust affects EAs 
to provide recommendation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5) The level of trust encourages 
EAs to spend more time on 
detailed discussions about 
technical audit issues with 
ACMs 
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“trust in ACMs’ abilities and technical 
discussions” (5.2) 
“trust in ACMs’ abilities and detailed 
communications (5.3) 
 
 
“one factor for consideration of the use of 
approaches only” (6.1) 
 
“high trust and less risks” (6.2) “internal 
control weaknesses and  
 
“audit approaches” (6.3) 
 
 
“tones from the top and audit approaches” 
(6.4) 
 
 
“trust in management” (6.5) 
 
5.3. If trust is high, auditors' communications 
with ACMs will be more detailed. 
 
 
6.1 Trust is only one factor of the factors that 
affect the use of audit approaches but it is 
not determinative. 
6.2 If the level of trust is high, perceived au-
dit risk is low, control-based approaches 
can be used. 
6.3 If trust is low, it is less that sure internal 
control is effective or in place, so sub-
stantive test should be used. 
6.4 If trust is high, tone from the top is ap-
propriate. Since control environment 
should be effective, control-based tests 
can be used. 
6.5 Trust in management is more important 
to affect selection of audit approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6) The level of EAs’ trust in 
ACMs encourages EAs ' se-
lection of control-based or 
substantive-based testing. 
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Appendix 10 
Codes and Themes after Fourth Categorisation 
 
Codes Sub-themes that emerged from the codes Themes that emerged from the sub-
themes 
“competence”(1.1) 
 
“diligence”(1.2) 
“Independence” (1.2) 
“integrity” (1.3) 
 
 
 
“information exchange at planning an 
audit” (2.1) 
 
“better understanding of audit risk” 
(2.1) and “effort and appreciation (2.1) 
 
“better quality of discussions” (2.2) 
 
“honest and open discussions” (2.2) 
 
“time spent on discussions” (2.2), 
“meetings with ACMs” (2.2) and 
“technical discussions” (2.2)  
 
 
 
1.1. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from   
ACMs’ competence. 
1.2. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from ACMs’ 
goodwill. 
1.3. EAs’ trust in ACMs develops from  
ACMs’ integrity. 
 
 
2.1. EAs can better understand audit risk and 
appreciate the feedback from audit com-
mittee member.  
 
 
 
 
2.2. Quality of discussion between EAs and 
ACMs is enhanced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) EAs develop trust in ACMs If 
they perceive that ACMs have 
and display competence, 
goodwill and integrity. 
 
 
 
 
2) EAs’ trust in ACMs enables 
EAs to better understand audit 
risk and improve discussion.  
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“trust in ACMs’ integrity and assess-
ment of management performance” (3) 
 
 
 
 
“open recommendations and reporting” 
(4.1) 
 
 
“abilities to adopt and attitude towards 
recommendations” (4.2) 
 
“drive management to make changes” 
(4.3) 
 
“time spent for discussion” (4.4) 
“detailed and technical discussion” 
(4.4)  
 
 
 
 
“high trust and less risks” (5.1) 
“internal control weaknesses and audit 
approaches” (5.2) 
 
 
“tones from the top and audit ap-
proaches” (5.2) 
 
3. There are no sub-themes 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. EAs are more open and willing to provide 
more recommendations or detailed reports 
of findings. 
4.2. EAs are more confident that ACMs are 
able to and seriously take their recommen-
dations. 
 
4.3. EAs are confident that ACMs will drive 
the management to make the changes. 
4.4. EAs spend more time and have more meet-
ings with ACMs to discuss technical and 
detailed audit issues. 
 
 
5.1. If the level of trust is high, perceived au-
dit risk is low, control-based approaches 
can be used. 
 
5.2. If trust is high, tone from the top is ap-
 
3) EAs’ trust in ACMs’ integrity 
improves their willingness to 
provide ACMs with an as-
sessment of the quality of 
management.  
 
4) EAs’ trust in ACMs’ ability 
encourages EAs to diligently 
discuss findings and recom-
mendations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5) EAs’ trust in ACMs encour-
ages EAs to select control-
based more than substantive-
based testing. 
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propriate. Since control environment 
should be effective, control-based tests can 
be used.  
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